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Summary
The Scullin Government held office for twenty-seven 
months, October 1929 - January 1932, at a time when Australia 
was beginning its experience of the worst economic depression 
in its history. The Government was severely handicapped by
c o hthe ofainefaurws of the depression. It was also crippled by 
its lack of a majority in the Senate. As a result the 
Government enacted only a small amount of legislation, other 
than routine measures, and hardly any which embodied the 
principles of the Australian Labor Party.
The Scullin Ministry was elected by the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party (Caucus) in October 1929. Later, in 
March 1931, Caucus declared all Ministerial and other positions 
vacant and elected a second Ministry. Further changes were 
made in June 1931. Throughout, the Ministry as a whole was 
moderate and cautious. A significant number of Ministers were
associated with the Australian Workers' Union.
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The Government's first months were taken up with 
budgetary and industrial matters. The latter involved the 
Government in the N.S.W. coal dispute and the aftermath of 
disputes on the wharves. It was also caught up in a minor 
but revealing crisis over preference to unionists. And 
after several months of negotiation, a mutilated AmendaSfetAc-f 
to the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act was 
accepted by the trade unions, the Caucus and the Opposition in 
the Senate.
At first the Scullin Government received little 
attention from the State Brainches of the Party or most of the 
trade unions. But this situation changed, slightly and 
briefly, after mid-August 1930.
In July-August 1930 the Cabinet reappointed 
Sir Robert Gibson as Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank Board; 
this aroused hostility within the Party, and it was a decision 
which was shortly regretted. At about the same time, the 
Federal Treasurer, E.G. Theodore, was forced to resign as the 
result of allegations of past corruption. In August Scullin 
and Brennan (Attorney-General) left for England. Their 
absence, with Theodore's, contributed to the Caucus 'rebellion' 
of late 1930. This was sparked off by the visit of Sir Otto
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Niemeyer of the Bank of England, whose advice helped create 
the deflationary Melbourne Agreement. This policy divided 
the Federal Ministry and Caucus between August and December 
1930. In the end a feeble compromise was agreed upon but the 
divisions were barely concealed.
Matters came to a head in early January 1931, 
when Scullin returned to Australia. Within a few weeks turmoil 
in the Federal Party was again at fever pitch. Although 
Theodore's name was still not cleared, Scullin secured Caucus 
approval for his reinstatement as Treasurer. Shortly afterwards 
six members of Caucus crossed the floor and joined the 
Opposition. Almost simultaneously, a group of seven N.S.W. 
Federal members led by J. Beasley (an Assistant Minister) left 
the F.P.L.P. and established a separate 'party'. Their motives 
are to be found in the politics of the N.S.W. Branch of the 
Party and the Lang plan.
In March-April 1931 the Government attempted a policy 
offensive but its efforts were thwarted, yet again, by the hostile 
Senate. At this point it seemed that the Government was about 
to begin a belated attempt to secure a double-dissolution.
However, its financial difficulties at last overwhelmed it and,
ix
pressed by the threat of default , in mid-1931 the Government 
accepted and implemented the deflationary Premiers' Plan.
With the exception of the Premiers' Plan the 
Government was relatively inactive between mid-April and 
November 1931. Finally, on 25 November, the Beasley group 
challenged the Government and brought about its defeat in the 
House of Representatives. The Government suffered a severe 
defeat at the subsequent election.
Throughout the Government's term of office it was 
subject to the scrutiny of the extra-parliamentary organisations 
of the A.L.P. Although it normally met triennially, the A.L.P. 
Federal Conference met three times in 1930-1931. The A.L.P. 
Federal Executive was also very active. For various reasons 
neither institution had much influence on the Federal Labor 
Government. With the single exception of N.S.W., the A.L.P. 
State Branches paid only slight attention to the Scullin 
Government and had little effective influence on it. This was 
also the case with a majority of the trade unions in all States. 
The most notable exception was the Australian Workers' Union.
But there was a large number of unions which made demands on the 
Government of a 'non-political' kind; this was particularly
evident in the Government's tariff policy. The unions, 
however, played an important though indirect role in the 
vital Government decision not to seek an early double­
dissolution.
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INTRODUCTION
Before Australia had fully recovered from the 
impact of the depression , during the middle and late 1930's, 
a number of studies were published which were chiefly 
concerned with the economic policy of Governments between, 
say, 1929 and 1935. Many of these studies were written by 
participants and they may now be regarded as primary sources 
for the period; the best example is the works of D.B. Copland 
(later Sir Douglas). These works are, however, of limited 
value because - apart from the natural bias produced by close 
involvement with events - their economic analysis is rooted 
in orthodox, pre-Keynesian economic theory.
L.F. Giblin's Growth of a Central Bank^ is a study 
by another economist who was also closely involved in the events 
of 1930 and 1931. Giblin, however, benefited from the twenty-year 
gap between 1930 and publication of his book in 1951, and from 
the acceptance of Keynesian theory by Australian Governments and 
economists.- Possibly too, Giblin was by far the most competent -
All works referred to in the Introduction are listed in full 
in the Bibliography.
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and most flexible - of the Australian economists of the 
inter-war period. Recently the work of C.B. Schedvin has 
provided a thoroughly researched account and more balanced 
interpretation of the economics of the depression. Together 
the studies of Giblin and Schedvin provide a sufficient 
understanding of economic events for those working in 
Depression studies whose principal interest is political or 
social.
This study of the Scullin Government relies 
heavily on the work of Giblin and Schedvin for economic 
background. Where appropriate their work has been used when 
discussing the economic policy of the Scullin Government, 
particularly its banking policy. Such discussion is, however, 
highly selective. Economic matters are touched on only when 
they have been germane to the principal themes: for example, 
the Scullin tariff receives some attention, while the exchange 
devaluation of '1931 does not; the tariff was a matter of great 
importance to a large number of trade unions, while the exchange 
devaluation was, as it were, an event external to the Labor 
movement.
Reference to the economic history of the depression 
has been kept to a minimum. There is no reference at all to the
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social history of the period. This omission is more 
serious than might first appear. An account of the politics 
of the 3ruce-Page Government between, say, 1925 and 1927, 
would require no more than a light sketch of the relevant 
social history. But times of crisis produce social turmoil 
which often has pronounced political effects. An adequate 
account of the A.L.P. conscription split of 1916-1917, or the 
conscription policy of the Curtin Government in 1942-1943, 
requires an understanding of the stresses and anxieties in 
society during those times - similarly, a full understanding 
of the politics of the Scullin Government demands a knowledge 
of the social conditions of 1930 and 1931. Startling as they 
are, unemployment statistics indicate only a part of the 
misery, shame and desperation experienced by so many. It was 
a time of tension and anxiety. It followed that, to give but 
one example, the 'Caucus crisis' of October to December 1930 
was in some part caused by the social crisis and the pressures - 
both personal and institutional - which that crisis exerted on 
Labor politicians. Much of the social conflict was of a kind 
which cannot be measured. And until a thorough social history 
of the time is produced there is little that a political history 
such as this can do except urge the reader to remember that
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political acts often had powerful social locomotors.
This study examines the Government formed by 
the Australian Labor Party, under the leadership of 
J.H. Scullin, which held office - but not power - in the 
Commonwealth of Australia from 22 October 1929 until 6 January 
1932. It is an attempt to combine two approaches used in 
previous studies of the Australian Labor Movement.
In his work on the Federal Labor Party, L.F. Crisp 
has charted the structure of the Federal Party. Roughly 
one-third of the book is devoted to two sections of the Party 
machine - the Federal Conference and Federal Executive - and 
two sections of the Parliamentary instruments - the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party (F.P.L.P., or Caucus) and the 
Federal Cabinet. At the purely political level these four 
organisations are my principal concern. I have used Crisp's 
study as a framework. However, Crisp's model is static; it 
describes the evolution of the four organisations separately 
and only occasionally shows how they intermesh in practice.
One of the main pursuits of this study has been to uncover 
the working relationship between Conference, Executive, Caucus
and Cabinet.
In his book How Labour Governs, V.G. Childe
describes the internal struggles of Labor up to 1921, 
concentrating on the period after 1910 and the struggles in 
New South Wales and Queensland. While Childe examines 
Party structure and its implications at length, the 
distinguishing feature of his work is his account of the 
trade unions and their position and influence in the Labor 
movement. Much of Childe's best work in How Labour Governs 
is in his description of - and incisive comments on - relations 
between the political and industrial wings of the movement.
In attempted emulation of Childe in this respect, this thesis 
has sought answers to the following kind of questions; did 
the unions influence the Scullin Government? Which unions ? 
how was influence exerted, where was it directed, and on what 
issues and with what degree of success? Conversely, how did 
the Government react to union pressures?
The writer has not been fortunate enough to enjoy 
the intimate personal acquaintance with the Labor movement 
shared by Crisp and Childe; therefore this account of the 
Scullin Government lacks the warm understanding of Crisp's 
work, or the pungently critical understanding of Childe's.
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Written records from four main sources are 
relied on: newspapers of the time, Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates; surviving Labor Party records, both State and 
Federal; and trade union records. Personal interviews with 
the few surviving members of the Government and those active 
in the Labor movement were sought. These were uniformly 
disappointing. Most of those concerned had only feeble memories 
for detail and many were at^  time too far from the centres of 
power to be of much help; many seemed very familiar with 
J.T. Lang's autobiographical pastiches, and were consequently 
confused. Published secondary sources were informative on the 
Labor movement generally but of very slight value for information 
on the Scullin Government. The same is true of the few works 
published on Australian trade unions. There is only one 
relevant published biography of standing, that of Chifley by 
L.F. Crisp. The published autobiographies of Lang are 
fascinating, but they are unreliable and inaccurate apologias. 
Memoirs by other participants are few and scrappy.
This is the first substantial study of the Scullin 
Government. Nevertheless, there are established interpretations 
of Scullin as a Prime Minister and the Scullin Labor Government. 
(In passing, it may be noted that most of the many writers of 
short ‘histories rely excessively on Denning's Caucus Crisis;
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interesting as the book is, it was surely never intended to 
provide more than colourful sketches of the main participants). 
One interpretation is that purveyed by the Communist Party of 
Australia. E.W. Campbell in his book History of the Australian 
Labour Movement; A Marxist Interpretation, (1945, pp.138-39), 
depicts Scullin and his Government as 'reformist puppets' who 
'carried out the capitalist offensive on wages and working 
conditions and savagely attacked the workers when they 
resisted'; much is made of the coal lock-out of 1929-30 in 
which 'the Scullin Government cynically discarded its promises 
to the miners and openly assisted the coal owners'. This view 
would not be worth much notice if it had not been so influential- 
partly because the Communist Party has published a large volume 
of political propaganda of this kind, and partly because of 
the similar line expounded in Frank Hardy's novel Power Without 
Glory, a work which seems to have been read widely in the Labor 
Movement and considerably influenced its opinions.
Another view of the Scullin Government comes from 
Labor Party sympathisers. This interpretation sees Scullin 
as a tragic figure, and the Government as valiant and idealistic 
but thwarted by economic fate and the 'Money Power'. It is a 
view which is butressed - and with justice - by the knowledge
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that Labor's basic economic policy of monetary expansion 
has since proved to have been the policy most appropriate, 
in purely economic terms, for the solution to Australia's 
depression problems.
The most recent examination of the Scullin 
Government is that written by J.R. Robertson. It is a 
tantalisingly brief summary of the interpretation developed 
by Robertson while working on his forthcoming biography
of Scullin. Robertson examines seven 'critical decisions'
©made by Scullin: his handling of the coal lock-out in 
New South Wales in 1929-30; his invitation to Sir Otto Niemeyer 
to visit Australia in mid-1930; the decision to go overseas 
from August 1930 to January 1931; his renewal of Sir Robert 
Gibson's tenure on the Commonwealth Bank Board; his decision 
to re-appoint E.G. Theodore as Treasurer in January 1931; his 
adoption of the Premiers' Plan in June 1931; and the decision 
not to force a double dissolution. Each of these decisions 
raises questions with wide implications. They are listed here 
because, within necessary limits, all seven are discussed 
this thesis and somewhat different conclusions are drawn, or
implied.
1Chapter 1
After the conscription split of 1916 the 
Australian Labor Party remained out of office in the 
Commonwealth Parliament for thirteen years. Between the 
defection of Hughes and his twenty-four followers and the 
election of the Scullin Government in October 1929 the 
Party was in a long, deep trough, and at the end of the 1920's 
it seemed that little had changed in the Party or its place 
in Australian politics.
Although the Party formed Governments in all six 
States between 1917 and 1929 its electoral performance at 
the national level was unimpressive. After the election of 
1917 the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party numbered only thirty- 
two in a Parliament of one hundred and eleven and the number had 
only risen to thirty-eight during the Eleventh Parliament of 
1928-1929. Labor increased its membership in the House of 
Representatives from twenty-three in 1925 to thirty-one in
November 1928, but it still seemed far away from office.
2The most encouraging change for Labor was an 
improvement in the leadership of the Party. After the 
departure of Hughes the outstanding leader of the Party's 
first two decades - the leadership was assumed by Frank 
Tudor (1916-1922) and then by Matthew Charlton (1922-1928).
Both were solid, industrious men with little formal education 
but much experience of trade union affairs and Labor Party 
politics.^" But although respected and admired by many of 
their colleagues, neither was a leader of the calibre of 
Watson, Fisher or Hughes and there was consequently 
dissatisfaction with them in the F.P.L.P. and the State Branches. 
This led to attempts to bring in outstanding State Labor 
leaders to replace them. In Tudor's case the candidate for
2the succession was a former Premier of Queensland, T.J. Ryan.
Ryan entered Federal politics at the invitation of the 1919
3Federal A.L.P. Conference; he quickly became Deputy-Leader
1
N. Makin, Federal Labour Leaders, Sydney, 1961, pp.70-82.
2
T.J. Ryan, B.A., LL.B., 1876-1921; M.L.C., 1909-1919; M.H.R. 
(West Sydney) 1919-1921; for further biographical details 
see, A .H . Chisholm (Ed.), The Australian Encyclopaedia, Sydney, 
1958, Vol.7, p.531.
3
L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-1951, 
London, 1955, pp.128-9.
of the F.P.L.P., but his sudden death in August 1921
left the Party with no candidate more distinguished than
Charlton. Charlton's likely successor was E.G. Theodore,
4also a former Queensland Premier. Theodore, however, did
not secure a seat in the Representatives until February 1927 ,
after being narrowly defeated in a Federal fc^-f&lection in
1925. He was not a candidate for the Deputy-Leadership 
5in 1927, but early in 1928 Charlton successfully recommended 
that the F.P.L.P. Executive be enlarged by one and that
g
Theodore be given the position. A few weeks later he
stood for Deputy-Leader but was defeated by A. Blakeley,
7reportedly by one vote. The set-back to Theodore's ambitions
was temporary, for in February 1929 Caucus elected him as 
8 *Deputy. Theodore's delay in entering Federal politics after
4
Edward Granville Theodore, born Adelaide, 29 December 1884, 
died Sydney 9 February 1950; M.L.C. (Qld.) 1909-1925,
Premier 1919-1925; M.H.R. (Dailey, N.S.W.) 1927-1931,
(A.H. Chisholm, Op.cit., vol.8, pp.480-1).
5
Argus, 18 March 1927.
6
Caucus, Minutes, 23 March 1928; Argus, 1, 5 May 1928.
7
Argus, 3, 4 May 1928.
8
It was reported that he defeated Blakeley by two votes; Argus, 
6 February 1929.
41925 and shifting factional alliances in the F.P.L.P. had, 
however, allowed a less talented rival to fill the leadership 
vacuum in the F.P.L.P.
9In March 1927 Frank Anstey resigned as Deputy-
Leader, ostensibly because of ill-health.^ His place was
taken by J. H. Scullin. On Charlton's resignation in
February 1928,^  Scullin was elected Leader by'a substantial 
12majority'. Scullin held the leadership from 1928 until
October 1935. During that time he was for twenty-seven months 
(22 October 1929 - 6 January 1932) the only Labor Leader to 
govern Australia between 1916 and 1941. He remained in 
Parliament until his retirement in 1949, an elderstatesman and 
adviser to his colleagues and two later Labor Prime Ministers.'1'
9
Frank Anstey, 1865-1940; M.L.A. (Vic.) 1902-1910; M.H.R. 
1910-1934; A.H. Chisholm, Op.cit., vol. 1, pp.188-9.
10
Age, 14 March 1927.
11
According to Makin, who was a member of the F.P.L.P. at the 
time, Charlton was much discomfited by Theodore's aggressive 
ambition; N.Makin, Op.cit., pp.81-2; Anstey tells a similar 
story (see, Frank Anstey, 'Red Ned', Overland, No.32, August 
1965, p .22).
12
Caucus, Minutes, 5 February 1928.
13
L.F.Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Biography, London, 1961, pp.142, 
144, 147, 221-2, 232.
514In 1929 Scullin was fifty-three years old. Born
near Ballarat in 1876 of Irish immigrant parents he had a
primary education. Before entering politics he conducted a
small grocery business in Ballarat and developed a
considerable local reputation as a debater and public speaker;
eventually, in the opinion of one who knew him, he became the
15finest orator the Party had ever produced. In 1907 he
married Marie McNamara, a member of a family well-known in
Victorian Labor politics. Like her husband, Mrs. Scullin
was quiet, modest, 'softof speech, gentle of manner', sensitive
and completely lacking in ostentation; she professed an
interest in golf and a passion for landscape painting.^
Scullin was a teetotaler and a non-smoker, and a Catholic who
was strongly attached to his religion. He was 'careful,
17saving and sacrificing by nature'. It is not surprising 
or evidence of hypocrisy, that the word 'honour' was so
14
James Henry Scullin, 1876-1953; for biographical detail, see 
A.H. Chisholm, Op.cit., vol.8, pp.48-51; N.Makin, Op.cit. , 
pp.83-97.
15
G.Brown, My Descent from Soapbox to Senate, Brisbane, 1953, 
p.209.
16
Australian Worker, 25 December 1929.
17
N. Makin, Op.cit., p.85.
frequently on Scullin's lips in 1930 and 1931, for
personal, Party and national honour - in ascending order
of importance - were deeply important to him. It was
evident, too, that he believed that personal struggle and
sacrifice were in some way purifying; that Australians would
in the future look back on the 'dark time' of 1930 and think
18that the experience had been 'good' for them.
Scullin's political life began in 1903, at the age 
of twenty-seven, when he joined the A.L.P. Three years later 
he was an unsuccessful candidate for the Federal seat of 
Ballaarat. Before his next attempt to enter Parliament he 
was employed as an organiser for the Australian Workers'
Union in the Western District of Victoria; this was the 
beginning of a life-long association with the A.W.U. He 
returned to A.W.U. employment after a term as Labor M.H.R. for 
Corangamite (1910-1913), when he was for some years editor 
of the A.W.U. paper the Ballarat Echo; during these years he . 
took an active part in the anti-conscription campaigns of 1916
18
Advertiser, 23 August 1930.
and 1917 and in the extra-parliamentary organisations of 
the A.L.P. in Victoria. After an unsuccessful attempt 
to gain the State seat of Grenville in 1920, Scullin was 
returned in 1922 for the Federal seat of Yarra, a safe 
Labor seat which he held until his retirement twenty-seven 
years later.
Even at the time of his greatest trials and failures
during the depression, Scullin never lost the admiration and
respect of a majority of the Labor Party. He was, however,
19overshadowed by two great figures of the time; J.T. Lang, 
Leader of the A.L.P. in New South Wales, and E.G. Theodore, 
Scullin's Deputy in the Party and Treasurer in his Government. 
It is significant that these two dominated to the exclusion of 
Scullin, who held a higher position than either. Lang and 
Theodore were more experienced in Labor politics and both
consequently were, among other things, masters of intrigue
wand manoevre to a degree which Scullin was not (which is not 
to imply that Scullin was entirely lacking in such skills). 
Scullin was the superior orator, but he lacked the physical 
19
John Thomas Lang; born Sydney, 21 December 1876; M.L.A. 
(N.S.W.) 1913-1946; Treasurer 1920-1922, Leader of the 
Opposition 1923-1925, Premier 1925-1927, 1930-1932; M.H.R. 
(Reid, N.S.W.) 1946-1949.
presence of his rivals; he was small, almost frail in 
appearance while Lang and Theodore were tall, robust and 
commanding. But the essential difference was in Scullin's 
character: he lacked that quality of cold, driving ruthlessness 
which was an outstanding characteristic of Lang and Theodore. 
Against his two great rivals Scullin appeared timid, weak and 
vacillating.
Like many Labor politicians before and after him,
Scullin's early radicalism had moderated with years and
experience. As a Victorian delegate to the 1916 A.L.P.
Federal Conference Scullin moved the motion demanding the
expulsion from the Party of all conscriptionists. He spoke
passionately of the sacred nature of Labor Party principles,
whether they be written into the Party platform or merely
understood as 'the spirit of the Labor movement', and of the
penalty of excommunication which must be imposed on all who
20violated 'fundamental principles'. At the 1921 Conference
Scullin was prominent among those supporting the adoption of
_
Australian Labor Party, Report of Proceedings of the Special 
Commonwealth Conference ... , Melbourne, 1917, pp.4-5.
Qthe socialisation Objective and Methods, he also, however,
22supported the Blackburn Declaration (which he may have
helped draft, reportedly after consultation with Archbishop
23Mannix of Melbourne ), which severely qualified the 
socialisation Objective.
The 1921 Federal Conference adopted most of the 
socialisation proposals put to it by the All-Australian Trade 
Union Congress of June 1921. (Scullin was also a prominent 
delegate at the Congress). The Congress had been called at 
the request of the A.L.P. Federal Executive because:
The movement had lost its momentum; it needed 
an infusion of industrial energy; somewhere 
there had to be found the 'genius and statecraft1 
which would restore its earlier elan. 24
Evidence of the loss of momentum was to be seen in Federal 
Labor's poor electoral performance and the dearth of talent
21
Australian Labor Party, Official Report of Proceedings of the 
Ninth Commonwealth Conference ..., Melbourne, 1921, passim.
22
Ibid., pp.35-6.
23
T.L.Suttor, 'Catholicism in Australian Politics since Federation*, 
Catholics and the Free Society: An Australian Symposium, Henry 
Mayer (Ed.), Melbourne, 1961, pp.39-40.
24
Ian Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics: The Dynamics of 
the Labour Movement in Eastern Australia, 1900-1921, Canberra,
1965, p .218.
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in the senior ranks of the F.P.L.P. Against this there
were stirrings in the industrial base of the Party.
25Unemployment was high, and the unions were apprehensive
at the economic downturn of 1920-21; several major unions
were involved in negotiations for amalgamation and schemes
2 Gfor the One Big Union; the Russian Revolution was only four
years old, still exciting and full of promise; a Communist
27Party was established in Australia in October 1920. In these
circumstances there arose an inclination to flirt with
something politically more radical than the traditional A.L.P.
position, as it had been exemplified by Fisher's words:
No [Labour] Party worthy of the name can deny 
that its objective is socialism, but no socialist 
with any parliamentary experience can hope to 
get anywhere for many years to come - other than 
practical legislation of a socialist nature. 28
The result was the socialisation Objective and Methods of 1921.
25
The national percentage average of unemployed trade unionists, 
1919-1923, was: 1919 - 6.6%; 1920 - 6.5%; 1921 - 11.2%; 1922 - 
9.2%; 1923 - 7.1%; (Commonwealth Year Book, No.17, 1924, p.541).
26
For which see, Ian Bedford, 'The One Big Union 1918-1923', 
Initiative and Organisation, Sydney Studies in Politics No.3, 
Melbourne, 1963, pp.5-43.
27
For which see, Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party of 
Australia: A Short History, California, 1970, Chapter I, Passim.
28
L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-1951, 
London, 1955, p.275.
11
The flirtation was, however, brief, vague and of little 
consequence. The 1927 Federal Conference retained the 
1921 Objective -'The socialisation of industry, production 
distribution and exchange' -, but by its emasculation of the 
Methods section the Conference signified that the Party had 
returned to its old stance of striving for 'practical 
legislation of a socialist nature'. Thus by the end of the 
1920's Labor was in its traditional position of parochialism, 
empiricism and gradualism.
Labor's rejection of dogmas and theories totally 
inapplicable in Australia in the 1920's was sensible. 
Unfortunately it was not a rejection based on analysis and 
understanding but, in part at least, an expression of disregard, 
if not contempt, for economic, political and social analysis. 
Labor was a reformist Party in a capitalist society but it did 
not appreciate that there was a rational, informed approach 
to reformism. The Labor Party was not a thinking or writing 
Party; its contacts with, for example, the Labour Party in 
England were negligible and it remained unaffiliated with the 
Socialist International. With few exceptions this situation 
was duplicated in the trade unions. Only a few unions were 
affiliated with institutions such as the Victorian Labor
12
College (which produced tired versions of crude Marxism),
30or the Workers' Educational Association.
A lack of ideas was exposed as one of Labor's 
important weaknesses in 1929-1932. Labor performed badly, 
worse than it might have done, in part because it was a 
poorly equipped reformist Party. Perhaps its inadequacies 
were no more than a reflection of the values of the society 
in which it functioned: but Labor offered little challenge 
or leadership.
A dearth of ideas was by no means the only or most 
important cause of the Scullin Government's dismal performance. 
The utfQg imposed by the economic depression produced
difficulties for all Governments. And in Australia these 
difficulties were made greater still by the Federal structure 
of the Commonwealth. Under the Constitution the Federal
29
For which see, Victorian Labor College Jubilee 1917-1967, 
N.P., ND, [Melbourne 1967].
30
E.M. Higgins, David Stewart and the W.E.A., W.E.A., Sydney, 
ND., has many useful observations on the relationship - a 
difficult one - between the unions and the W.E.A; see in 
particular Chapters 6 and 7; see also the important comments 
of G.V. Portus in Chapter XVII of his autobiography, Happy 
Highways, (Melbourne, 1953).
13
Government shared power with, the six State Governments 
and although the Federal Government was paramount its 
power and influence were restricted. The six States were 
widely separated geographically, at different stages of 
economic development, with populations varying in size and 
distribution, and under Governments of varying political 
complexions and competence. Thus there were ever-present 
tensions between the States and between the Federal 
Government and the States.
The difficulties, restrictions and tensions of 
federalism were paralleled in the Australian Labor Party.
The Labor Party comprised what were in effect seven parties - 
the Federal Party and the six State Branches - closely bound 
by common origins, structure, aims and methods, yet 
continually in danger of being pulled apart by the centrifugal 
forces of State autonomy.
The organisation of the A.L.P. was fairly simple.
At the Federal level there were three organisations. The 
Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (F.P.L.P.) comprised all 
Labor members of both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament. 
The F.P.L.P. takes its usual (although unofficial) name, 
Caucus, from the function it performed: members met inlconclave
14
before and during sessions of Parliament to decide by
majority vote what Party policy to political questions
should be; once decided, each member was bound by his
signed pledge to vote for the policy accepted by the
Caucus majority. Guide lines for Caucus decisions were
established by the Federal A.L.P. Conference. Consisting
31of thirty-six delegates - six from each State Branch 
the Conference normally met trienially to consider proposals 
from the State Branches for inclusion in the Party's 
programme. In theory and often in practice the Federal 
Conference was the supreme governing body in the Labor Party. 
Between Conferences a Federal Executive of twelve - two
delegates from each State Branch - met at least once a year
resolve the more urgent policy and disciplinary questions.
Neither Conference or Executive employed full-time officers.
The obvious must be emphasised: equal Branch representation
Conference equal to that of New South Wales; whatever the 
merits of the allocation it is understandable that it was 
the cause of dissatisfaction. (This does not imply that 
the Conference divided along State lines).
15
The chain of organisation - Caucus - Executive - 
Conference - was roughly duplicated in each of the six 
State Branches, although there were many minor variations 
in structure and nomenclature (most notably in Western 
Australia). The important difference was rank-and-file 
participation by the local (i.e. intra-state) branches and 
trade unions. The theory and constitution of Labor 
suggested that the wishes of the ordinary Party member in 
an affiliated trade union or a local branch (or possibly 
both) were made effective by transmission through the union 
or branch delegate to the State Conference and hence to the 
State parliamentary Caucus. Where the impulse concerned 
Federal affairs it went on from the State Conference or 
Executive to their Federal counterparts and then to the 
Federal Caucus. The latter was therefore a long distance 
from the Labor Party member in the States and there was always 
the possibility of requests losing their way before even 
being considered by Federal Caucus.
As Labor placed a high value on rank-and-file 
participation the Federal Party was always susceptible to 
accusations that it was out of touch with the ordinary worker
16
(and Party member) in the States. And as this was 
combined with a deep-rooted and powerful instinct for 
State autonomy, there was a continual temptation in the 
States to leap across the chain of transmission and 
directly 'instruct' members of the F.P.L.P. to do the 
bidding of the State Branch. Such temptation was the 
greater and the 'instruction' likely to be more powerful 
because the State organisations were the power bases for 
Federal Caucus members. Organisations within the State 
Branches controlled a substantial part of Party finance, 
the election campaign machine and, more importantly, the 
process of pre-selection and endorsement for Labor Federal 
Parliamentary candidature.
Threaded through the A.L.P. was 'the time-serving
and place-seeking, the graft and chicanery' which, Turner
32says, are endemic in Labor movements. Nobler aspirations
also prevailed and the only too evident cynicism, corruption,
ambition and blind joy in factional intrigue are insufficient
as an explanation for the struggles of 1930 and 1931. Several
forces were at work in the Party which continually pushed it
toward destruction. One such force arose from the strains
imposed by Federalism. Another was the reverence for 
32
Ian Turner, Op.cit., p. XVII - XVIII.
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rank-and-file participation and control, and the 
consequent concern to ensure that Labor politicians were 
responsive to the membership and could be disciplined for 
breaches of Party principle.
At the time of the 1916 conscription split in the 
A.L.P. there was much talk among trade union officials of 
the need to discipline Labor politicians and 're-instate' 
control over politicians by the industrial wing of the Labor 
movement. During 1930 and 1931 there was again much talk, 
and some action, of the same kind. At both times there 
was j.ustification for the feeling that the Labor Party had 
failed its creator and mainstay, the trade unions. Yet while 
at times fierce in their denunciation of the Scullin 
Government, the union critics played a very soft pedal on 
their own responsibility for Labor's political failures. In 
fact their own responsibility was considerable.
The Australian trade union movement was one of the 
strongest in the world. Its numerical strength rested on the 
protection offered through the Commonwealth and State arbitration 
systems. Although at the end of 1928 the unions had
approximately 911,000 members, they were perhaps less
powerful than they would have been with smaller numbers.
There was considerable apathy in the majority of unions
on the part of a majority of members. Voting and attendance
figures in union records of the late 1920's indicate that
most unionists were indifferent to the day-to-day business
and activities of their union (though not of course, to the
economic fruit of that activity). One consequence of such
indifference was that union officials tended to remain
unshakeably fixed in their positions. These two things,
together with most unionists apparent indifference to the
part played in Labor politics by their union , meant that
Labor's theory of democratic participation was too often in
practice nothing but a sad farce. It was the case in 1930 and
1931 that economic hardship had an effect the reverse of what
might have been expected: participation in union affairs very
often diminished rather than increased. Union officials who
spoke in Labor Party counsels as though they were the echoing
voice of thousands were frequently the voice of only a handful.
The handful may have had authority in arbitration legislation
and like matters; its concerns, however, extended far beyond
such narrow fields.
33
Commonwealth Year Book, No.22, 1929, p.569.
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In 1928 there were 379 separate unions in
Australia. Of these, 107 operated in two or more States
and 43 operated in all six States; the 107 interstate
34unions contained 81% of all Australian unionists. Some 
few unions such as the A.W.U. were well integrated, with a 
strong and dominant Federal organisation. However, these 
few were the exception. In general, the interstate unions 
had relatively strong State Branches and a weak Federal 
organisation: there were a multitude of unions in this 
position; the A.R.U., W.W.F., the Ironworkers, Carters and 
Drivers and various building trades unions were typical of 
most. One consequence was that such unions were much more 
interested and influential in State Labor politics than they 
were in the Federal Labor Party. Conversely, those rare 
unions such as the A.W.U. which were strongly organised 
federally were interested and influential in Federal Labor 
politics (though not, in the case of the A.W.U., to the 
exclusion of influence on Labor in some States).
34
Ibid., pp.569, 571.
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Unions were organised on a regional, State and, 
after 1927, a national basis. Some unions with allied 
interests were members of councils of the kind later 
exemplified by the Metal Trades Federation; among such 
unions at the end of the 1920's were the iron, steel, brass 
and building trades. Such councils were insignificant 
politically ((and probably, industrially) during the late 
1920's and early 1930's. Each State had a number of Labor 
Councils, the most important of which were those in the 
capital cities. Although not as institutions affiliated 
with the State Branches of the A.L.P. they contained most of 
the unions which were affiliated with the Party. Thus the 
principal Councils were bodies to be reckoned with in Labor 
politics; but, again, their influence was most evident and 
important at the State Labor Party level.
The unions as a whole expressed their demands through 
the Australasian Council of Trade Unions (A.C.T.U.). This 
organisation was established in May 1927 with the general 
objective of the socialisation of industry, by the methods of 
the establishment of one union for each industry (i.e., by the 
elimination of the craft union), 1the consolidation of the
21
Australasian Labour Movement with the object of unified
control, administration and action1, and the central control
35of industrial disputes. Each of the principal State
Labor Councils acted as a branch and supplied two 
representatives to the A.C.T.U.Executive, which also 
contained four other officials; like the A.L.P. Federal 
Executive, the A.C.T.U. Executive had no permanent office 
or full-time officials. For a number of reasons the 
A.C.T.U. was not at all a significant influence on the 
Scullin Government. Obviously, in 1930 the A.C.T.U. was still 
in its infancy, unused to its position, lacking real powers 
and much subject to interstate and inter-union jealousies.
Less important was the fact that the unions in Western 
Australia had remained outside the A.C.T.U. (There were only
30
61,498 unionists in W.A. in 1928). Much more important
was the refusal of the A.W.U. to participate in the A.C.T.U. 
and the hostility that existed between the two in 1930 and 
1931.
35Ibid., p .572.
36
Ibid., p.569.
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The A.W.U. was Australia's largest and one of its
37oldest unions. In 1928 it claimed 160,000 members; the
next largest was probably the A.R.U., with approximately 
3860,000 members. The A.W.U. was undoubtedly the richest
of Australian unions, and one of the most efficient.
Perhaps because it seemed so monolithic, rich and powerful, 
the A.W.U. was the subject of much criticism from other 
unions, especially the more militant; even one prominent 
A.W.U. man acknowledged that the opinion of many was:
That the A.W.U. was becoming a bureaucracy, 
and that the rank and file had no say in the 
framing of the rules and constitution of the 
organisation. 39
As we have noted, the A.W.U. was one of the very few unions 
which were strongly organised federally. Its influence with 
the Scullin Government was strong, much more so than the 
A.C.T.U., any Labor Council or any other trade union; often 
its influence was greater than any combination of all three.
In part this was because there was a large number of A.W.U.
37
A.W.U. Annual Convention, Official Report, 1928, p.3.
38
Railroad, 10 August 1929.
39
A.W.U., Op.cit., 1931, p.72.
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members in the Scullin Ministry and the Caucus of 1929- 
1932. And in part it was because the A.W.U. was the 
industrial mirror image of the Federal Labor Party; strongly 
federalist and moderate in aim and pragmatic in action.
Many of the weaknesses of the union movement were 
revealed in the three great industrial disputes of 1928- 
1929. Some 60,000 unionists in the waterside, timber and 
coal industries were locked in a struggle with the employees, 
the Arbitration Court and the Commonwealth Government. In 
each case the unionists were defeated and the unions 
involved were crippled in the difficult years which followed. 
The effect on even the militant unions was profound, for the 
three lost struggles indicated that direct action was now 
hopelessly ineffective against wage reductions and erosion of 
working conditions.
Federal politics in 1928 and 1929 was dominated by 
industrial affairs. Industrial disputes of great bitterness, 
a major amendment to the Commonwealth Arbitration Act (1928) , 
use of the new Transport Workers' Act and an abortive 
Industrial Peace Conference contrived to heighten and define 
attitudes. Many in the Labor movement believed that a 'general
24
capitalist offensive' was underway, and that the Government 
was contriving with the employers to facilitate it. The 
Bruce-Page Government (1923-1929) was convinced that in 
their attitude to arbitration the unions were irresponsible, 
inconsistent and insincere.
The Bruce-Page Government announced in May 1929 that 
if the States would not transfer their industrial powers to 
the Commonwealth (and they refused to do so) the Commonwealth 
would relinquish its own industrial powers, except in the 
maritime industries. In September 1929 a Bill to give 
effect to this was introduced into the Federal Parliament.
On 10 September the Government was defeated in the House of 
Representatives by one vote, on an amendment moved in 
Committee by W.M. Hughes. An election, for the House of 
Representatives only, was held on 12 October and Labor won 
a sweeping victory.
Five of the nine Ministers standing for re-election 
were defeated, including the Prime Minister. Non-Labor 
membership of the Representatives fell from forty-four to 
twenty-nine (and Nationalist Party membership from twenty-nine 
to fourteen). Labor numbers rose from thirty-one to forty- 
seven* A by-election in December 1929 won a further seat
for Labor. As there was no Senate election in 1929 Labor 
representation in the Senate remained at seven and non- 
Labor at twenty-nine. Thus at the end of 1929 the 
Labor Caucus numbered fifty-five.
A careful study of the defeat of the Nationalist
Government and the subsequent election has made extremely
doubtful the accepted interpretation, which was that the
election defeat was due to the Government's blunder over 
40arbitration. As Carboch points out, there is no way
of knowing why the three and a half million electors voted 
as they did. There is some indication - such as the fact 
that many Labor gains were made in rural and rural-urban 
seats - that arbitration was but one influence among many. 
Carboch notes a number of issues put forward by opinion 
leaders:
40
Dagmar Carboch, 'The Fall of the Bruce-Page Government', 
Studies in Australian Politics, Melbourne, 1958, pp. 119-
282.
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The John Brown case and 'class justice'; 
the film tax' the New South Wales coal 
lock-out; the timber workers' strike; the 
Government's financial policy; the Public 
Service Bill; the question of mandates; the 
question of Party discipline and the 
importance of Party platforms; the rights 
of the smaller States - and so on. 41
Little mention was made of the worsening 
economic situation. Doubtless many in the Labor movement 
thought that Australia was about to experience a relatively 
minor economic downturn, of the order of that of the early 
1920's. On this issue there was no sense of urgency
42or alarm from Labor. Scullin's policy speech was typical.
He acknowledged the economic decline and laid the blame on 
the Nationalist Government's mismanagement and extravagance; 
Labor would correct this by curtailing loans and restricting 
loan expenditure to 'reproductive works'. He promised to 
implement several traditional Labor policies, such as higher 
tariffs, unemployment insurance, banking reform and pool­
marketing of primary produce. The principle matter, however,
41
Ibid., p.269.
42
Sydney Morning Herald, (S.M.H.), 20 September 1929.
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was arbitration. Scullin, and Labor generally, denounced 
the Bruce-Page policy and promised reforms which would remove 
the punitive aspects and broaden the conciliative functions 
of the arbitration system. In the context of the 
industrial strife of 1928 and 1929 and the Bruce-Page 
attack, this promise appealed greatly to the trade unions 
and they were more than ordinarily active in the Labor 
campaign. The Labor movement apparently chose to ignore 
Labor's position in the Senate and the predictable 
intransigence of the Opposition Senators. Although this
problem was very rarely mentioned during the election
the more thoughtful members of the Party. Before leaving
economic position would not be righted in a day or a year*
and that 'things will be worse before they are better'; he
concluded that 'the duties lying ahead of the Labor Party
were much too serious to permit any undue exuberance'.
Argus, 19 October 1929.
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Chapter Ii
Bruce resigned on 21 October and the Governor 
General sent for Scullin and invited him to form a Government. 
As is customary, Scullin asked for time before giving a 
definite reply, meaning that he would first consult the 
Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. This was of course a 
formality and the business of the Caucus meeting of 22 October 
was the election of a Ministry and the nomination of other 
Parliamentary and Party officers.
Although, with fifty four members,^ the choice was a 
wide one, there were several constraints. The first was the 
tradition that Cabinet should consist of at least one 
representative from each State; thus Caucus had to choose three 
members from among the eight representing Queensland, Tasmania 
and Western Australia. A second limitation, also traditional, 
was the necessity to have at least one Minister in the Senate, 
who would have to be chosen from among Labor's seven Senators.
1
A table setting out the changing strength of the F.P.L.P. 
will be found in Appendix I.
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Choice was further narrowed because the Leader and
Deputy-Leader of the Party, though subject to re-election
to their positions at the Caucus meeting, would automatically
take two of the most senior Ministerial positions. At the
other end of the scale were the fifteen members of the House
of Representatives who had been elected for the first time a
few weeks earlier, and who at the meeting of 22 October had
not yet even been sworn in as members of Parliament. Their
chances of climbing straight to Cabinet rank were slender
indeed. The exception among them was J.A. Lyons, the former
Premier and Treasurer of Tasmania who had been invited by
Scullin to resign his seat in the State Parliament to contest
2a seat at the 1929 Federal Election. (Lyons had refused a
3similar invitation in 1928-) The invitation and his
4experience made Lyons' election to Cabinet certain, the more 
2
Dame Enid Lyons, So We Take Comfort, London, 1965, p.148; J.Guy, 
Deputy Leader of the A.L.P. in Tasmania and D.Riordan of 
Queensland also resigned State Labor seats and were elected to 
the Federal Parliament in 1929.
3
Caucus, Minutes, 13 September 1928.
4
For a brief account of Lyons1 twenty years in Tasmanian 
politics see, P.R. Hart, 'J.A.Lyons, Tasmanian Labour Leader' 
Labour History, No.9, November 1965, pp.33-42.
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so because he could also serve as the Tasmanian 
representative in Cabinet. A few other Caucus members 
were much handicapped, even had they sought office, by old 
age or chronic ill-health.^
With these limitations and reservations there were 
approximately thirty members of Caucus who might allow their 
name to remain on the ballot paper with some hope that they 
might win a position in the Ministry. But even these thirty 
had chances which were far from equal. After being out of 
office for thirteen years the Party was likely to reward those 
who had given long service in the bad years, and it is not 
therefore surprising that six of the thirteen Ministers had 
been members of Parliament at the time of the Fisher Labor 
Government of 1910-1913.^ A further influence defining 
eligibility for Ministerial rank was the moderate attitudes
5
For example, Dr. W. Maloney was 75 years of age; J. Mathews 
was 'an extremely sick man1 (Australian Worker, 4 December 
1929) who attended no more than ten Caucus meetings throughout 
the Government's term of office.
6
The six were Scullin, Brennan, Fenton, P.Moloney, Barnes 
and Anstey. A list of all Federal Labor members, 1929-1932, 
and their electorates, appears in Appendix II.
of Scullin and Theodore and their closest supporters.
Another moderating influence was the Australian Workers 1
Union, whose General Secretary claimed that more than half
of the^members of the House of Representatives were members 
7of his union. The A.W..U. was, as we shall see, certainly 
influential with the Scullin Government and it was generally 
and properly regarded as moderate in trade union and 
political affairs.
Just what a Labor member of Parliament1s Union 
affiliation meant is difficult to gauge, and before dealing 
with the selection and the composition of the first Scullin 
Cabinet, which will also touch on the matter of union 
affiliation, it will be convenient here to discuss the 
connection and its implications.
Most members of the P.P.L.P. were members of at 
least one Union. 56% of the Labor members of 1929-1931 
had held a post of some kind in a union, while 22% of the
E. Grayndler, in the Australian Worker, 16 October 1929.
7
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total had at some time been full-time union secretaries.
Among the latter were R.V. Keane, Secretary to the A.R.U., 
Victorian Branch, at the time of his election in 1929;
J.M. Gabb, Secretary of the Federal Gas Employees'Union 
from 1926 to 1929; and A. Lewis, Secretary of the Victorian 
Branch of the Carters' and Drivers' Union between 1907 and 1929. 
Others had union connections no less direct. E.J. Holloway 
was an ex-official of the Boot Trades Employees'Union and 
from 1916 to 1929 the Secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall 
Council; J.A. Beasley was President of the Electrical Trades 
Union in New South Wales from 1922 until 1930 and of the New 
South Wales Labor Council from 1922 until 1928. The A.W.U. 
had the greatest number of adherents, having fostered Theodore, 
Scullin, Blake]fy, (Federal President of the A.W.U. from 1919
A
until 1922), Senator Barnes (Federal President, 1924-1938),
8
L.F. Crisp and S.P. Bennett, Australian Labor Party Federal 
Personnel 1901-1954, Canberra, September 1954, (with 'Corrections 
and Additions', December 1954), N.P. (Table, 'Vocational 
Backgrounds ...'). Unless otherwise indicated, biographical 
information on Labor members is based on Crisp and Bennett, 
supplement!; by obituaries and 'profiles' in the press, remarks 
in union records, parliamentary debates and other published
sources.
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Cunningham, G ibbons ,  L acey ,  M a r te n s ,  M c N e il l ,
( F e d e r a l  P r e s i d e n t ,  1 9 3 8 -1 9 4 3 ) ,  Long, N e ls o n ,  R io rd a n  and . 
S e n a to r s  D a ly ,  H oare ,  O 'H a l l o r a n  and  D oo ley . O th e r  c l o s e  
c o n n e c t io n s  were t h o s e  be tw een  t h e  M in e r s '  Union and  James 
and W a tk in s ,  C h i f l e y  and t h e  A .F .U .L .E . ,  C u l le y  and t h e  
B u i l d e r s  L a b o r e r s , and Rowe and  t h e  P r i n t i n g  I n d u s t r y  
E m p lo y e e s 'U n io n . T here  w ere  a number o f  members whose 
b a c k g ro u n d  as t e a c h e r s ,  j o u r n a l i s t s ,  o r  la w y e rs  made t h e i r  
t r a d e  u n io n  c o n n e c t io n s  more t e n u o u s .
I t  i s  t e m p t in g  t o  c o r r e l a t e  u n io n  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  
d e g r e e s  o f  r a d i c a l i s m .  The s p l i t s  o f  1931 seem t o  j u s t i f y  
su c h  a c o r r e l a t i o n :  L yons , t h e  fo rm er  s c h o o l t e a c h e r ,  and 
F e n to n ,  t h e  fo rm e r  j o u r n a l i s t ,  l e d  o u t  a  ' c o n s e r v a t i v e '  s e c t i o n ,- 
w h i l e  t h e  d e p a r t i n g  ' r a d i c a l '  s e c t i o n  was l e d  by B e a s le y ,  and  
c o n t a i n e d  su c h  u n io n  m i l i t a n t s  a s  James and Ward. F u r t h e r ,  
t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  from  C a b in e t  i n  Ju n e  1931 o f  t h e  ' ' i n d u s t r i a l i s t s '  
H ollow ay and  C u l l e y  o v e r  t h e  P r e m i e r s '  P l a n  a p p e a r s  t o  o f f e r  
a d d i t i o n a l  p r o o f  f o r  t h i s  c o r r e l a t i o n .  B u t t h e  c o n n e c t io n  does  
n o t  h o l d .  I n  e v e ry  i m p o r t a n t  c a s e  be tw een  1929 and 1931 t h e r e  
a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  e x c e p t i o n s .  I t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y
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a consistent group of trade-union "industrialists'; nor
is it meaningful to divide the F.P.L.P. into categories of
miners, clerks and orchardists, and so on. There is first
the problem of identifying the union to which the Labor
Parliamentarian was affiliated. Gabb had strong associations
with the Federal Gas Employees' Union, yet at the time of his
defection to the Opposition in 1931 it was revealed that he
9was also a member of the Adelaide Branch of the W.W.F. West 
had a lifelong association with the Master Plumbers' Union, 
yet he was also a paid-up member of the A.W.U., an affiliation 
which had remained unknown to his parliamentary colleague 
Senator Barnes, the Federal President of the A.W.U. The
A.W.U. was apparently one of those unions who accepted 
parliamentarians as members even though they had little or no 
connection with the interests of the union, a practice which was 
again illustrated when Chifley became a financial member of that 
Union after being expelled from the A.F.U.L.E. in 1931 for his 
stand on the Premiers' Plan.^ Another union which served the
9
W.W.F. - S.A. Branch, Minutes of General Meetings, 23 February, 
29 June 1931.
10
Australian Worker, 25 March 1931.
11
L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley; A Biography, London, 1961, pp.81-82, 
Fn.7.
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'tXesane purpose,, was Clerks'Union, which had such members as
Eldridge, Lazzarini, E. Riley, Tulley, Theodore and
12Blakeley (and in N.S.W., Lang and J.J. Graves). The
implications of this can be traced in J. Curtin's associations.
He was a former Secretary and President of the Timbcrworkers'
Union, and from 1917 to 1928 the editor of the A.W.U. paper
the West Australian Worker. During 1929-1931 he was a member
of the A.W.U., which on the simple equation of political
attitude and union membership should place him among the
moderates of the Scullin Government; but as will be related,
he proved to be one of the foremost of the 'Caucus Radicals'
in 1930. and 1931. This example can be generalised to make the
point that a member's political attitudes, even in the narrow
field directly affecting union affairs, depended as much on
age, parliamentary experience and office, previous occupations,
and composition of his electorate, and life experience and
13environment as it did on union affiliation.
12
Bulletin, 28 August 1929; World, 21 November 1931.
13
An outstanding example will be found in Chapter VI, where 
the Caucus vote of 26 January 1931 on Theodore's reinstatement 
as Treasurer is discussed.
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C a n v a s s in g  f o r  p o s i t i o n s  i n  C a b in e t  b e f o r e  t h e
Caucus m e e t in g  o f  22 O c to b e r  was i n t e n s e ,  th o u g h  d i s j o i n t e d
b e c a u s e  members had  n o t  m et i n  Caucus s i n c e  12 S e p tem b e r ,
s i n c e  when Caucus members had  been  much e n l a r g e d .  L obbying
was t h e r e f o r e  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  S t a t e s  and i n  C a n b e r ra
d u r in g  t h e  day o r  tv/o b e f o r e  t h e  m e e t in g .  Both  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
( J . J .G r a v e s )  and t h e  O r g a n i s e r  (A .J .  McPherson) o f  t h e  N.S.W.
B ranch  o f  th e  P a r t y  w ere  i n  C a n b e r ra  b e f o r e  t h e  m e e t in g  t o
lobby  f o r  t h e  C a b in e t  ' t i c k e t '  c i r c u l a t e d  by t h e  N.S.W.
E x e c u t i v e .  A f u r t h e r  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  e x t r a -
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  A .L .P .  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  C a b in e t
was g iv e n  on t h e  m o rn ing  o f  22 O c to b e r  when an anonymous
14c i r c u l a r  was d e l i v e r e d  t o  e a c h  member. The c i r c u l a r  was an
a t t a c k  on Coleman (M.H.R. f o r  R e id ,  N .S .W . , s in c e  1 9 2 2 ) ,  who 
was r e g a r d e d  a s  a  p o s s i b l e  member o f  C a b i n e t .  Coleman was t h e n  
t h i r t y - s e v e n ,  a P r o t e s t a n t ,  a  fo rm e r  member o f  t h e  Seam ans ' Union 
and an e x - o f f i c i a l  o f  t h e  C l e r k s '  Union and  a s e l f - e d u c a t e d  man 
who was s t u d y i n g  f o r  a l a w - d e g r e e .  He w as , i n  J . T .  L a n g 's  w o rd s ,  
'o n e  o f  t h e  b r i g h t e s t  i n t e l l e c t s  o f  t h e  P a r t y T h e  c i r c u l a r  
a t t e m p t e d  to  c o u n t e r  C o lem an 's  a d v a n ta g e s  by r e p r o d u c in g  a
-14
15
B r i s b a n e  C o u r i e r , 23 O c to b e r  1929.
J . T .  L ang, The G r e a t  B u s t :  The D e p r e s s io n  o f  t h e  T h i r t i e s , 
Sydney , 1962 , p .1 5 7 .
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newspaper article of June 1918 in which Coleman had 
exhorted young Australians to enlist and ‘take up the 
rifle'. Members were also reminded that Coleman was a 
volunteer in the Great War who had served in the Pay Corps. 
These were two accusations which may have been persuasive 
with the fiercely anti-conscriptionist and generally anti­
militarist majority of Caucus. Others would have been 
influenced by the inference in the circular that Coleman 
had been responsible for the disclosure of the N.S.W. ballot- 
box scandal of 1922. It is difficult to fix responsibility 
for this circular, but it is possible that it originated with 
the A.W.U. in N.S.W. But whatever its origin, Coleman was 
not elected to Cabinet. His trip to London in early 1930 
was regarded as compensation for this disappointment.
Caucus met at 11.00a.m. on 22 October, with 52 
members present. After an enthusiastic reception of cheers 
and singing for Scullin and a welcome and congratulations for 
new members, Scullin and Theodore were unanimously re-elected 
Leader and Deputy-Leader. Caucus then began filling the 
remaining eleven Cabinet positions. Senators Barnes and Daly, 
two A.W.U. stalwarts, were elected first (after a motion from
38
Theodore and Chifley that there be two Ministerial 
Representatives in the Senate had been carried, and an 
amendment from Daly and Barnes seeking three Senate 
representatives had been defeated).^0 After an adjournment 
for lunch the balloting continued. All Cabinet positions 
had been filled by 3.00 p.m., after a surprisingly short 
deliberation, indicative of the agreement in the F.P.L.P. on 
the composition of the Cabinet. The meeting adjourned again 
while Scullin allocated the thirteen portfolios and the chosen 
members were sworn in. Caucus met again in the evening and 
sat for several hours while the election for the various 
Party officials and nomination for Parliamentary positions was 
held.
17The first Scullin Ministry comprised:
J.H. Scullin: Prime Minister, Minister for External
Affairs, Ministry for Industry.
E.G. Theodore: Treasurer
16
Caucus, Minutes, 22 October 1929.
17
Changes in the Ministry and the Ministers and their various 
portfolios will be found in Appendix III.
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F. Brennan: Attorney-General
J.A. Lyons: Postmaster-General, Minister for 
Works and Railways
J.E. Fenton: Minister for Trade and Customs
A. Blakeley: Minister for Home Affairs
F. Anstey: Minister for Health
A.E. Green: Minister for Defence
P.J. Moloney: Minister for Markets and Transport
F.M. Forde: Honorary Minister
J.A. Beasley: Honorary Minister
Senator J.J.Daly: Vice-President of the Executive Council
Senator J. Barnes: Honorary Minister
Although he had not chosen its members Scullin had 
no great reason for dissatisfaction with the Caucus selection 
of his Ministers either on the grounds of competence or personal 
compatibility. (Though this does not mean that Caucus selected 
the best men). Left to make his own selection Scullin may have 
excluded Anstey or Beasley. Brennan, Moloney, Fenton, Blakeley 
and Barnes were all old friends; Lyons and Forde he knew and
liked. Daly was a newcomer to Parliament, elected to the Senate
40
in November 1928, but he was competent and malleable.
Theodore;s great talents would have meant his inclusion 
in any Labor Ministry of the time; Scullin placed great 
trust in him and depended heavily on his advice. Some of 
the later changes in the Ministry were not so closely in 
line with Scullin's wishes. Those of 1931 introduced McNeill, 
Chifley, Dooley, Holloway, and Culley. The first three 
might have been Scullin's own appointments. McNeill, who 
was Scullin's brother-in-law, was a staunch A.W.U. man, and 
he was numbered among the moderates of the F.P.L.P. Dooley 
also was a life-long member of the A.W.U. and a faithful 
Party man . Chifley, too, was a moderate and his record 
between 1929 and 1932 was an unrivalled one of complete and, 
most often, uncritical loyalty to Scullin and the A.L.P.
Holloway and Culley were less acceptable to Scullin, but by 
March 1931 after the defection of the Lyons and Beasley groups, 
the choice was a narrower one: the F.P.L.P. then numbered 
forty-one (thirty-five in the Representatives and six in the 
Senate); Anstey and Daly were in disfavour; McTiernan had gone; 
Mathews was very ill; Maloney was too old; Cusack was not capable 
and the Party was in turmoil. Despite the Premiers' Plan, the 
Party was less strife-ridden in June 1931 when the third and
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a^ o. last Cabinet change took place. The appointment of
L.L. Cunningham was a Caucus selection with which Scullin
could concur; Cunningham had nearly seven years experience
in Federal Parliament; he was a Catholic and like Scullin an
old member of and former organiser for the A.W.U., and, as the
member of the rural electorate ofGwydir, he was numbered
18among the more conservative members of the F.P.L.P. Of his 
eighteen Ministers Scullin might not have chosen four (Anstey, 
Beasley, Holloway and Culley) . Even had he had a free choice 
Scullin would have observed certain limitations and pressures 
and it is possible that any one of the four, or all of them, 
could have been among his own selections. The Caucus, for all 
its size, did not present a particularly wide range of talent. 
It is probable that Caucus selection of Cabinet avoided more 
problems than it created, great as the problems proved to be.
The Cabinet selected by Caucus in October 1929 has
been described as 'a victory for the Scullin-Theodore "ticket",
19which was also an A.W.U. ticket'. This was not so. Two
18
Cunningham had 'a very small interest in manufacturing 
concerns', (C.P.D., Vol. 128, (15 April 1931), p.826).
19
S. Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia, Melbourne, 1962, 
p.184.
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tickets were circulated, one produced by the N.S.W. Branch 
Executive and another by the A.W.U. organisation in N.S.W. 
Both listed twelve names for Cabinet and one for Speaker.
The two tickets are remarkably similar ,as the following lists show
N.S.W.-A.L.P. A.W.U.-N.S.W. The Cabinet
Scullin Scullin Scullin
Theodore Theodore Theodore
Blakeley Blakeley Blakeley
Brennan Brennan Brennan
Moloney Moloney Moloney
Lyons Lyons Lyons
Barnes Barnes Barnes
Daly Daly Daly
Forde Forde Forde
Curtin Curtin -
Coleman - -
Beasley - Beasley
- Fenton Fenton
- Cunningham -
- - Anstey
- - Green
(Makin) (Makin) (Makin-Speaker)
20
Age, 2 2 , 23 October 1929.
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This shows that neither ticket could claim a ‘victory1.
Ten of those selected appeared on both tickets. Curtin 
was on both but was not elected; while Anstey and Green 
were elected, though they did not appear on either ticket.
Two things became apparent from consideration of these 
tickets. The first is the surprising degree of agreement 
between them, which points to the wider degree of unanimity 
of the issue within Caucus (for the tickets were sponsored 
by rival and hostile groups within New South Wales). The 
second is the irrelevance of the tickets.
There were few surprises in the membership of 
Cabinet. The greatest departure from the expected was the 
inclusion of Green instead of Curtin. As the only representatives 
from Western Australia one or the other was certain of 
selection. Most newspaper reports had included Curtin in 
their lists of probable Ministers and mentioned him as amongst 
those rumoured to be certain of elevation. He had also been
included in both 'tickets' which circulated before the meeting.
44
When Curtin is compared with Green the only apparent 
differences are those of age - Green was sixty and Curtin 
was forty-four - and experience in the Federal Parliament, 
where Green had seven years and Curtin only one. In both 
ways Green was more typical of the full Cabinet, whose 
members had an average age of fifty and an average of nine 
years in Federal politics. In addition, Green was aIcolorful 'character', who rejoiced in the nickname ‘Texas'
and enjoyed popularity among his colleagues as an old style
radical, loyal party man and genial fellow, By contrast
Curtin, a relative newcomer, was thoughtful and intense,
somewhat withdrawn, and inclined to a sharper, more informed
radicalism. These qualities may have prejudiced his chances
in a Party noted for its suspicion of critical intellect, and
its appreciation of 'mateyness'. Curtin was also a heavy
21drinker and an ex-catholic turned free-thinker, two things 
which are said to have alienated Scullin, who was an 
ardent Catholic and a teetotaller.
21
Useful comments on Curtin by those who knew him will be 
found in John Thompson (Ed.), 'John Curtin', On Lips of 
Living Men, Melbourne, 1962, pp.57-75.
The other surprise member in Cabinet was
J.A. Beasley, the thirty-three year old member for West 
22Sydney. His election was regarded as a concession to
the 'industrial wing' in the Party, and to the N.S.W. Branch:
he had appeared on the N.S.W. Labor Party ticket for
Cabinet and had enjoyed the support of Theodore, who later
claimed that he had been chiefly responsible for Beasley's
23inclusion in Cabinet. Even so, he was only an Assistant
Minister, though his portfolio was concerned with industrial 
affairs which meant that he was under Scullin's scrutiny. 
Scullin's sole innovation in the establishment of his Ministry 
was to remove^ the Ministry of Industry from the Attorney- 
General and attach it to the Prime-Minister's Department, where, 
Scullin considered, it would be removed from its previous 
legal atmosphere.
22
With J.J. Graves and 'Jock' Garden, Beasley had been an 
early member of the Communist Party of Australia, (Alastair 
Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History, 
California, 1969, p.29); during 1930 and 1931 he was a member 
of the Committee of the International Class War Prisoners'
Aid organisation; Senator Rae was President of the Committee 
and James, M.H.R., was also a member (as was Garden); in 1930 
and 1931 he was, with J.T. Lang, one of the six members of the 
Board of Directors of the Labor Daily, (Printer,10 January 
1930, 8 January 1932) .
World, 30 November 1931.
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The Cabinet was predominantly Catholic, with 
eight of its thirteen members (61%) of that religion,
24compared with the 45% Catholic composition of Caucus. It is
as difficult to know what to make of this connection as it
is with union affiliation, for the intensity of religious
belief and the influence of religious teachings must remain
unknown, often to the individual himself. Scullin, Beasley,
and Lyons were practising members of their faith and its
influence on their values was probably strong; this was also
true of Brennan, Daly and Forde. It is tempting to see the
Ministry's record of book banning as evidence of moral-
religious rigidity, especially its treatment of Norman
Lindsay's 'Red Heap' in 1930, which was banned by Forde, with
25Scullin's support. But this was no more than a part of
the general Australian puritism reflected by all Governments 
of the time, and intensified by the Depression. So far as 
policy and action are concerned the Scullin Ministry and 
Government did nothing that might be interpreted as specifically
24
Crisp and Bennett, Op.Cit.
25
For the 'Red Heap' episode, see, Peter Coleman, Obscenity, 
Blasphemy, Sedition: Censorship in Australia, Brisbane,
ND. pp.21-23.
47
Catholic and the record agrees with the comment of the
historian Patrick O'Farrell:
The Labor Government, led by Catholic James 
Scullin^1929-1931^did as much for Catholic 
policies as the non-Labor government led by 
the Catholic Joseph Lyons, 1931-9 - that is, 
nothing. 26
Catholicism is more properly seen in its influence
admittably unmeasurable, on individuals in the Ministry and
Parliamentary Party. Thus it probably contributed to the
ending of conscription, the several gestures to Australian
nationalism, the hesitation over any matter which touched
the infant'threat' of internal communism, and in generally
reinforcing the Party's inclination to disregard its own
27Socialist Objective.
One of the main channels of Catholic influence was
through Dr. Mannix, Archbishop of Melbourne. Niall Brennan,
Frank Brennan's son, related that his father would often
return from Canberra and exclaim 'I'll go and have a yarn with
the Arch', and that Mannix often 'helped a confused or doubtful 
26
Patrick O'Farrell, The Catholic Church in Australia, A Short 
History: 1788-1967, Sydney, 1968, p.258.
27
See the discussion in James G. Murtagh, Australia the Catholic 
Chapter, Sydney, revised edition 1959, pp.163-66.
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public man to sort out his own thoughts; by question,
28by analysis, by stating his problem for him'.“ Mannix
was especially close to Scullin and Brennan, who, with
29other members of the Ministry and the Party, often sought
his advice, and Mannix 'occasionally... attended gatherings
where views could be exchanged more frankly them was possible
30with the press present'. As NiaU Brennan says, ‘how far
he influenced these men will never be known, for it cannot
31be measured; that he did so cannot be denied'. We may,
however, suggest that the advice offered was not discordant 
with the general approach of most Labor parliamentarians at 
most times, whether they were Catholic or not; that Mannix 
counselled caution in major political, economic and social 
affairs.
28
Niall Brennan, Dr. Mannix, Adelaide, 1964, p.234.
29
According to Niall Brennan, P. Moloney and Fenton were also 
friends of Archbishop Mannix, (Ibid, pp.230-1); a member of 
the Opposition called out to McGrath in the H. of R., 'Probably 
if it were a statement by Dr. Mannix, you would view the matter 
differently. (C.P.D., Vol. 128, 25 March 1931 , p.676).
30
Brennan, Op.Cit., p.232.
31
Ibid.
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While the association of Mannix and members
of the Scullin Government was fairly open, the influence
of the Melbourne financier John Wren was more tenuous and
vague, and generally regarded as more sinister. Wren, a
staunch Catholic, was known as a friend and confidant of 
32Mannix. However, there is no suggestion that Wren's
association with the members of the Scullin Government was
religious in tone. Rather it rested on a direct financial
connection, both with the Party and individual Labor
Parliamentarians and officers which was held to be closest in
the State Labor parties, particularly in Victoria and 
33Queensland. By its nature, this connection is most difficult
to trace. Wren's substantial donation (£1,000) to the timber
34workers' strike is an indication of his sympathies. He also
32
Ibid., pp.90-3, 179-80.
33
The following is one of many allegations made in 1930 and 
1931: when the H.of R. was debating the Fiduciary Notes Issue 
Bill, Gabb - who had left the F.P.L.P. only a few weeks before - 
moved an amendment:
Treasury notes shall bear the impress of the 
photographs of John Wren, William Mahoney, Randolph 
Bedford and "Sugar" Roberts in each corner... and the 
impress of the photograph of the Treasurer of the 
Commonwealth in the centre of each note... the printed 
border of such note shall consist of the impress of 
Old Court Whiskey bottles.
(C.P.D., Vol. 128, (26 March 1931), p.665)
34
Argus, 6 March 1930; Australian Worker, 12 March 1930.
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appears to have assisted the Geelong Trades and Labor 
35Council. His name was mentioned several times in
Parliament, where members of the Opposition alleged that
a company in which Wren had a substantial interest, Federal 
3 8Distilleries,'" had been favoured by tariff manipulation,
and that a Minister or Ministers had 'leaked1 tariff chances 
37to that firm. Apart from these rather vague references
no direct connection with the Federal Labor Party has been 
established.
There can be little doubt that- Scullin was
acquainted with Wren, most likely through their mutual
friendship with Mannix. There is equally little doubt, despite
38Lang's assertion to the contrary, that Wren's political 
influence with Scullin was very small, if not totally non­
existent. Scullin's whole life and political career, and
many witnesses, speak against such an influence, though it is
35
Geelong Trades and Labor Council, Minutes, 27 May 1930,
15 September 1931.
36
C.P.D., Vol. 132, (18 November 1931), p.1738; Federal
Distilleries placed several full page advertisements in the 
Labor press in 1929 which spoke highly of the Labor 
Government; Labor Call, 12 December 1929; Australian Worker,
18 December 1929.
37
C.P.D., Vol. 122, (20 November-13 December 1929), pp.290, 420, 
497, 1025, 1069-70; Vol.132, (18 November 1931), pp.1737-46;
Vol. 129, (23 April - 4 June 1931), pp.1766, 1793, 1849.
38
Lang, Op.Cit., pp.97, 156, 277, 329.
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possible that the element of naivity and innocence in 
Scullin's character would make him susceptible to rumours 
based on guilt by association. This is not the case with 
two other Ministers whose names have been linked with Wren, 
and with these two, Anstey and Theodore, there is some little 
evidence of a closer association.
Anstey was a veteran radical in the Party, of whom
Tom Mann wrote in 1923, 'Frank is a man of moods . Should a
real revolutionary movement take place in Australia, and Frank
be in a cheerful mood, he will stick at nothing, but will go 
39the whole hog'. Mann spoke of the Anstey of the pre-1914
era. Since then Anstey's fervour had diminished, but he
remained a radical, particularly on economic matters. His
writings on the Money Power were widely read and quoted; though
crude by later standards they are forceful and intelligent,
40with evidence of wide reading, and they helped give him 
special standing in the Federal Party (of which he was Deputy-
39
Tom Mann's Memoirs, London 1967, (1st ed. 1923), p.160.
40
Among the books and pamphlets produced by Anstey are 
Kingdom of Shylock, Money Power, Democracy and Monopoly, Red 
Europe, In the Good Old Days and Facts and Theories of Finance.
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leader from 1922 to 1927). Anstey was an outstanding 
orator, in a Party which contained many gifted speakers.
He was also, in the testimony of one observer, a man of 
attractive personality: F.C. Green wrote:
I liked him because he was generous and tolerant. 
There was nothing petty or devious in his make-up.
He was governed by neither fear nor desire, and 
you could believe what he said. He interested 
me because he never ceased to fight for the cause 
in which he believed... . 41
J.T. Lang makes similar statements in the second volume of
his autobiography, where Anstey is one of the few members of
the Scullin Government to escape Lang's scathing criticisms,
and the only one on whom he bestows his praise and approval,
42naming Anstey as 'Australia's great commoner'. In short,
Anstey was the epitome of the 'good Labor man'. Yet at the
time of his elevation to Cabinet in 1929 Anstey was past his
best. Like a number of members of the F.P.L.P. his health 
43was poor. He had spent nineteen years in the Federal
41
F.C.Green,'Frank Anstey - the Man I Knew', Overland, No.32, 
August 1965, p.17.
42
Lang, Op .cit., p.110.
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Australian Worker, 25 December 1929.
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Parliament and had grown tired, and disillusioned with the
lack of idealism in the Party and the opportunism of some
of its members, especially that of Theodore. Nevertheless,
Anstey and Theodore were in a sense, through their connections
with Wren, business associates. Anstey spent several weeks
of December 1930 and January 1931 visiting the goldfields 
44in New Guinea, a strange resort for a Minister of Health
and Repatriation, but not for the holder of mining shares.
Anstey held 25,000 shares in the Upper Watut Goldmine, while
45John Wren held 75,000 of the total of 104,000.
Theodore was intellectually Anstey*s superior, 
and his debating equal, though Theodore lacked the popular, 
emotional appeal of Anstey. Anstey the socialist visionary 
and Theodore the political pragmatist had little in common, 
except their apparent inability to live on their income as 
politicians. Like a great many members of the Labor Party, 
they had no family endowments, or professional training: if
they lost their parliamentary position they might, once again,
44 1
Argus, 27 January 1930.
45
Smith*s Weekly, 5 April 1930.
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fall back into the ranks of the workers, a transmission 
which age and acquired standards and habits might make 
painful. In Anstey's case those considerations may be 
part of the explanation for the dubious association with 
Wren, but it is unlikely that this is so with Theodore, 
who it seems was by nature an astute, if unscrupulous, 
businessman; a man who combined talent for accumulating 
money with the aggressive drive to realise on that talent; 
a man who in fact was not unlike Wren in his ability to rise 
from the working class and on an individual basis expropriate 
some of the wealth of the expropriators: indeed, with a 
little imagination it is not difficult to see Wren and Theodore 
in reversed roles.
Theodore began to accumulate his personal fortune 
46during the 1920s. He had shareholdings in Mt.Isa Mines, a
company in which Wren also had considerable holdings. Wren 
appeared as a witness before the Royal Commission which 
investigated the allegations of bribery surrounding Theodore 
and Dailey Federal Parliamentary seat. The Commissioners
46
Theodore's career is dealt with in greater detail in 
Chapter IV.
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Report does not say where the money to buy the seat
came from, but it is thought that Wren was the benefactor.
Although Theodore's affairs came under close, critical
scrutiny in 1929 and 1930 no direct relationship between
Wren and Theodore was made public, though Theodore's holding
47of 12,000 shares in various Brisbane companies, his
48ownership of a small sugar caneplantation in Queensland ,
and the fact that he had paid £4,850 for a fine house at 
49Kirribiili Point, were commented on. But all such snipes
were eclipsed by Theodore's involvement in the Mungana
scandal. The evidence of the Wren-Theodore connection reappears
after Theodore left Parliament when they were associated in
gold mining ventures, mainly in the Pacific Islands.^0 The
51relationship remained strong through the 1930s and 1940s, 
and it seems that it was no less so during the 1920s.
47
C .P.D., Vol. 132, (23 September 1931), pp.206-9.
48
Smith's Weekly, 29 March 1930.
49
Australian Worker, 3 September 1930.
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The association continues through the sons of both men 
and their shareholdings and directorships in mining companies, 
including the Emperor, Loloma and Great Boulder Companies, 
(Business Who's Who of Australia 1969, Sydney, 1969, pp.199,238; 
Who's Who in Australia 1965, Melbourne, ND, p.834).
51
See Curtin's story of telephone calls from Wren - ‘This Bill 
hits Mr.Theodore and myself very severely, and I want you to 
do something about it' - in L.F. Crisp, Op.Cit., p.158, FN.4
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However, even if substantial evidence could be 
produced of close financial connections between Wren and . 
Theodore and Anstey, and the other Federal Parliamentarians, 
such relationships are essentially the same as those more 
extensive ones which have existed between non-Labor 
parliamentarians and diverse business interests; and these 
connections, though little publicised, have been accepted 
as not abnormal in Australian politics. The distinction made 
is twofold. First, Wren was disreputable, suspected of 
criminality, and distasteful to those who had achieved wealth 
and respectability. Secondly, there was the feeling that 
members of the Labor Party were men of principle, reformers 
who wished to transform society and make Australia a land 
where liberty, equality and fraternity might flourish. And 
for such men to pluck the fruits of capitalism while propounding 
the reed to change that system seemed to show cynicism. 
Nevertheless, the records suggest that few men in the Labor 
Party or the trade unions regarded Wren's Labor Party associates 
with anything other than respect and admiration; and it seems 
that most in the Australian Labor movement felt no great ill 
will towards their representatives when they 'made a bit on the 
side', providing they also did their best to advance the 
economic interests of the working class.
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As we shall see, the trade unions were 
principally concerned with the economic interests of their 
own members. A union took some pride and a little 
reassurance in having one of its members in Federal Parliament 
and even more, a member in the Ministry. As' already 
described, union affiliation is no easy matter to fix, nor, 
being fixed, to evaluate. Yet it is necessary to consider 
the major influence. This was the A.W.U.
At least four members of the first Scullin 
Ministry were members of the A.W.U. Blakeley and Barnes had 
the closest connections, and indeed they owed their political 
career principally to that Union. Senator Daly was also a 
member of many years standing. Scullin was a former A.W.U. 
organiser, a former editor of an A.W.U. newspaper (the 
Ballarat Echo), and was, as Prime Minister, still a member of 
the Union. (Theodore had had many years association with the 
A.W.U. and was still, if not a member, sympathetic to A.W.U. 
views, although he was not at peace with the A.W.U. in New 
South Wales). The change in the Ministry in March 1931
increased the A.W.U. strength to six, when McNeill and Dooley
58
were included. And the third Ministry, from June 1931
to until the end, increased the number to seven, after
the inclusion of Cunningham, who was, like Dooley and
McNeill a Catholic, and a man with many years of activity
52in the A.W.U. As Encel has noted, this three step 
increase in A.W.U. strength was concurrent with an increase 
in the number of Catholics in the Ministry from eight to 
nine in March 1931 (despite the loss of Lyons) to ten in 
June 1931.
Thus the Ministry elected in October 1929 was 
predominantly Catholic, drawn mainly from Victoria and 
New South Wales, middle-aged, without much formal education, 
(only Brennan and Daly, as lawyers, had reached tertiary 
level), and lacking in Ministerial experience. The average 
length of service in Federal Parliament was nine years. None 
had held Federal Ministerial office before, though Theodore 
and Lyons had been State Premiers. There is, however, no 
reason to believe that this lack of experience was the cause
52
S. Encel, 'The Political Elite in Australia', Readings in 
Australian Government, edited by Colin A. Hughes, Queensland, 
1968, pp.95-6; note that the figures given above do not agree 
with those given by Encel.
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of any significant weakness in Labor's ability to govern.
It should be remembered that in the Curtin Ministry elected
in October 1941 only four of the nineteen Ministers had
53previously held Federal Office, yet that Ministry's 
record was a distinguished one.
Cabinet held its first meeting on 23 October, the 
first of a series of meetings which continued through 
October, November and into December 1929, resumed in late 
January 1930 and continued thereafter on a regular basis. 
Parliament, on the other hand, between the swearing-in of 
the Ministry on 22 October and the opening of the first full 
period on 6 March 1930, met only briefly between 20 November 
and 13 December 1930. And Caucus, after its meeting of 22 
October, did not meet again for three weeks, when on 13 November 
it began a series of seven weekly meetings, dispersing on 
12 December 1929, not to meet again until 5 March, eighty days 
later. Thus in the first eighteen weeks or so after the 
Government took office the Cabinet met frequently, perhaps 
thirty or forty times, while Caucus met seven times, deliberating
53
Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941, 
Canberra, 1952, p.519.
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together for a total time of about twenty-four hours.
One effect of this was effectively to widen the gap 
between the Ministry and the Caucus by impressing Ministers 
with the gravity of the practical problems facing the 
Government, and hence increasing their sense of responsibility 
and group solidarity.
Before the first Cabinet meeting Scullin told press
reporters that 'there were so many urgent problems that they
54hardly knew where to begin'. The greatest problem was
national finance, a problem made more dramatic by the Wall 
Street collapse of 24 October and the international financial 
panic in the following days. The difficulties ahead were 
foreshadowing at a meeting of the Commonwealth Loan Council on 
11 November, when Theodore explained that as the money market 
was tight and interest rates very high the Federal Government 
recommended continuation of the economy arrangement of August 
1929. The Council resolved:
54
The pressure of business was so great that Brennan had to 
tell the Watersiders that '... so far a thorough review of 
[the W.W.F.s] position had not been possible, owing to other 
equally pressing matters of importance claiming the attention 
of Cabinet'. W.W.F., Minutes of Half-yearly [Federal] Committee 
of Management, 18 November 1929.
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That in the difficult monetary conditions 
existing in Australia and overseas... it 
would be quite impracticable to raise 
sufficient loan moneys to permit any increase 
in the loan programme of the respective 
Governments. 55
This meant that the Federal Government would not inaugurate 
any large-scale 'pump priming' public works programme to 
reduce unemployment. The editorial writer for the Age 
commented:
... the latest meeting of the Council should 
do much to lay the election bogey that the 
Federal Labor Government has no sense of 
financial responsibility... 56
Tnis was a comment which must have sung sweetly in the ears of
some, and added reassurance to the earlier comments on unnamed
57Ministers that 'no hasty or drastic changes would be made'.
The Government's immediate programme was put 
before Caucus on 13 and 14 November. Scullin and Theodore 
spoke at length on the financial position, and the proposed
55
Argus, 12 November 1929.
56
Age, 12 November 1929.
57
Argus, 26 October 1929.
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revision of the Estimates. Debate on finance continued
over the two days. During the ten hours of discussion
58thirty-six of the forty-three members present spoke.
The debate took the form which was to be common in Caucus 
meetings over the next two years: Ministers outlined their 
proposals and stressed their inability to do more, either 
for financial, constitutional or political reasons (i.e. 
Opposition control of the Senate), and held to their analysis 
under questioning. Later, in 1930 and 1931, there were 
fiery clashes on financial policy, which sometimes descended 
into shouting matches. But except for a brief period at the
end of 1930/ Cabinet retained its ascendancy over Caucus in
V.all major issues.
The first of many disagreements on financial
policy was aired on 13 November, when several members pressed
the Government to overcome the scarcity of funds by an
59inflation of the note-issue. This policy had minority
58
Caucus, Minutes, 13, 14 November 1929.
59
Age, 14 November 1929.
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support in Caucus throughout the Government's term of
office; its most vociferous advocate was Yates, and the
number of its advocates gradually increased. However, even
in the relatively calm days of 1929 and early 1930 it was
generally thought of as one of the money fallacies and the
suggestion received scant attention from the Ministry and
60the majority of Caucus. Caucus did, however, make a
gesture toward smoothing the disquiet concerning the lack 
of a specifically Labor financial approach by appointing as 
a committee Scullin, Theodore and Anstey to investigate 
'Australian banking conditions and monetary matters in 
general, and also to enquire into and recommend regarding the 
future of the Commonwealth Bank'^.
60
Theodore's comments are typical of the prevailing opinion: 
'... to issue more paper money, as some people suggested, 
would be an evil infinitely worse than the remedy. Every 
worker in the land would be robbed. It would be foolish 
to reduce the purchasing power of money,and that was what 
inflation would bring about...', (Australian Worker, 5 
February 1930); In May 1930 Theodore rejected Yates' scheme 
as 'not practicable', (Caucus, Minutes, 15 May 1930).
Age,
61
15 November 1929.
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A seco n d  Caucus com m ittee  was e l e c t e d  a t
tn e  m e e tin g  o f  12 D ecem ber when on th e  m o tio n  o f
B la k e le y  ana  W est (b o th  N.S.W. r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s )  i t  was
d e c id e d  to  e s t a b l i s h  an I n d u s t r i a l  C om m ittee ' t o  a c t  i n
c o n ju n c t io n  w i th  th e  A tto rn e y -G e n e ra l  and th e  M in i s t e r
x o r I n d u s t r y ' .  The f o u r te e n  members w e re , w ith  t h e
e x c e p t io n  o f  M cT iem an , draw n from  th o s e  i n  th e  F .P .L .P .
w ith  th e  c l o s e s t  t r a d e - u n io n  a s s o c i a t i o n s ;  th e  A .W .u . had
th e  s t r o n g e s t  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  w i th  th e  i n c l u s io n  o f  f o u r
o f  i t s  s ta u n c h  members (R io rd a n , M a rte n s , M cN eill and  
6 3
N e ls o n ) .  The com m ittee  d e p a r te d  from  th e  u s u a l  F .P .L .P .  
p r a c t i c e  i n  t h a t  s t a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  was n o t  e q u a l .  S o u th  
A u s t r a l i a  had  no r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ;  New S o u th  W ales had  f i v e  
and  V i c to r i a  f o u r  ( th u s  r e v e r s in g  th e  s t a t e  r a t i o  o f  C a b in e t  
M i n i s t e r s ) : Q u e e n s la n d  tw o ; and T asm an ia , W este rn  A u s t r a l i a  
and th e  N o r th e rn  T e r r i t o r y  one e a c h . Such C aucus c o m m ittee s  
w ere n o t  w i th o u t  p r e c e d e n t .  when L ab o r was o u t  o f  o f f i c e
was n o rm a lly  d iv id e d  i n t o  a  g ro u p  o f  c o m m itte e s , t o  th e
^ C a u c u s ,  M in u te s , 12 Decem ber 1929; ^ e ,  13 Decem ber 1929 .
( S e c r e t ^ v ) 0 ^ ^ 6 COm-D r is e d :  « c T ie rn a n  (C h a irm an ), Keane 
( r e t a r y )  , E l d n d g e ,  L a z z a r in i ,  c h i f l e y ,  R ae, H ollow av
L e w is , M c N e ill ,  R io rd a n , M a rte n s , C u r t in ,  N e lso n , C u l l e y '
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number of six in 1929, * to watch over the work of the
various Ministries. (There had also been a standing
Publicity Committee in 1929 and an F.P.L.P. Executive of 
65twelve). A number of temporary ad hoc Caucus committees
were elected during 1929-1931 to consult on Bills or consider
special problems; an example of the former was the committee
of F.P.L.P. lawyers (Brennan, McTiernan and Crouch)
established to consider the constitutional Bills of early
1930;66 an example of the latter was the Finance and
Unemployment Committee of seven members - comprised of three
nominated Ministers (Scullin, Theodore and Anstey) and four
6 7elected non-Ministers, (Holloway, Tulley, Yates and Keane).
An attempt was made in March 1931 to regularise the position 
of Caucus committees. E.C. Riley and Riordan moved 
unsuccessfully for the appointment of four permanent Caucus 
committees. Each was to be of three members, with power to 
co-opt, and they were to examine all the relevant Bills
6prepared for submission to Caucus and other related matters.
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Caucus, Minutes, 29 August 1929.
65 Ibid., 7 March, 5 February 1929.
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Ibid., 13 March 1930.
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The only permanent Caucus committee was the 
Industrial Committee established in December 1929. it had 
its origins ir. the need for a group in the F.P.L.P. to 
consult with and deliberate on the proposals of the trade 
unions for amendments to the Arbitration Act and similar
legislation, its establishment was also a response to the 
industrial problems on the waterfront and the northern 
N.S.W. coalfields. The coalfields lockout created 
considerable difficulty for the Government and some dissatisfaction 
within Caucus, which devoted two complete meetings to the 
problem, on '28 November and 3 December. The seven Caucus 
meetings of November-December 1929 seem to have devoted 
rougnly half as much time to discussing the coal lockout as
they did to debating national finance and general Government 
poncy. Tms is perhaps an indication of the general inability 
of Caucus to comprehend the larger issues, especially in face 
of tne Ministry's more intimate acquaintance with such issues, 
and also the more intimate association of the majority of
Caucus with the cause of trade unionism, and the engagement of 
their more immediate sympathies.
Before Parliament met on 20 November the Ministry 
haa already taken some action. The principal and most
67
controversial change was the suspension of compulsory
military training. This had been promised in Scullin’s
69election policy speech of November 1928, though not in that
of September 1929. The decision to suspend training was made
70at a Cabinet meeting in Canberra on 31 October. Earlier,
Green, Minister of Defence, had equivocated on the matter, only
to be publicly rebuked by McGrath for making an 'ill-advised'
71statement. McGrath said that abolition was a fundamental
plank1 of the Labor Platform (which it was) and that whatever
the Minister might say, compulsory training would vanish before
Christmas. The Ministry did not discuss the matter with
72Caucus, nor did it consult the Defence Department.
Despite the 1 complete surprise’ of the Argus, the
action was not unexpected. The Labor tradition since 1916-17
74was one of the utmost hostility to conscription; particularly
69
Argus, 5 October 1928.
70
Argus, 1 November 1929.
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Argus, 29 October 1929.
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Argus, 14 November 1929; C.P.D., Vol. 122, p.307.
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Argus, 2 November 1929.
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K.S.Inglis, ’Conscription in Peace and War, 1911-1945’;
R.Forward and B.Reece, Conscription in Australia, Brisbane, 1968,p.46.
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it seems, during the period 1929-1931 and especially in the
Victorian Branch of the Party. Eleven members of Caucus had
been among the anti-conscriptionist Federal Labor members in
751916 (and seven of these were Victorians), while many 
others had been active in the anti-conscription campaign,
7 oamong whom were Scullin, Theodore, Rae, Curtin and Holloway.
Only a handful of the fifty-four members of the F.P.L.P.
77were ex-servicemen. The Opposition contained many with
extensive experience of war, and the previous Ministry had at 
least seven ex-officers. By contrast, not one member of the 
Scullin Ministry had enlisted in 1914-1918. Thus, although 
the Government made much of the reduction in expenditure which 
the new system of voluntary training would bring, suspension 
was, as its timing suggests, primarily a matter of faith, This 
action created much goodwill for the Government in the trade
75
Anstey, Brennan, Fenton, McGrath, Maloney, Moloney, Mathews 
and E. Riley, Watkins, West and Yates; H.McQueen, 'Who were 
the Conscriptionists? Notes on Federal Labor members, Labour 
History, No.16, May 1969, p.46.
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See, L.C. Jauncey, The Story of Conscription in Australia, 
Melbourne, 1968, (first ed. 1935).
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Probably not more than seven; among them were Crouch, Coleman, 
Jones, E.C. Riley (son of the anti-conscriptionist E. Riley), 
‘Digger1 Dunn and 'Gunner1 Yates.
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unions, who showered the Government with .resolutions of
congratulation. Although the training system had already
been curtailed under the Bruce-Page Government in the late 
7 81920s, the change provoked some savage debate in Parliament, 
during which insults were freely exchanged.
Parliament met on 20 November and adjourned on
13 December 1929, after both the House of Representatives and
the Senate had sat for fourteen days. The Government
introduced eleven Bills, all but one of which were concerned
with routine matters. The exception was the Commonwealth
Bank Bill. This Bill, the Government's only major legislative
measure between October 1929 and March 1930, was the child of
the Commonwealth Bank Board. It was the result of a letter
79from Sir Robert Gibson to Theodore in October. During
consultation between Scullin, Theodore and Gibson, Gibson urged 
that the Government take action to control the export of gold
78
K.S. Inglis, Op.Cit., p.46.
79
The letter has been published in E. Shann and D. Copland 
(eds.), The Crisis in Australian Finance 1929 to 1931, pp.1-3.
70
by placing control of all Australian gold movements in the
80hands of the Commonwealth Bank. The Government drafted
81a Bill, submitted it to the Bank, which recommended seme 
82alteration, “ and then to Parliament. The measure became law 
83on 17 December.
Although the Government acted on the advice of
the Commonwealth Bank the Bank Bill was much criticised by
Australian financial institutions and met spirited criticism
from the Opposition in Parliament. The debate on the Bill
defined the Opposition's attitude to Labor's economic legislation
84during the next two years. It was an attitude of the utmost
80
The economic implications of the Act are explained in 
C.B. Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression, Sydney, 1970, 
pp.122-6; its main effect was to remove Australia from the Gold 
Standard, though this was not generally acknowledged until much 
later in 1930.
81
Theodore's brief explanation of the Bill in Caucus was made 
during a meeting otherwise devoted entirely to the coal dispute; 
Caucus, Minutes, 28 November 1929.
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L.F.Giblin, The Growth of a Central Bank, Melbourne, 1951, p.66
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Which was too late to thwart evasive action, involving over two 
million pounds, taken by two banks; S.J.Butlin, Australia and New 
Zealand Bank, London, 1961, p.394.
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C.P.D., Vol. 122, (20 November-13 December 1929), H.of R. ,
2nd rdg., pp.427-30, 596-626, 698-717; Senate, 2nd rdg., pp.885- 
914, 974-1004.
suspicion of Labor's intentions. Despite Labor's impotence
C nvnin the Senate and the mmmm&ssxm of the depression there was 
a general theory of Labor wickedness which held that Labor 
was bent on the rapid destruction of the existing order by 
subterfuge, using 'political control of banking' as the chief 
weapon. Doubtless this was non-labor's reaction to and 
counterpart of the widespread belief, in the Labor movement, 
in the Money Power Conspiracy. Both views were deeply embedded, 
and propounded with sincere conviction, though probably with'S* 
more justification in the case of the Labor attitude. Despite 
confessed and apparent ignorance of economics both applied and 
theoretical, both camps remained convinced and the events of 
1929-1931 served only to reinforce both sides in the rightness 
of their beliefs.
The Opposition criticised the 1929 Bank Bill
because the Government had not consulted the Banks and it was
not in the least reassured by Theodore's reply that he had
discussed the matter at length with A.C. Davidson, Manager of
85the Bank of New South Wales. The Opposition's remarks, then
85
Ibid., (4 December 1929), p.707.
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as later, were founded on the conviction that Labor if not 
utterly malevolent in its intentions, was ignorant and 
incapable because it had no experience of business and 
financial matters. There were frequent allegations that the 
Bill was the first step toward nationalisation of banking, 
wild inflation of the note issue and the destruction of all 
normal values. These fears were not assuaged by Theodore’s 
November revision of the Estimates, which budgeted for greater 
expenditure, using an increase in super tax, income tax and 
customs and excise duties. During his speech Theodore espoused 
the Keynesian notion of counter-cyclical spending on public 
works and expressed the Government's dissatisfaction with the 
system of credit control in Australia, under which the private 
trading banks which had:
in recent years almost exclusively arrogated 
to themselves the power to determine the bank, 
discount and exchange rates, and the extent to 
which credit shall be expanded or restricted; 
and, equally important, the classes of business 
and industry to which credit facilities shall 
be extended. 86
Ibid, (21 November 1929), p.116.
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Theodore said that the Government regarded credit
manipulation as a matter for Government control and would
therefore shortly 'give consideration to the question of
remodelling the Commonwealth Bank and increasing its scope 
8 7and function'.
A major issue facing the Government was
unemployment. One small gesture toward easing the problem
was taken when the Government opened negotiations with
Ramsay MacDonald's Government in Britain for the cesaation of
the '£34 million agreement' under which the Bruce-Page
Government had agreed to an assisted immigration scheme. Since
its inception it had been a thorn in the side of the Australian
trade unions and the A.W.U., with its large number of unskilled
88members, had been particularly vehement in its opposition.
87
Ibid.
88
See the A.W.U. Central Branch [N.S.W.], Annual Report 
and Balance Sheet, 1924, p.8; 1925, pp.11-2; 1926, p.9;
1927, p.ll; 1928, p.18 ('... we do offer strong objections 
to the swamping of Australia at a time of industrial depression 
and with a class that is repugnant to the ideals of a White 
Australia*); 1929, p.18; 1930, p.18.
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Opening negotiations to set aside the Agreement, as with 
abolition of compulsory military training, was a move which 
was in accord with the Government's drive to economy in 
expenditure, its stated policy, and the interests and 
sentiments of the movement. Issues of this kind were few 
and quickly exhausted, but they contributed to the brief 
honeymoon period which existed in these early months between 
the Government and the Party organisation.
A similar issue of agreement was the ‘Scullin
89tariff. Labor had long advocated high tariff protection.
The main appeal was the stimulation of Australian industry
and hence an increased level of employment, with subsidiary
benefits in the maintenance of a white Australia and increased
revenue. During the 1920's the Nationalist Party, and with
some qualifications, the Country Party, had also supported a
90high level of tariff protection. This, however, had not
prepared the Opposition for the extravangance of Labor's 
tariff policy of 1929-1931.
89
C. Goodwin, Economic Enquiry in Australia, North Carolina, 
U.S.A., 1966, pp.26-31.
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G. Greenwood, (ed.), Australia: A Social and Political History, 
Sydney, 1955, pp.295-6, 320.
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Tariffs had been high and rising during the
1920s, to the point in 1923 where 259 items carried duties
greater than forty per cent. An index designed to measure
tariff changes shows a rise from 108 in 1921-22 to 118 in
1923-29. But under the Scullin Government's tariff policy
the index soared in the three financial years from 1929-30
to 1931-32 from 155 to 181 to 194, a rate of increase and
91a level entirely without precedent. This was a
reflection of the strongly protectionist composition of the 
Federal Labor Party, and the widespread faith in the Labor 
movement in the capacity of tariff protection to generate 
employment, a faith which hardened as the Government found 
itself unable to legislate or initiate other expansionary 
economic measures. In addition, tariff manipulation was 
within the canon of economic orthodoxy, while credit 
expansion was not. Further, the Government could by-pass 
the Tariff Board and postpone parliamentary sanction for a 
considerable time. Thus the tariff was the principal 
Government measure to counter the effects of the depression 
on industry and employment.
91
W.M.Corden., 'The Tariff'; A. Hunter (ed.), The Economics 
of Australian Industry, Melbourne, 1963, p.186.
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After some vague discussion of the matter in
Caucus the first of sixteen alterations to the tariff was
tabled in Parliament on 21 November 1929. The Government
was enthusiastic, and so it seems were a host of manufacturers
and trade union officials. An extraordinary situation
developed as the Government was besieged by deputations from
employers and union officials, often acting jointly, seeking
92tariff protection. One day in early January 1930 Scullin
93was said to have received a deputation every fifteen minutes.
A few days later Forde, as Acting-Minister for Customs, was
reported to'be overwhelmed with requests to receive
deputations on the tariff, and the Argus printed the invitation:
'Anyone desiring to interview Mr. Forde is advised to
94communicate with his secretary (Central 5551)1. Canberra was
flooded with 'tariff touts' and ‘wherever two or three people
were gathered together in a quiet place, it was an easy wager
that one of them was a Labor member, and the others high tariff 
95advocates'. This was doubtless a heady experience for Labor
members.
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The effects of the tariff were strong, though
not immediate. Expenditure on imports fell from £146.8 million
in 1929-30 to £82.1 million in 1930-31, to a floor of
96£57.8 million in 1931-32. A major part of this decline was 
the result of the fall in internal purchasing power, rather 
than to the increased tariff and prohibition of imports, but 
the fall had by the end of 1931 corrected the Balance of 
Payments deficit, for which the Government took the credit. 
However, any effect the Scullin tariff had in stimulating 
employment was smothered by the more powerful contractionary 
pressures of falling export prices, the collapse of the loan 
market, and the resulting whirlpool of constriction, which 
was fed by self-generating economic pessimism.
Unemployment continued to increase steeply from
1929 until 1932. One long term effect of the Scullin tariff
was its contribution to the expansion of the manufacturing
97industry section of the economy. Probably this
contribution was operating in 1930 and 1931. The snag from
96
N.G. Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Investment and 
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97
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1966, (1st edn. 1944), pp.158-9.
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the Labor point of view was that even in the industries
sheltering under the tariff the Government was unable to
ensure that employees derived benefit, for the Government
could not make protection conditional on the upholding of
a certain level of wages and conditions, or on reduction
in prices. This was the old story of Leakin's 'New
Protection1. Constitutionally the Scullin Government could
do nothing but rely on the goodwill of the protected
employers, which in 1929-1931 was indeed a slim hope.
Scullin threatened to remove the protective umbrella from
99any manufacturer who violated the Government's trust.
There is no record of his having done so. Sections of the 
Labor movement voiced their disquiet at the injustice of the 
internal effects of the tariff. One example of this is 
seen in a wild resolution of the Labor Council of South 
Australia:
Argus, 30 November 1929.
99
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That in view of the serious unemployment
in Australia this Council requests the
Federal Government to pass amending
legislation to the tariff act whereby those
industries at present enjoying full tariff
protection shall contribute at least 15% of
the extra profits drawn through the operations
of the tariff to a national unemployment fund
[to be] subsidised by the Federal Government'. 100
[scullin promised that this suggestion 'will be
given the fullest consideration'•j 101
Nevertheless, throughout the Government's term of office 
individual trade unions, especially the smaller craft unions, 
pressed the Government for protection.
From its beginnings the Government was subject 
to severe criticism from the press and spokesmen for financial 
and business institutions. Comment from the Labor movement 
was biased in the opposite direction. During the first four 
or five months the Scullin Government was pricked occasionally 
by the Labor press and the trade unions for its neglect or 
hesitation ih some things, but with the exception of the coal 
dispute these tended to be minor and of a fairly narrow and 
sectional interest. In this early period the Labor movement
1ÖÖ
United Trades and Labor Council of South Australia,
Minutes, 4 April 1930.
101
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accepted that the Government had inherited a difficult 
economic situation; there was undoubtedly some sympathy 
within the State branches for the great difficulties facing 
the Federal Government. In part this was a reaction, drawing 
on the sentiment of solidarity, against non-labor criticism 
of the Government:
So far the Scullin Government has done fairly 
well. It has not satisfied everyone; but it 
has acted honestly, and has not been tempted 
by a desire for popularity to act impetuously 
.... Workers should not be ready to accept 
the accounts of the Government losing its grip 
on the Party, so prominent in the Vested Interest 
press. 102
Such reactions were also conditioned by the manner in which 
the Australian Labor Party was organised.
The Government elected in October 1929 brought 
with it no detailed Labor blue-print for action. The Party 
Platform was a curious hotch-potch of intentions which lacked 
cohesion and direction, a situation which caused the Federal 
Executive in 1928 to establish a sub-committee to tidy-up 
the text, after delegates criticised 'the superfluous wordings 
and ill-balanced statement of the Federal Platform', which 
102
South Australian Worker, 7 March 1930.
81
they felt led to 'confusion and misconstruction1.
However, no amount of textual tidying-up could make up for
the deficiencies of the programme as a guide to action for
the specific circumstances of 1929-31. Some of the Platform
104was plainly redundant. The Government could, for
example, enjoy the irony of that section which demanded the 
'restriction of public borrowing'. A more important example 
was the section 'Industrial Regulation'. The Government 
was pledged to carry through a drastic revision of the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration A c t , w h i c h  as 
amended in 1928, was a complicated, detailed piece of 
legislation. The Federal A.L.P. Platform devoted a considerable 
section to industrial regulation. Over half of this programme 
was devoted to intended amendments to the Workers' Compensation 
Act and the establishment of a Board of Trade. There was very
10 3
A.L.P. Federal Executive, Minutes, 14 February 1928 
(in the uncatalogued A.L.P.-W.A. 'Correspondence' held in the 
State Library of W.A.)
104
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105
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little in the remainder of the section on which the new 
Government might base its proposed amendments to the Act.
The trade unions were vitally concerned with the Government's 
intentions in this matter, and after an interval of time and 
not without some conflict the unions advised the government 
of their desires. But the Government had to wait on the 
recommendations of the movement, which, in this sphere, meant 
a delay of four months. In matters other than the industrial 
the delay was longer, the number of advising voices greater, 
the level of expertise much lower, the conflict of opinion 
deeper and wider, and gap between the Government's 
appreciation of what was practicable and the movement's 
approval of what was needed was very much greater.
The Federal Party was based on its six State 
Branches. Each State Branch differed in constitutional 
structure and, more importantly, and more subtly, in outlook.
At the extremes were the New South Wales and Tasmanian branches, 
where the State geographical, population and general economic 
and social differences were reflected in the character of the 
Party and trade unions. No two State Branches were exactly 
alike. The differences were not always great, or important, 
nor was it a matter of a simple predictable equation between,
83
for example, the degree of industrialisation and the 
level of 'militancy'. There was, however, sufficient 
disparity to make it difficult to distil a specific labor 
movement attitude to the Scullin Government. It was the 
task of the Federal Executive and Federal Conference to 
bring all sections and opinions together for analysis and 
judgement. But before discussing the deliberations of these 
two Federal authorities it will be fruitful to examine the 
attitude of the State Branches to their new Federal Government.
As Rawson says, the Labor movement in Western 
Australia between 1906 and 1963 was 'the most highly-integrated 
in the w o r l d T h e r e  was complete organisational fusion 
between the industrial and political wings of the Party. There 
was also, more than in any other State, a feeling in the Party 
no less than in the State generally of separation from Federal 
affairs. Numerically and financially the W.A. Branch was 
strongly influenced by the A.W.U., which controlled the only
1Ö6
D. Rawson, Labor in Vain?, Melbourne, 1966, p.20.
84
labor newspaper in the State. These circumstances made 
it one of the least critical of Party Branches between 
1929 and 1931. This quies^nce was reinforced by the 
provision in the Branch constitution for triennial State 
conferences (as in Queensland). Branches in other States, 
especially Victoria and South Australia - though not at this 
time in New South Wales - found Annual and Special Conferences 
a source of criticism and disruption. The record is an 
interesting one: during the two years 1930 and 1931, Queensland 
had no Conference; Western Australia had one (in May 1931 - 
before the Premiers' Plan); New South Wales and Tasmania held 
their normal Annual Conference in both years; while Victoria 
and South Australia, then under State Labor Governments, held 
four each (or, if the period extends to January 1932, five each), 
and these conferences, though primarily concerned with State 
matters,, were sources of criticism of the Federal Government.
This was particularly so in Victoria. In W.A. criticism was 
further dampened by the fact that the Party was to face a State 
election in April 1930. Before this the Party was too 
concerned with local matters and election campaigning to give 
more than slight attention to the efforts of the Scullin 
Government, while after the election (in which the Party was
I
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defeated) the State Party was happy to divert criticism
of the Federal Government to the non-Labor State Government,
in anticipation of the elections of 1933. This diversionary
tactic was also evident in Tasmania, where the State Party
was in Opposition from June 1928 until March 1934. It was
even more pronounced in Queensland during the Party's period
in Opposition between May 1929 and June 1932: a 'Labor back
to power' campaign began in mid-1930 and by February 1931 the
Queensland Central Executive sought a measure of isolation
from Federal Labor members because it considered that
Federal speakers 'would greatly hinder' their own attacks on
107the Queensland non-labor Government'. A striking example
of the Branch's attempt to isolate itself from the misdeeds
of the Scullin Government was seen in the debate in the
Queensland Parliament on the Premiers' Plan in July 1931, when
Labor repeatedly disowned the Federal Government, in terms which
suggested that there was no connection between the Federal
10 8Party and the State Branch. Although at times swamped by
other considerations - notably the coal dispute - this separation
107
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was also evident in the New South Wales Branch until the 
Lang Labor Government was established in October 1930.
The South Australian Branch was uncritical to 
the point of complete lack of interest until April 1930, when 
the Hill Labor Government took office. Thus there was in 
five States an initial period of at least five months when 
Federal Labor was relatively at peace with State Labor because 
the latter had good reasons of their own for avoiding conflict.
The Party in Western Australia refrained from 
criticism and asked little of the Scullin Government during the 
six months November 1929 to April 1930. Control of Party 
affairs was concentrated in the State Executive of thirty members 
and the four State Executive Officers. Both groups met 
separately, the former on eight and the latter on nine occasions 
during the six months. State affairs dominated these meetings. 
There was some discussion of the possibility of a double­
dissolution, the tariff as a cause of high prices, the coal
dispute, a Federal scheme for unemployment insurance, and a
109bonus on gold production. The direction of events, however,
109
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can be seen in the questioning, troubled note of a 
resolution carried by the State Executive on 22 April 1930:
That as the deflation of credit always acts to 
the disadvantage of the workers, the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party be asked what steps, 
if any, they are taking to resist the deflation 
now in the process throughout the Commonwealth. 110
Queensland Branch was dominated by the A.W.U.
That union conducted the affairs of the Branch with a 
secretiveness and aloof arrogance which mocked the Labor 
Party's hopes for participatory democracy in Party affairs.
The triennial 'Labor-in-Politics1 Convention met in 1928, not 
to gather again until 1932. The management of the Branch was 
ostensibly in the hand of the State Central Executive. This 
body met twice during the first six months of the Scullin 
Government, and only 14 times in all between September 1929 
and November 1931. Real power in the Branch was apparently in 
the hands of the tiny Executive Committee. In these 
circumstances and given that the State Party was in Opposition 
and campaigning strongly, even in 1930, for the 1932 elections, 
it is not surprising that the Queensland Branch and the two
TTÖ
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Labor papers in Queensland, both, under A.W.U. control, 
made none but the faintest criticism of the Federal 
Government.
The Party in South Australia also had strong 
links with the A.W.U., which claimed majority representation 
in the Hill Ministry. ~± ~1 ^  This influence was not as 
powerful as it was in Queensland and Western Australia, mostly 
because South Australia did not have the extensive pastoral, 
mining and bush industries of those States but also because, 
as in New South Wales, the A.W.U. was not affiliated with the 
principal Trades and Labor Council and because it did not control 
South Australia's only Labor newspaper. The attitude of the 
S.A. Branch was much conditioned before April 1930 by the 
approaching State election. A Special Conference of the Branch 
met in January 1930 but confined its attentions to unravelling 
and smoothing over a recent ballot-box scandal. The two 
other principal authorities in the Branch, the nine-member 
State .Executive and the State Council, of over two-hundred 
members, met several times between November 1929 and April 1930, 
the Executive six times and the Council seven times (with an
Australian Worker, 30 April 1930.
111
average attendance of 130). F’ederal affairs received
scant attention at these meetings. The situation changed
after April 1930, but not at first very greatly. The
Council passed resolutions against wage reductions, which
applied to the State and Federal Government. It also
criticised the Government for its handling of the waterside
workers' troubles. But dissatisfaction with the State Labor
Government eclipsed resentment with the Federal Labor 
112Government. The Scullin Government received side-blows
in the process which led to the disintegration of the Party in 
South Australia in 1931-32 but for various reasons these never 
attained much significance. This was partly a result of the 
structure of the Party, which tended to insulate the Federal 
members. It was also a function of the Federal structure of 
the Commonwealth and the State Branches'inability to comprehend 
the geography of Federal-State relationships. Federal affairs 
seemed remote, complex and obscure, when compared with the 
proximity of State parliamentarians and the immediacy and 
seeming simplicity of the demands made upon them.
112
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New South Wales was a special case. With 
its Annual Conferences - Country, Metropolitan and State - 
and bi-monthly meetings of its State Executive, the N.S.W.
Branch seemed well equiped to gather and transmit the wishes 
of the movement. Notoriously this was not so. In the years 
since 1927 the democratic institutions of the Branch had 
become largely irrelevant. Before 1927 and the days of 
J.T. Lang’s ascendancy,internal democracy had been imperfect 
and often abused: during Lang's reign it was at best perverted
11;and most often just ignored. This has been described elsewhere. 
Here it is sufficient to say that during the depression period 
the N.S.W Branch was ruled by Lang and an Inner Group on the 
N.S.W Executive. There was much animosity between the N.S.W. 
Branch and the Federal Party, especially between the Branch 
and the Scullin Government's principal union supporter, the 
A.W.U. Between Lang and Theodore the animosity was very strong. 
The initial performances of the Scullin Government on the 
matter of the coal lock-out were the subject of some extremely 
113
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Sharp criticism from the N.S.W. Branch and little restraint 
was observed by the Branch or the Federal Party. After 
the dispute ended in June 1930 and with the approach of the 
October N.S.W. elections these attacks were stopped, and 
differences papered over. The truce lasted only a few months 
before it ended with the disastrous split of March 1931.
The Party in Victoria formed a Government in
November 1929. It was therefore confronted with the realities
of the depression avoided in this early period by the other
State Branches. The governing authority in the Branch, the
Central Executive, met seven times between November 1929 and
April 1930 (though not at all in March). At its meeting of
13 December the Executive decided to summon a Conference to
draft 'a scheme of practical measures to meet the unemployment 
114situation'. The Conference proposals were presented to
Brennan on 10 February and sent to Price (Secretary of the
F.P.L.P.) who replied that they would be discussed at the
pre-sessional Federal Caucus. meetings beginning on 5 March 
1151930: at these meetings the proposals were thrown into the
114
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prolonged discussion on the Ministry's prepared programme,' 
and submerged in the general debate. Two things should be 
noted about these proposals: first, that like most other 
proposals coming from within the Party at this time, they 
said what should be done, but not how things could be done 
(and this vagueness made it easier for the Federal Ministry 
to show that these things could not be done); secondly, and 
also typically, these proposals were overtaken by events; 
the scheme originated with the State Executive meeting of 13 
December 1929 and although direct representations to the 
Federal Government were made in the interim, the proposals 
were not officially noticed until they were presented - with 
other opinions - to the Federal Conference in May 1930.
The attitude of the Ministry to these proposals, 
and to those emanating from the A.C.T.U. Congress of February 
1930 and, presumably, to the plethora of similar advice it was 
later to receive, was expressed to the Victorian Branch in
April 1930.
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The Victorian A.L.P. Annual Conference was
attended by 230 delegates, of whom 159 were representatives
116from the trade unions/'' Scullin, Brennan, Keane, Lewis,
Crouch, Barnes, and McNeill were all credentialled delegates.
Scullin in particular was active in the debates. Over 50 of
117the 233 agenda items dealt with Federal matters, but most
time was devoted to State affairs. A motion from R.S. Ross
called for the replacement of the 1927 Objective by the 1921
Objective. During a spirited debate Scullin opposed the
change on the ground that 1 it was not desirable to be always
118tinkering with the objective1 and the motion was lost for
want of a statutory majority (116), by 98 votes to 84. The 
principal debate was that on unemployment. Earlier, Scullin 
had assured the delegates that 'win or lose' the Government 
would never accept the economically unsound policy of 
reducing wages; nor would it do anything unconstitutional; when 
commenting on the Report of the Unemployment Committee established 
by the Conference, which followed the policy formulated by the 
A.C.T.U. Congress, Scullin urged the Conference to give the 
116
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Ministry 'a chance to do something practical' and continued:
... carry resolutions if you like but you are only 
fooling the workers outside if you cannot carry 
them out. We have a responsibility as a Government, 
and our first responsibility is that nobody should 
go hungry. We must stand by the recognition of our 
obligations on the other side of the world. I would 
refuse to remain in office rather than declare that 
Australia cannot pay her debts. We have pledged the 
national honor, and I am going to stand up to it. I 
am not defying Conference; I am simply giving facts. 119
To an interjector he replied: 'You must change the competitive
system under which we live'. The A.W.U. reporter, R.S. Ross,
thought Scullin's defence of the Government on this and other
issues was masterly, and that it exerted considerable influence
on decisions made by the Conference. Nevertheless the
Government was subjected to severe criticism. An A.R.U.
120delegate described Scullin's argument as camouflage. W.J.Duggan, 
a delegate from the Plumbers' Union, and President of the 
A.C.T.U., was critical of Government policy on unemployment and 
emphasised that the industrial wing was not, as Scullin and 
Brennan had suggested, merely a part of the movement but its
119
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very foundation and if it were shaken, 'the whole
superstructure would topple like a pack of cards'.
In a direct and fundamental attack, Maurice BlackS*»? 
M.L.A. said that Scullin:
121
had sounded the death warrant for parliamentary 
action for Labor. If the Federal Parliament 
could do nothing they could not look to the 
parliamentary system to relieve the wants of the 
people. If the Federal Parliament could do 
nothing they might as well realise that the 
parliamentary action of Labor was bankrupt. 122
The Conference ignored Scullin's pleas for practical 
proposals and endorsed the Committee's unemployment report, 
the provisions of which Scullin had already said were 
financially impossible. Implicit in this conflict was the 
dilemma which confronted the Labor movement. It was 
reasonable that Scullin should reject an unemployment 
insurance scheme which would cost an estimated £40 million 
a year, at a time when his Government was striving to effect 
every possible economy; government income was falling and was
121
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expected to fall even further; while expenditure, 
though contracting, lagged behind the fall in income; 
and both the Government and a majority of the Labor 
movement adopted the orthodox theory which called for 
'good national housekeeping1 in the form of balanced 
budgets. Yet, on the other hand, the movement's call for 
unemployment insurance was equally reasonable, for such a 
measure was necessary and to be expected if the Party was to 
justify itself as a movement of reform. This dilemma was 
not resolved. An important part of the history of the 
Scullin Government is a record of the movement's attempts to 
do so, and the consequence of its inability to find a 
solution.
The Annual Conference of the Tasmanian Branch of the
Party in.April was a quiet affair. Less than fifty delegates
were present. Twelve of these were State Labor members and
123four were Federal members (Lyons, Guy, Culley and Frost).
The two days of discussion were confined almost exclusively 
to State issues: the only matter of Federal importance was
123
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a resolution calling for the Federal Government to 
institute a sickness, accident and unemployment insurance 
scheme. It was resolved to send this resolution to the 
forthcoming Federal Conference.
The A.L.P. Federal Executive met in Sydney on 4 and
5 February 1930. This was its fifth meeting since May 1927.
Thetvelve delegates were drawn two from each State. All were
senior Party or trade union officials. Three were members of
State parliaments, including the Federal President (1928-1936),
J.J. Kenneally, M.L.A. and Federal Secretary (1925-1946) ,
D.L. McNamara, M.L.C. The two S.A. delegates, Price, M.H.R.
and Yates, M.H.R. were the only delegates who were members of
the Federal Caucus. Duggan (Vic.) was President of the A.C.T.U.;
Watts (W.A.) was the State Secretary of the A.W.U.; W.J.Rioraan
(brother of D. Riordan, M.H.R. for Kennedy, Q.) was A.W.U.
Secretary in Queensland, and Lamp was an A.W.U. official in
Tasmania. The two main items dealt with were redrafting of the
Federal Platform, which was restricted to removing ‘duplications
124and improving grouping and praseology' and the forthcoming 
124
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triennial A.L.P. Federal Conference. The Executive
decided that the Conference should be held in Canberra,
and not Kobart as previously arranged, and that Federal
Executive Officers should act as an agenda committee, and
that the President of the Executive act as Chairman of the 
125Conference. After some slight amendments, the proposed
constitution of the Labor Women's Interstate Executive was
approved. The meeting adjudicated on a dispute between the
Electrical Trades Union in Western Australia and the A.L.P.
Branch, and considered the representations made by a
deputation from the Labor Women's Organising Committee.
N.S.W. Representatives of the A.F.U.L.E. urged that the
Federal Government be requested to implement that part of the
A.L.P. Federal Platform which provided for the establishment
of a Board to enquire into and make regulations concerning
transport accidents. The Executive also passed a resolution
reaffirming its supremacy over State Branches in any matter
126affecting the platform or policy of the party. This arose
125
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from a dispute with the N.S.W. Executive, at first sight
over the right of members of the A.L.P. to advocate
Communism. The real issue was that of State autonomy within
the Party. This was only a preliminary airing of a
conflict which was the subject of much discussion in several
Branches in 1931, and the justification used by the N.S.W.
Branch for going its own way with the Lang Plan early in 1931.
The Executive concluded its meeting with a public statement
congratulating the Scullin Government on its handling of
Australia's industrial and financial affairs during the previous 
127three months.
The Federal A.L.P. Conference was the supreme 
authority within the Party. Its decisions were binding for all 
Party organisations and members, including the F.P%L.p., the 
Ministry and the Prime Minister. Conferences were held 
trienially and consisted of 36 delegates, six from each State, 
elected by State Conferences or State Executives.
127
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The Twelth Conference was held in Canberra from 26 
to 30 May, 1930. The Agenda - items for which had to be 
with the Federal Secretary by 1 March, and with State
1 2 Qauthorities some weeks before that - contained 94 items.
Eighteen of the delegates - one half of the total - were
members of Parliament, and ten of these were members of the
129Federal Parliament. There was, however, no united
front of politicians at the 1930 Conference, though the three 
members of the Federal Ministry who were delegates (Scullin,
Daly and Brennan?-, the l-rthtor as a proxy Tasmanian delegate) 
presented a solid front on all important matters. Nor, on the 
other hand, was there great cleavage between politicians and 
trade unionists. The N.S.W. delegation contained no 
politicians and was the most critical of the Federal Government, 
yet this was more from factional causes and for reasons of State 
autonomy than from greater political radicalism. The little 
radicalism that was exhibited by Conference came primarily from 
the South Australian delegation (Daly excepted) which contained 
five Federal members, and from three members of the Victoria 
delegation (Drakeford, M.L.A., Duggan, and R.S. Ross).
128
Labor Call, 22 May 1930.
129
Scullin, Brennan, Daly, Makin, Yates, Daly, Lacey, O'Halloran, 
Curtin, Culley. • .
101
Conference v/as quiet and without major disputes.
Perhaps the high representation of politicians contributed to 
this accord, as perhaps did the high ratio - at least one-third - 
of delegates associated with the A.W.U. Nevertheless the 
attitude of the Conference was in general, a fair reflection 
of the attitudes of the Labor movement in Australia at that 
time.
The Conference lasted for five days. A very wide 
range of matters was discussed; among them were Imperial 
honours, the Governor-Generalship, child endowment, disarmament, 
affiliation with the Socialist International, oil leases, a 
bonus on gold production, and Royal Commissions. Discussion 
on motions dealing with the powers of State Branches vis-a-vis 
those of the Federal Conference and Executive, and on the 
eligibility of Communists for A.L.P.membership, provided yet 
another opportunity for N.S.W. to declare its stand for 
State autonomy. The principal debates were those on
130constitutional amendment, unemployment and industrial law.
130
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In his opening speech to the Conference Scullin 
announced that the Ministry had decided to withdraw the 
three constitutional Bills then before the Federal Parliament. 
Despite this the Conference devoted much time to debating 
the three measures, as Scullin implied that they would be 
reintroduced at some future time. It was also evident 
that the matter was one of fundamental concern to the Party, 
representing one of its highest hopes. No doubt this 
interest had been sharpened by the limitations, already 
apparent, that the Constitution placed on the Scullin 
Government. The Conference unanimously endorsed proposals 
for increased Commonwealth powers over industrial questions 
and over trade and commerce. The proposal to grant full 
power to the Federal Parliament to amend the Constitution was 
only approved after lengthy discussion, by 22 votes to 13.
The opposition came mainly from Western Australia (5 delegates) 
and Tasmania (5 delegates), and it was a stand for State 
rights. This particular difference of opinion meant little in 
1930 and 1931, when measured against the Government's other 
handicaps, but it is one further indication of those difficulties 
created by federalism which enveloped the A.L.P. before, during 
and after the depression.
Federal Industrial Lav; did not delay the
Conference for long. As will be related in the next 
Chapter, the matter was a subject of great interest to the 
movement. But the role of the Federal Conference was that of 
the rubber-stamp. Conference appointed a committee of six, 
of one delegate from each State, to report on what was 
required. After considering reports from trade union and 
A.L.P. conferences and conferring with Brennan the Committee 
presented a four-point report, outstanding only in its 
vagueness. In fact the Conferences' deliberations were quite 
irrelevant. The trade unions had by-passed the Conference 
and made their representations directly to the Government.
When the Conference first touched on the subject Curtin and 
Culley moved unsuccessfully that all agenda items dealing with 
Federal arbitration be discharged, as the matter had already 
been settled. And, indeed, the Arbitration Bill was 
introduced into the House of Representatives before the
131Conference committee on Arbitration had presented its report.
Nevertheless, the Conference went through the ritual of making
its own recommendations, partly because the ritual appeared
necessary for its own sake, and partly perhaps as a concession
to the A.W.U., which was not affiliated with the A.C.T.U. and had 
131
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not therefore been represented at the A.C.T.U. Congress 
of February 1930.
The key issue of the Conference was the formulation 
of a policy to deal with unemployment. Nothing was more 
revealing of fundamental attitudes than this debate, and it 
therefore deserves to be related in some detail.
Twenty delegates spoke in the debate, though the 
Tasmanian and South Australian delegations took little part.
All agreed that Australia faced a great crisis. There was 
extensive agreement on the causes of this. Among the causes 
were immigration, excessive overseas borrowing, the fail in 
export prices, introduction of labor-saving machinery, over- 
capitalisation, the land monopoly and the machinations of 
the Money Power. And behind these causes the delegates 
acknowledged that the root of the trouble was the capitalistic 
system: 'They all knew1, in Forgan-Smith's words 'that 
unemployment was due to the present economic fabric of society 
itself, and that economic organisation had to be completely 
altered before unemployment would be brought to an end'. But 
on the question of what instructions the Conference should give 
the Government, unanimity ended. Scullin, Brennan and Daly 
urged delegates to discard theoretical notions and recognise
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the practical difficulties. Scullin painted a vivid 
picture of the quagmire in which the Government found 
itself, and the institutional and economic constraints which 
held it down. He asked delegates not to ‘submit impossible 
propositions to the Government', but to ‘tackle the problem 
by practical and sound methods'. Scullin did not suggest 
what methods these might be. Daly reiterated Scullin's 
pleas, stressing the Government's limited powers and its 
weakness in the Senate. Brennan went over the same ground and 
asked delegates to consider the consequences of 'routing1 the 
Government, and what would result if 'a new and reactionary 
Government' were to replace the present administration.
Like Scullin, he told the Conference that 'it was not a time 
to attempt to introduce the new order... they were not dealing 
with theories, but with practical and pressing difficulties 
requiring immediate solution'.
It was obvious that the Ministry knew what it did not 
want from the Conference. It was soon evident that the 
delegates were confused about what they wanted. An indication 
of this confusion appeared when Collings (Qld.) suggested that 
Mr. Frank Locke be invited to address the Conference. His 
request was supported by Drakeford (Vic.) and Kilbum (N.S.W.) 
but opposed by Curtin (W.A.) on the grounds that they ail knew
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about the workings of the Money Power (and if they needed 
further instruction, Frank Anstey would be a better teacher); 
they had only to decide what to do. Curtin was over-ruled. 
Locke, the author of 'Nationalisation of Credit: The Only 
Cure for Industrial Unrest' (1919), delivered a lengthy 
address which added nothing to what the delegates already 
knew and was less relevant than the debates on unemployment 
which had already taken place within the movement at the 
A.C.T.U. Congress and the Annual State Conferences in 
Victoria and New South Wales. The Conference decided to 
appoint a committee of six to prepare a report on 
unemployment. The problem was then to decide on its terms 
of reference: was it to establish a policy for the 
alleviation of existing unemployment, or a policy for the 
elimination of unemployment ? Forgan-Smith moved for a 
report on alleviation and Ross for a report on elimination. 
This suggests a debate which would open up fundamental 
consideration of the nature of the Party. This was not the 
case. The Party and the movement could not suddenly change 
its character and ignore its own history and context. A 
compromise was accepted from Duggan, asking for a report on 
'the immediate relief and 'future regulation and control' of
unemployment.
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The Committee's report recommended the adoption 
of the scheme of unemployment insurance and the other 
proposals recommended by the Victorian A.L.P. Conference and, 
before that Conference, by the A.C.T.U. Congress. Such 
measures would obviously have been blocked by the Senate, 
but this was ignored by all three conferences. The Report 
placed great stress on 'the restoration and freeing of credit' 
and as a first step it said that 'the Federal Government 
should find £20,000,000* to allocate to the States for works 
(stipulating that the work should be done under Arbitration 
Court award rates and conditions). The Report did not say how 
the Government should find the money. It was assumed that 
it would be released through the Commonwealth Bank, yet it was 
obvious by May 1930 that the Bank was independent of the Government 
and would not implement deliberate expansion of credit. By 
ignoring this and not also advising the Government to seek a 
double-dissolution, the Report was rendered sterile. (Of the
36 delegates only Curtin pointed to the necessity of seeking a 
double dissolution if the Government was to be asked to manipulate
credit). The Committee's report concluded that 'owing to the 
conditions under which [it] has had to work, it has confined 
its recommendations to the immediate problem of abnormal 
unemployment'. It agreed that 'the general problem is inherent
in the existing system' and concluded that the final remedy
lay in 'the realisation of the policy set out in the objects 
and platform of the Australian Labor Party1.
The Government had done little to implement Labor 
policy in its early months. The Parliamentary sitting of 
November-December 1929 was confined to minor issues and the 
emergency Bank Bill. Labor's own legislative programme
was not introduced until March 1930.
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Chapter III
Parliament met again on 12 March and continued 
sitting until 8 August 1930. During these five months 
Caucus met thirty-two times, for a total time of approximately 
eighty hours. Because of sickness, journeys interstate and 
overseas and election campaigning in Western Australia and 
South Australia there was never a Caucus meeting at which ail 
fifty-four members were present. On average, nine members 
were absent from each meeting. As proxy voting was not 
permitted, Caucus decisions to some extent depended on chance 
as well as tactics and the merits of issues.
Three pre-sessional meetings of Caucus were held 
(5, 6, 7 March) to discuss the Party's programme for this 
vital period. Members of the Ministry presented their proposals 
in a list of more than thirty Bills and these were discussed 
at length. Scullin promised to have certain matters raised 
again in Cabinet."^
Caucus, Minutes, 5, 6, 7 March 1930.
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When Parliament met Scullin made a Ministerial 
Statement of Policy. The situation he outlined was a grim 
one and he concluded with a suggestion that 'the Parliament 
might fittingly become an economic conference of representatives 
of the people meeting to discuss the general position'.“
Some parts of the programme mentioned in Scullin's address 
were never presented to Parliament by the Scuilin Government, 
notably repeal of the Transport Workers' Act and an amendment 
to the Crimes Act; but fifty-five Bills passed through both 
Houses between March and August 1S30. Seventeen were 
concerned with sales tax and another nine with customs, tariffs, 
bounties and the export of primary products. Most of the 
remaining Bills were machinery measures or matters of no great 
significance, with the important exception of the Arbitration 
Bill. Twelve Bills were not enacted. Some were withdrawn or 
were still being dealt with at the end of the period, on 8 
August. Six, however, were defeated in the Senate. Two of 
the rejected Bills dealt with bounties (one for hops and the other 
for serving-machines). The remaining four were among the 
Government's most important measures: a wheat subsidy Bill and 
three Bills to amend the Commonwealth Constitution.
C.P.D., Vol.123, (12 March 1930), p.30.
2
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The three Bills to amend the Constitution were
the first to be rejected. Scullin submitted two draft
3Bills to Caucus on 5 March , one to give the Federal
Government full power in industrial matters (by altering
Section 51 , XXII ) and the other to enable the Federal
Parliament to amend the Constitution (by altering Section 128).
On 6 March Caucus adopted these proposals and carried a
motion from Coleman and Rae that they be submitted to a
referendum as quickly as possible. An amendment from Curtin
and Keane asking that the power of amendment provision be
4dropped was defeated. The two Bills were introduced into
the Representatives on 13 March and passed the Third Reading 
5on 10 April. In the meantime, on 4 April, the Government
had introduced a third constitutional Bill to extend Federal
6powers over trade and commerce (by altering Section 51/I). 
Scullin explained to a special Caucus meeting on 2 April that
3
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a number of Caucus members had asked for this Eill and that
7Cabinet had given its approval. He asked Caucus for
permission to proceed with the Bill. Permission was granted
next day and the Bill was introduced that afternoon. All
three Bills were rejected by the Senate during the Second
8Reading debate, by 7 votes to 22, on 28 May.
The Government had expected that the Senate would
reject the Bills. It planned to resubmit them and, assuming
that they would again be defeated in the Senate, then put
them to a referendum, as provided for under Section 128 of the
Constitution which states that there must be 'an interval of
three months' between rejection by one House and resubmission
to the other House. Scullin said that the three months would
9begin from 11 April, when the Bills left the Representatives. 
Therefore they could be reintroduced on 11 July. In the 
Government's timetable, a month was allowed for their second 
consideration in Parliament to the point where they were again 
rejected by the Senate, followed by a short campaign of three 
weeks, ending with a referendum a day or two before Scullin
7
Caucus, Minutes, 3 April 1930.
8
C.P.D., Vol.123, pp.2190-1.
Argus, 29 April 1930.
9
113
10left for Great Britain at thd end of August. A dispute
arose whether this plan rested on a correct interpretation
of Section 128, principally on whether the three months was to
begin from the time when the Bill left the Representatives
(11 April) or from its rejection by the Senate (28 May): if
it were the latter the referendum probably could not be held
before October or November 1930.a"'L The Crown Law officers
supported the Government's interpretations. But because of
the controversy Brennan consulted legal authorities, who
advised that there was a serious doubt which could only be
resolved by a High Court decision (after the proposals had
12been approved at the referendum). Because of this doubt
the Ministry (but not the Caucus) decided to postpone the
matter until 1931. Scullin announced the decision at the first
13day of the A.L.P. Federal Conference on 26 May, and to 
14Caucus on 29 May. Despite endorsement of the three
proposals by the Federal Conference they were not revived by 
the Government.
10
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11
Argus, 1, 3 May 1930.
12
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13
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14
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The Government faced many difficulties. The
difference in the interpretation of Section 128 was one
problem, though this was only acute if the Government was
determined to hold the referendum before the end of
August. But there was a strong probability that, in any
case, the proposals would be defeated at a referendum
whenever it was held, given the poor record of success of
referenda,‘L'J especially as there was no doubt that the
Opposition would campaign for a 'no' vote. And the
humiliation of a defeat would have been accentuated by
conflicts within the Labor movement. Of the sixteen proposals
presented in seven constitutional referenda between 1906 and
1928, Labor had been responsible for e i g h t . T h e s e  had
met with some resistance within the Labor movement, especially
17in New South Wales. The two proposals of the Bruce-Page
15
A.H. Chisholm (Ed.), The Australian Encyclopaedia, Sydney, 
1958, Vol.VII, pp.397-400.
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How Labour Governs..., Melbourne, 1964 (1st edn .1923) , 
pp.35-38.
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Government in 1926 had produced sharp divisions within
18the movement which had severely shaken unity.'*’ The
N.S.W. Branch of the Party had opposed the stand of the ‘
Federal leaders, and a 'split' was threatened. The A.W.U.
had also been opposed. In 1930 the A.W.U. supported the
19Scullin Government's constitutional proposals. But the
State Branches of the Party showed few signs of enthusiasm,
and the N.S.W. Branch seems to have been completely opposed.
As in the past, resistance within the movement to enlarged
Federal powers was often passive rather than active and
public. A Wheat Marketing Bill was introduced in the
Representatives on 8 April and rejected by the Senate on
4 July 1930. This was the first of six measures to assist
20the wheat industry during 1930 and 1931. Only two were
enacted. One of these (the Wheat Advances Act of December 
1930) was rendered useless when the banks refused to co-operate. 
The second (the Wheat Bounty Act of October 1931) fixed a 
bounty of 4% pence on all wheat marketed; it did not satisfy 
18
For Labor attitudes to the 1926 proposals, see A.Wildausky, 
'The 1926 Referendum', in Studies in Australian Politics,
Sydney, 1958, pp.17-62.
19
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20
For the Government's attempts to bring relief to the wheat 
farmers see E. Dunsdorff The Australian Wheat-Growing 
Industry 1788-1948, Melbourne, 1956, pp.267-83.
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the Government or the producers.
Among the most important measures introduced 
by the Government in 1930 were two banking Bills. Like 
the constitutional Bills, these represented the Party's 
desire to make changes in the economic system, as distinct 
from the many measures necessary to administer and assist; 
but the banking Bills also came to nothing.
The Central Reserve Bank Bill was read for the
21first time in the Representatives on 2 April and the
22Commonwealth Bank Bill on 23 May. in introducing the
second Bill Theodore explained that 1 it was not intended to
go on with the Bill until the fate of the Central Reserve
23Bank Bill is determined r. No more was heard of this second 
Bill in 1930.
The Reserve Bank Bill was not a radical measure.
It proposed a reserve bank endowed with central banking powers 
as understood by orthodox banking opinion in the 1920 s . This 
meant that the central bank was to serve the private banks ,
21
C.P.D., Vol. 123, p.759.
22
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23
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not direct or control them. The Bill, says Giblin, was
'accepted by the Opposition [in the Representatives] as
a genuine attempt to strengthen central banking in Australia
24on moderate and even conservative lines'. In 1928 the
Bruce-Page Government drafted a Bill to increase central
banking powers; the measure was ready for submission in
early 1929 but was shelved by the Government. Schedvin
believes that the Scullin Government's Bill 'was probably
similar in principal to the 1928 Bill'.“  ^ The 1930 Bill
was drawn up in consultation with officials of the Commonwealth
26Bank and amended by the Bank Board ; Giblin concludes that
the Board was in favour of the Bill. Moreover, the
Government sought advice on the Bill from Sir Ernest Harvey
27of the Bank of England; though it ignored the request of 
that Bank to defer the introduction of the Bill until after
28their adviser, Sir Otto Niemeyer, had arrived in Australia. 
Nevertheless, the Opposition in the Senate opposed the Bill.
And Schedvin shows how this opposition was organised.
24
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On 12 May, well before the Bill had even reached 
the Senate, Davidson wrote: "We [the Sydney Banks] 
arranged several weeks ago now with the Leader of 
the Opposition and several other Senators that the 
Bill would be referred to a select oommittee if 
possible in order to have the whole question examined 
in an endeavour to educate public opinion " . 29
The Bill had its first reading in the Senate on
30 3118 June. Daly made his second reading speech on 27 June ^,
and when the Bill was next considered on 10 July the Senate
majority referred it to a Select Committee of eight members,
32which included three Government members. These three
were replaced with Opposition members on the next day, when
they resigned because of the Government's antagonism to the
33establishment of the Committee. The Government refused to
co-operate with the Committee, by, for example, refusing to 
34pay its expenses. Three days before Parliament adjourned
29
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on S August the Committee presented a progress report,
35which was hostile to the establishment of a reserve bank,
and reiterated this opinion in its final report on 2 December 
361930. But the Committee's real achievement lay in the 
victory it represented of the Senate Opposition over the 
Government, for it was a striking example of the helplessness 
of the Government.
The Bill had been greeted with great enthusiasm
by the Labor press. But in Parliament those members of the
Party interested in banking and finance were not enthusiastic.
Anstey did not speak. Curtin approved but had no praise,
while Lazzarini, West, James and Yates expressed disappointment;
38Yates, for instance, said 'This Bill leaves me stone-cold'.
When conflict with the banks was at its height in 
early 1931 Theodore told Party members that 'he had staked a 
lot on the passing of the Central Reserve Bank Bill, which
35
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36
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37
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would have altered the whole financial position,... They
had not been able to force an issue because the Bill had
39so far not failed to pass, but was merely held up'.
Thus Theodore suggested that the Bill w7ould have given the 
Government control over the private banks, which was not so; 
and he hinted that in 1930 the Government had intended 
seeking a double dissolution on the Bill, and this too was not 
correct. The progress of the Bill in 1930 had been slow. 
Parliament met on 12 March. The Bill had its first reading 
on 2 April; Theodore made his second reading speech on 1 May 
and the second reading debate in the Representatives began on 
3 June. It is difficult to believe that this is the record 
of the Bill which was the key to the Government's strategy 
in a battle with the Senate. In fact, in 1929 and 1930 the 
Government had no intention of challenging the Senate.
In March-April 1931 the Government began a 
belated attempt to bring about a double dissolution which,
4CScullin anticipated, would lead to an election in September.
39
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But the talk of 1931 was never more than half-hearted, 
and it was that of a demoralized Party which had had 
the necessity for a double dissolution thrust upon it; 
whereas a decision on the matter in 1929 involved taking 
an initiative.
In 1929 and early 1930 members of the Party made
41many brave statements about confronting the Senate. In
November-December 1929 Scullin, Brennan, Daly, Dunn and
42Fae and others made challenging noises. Green told the
Western Australian Metropolitan Executive in January 1930
43that the Government would not submit to Senate dictation.
Curtin said that any obstruction would provoke Government 
44action. But by January 1930 the decision not to challenge
the Senate was already known in the Party. On 14 January
the Queensland Central Executive decided that because of
changes in the Federal situation the closing date for Senate
45nominations could safely be extended to June 1930.
41
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42Labor Call, 23 November 1929; Argus, 10, 11 December 1929; 
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The decision not to seek a double dissolution
has been regarded as a major mistake of the Scullin
Government. It has been seen as a failure of nerve, an
indication of the Government's timidity and a measure of
the general self-serving nature of Labor politicians.
Although these accusations may be justified the issue was
more complicated than it appears to those commentators, such
46as Whitington, who write with the advantage of hindsight.
The constitutional provision (Section 57) for
47securing a double dissolution had been used only once betöre.
In 1513 the Cook non-labor Government had assumed office 
without gaining control of the Senate, where, like the Scullin 
Government, it was opposed by twenty-nine members to seven.
The Cook Government deliberately brought on a double dissolution. 
It introduced a Bill on 31 October 1913 which was rejected by 
the Senate on 11 December. In 1914 Parliament met on 15 April:
46
D. Whitington, The House Will Divide, Melbourne, 1954, pp.30-31; 
Chapter IV, on the Scullin Government, is a precis of Denning's 
Caucus Crisis.
47
For a summary of the double-dissolution of 1914 see 
J.R. Odgers, Australian Senate Practice, Canberra, 1967 (1st 
edn. 1953), pp.18-22; the section on the double dissolution of 
1951 (and in particular, the discussion of 'failed to pass'), 
pp.22-30, is also relevant.
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the Bill was reintroduced in the Representatives on 6 May 
and again rejected bv the Senate, on 23 May. Cook advised 
the Governor-General on 5 June that he should dissolve 
both Houses and this was done on 30 July. An election 
followed on 5 September. (It may have weighed with members 
of the Scullin Government that Cook was soundly defeated 
at this election.)
In 1S13-1914 the process of contriving a double 
dissolution took about ten months. Had the Scullin 
Government wished to pursue a similar course in 1929 the 
time could perhaps have been shortened: there was, for example, 
no constitutional or statutory obligation to adjourn 
Parliament for the long recess between 13 December 1929 and 
12 March 1930. Nor would the question of suitable issues have 
been insurmountable: presumably some controversial legislation - 
the arbitration, constitutional, banking or wheat Bills, or a 
collection of them - could have been introduced in some form 
by December 1929. No doubt the Opposition would have resisted 
any attempt to provoke an early election before, say, at least 
April 1930. In a letter read to the post-election meeting of 
the Nationalist Party in Canberra Bruce warned the Nationalists 
against pessimism, suggested that 'there will soon be a
124
tremendous revulsion of feeling' against Labor and
warned that 'it is imperative that the Senate should not
by precipitate action' allow the new Government to blame it
for its inability to govern."0 The President of the
49National Federation gave similar advice. The Senate, 
however, had only three options. It was most unlikely that 
it would have passed the controversial Bills. It could have 
rejected them, in which case the Government would have 
succeeded. Or it could have contrived to delay them.
Hov/ever, this, the most likely tactic, could not have 
continued indefinitely, and some delaying tactics might have 
been subject to challenge,- for example, that referral by the 
Senate to a Select Committee constituted 'failure to pass' 
under Section 57 of the Constitution. (Daly referred to
I
possible Government action on these lines in November 1930.)’ 
The difficulties were considerable, but it seems likely that 
had it wished, the Government could have had an election for 
both Houses at some time in 1930.
48
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Tactics with the Senate were not the only 
consideration, and they were perhaps not the most important. 
Although there were no precedents for this kind of decision 
in the A.L.P. it can be assumed that the matter was one on 
which a Caucus majority would rule. And members of Caucus 
had many reasons for resisting a strategy aimed at a double 
dissolution and an early election.
The Party had not been in office for thirteen 
years, and there was an understandable reluctance to risk 
the situation in an early election, before the Government had 
enacted any legislation. Another appeal to the electors might 
be interpreted as an admission of ineffectiveness, especially 
as there had been scarcely any mention of the position in the 
Senate during Labor's election, campaign. And perhaps Caucus 
reflected the optimism of its very large majority in the 
Representatives where, the Government being so firmly in 
control, it seemed less likely that the Senate would prove too 
intransigent. (A majority of Labor Senators appear to have 
been in favour of an early double dissolution.) Some members 
may have been influenced by their new status as members 
of Parliament, the Government or the Cabinet, or by the travel, 
social 'diichessing' - without as well as within ’the Labor
movement - end feelings of power end position. A number
of members had won scans in October 1329 which they would
have had great difficulty in holding at any subsequent
election. To these considerations must be added yet another,
that of finance. Members of the Representatives had had
the expense of an election in October 1929. Most of them had
faced another election less than twelve months before, in
November 1923.' Their personal resources would have been much
strained by yet a third election in 1930. And with State
elections in Victoria in November 1929, in Western Australia
and South Australia in April 1930 and in New South Wales in
October 1930, the Party Branches - never well endowed - had
reason to conserve their slender funds (.the New South Wales
Branch, for example, was overdrawn by £12,000 after the 1929
51Federal Election). The concrtron ox union finances was
also a deterrent to another election. In 1929 and 1330 the A.W.U
in Queensland, Vicuoria, New South Wales and South Australia
paid approximately 111,725 to State A.L.P. Branches in
52election donations and affiliation fees. “ In Western
51
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52
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Australia, the A.W.U. paid £300 to Federal Election funds
in 1928, £400 in 1929, a further £600 towards the 1930 State
_ 53election, and -779 in A.L.P. affiliation rees in 1929-30.
Yet A.W.U. membership had been declining since 1927, when
it reached its inter-war peak, and the decline had become
precipitous in 1929-30. Falling income in the A.W.U., and
in most other unions, meant union financial support in a 1930
Federal election would have been meagre. There were other
reasons why union officials were against a 1930 election.
Some thought they might get personal preferment: they could
not expect to do as well as they might with a Lang Government,
which appointed men to the Legislative Council ('... the
gold pass would be an advantage in minimising organising 
54expenses5) ; but in the Federal sphere there were other
havens for 'sincere friends of the Ministry' - as was
recognised by the Union Federal Secretary who aspired to
55become Manager of the Commonwealth Clothing Factory. Some 
union officials derived a sense of importance and reflected 
glory from their visits to Canberra and their association
53 ’
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with Ministers and members of Caucus. Much more important
were unions"expectations of what a sympathetic government
would do for them. The obvious examples concerned the
industrial troubles of the coal-miners and the waterside
workers. Less obvious but more important was Labor's high
tariff policy. Scores of unions lost no time in approaching
the new Government for tariff protection to cover the
occupations of their members: much time and money were
expended; the Government was known to be highly favourable to
very high protection but it was realised by the unions that
protection, once granted - and it seems that it was rarely
refused - would not be effective for some time, and that a
non-Labor Government could not be expected to be so favourable.
The vital point in the connection between the unions, the tariff
and union attitudes to a double dissolution was that tariffs
56could be imposed without Parliamentary sanctions, so in this 
matter the hostile Senate was not important. Tariffs eventually
56
'The Government was in a strong position on this matter 
[i.e. tariffs], notwithstanding the Senate obstacle because 
under the Customs Acts alterations in the tariff rates 
took effect from the time of tabling a proposal in the 
Representatives, while import embargoes could be imposed 
by executive proclamation not subject to Senate veto;1 
G. Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Lav; 1929-1949, 
Melbourne, 1963, pp.28-9.
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had to be approved by Parliament, but the Government 
could delay: the Senate debate on the tariff did not begin 
until 29 October 1931 . Thus the Scullin tariff was a 
powerful influence in setting the unions against risking 
a double dissolution. There were other influences acting 
in the same direction. Among them were the expected 
amendments to the Arbitration Act, the Transport Workers'
Act and the Crimes Act. All made a strong contribution 
to the sentiment voiced frequently in 1930 and 1931 that 
'the worst Labor government is better than the best non-Labor 
government'.
Anstey was the leader of a small group which in
1929 and early 1930 urged the Ministry and Caucus to seek
an immediate double dissolution. Anstey was sure that the
Government would be returned with a majority in both Houses.
It could then implement Labor's policy, particularly bank 
57nationalisation. Anstey subsequently saw the Government's
57
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sorry performance as the result of its failure to
58challenge the Senate.  ^ It is useless to speculate on 
what might have happened, for the chain of imponderables 
and the list of hypothetical situations and consequences 
is very long indeed. It must be remembered, however, that 
with or without control of the Senate, Labor faced a world­
wide economic collapse of unprecedented severity, and that 
Australia was one of the first to feel its impact and one 
of the most severely affected countries. In this great 
crisis all Governments, whatever their political colour, 
fared badly. Thus, as far as its record in combating the 
depression is concerned, the Scullin Government's position 
in the Senate made only a marginal difference to the degree of 
its failure. The most important long-term effect, for the 
Labor movement, of the Government's failure to challenge the 
Senate was the crippling effect on morale and the steady 
erosion of faith in the efficacy of the Labor government: it 
was with this in mind that Anstey remarked, 'the past should
only be remembered for whatever lesson it may contain for 
59the future .
58
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Despite their acknowledgement of its 
difficulties in the Senate the trade unions expected much 
of the Scuilin Government. The Brisbane Trades and Labor 
Council, for example, sent congratulations to Scuilin and
60asked that a letter-box be erected outside the Trades Hall.
The Carpenters' Union in W.A. wanted the new Commonwealth
Bank Building in Perth to have wooden rather than bronze
d o o r s . T h e  Seamens Union wanted an extensive revision of
62the Navigation Act. Members of the Musicians’- Union - the
classical victims of that time of technological change -
. 63wanted the Government to ban the import of canned music.
Union requests poured into the Government. Some of these 
extended beyond the interests of one union, or a small group of
60
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61
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unions. One such natter was the promised change in 
Commonwealth Arbitration law. Another concerned preference 
to unionists. The industrial problems of the New South 
Wales coal-miners and the waterside workers were those of 
industrial unions but these groups had aroused much sympathy 
among unionists as the first sufferers in the 'capitalist 
onslaught' launched in 1928-2S. In addition, both groups 
had received particularly harsh treatment from the 
Nationalist Government. It was expected that the new Labor 
Government would soon show its mettle by making things right 
for those victims of industrial and political injustice.
At the time of Labor's victory in October 1929 
the coal-miners in northern New South Wales had been locked 
out for seven months.
The dispute had greater than ordinary claim for 
sympathetic action from a Labor government. The mine-owners 
were clearly acting illegally: without reference to the Coal
Tribunal and in defiance of the award governing the industry 
they had,’in mid-February 1929, told the miners that they 
must accept a reduction in contract wages of 12 1/2% and a 
shilling a day in day wages. The miners refused to accept
133
these demands, and at the beginning of March the owners
closed about thirty mines on the northern fields, throwing
64more than 10,000 miners out of work.
Throughout the 1920s the Nationalist Government 
had taken a strong line in dealing with industrial disputes 
whenever the trade unions had attempted to by-pass or defy 
the established system of arbitration. The Government had 
acted immediately and with severity, particularly in the 
Seamen's (1925), Waterside Workers' (1928), and Timberworkers1 
(1929) disputes. Unions had been fined and union officials 
prosecuted. Thus the illegal action of the mine-owners was a 
test of the Nationalist Government's impartiality; if it was 
sincere in its defence of arbitration, it now had to get tough 
with mine-owners. On 22 March the Attorney-General told 
Parliament that a prosecution for a lock-out was to be 
undertaken against John Brown. Brown, 'the coal Baron', was 
one of the richest men in Australia, and one of the most 
intransigent of employers in industrial disputes. The unions 
were delighted with the prospect of Brown's impending 
64
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humiliation. Two weeks later, however, while Parliament
was in recess, it was announced that the prosecution had
been withdrawn on the grounds that a prosecution would only
prolong the dispute, as the owners would not confer while one
of their number was before the court. As Professor Sawer
has said, the withdrawal was justified on legal grounds, though
it may have shown a kind of unconscious class bias on the
part of the Government, 'but it showed even more how the
organisation of industry, the structure of the law and even
chance favoured the militant capitalist and handicapped the
65militant unionists'.
That there was 'one law for the rich and another
for the poor' was knowledge with which the Labor members of
Federal Parliament considered themselves well acquainted.
While in Opposition during 1929 they made frequent and caustic
reference to the Nationalist Government's 'softness' on the
matter of prosecuting Brown and to the built-in bias of the
66the capitalist system. But they were not explicit on how
65
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a Labor Government would circumvent the restrictions they so
happily denounced. Nevertheless, they made skilful use of
the issue during the election campaign of September-October
1929; and many Labor candidates spoke with force - though in
vague terms - of getting the miners back to work. Mott were
content with generalities. Unfortunately E.G. Theodore,
deputy leader of the Party since 1923, was not. At Balmain
on 23 September he told his audience that ’one of the first
actions of a Labor Government would be to re-open the mines...
[the owners] would either have to re-open their mines or
Labor would work them in the name of the people'. At a
later meeting he spoke of Labor taking 'drastic action'.
Finally, a week before the election, he assured his listeners
at a meeting on the coal-fields that the Federal Government
had sufficient power to deal with the coal dispute, that a
Labor Government would not hesitate to use such powers, and
that if there was a victory on October 12 the mines 'would be
67re-opened within a fortnight'. This was a promise which was
to plague the Scullin Ministry, alienate some industrial
support, discredit Theodore and provide a weapon for the new
Government's critics - both the Nationalist opposition and those
within the N.S.W. Labor movement.
S.M .H ., 24, 27 September, 7 October 1929.
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In his role as election campaign director in
N.S.W. Theodore had appealed to the Miners’Federation for
financial support. In reply to one of his circulars the
Central Council of the Federation had invited him to address
a meeting of the Council, which he did on 24 September,
telling the Council that the first action of a Labor
Government would be to open the mines at pre-lock-out rates.
63The Council voted to donate £ 1,000 to Labor Party funds. 
Expecting a dividend from their investment and mindful of 
Theodore's promises, their representatives appeared in 
Canberra on the first Monday after the election, to demand that 
the new Government honour its pledge.
Theodore's first move was something of a squib, 
for he did no more than had already been done several times 
by the Nationalist Government: he called a conference of the 
miners and the owners. The conference was a failure, like 
the score or more of its kind which followed in succeeding 
months: the four parties involved in the dispute - the miners, 
the mine-owners, and the N.S.W. and Federal Governments - could 
not reach agreement. Months of attrition had made a simple 
63
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negotiated settlement impossible. Although he continued 
to attend some conferences Theodore gradually dropped into 
the background. As Treasurer he became deeply involved 
in the economic problems facing the Government, which within 
eight weeks required the preparation of a supplementary 
Budget and legislation to control the export of gold.
Besides, as the hollowness of his pre-election promises 
became apparent, Theodore's presence as a negotiator rankled 
with the miners, and provided a contrast between promise and 
performance which the Government wished to avoid. Scullin, 
Brennan, Beasley and several of the Federal members from N.S.W. 
continued the Government's efforts to end the lock-out.
Cabinet considered the dispute several times.
Acting on a request from the miners it decided to summon a
compulsory conference, under the provisions of the Industrial
Peace Acts of 1920, with Mr. C. Hibble as Chairman. Hibble
had been Chairman of the Coal Tribunal since 1920. The miners
pressed for the appointment of someone more sympathetic to
69their cause, such as Matthew Charlton or A.C. Willis. When 
Premier of New South Wales in 1925 J.T. Lang had apparently
Argus, 7 December 1929, 7 February 1930.
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permitted the miners to nominate the Judge who was to head
70a Commission on the coal industry; but in 1929 the Scullm 
Government refused to allow itself to be thought guilty of 
partiality. Apparently, however,the miners were allowed to 
assume that Hibble 'would do the right thing' by ordering 
a return to work at pre-lock-out rates before making a 
settlement. The conference met in Sydney on 13 November.
It was a failure - doubly so for the miners because Hibble 
did not make an interim order for the mines to open at the old 
rates, and he publicly counselled the miners to accept the 
owners' terms.
Amid mounting criticism from the trade unions in 
N.S.W. the Government continued with its series of conferences. 
Scullin adopted the plan first put forward, twelve months 
earlier, by Bavin, the Nationalist Premier of New South Wales 
(1927-1930): the price of coal had to come down by four 
shillings a ton; to secure this reduction the N.S.W. Government 
would reduce government charges by one shilling a ton; the 
Federal Government would grant a subsidy of one shilling a ton; 
the owners would lower their profits by one shilling a ton, and 
70
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the miners would accept a cut of a shilling a ton in wages.
With some minor variations this was the proposal which the 
Scullin Government urged the miners to accept, from mid- 
November 1929 until the end of the lock-out in June 1930. 
There was a brief period of optimism after .a meeting of 
miners and owners on 29 November, when the miners' 
representatives agreed to accept wage reductions and, if 
the rank and file accepted the settlement, to return to work 
on 9 December. By this time some officials of the mining 
unions had accepted that the Federal Government could do 
nothing for the miners, and that the N.S.W. Government was 
determined to end the lock-out on the mine-owners' terms.
But the miners on the coal fields were not yet prepared to 
concede defeat: being the first in Australia to have their 
standard of living ravaged by the Depression, they did not 
realise the futility of resistance; at several mass meetings 
they angrily repudiated the terms accepted by their union 
leaders on 29 November. The lock-out continued.
On Christmas Eve 1929 Scullin announced that the 
Government would make a relief grant of £7,000 to the miners. 
Apart from this the Government felt it could do nothing. It 
continued to negotiate for a settlement but the story of its
140
endeavours after December 1929 becomes little more than 
'one long recital of futile conferences, whispered
conversations over the telephone, this mystery man and that
,71mystery man...
The Nationalist Government in New South Wales 
also wished to end the dispute. Its action was of a direct 
and dramatic kind. After the failure of the Hibble conference 
the Bavin Government announced, on 15 November, that it would 
take over and work certain of the mines - with union labour 
if it was available, at the cut level of wages, but with 
non-union labour if it was not. Unions reacted with predictable 
anger to the threat of 'scab' labour: the miners were 
promised full moral and financial support by individual unions, 
State Labor Councils, and the A.C.T.U. There were calls for 
a general strike in the mining industry and demands for the 
Federal Government to 'take control' in N.S.W. Despite its 
good intentions, the Federal Government appeared timid and 
ineffective in comparison with the strong action - and even 
stronger words - of the N.S.W. Government. In a desperate 
situation a reasonable explanation of the limits of the
71
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Federal Government's power seemed like pettifogging nicety.
Rowley James, M.H.R. for the coal-mining electorate of
Hunter, was the first to break the externally solid front
of the Government: on 3 December he announced in Caucus his
72intention to attack the Government in the House. He
ignored threats of disciplinary action and, on moving the
Adjournment motion, launched his attack on Scullin's
handling of the dispute. In this he was supported by three
members of the Opposition and two members of the Labor Party
73(Lazzarini and Watkins).
Violence erupted on the coal fields on 16 December
at Rothbury when the introduction of non-union labour led to
74a clash between police and several thousand miners. One miner 
was killed and scores were injured. For many weeks a tense 
situation existed as armed police patrolled the mining towns 
and miners enrolled in the Labor Defence Army.
72
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Under the direction of 'Jock' Garden the
militants of the New South Wales Labor Council - fresh
from their unsuccessful leadership of the Timberworkers1
strike in New South Wales - rushed their organisers to the
trouble centres to urge the miners to create a general
75strike in the industry. The Federal Government also
76acted. On the day after the Rothbury shootings, Judge
Beeby summoned the disputants in the coal lock-out to a
compulsory conference. Finding that they still refused to
compromise■he ordered the dispute into the Arbitration Court
where on 19 December he made an interim award, under which
the mines were to open at pre-stoppage rates. This
settlement was immediately suspended and later overturned
when the mine-owners and the N.S.W. Government challenged the
77validity of the award before the High Court, on the grounds 
that as the dispute was not genuinely an inter-state one 
(under Section 51, XXXV, of the Commonwealth Constitution),
Beeby had no jurisdiction. The Federal Government was powerless
75
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in the matter, except that it was able to intervene before
the Court to defend the validity of Beeby's award. The
Government also intervened before the High Court when the
process of interim award and challenge was repeated a few 
78weeks later. Again, however, the Court decided that Beeby
had no power to make an award. There was some small
compensation for the Federal Government in these legal
proceedings; it was able to make a display of loyalty to the
miners by joining them in defending Beeby's interim awards;
and the lengthy proceedings (19 December 1929 - 3 March 1930)
in the Courts provided many opportunities for the Government
to point out that it was the mine-owners and the New South
Wales Government who were actively resisting a reasonable
settlement. But these were only minor tactical victories.
The Federal Government had been frustrated at every turn. It
had tried, and it had been thwarted by the Constitution. It
could only say; that its experiences had further demonstrated
the necessity for hurrying on its plans for legislation to
79remove the worst restrictions of the Constitution.
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A s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  L abor  movement was n o t
s a t i s f i e d  w i th  t h e  G o v e rn m e n t 's  e f f o r t s  t o  end t h e  d i s p u t e .
A f t e r  t h e  R o th b u ry  i n c i d e n t  a m e e t in g  o f  New S ou th  W ales
L abor  members o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  P a r l i a m e n t  e s t a b l i s h e d  a
co m m it tee  o f  f i v e  (Jam es, L a z z a r i n i ,  R ae , C h i f l e y ,  and
M cTiernan) t o  c o n s u l t  w i t h  New S o u th  W ales Labor M .P .s  on 
80
t h e  d i s p u t e .  The co m m it tee  a s k e d  S c u l l i n  and members o f
t h e  C a b in e t  t o  a t t e n d  a c o n f e r e n c e  i n  Sydney on 21 December- 
F iv e  C a b in e t  members a t t e n d e d ,  w i t h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from t h e  
L abor  members o f  t h e  S t a t e  and F e d e r a l  P a r l i a m e n t s ,  t h e  New 
Sou th  W ales A .L .P .  E x e c u t i v e ,  t h e  L abor  C o u n c i l ,  t h e  A .C .T .U . , 
and t h e  m in in g  u n i o n s .  A t t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  t h e  m i n e r s ,  and 
a g a i n s t  S c u l l i n ' s  w i s h e s ,  J . T .  Lang was a l s o  i n v i t e d :  i n  h i s  
t y p i c a l  s t y l e  Lang made h i s  e n t r a n c e ,  w i th  h i s  c l o s e  a s s o c i a t e  
H a ro ld  M cCauley, a t  t e n  i n  t h e  ev en in g , a f t e r  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  
had  b e e n  s i t t i n g  f o r  many lo n g ,  h a r ro w in g  h o u r s .
The demands o f  t h e  m i l i t a n t s  were s im p le  and  
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ,  w i t h  t h e  k in d  o f  d r a m a t i c  s i m p l i c i t y  w hich 
more t h a n  tw e lv e  m on ths  l a t e r  was t o  c h a r a c t e r i s e  t h e  a p p e a l  
o f  t h e  Lang P l a n .  T h ey  u r g e d  S c u l l i n  t o  u s e  t h e  m i l i t a r y  t o
A u s t r a l i a n  W orker , 25 December 1930 .
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disarm and disperse the State police; seize control of the
coal mines and work them with union labour at award rates;
issue a Proclamation under the Commonwealth Crimes Act
and use it to prosecute the mine-owners, the Premier of
81N.S.W. and the N.S.W. Minister for Mines.
Lang agreed. His advice was delivered with the 
compelling force and complete disregard for consequences 
which were to make him both hero and villain in 1931 and 
1932:
Seize the mines...The owners have been defying 
the law for ten months. Your Government was elected 
to govern.... Seize the mines and work them .... I do 
not ask lawyers whether I am right or wrong. I tell 
them I want to do something.... If I were the Prime 
Minister, with a mandate to open the mines in a 
fortnight, I would seize [the mines] and work them... 
Too much time has been wasted in lawyers' arguments 
... Seize your mines and, if necessary, pass your 
law later. 82
Throughout its term of office the Scullin 
Government refused to do anything which it considered 
unconstitutional. During the coal lock-out Scullin and
81
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Brennan stressed that unconstitutional action would lead 
to civil war; the Labor Party must govern democratically 
or not govern at all. The Government must accept the rules:
The Labor Ministry has come into power determined 
to exact obedience from every person in this 
Commonwealth to the laws passed constitutionally 
by Parliament. It will require respect for, and 
obedience to, these laws. Remembering the history 
of tire Labor Party, it would be utterly inexcusable 
and indefensible if we who depend on parliamentary 
action should advocate any transgression of the 
parliamentary limits to which we require other 
people to subscribe absolutely. 83
The sanctity of the Constitution was the Government's main
answer to the militants' demands of December 1929. There were,
however, secondary defences; Scullin pointed out that the
miners' representatives did not want the mine-owners
prosecuted: they considered that a conviction would merely
84delay a settlement of the dispute. He also appealed to the
A.L.P. Federal Platform which forbade the'...employment of or 
interference by soldiers in industrial disputes'. It was also
83
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likely, he added, that a future non-Labor Government would
find a convenient and excusing precedent should the
military be used by a Labor Government. (Whether the
Scullin Government could command complete loyalty from the
85army was not discussed, at least not publicly.) Even if
the Federal Government did take control of the mines, it 
would be unable to market the coal unless it had the 
co-operation of the N.S.W. Government.
Scullin's position on the coal dispute had some
supporters in the Labor movement. A meeting of the A.L.P.
Federal Executive in early February issued a statement
commending the Government's wise handling of its current
86industrial troubles. In January a meeting of the New
South Wales State Council of the Federated Engine-drivers^ and
Firemen's Association deprecated disloyal criticism of the 
87Government. The Australian Workers' Union also spoke up
85
In February 1931 an A.C.T.U. Conference sent a deputation to 
Canberra to demand a ’Declaration of National Emergency'; one 
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1930, Secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall) 'reported that 
Brennan had expressed doubts as to whether the armed forces 
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in Scullin's defence. On the fourth day of its Annual
Convention (29 January 1930) the A.W.U. expressed its
confidence in Scullin's handling of the dispute, pledged its
support to the Government, and criticised those whom it
88accused of disloyalty. A few days later Scullin appeared
at the Convention to express his gratitude.
The general attitude of the Labor movement was 
critical, though there gradually arose some sympathetic 
understanding of the Government's difficulties. This was not 
so with the movement in New South Wales, which remained almost 
uniformly hostile for many months.
In December James criticised the Government in
Parliament in a way which 'may be the cause of my leaving this 
89party'. His attack was supported by Lazzarini ('Had Jack
90Lang been Premier... the mines would have opened long ago1). 
Eldridge, telegraphed Scullin, urging him in 'this time of 
impending civil war' to take control of the dispute in N.S.W., 
and hinting that he and others could not remain loyal if the 
88
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Government did not act. During one of his many attacks
on the Government James revealed that he had been approached
92to form a break-away Labor Party. Even more scathing
was Mr. E.J. Ward. Ward was still more than twelve months 
away from his election to Federal Parliament but while a 
trade union and political activist in 1929 and 1930 he was an 
ardent critic of the Scullin Government. These four men, 
with Senators Dunn and Rae - all from New South Wales - 
became the Lang splinter group in Federal Parliament in 1931. 
J.A. Beasley, leader of the Lang rebels in 1931, was 
Assistant-Minister for Industry from 1929 until March 1931.
He was intimately involved in the negotiations to end the 
dispute; as a former President of the New South Wales Labor 
Council he was valuable to Scullin in negotiations with the 
trade unions in that State. While he remained a Minister 
Beasley continued to defend the Government. When compared 
with the statements of other members of Cabinet, however, 
Beasley's defence is sour; for example, in February 1930 
he said:
91
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After all was said and done, whether it was a 
Labor Government or any other form of government, 
under the present form of society they were called 
upon to administer the present system and were 
confined within the Constitution. 93
The militant programme put to the conference of
22 December 1929 came from the Labor movement in N.S.W.
Its rejection by Scullin and his Ministers did not deter its
sponsors. On 17 January 1930 the A.L.P. Executive in New
South Wales called for a special conference of Federal and
State A.L.P. politicians, N.S.W. members of the Federal
Executive, the N.S.W. Executive and union officials. The
conference was held on 22 January in the Trades Hall, Sydney.
Beasley was the only member of Cabinet to attend; he cautioned
the gathering that a strong line against Scullin would hinder
the accomplishment of their great task, the return of J.T. Lang
to the Premiership. A number of Federal members supported
Beasley, but these were outnumbered by the critical Federal
94rebels, James, Lazzarini, Eldridge, Dunn and Rae. The mood 
of the conference is reflected in Lang's speech:
There was a lot of talk about the Constitution...
If the Constitution conflicted with the will of the 
people it should be cut out.... What was wanted was 
action and not words. 95
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Resolutions were passed demanding vigorous action 
from the Federal Government. A further resolution 
instructed all Federal members of the A.L.P. from New South 
Wales to obey the decisions of the conference. On the 
following day Scullin expressed his contempt for these 
decisions.
The next move was then with the N.S.W. Executive.
At the end of January it endorsed the conference's
recommendations and decided to call another conference of all
N.S.W. members of Federal Parliament to discuss ways of forcing
the militant programme on the Government. However,before that
meeting, the Annual New South Wales Metropolitan Conference of
the A.L.P. gave another opportunity for an airing of the
conflict. Two Ministers, Theodore and Blakeley, attended to
defend the Government. A committee of six which included
Theodore brought in a report which blamed the Bavin Government
for the continuation of the coal dispute, and appealed for unity
in the Labor movement. The Conference repudiated this report.
The militants' programme was adopted and a few more demands
97were added to the list.
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The Metropolitan Conference was still in session 
when the special conference called by the N.S.W. Executive met 
in Sydney, on 14 February. Four members of Cabinet attended. 
Theodore spoke for the Government. He was emphatic that the 
Government would not consider any demands which required 
unconstitutional action, and he denied the right of any Labor 
organisation in N.S.W. to instruct Federal Labor members:
As to the course of policy to be followed by the 
Government in such matters [as the lock-out], the 
Government must act on its own judgement and upon 
its own responsibility, subject, of course, to the 
control of Parliament and the ultimate control of the 
Labor movement as a whole. While the Government 
remains in office it will not submit to non-parliamentary 
dictation nor allow its authority to be usurped by 
anybody. 98
The meeting continued until four in the morning.
In the end the decision went to Theodore and the Federal Party: 
a committee was appointed to co-operate with the Government in its 
attempts to end the lock-out.
This decision was then put to the N.S.W.
Metropolitan Conference. As we have seen, the Conference had 
earlier repudiated the compromise suggested by its own 
98
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committee of six. In the intervening days no move had 
been made in the Conference to reverse the endorsement of 
the militant programme. Yet two days after Theodore's victory 
the Conference swung about: two members of the N.S.W. 
Executive, Falkingham and Kilburn, asked the Conference to 
endorse a policy of co-operation with the Federal Government 
over the coal dispute. Despite a renewed attack from 
E.J. Ward and others - and amid talk of 'traitors' and 'a 
sell-out' - the Conference approved the appointment of a 
committee of ten to achieve Federal-State co-operation. If 
the original decision to recommend the establishment of the 
committee was a victory for Theodore, its endorsement by the 
Metropolitan Conference was a triumph. Mr. E. Grayndler, 
M.L.C. (N.S.W.) and Federal Secretary of the A.W.U., had no 
doubts in the matter:
... the attempt to stampede the Federal Government into 
a hopeless and unconstitutional position... was not made 
with any idea of really helping the coal-miners, but to 
embarrass the Government and elevate certain alleged 
Labor leaders to positions of prominence as militant 
industrialists... The victory of Mr. Theodore is 
refreshing. It proves what we have been saying for a 
long time - if the Reds are courageously faced in New 
South Wales they will wilt and wither away. 99
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The coal lock-out was the major industrial 
dispute inherited by the Government in October 1929. The 
timber workers' strike was settled in Melbourne in July
1929 and in Sydney on the Monday after the Federal election 
(reportedly, after consultations between Scullin and Garden)7^° 
Trouble on the waterfront, however, continued throughout the 
Government's term of office. These troubles created friction 
within the Labor movement in Victoria and South Australia in
1930 and 1931 when State Labor Governments had to deal with 
violence between union members and volunteers on the wharves.
At the Federal level the Government was able to assist the 
union. As a result the Waterside Worker sv Federation was one 
of the few unions to campaign vigorously for the Government
in December 1931 (though not in N.S.W.). But relations between 
the Government and the Union in 1929 and 1930 were often 
hostile, and the whole business illustrates some of the 
difficulties facing the Government in its dealings with the 
unions. It also provides an example of the conflicts within 
Caucus in 1930.
S.M.H., 17 October 1929.
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The Unions' troubles began with a strike 
against an Arbitration Court decision in August 1928, The
101strike ended in October. Five things marked the dispute:*" 
first, the Central Committee of Management of the W.W.F. made 
several mistakes which resulted in it losing control of the 
dispute (like many other unions, the W.W.F. was organised on 
a Federal basis, but State Branch autonomy remained very 
strong); secondly, the men in Sydney and Hobart returned to 
work almost immediately, while those in other parts held 
out; thirdly, the other maritime unions and the A.C.T.U. were 
divided in their attitude to the strike; fourthly, while the 
men were on strike volunteers had been recruited to fill 
their jobs (though not in Sydney and Hobart); fifthly, Bruce 
had invoked the provisions of the Transport Workers* Act 
(1928) and ordered all waterside workers to register by 
taking out licences to work - striking members of the W.W.F. 
refused, but the volunteers did not. Thus by October 1929 the 
W.W.F. Branches in most parts were threatened with extinction.
M. Perla*«, Judges in Industry: A Study of Labour Arbitration 
in Australia, ■ Melbourne, 1954, pp. 130-9.
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The existing licences - held by volunteers - were not due 
to expire until 30 June 1930, and the shipping companies 
would only employ licence-holders. The W.W.F. wanted the 
Scullin Government to restore the union to its old position 
in all the affected ports.
While some members of the Party were engaged in
1929 and early 1930 in frequent conferences to end the
coal dispute, other members (and sometimes the same members)
were similarly engaged on the watersiders' problems. The
first result was seen on 9 November 1929 when, after
consideration of the matter in Cabinet, Scullin announced that
102no more licences would be issued. The next move followed
on 11 December, when the Union made an application to Judge 
Beeby in the Arbitration Court for a union preference clause 
to be inserted in its award. Resort to the High Court was 
made at the insistence of the Government and against the wishes 
of the Union, after Brennan had told a conference attended by 
himself, Holloway, C. Crofts (Secretary of the A.C.T.U.) and 
representatives of the W.W.F., on 7 November, that 'there is 
no alternate proposal at present; the Government expects you 
_
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to make this application'. Like the applications made
by the coal-miners at this time (also made at the
Government's insistence), the move was not successful and
Beeby rejected the application on 5 May 1930. The Government
had been in office for six months. In this time it had
stopped the issue of new licences (9 November), removed
Fremantle from the list of ports to which the licensing
system applied (19 December), and proclaimed new pick-up
regulations in the Port of Melbourne (10 April 1930). After
intensive lobbying the union persuaded the Cabinet to refund
to the union that part already paid of the £1,000 fine
104imposed in September 1928. These moves, however, did
not help the union greatly. And the vital question was still
undecided: what would the Government do at the end of June
1930, when the existing licences expired ? After taking advice
from the W.W.F., the A.C.T.U. Congress of February 1930 asked
105the Government to repeal the Transport Workers' Act. Given
103
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the attitude of the Opposition majority in the Senate, it 
was most unlikely that this could be done. Recognising 
this, the Congress gave a general direction: that 'the 
Government, by regulation or otherwise, shall exercise all
its powers to restore complete preference of employment' to
_ , 106 members of tne W.W.F.
From October 1929 until April 1930 negotiations on the
watersiders1 problems were conducted between officials of the
union, representatives of the ship-owners, officials of the
A.C.T.U., members of the Cabinet and a few interested members
of Caucus (notably, Holloway and Makin). Caucus had shown
107little interest in the subject. But on 1 May 1930 Scullin
108and Brennan discussed the waterfront position with Caucus ;
thereafter, Caucus decisions ruled the Government's policy on
the matter. At the Caucus meeting of 8 May Scullin reported
that Cabinet had again discussed the situation but had made no
109decisions. He asked Caucus to make a recommendation. The
106
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Union wanted a regulation under the Act which would give
priority in work to its members and Holloway, who had been
in close contact with W.W.F. officials, moved that this be
the Government's policy. Two amendments were moved. Two
N.S.W. members, McTiernan and Chiflev, moved that no
regulations be issued but at the end of June new licences be
given only to 'approved' workers. Curtin and Riley moved
that the licensing system be discarded after 30 June. After
110discussion the matter was adjourned for a week. " In the
interval members of the Union's Committee of Management
consulted with Holloway, Daly and Brennan. The President and
Secretary of the Union then went to Canberra, where they spoke
to an informal meeting of Caucus and discussed their demands
with members of the Cabinet. They asked for a regulation
granting preference to their members until 30 June; after
which all licences should be restricted to members of the W.W.F.
The Cabinet would not agree to the last request. Ministers said
that the Party (i.e. the Caucus) was opposed because such a
move might allow the Senate Opposition a chance to challenge 
112the Government. In the opinion of the W.W.F. officials, it 
110
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was the members representing rural electorates who were
113particularly anxious to avord a clash with the Senate.
On the Union's first request Scullin said that the best the
Government could do was issue a regulation giving first
preference to returned soldiers who held licences and
114second preference to members of the union. As this was
'better than nothing', the union representatives reluctantly 
agreed. The matter was then debated at two lengthy meetings 
of Caucus (14,15 May). The three proposals put to Caucus 
on 8 May were still to be considered. Holloway and 
McTiernan withdrew their motions after Scullin reported the 
agreement reached with the Union. Curtin's proposal, to 
cancel all licences after 30 June, was defeated by 28 votes 
to 19. Lewis and Makin then moved the adoption of the 
Cabinet-Union proposal and this was carried by a large majority
113
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The Union could expect some benefit from the 
limited preference to be granted by the proposed regulation.
But the effectiveness of the regulation would depend on 
manipulation of the existing licence system, which was due 
to end on 30 June. It seemed that after Caucus1 decision 
of 15 May to give first preference to returned soldiers and 
second preference to Union members, it would naturally 
decide to continue the licence system, and issue licences 
on the first and second preference basis. With the licensing 
system, Government employees would supervise employment on 
the wharves and ensure that the preference stipulation was 
observed. Without the licensing system the ship-owners 
would supervise employment.
At a Caucus meeting on 22 May the licensing system
11Gwas discussed and Scullin asked for a decision. Lacey and
Chifley moved that licensing be continued after 30 June and
that new licences be issued on the first and second preference 
117basis. A vote was taken on 29 May. The motion was defeated
116
Ibid., 22 May 1930.
Ibid.
117
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15 votes to 25; and the Party was once again without a
118policy on the issue. Brennan explained to the next
Caucus meeting (5 June) that Cabinet had considered the
position in light of the Caucus decision of 29 May and now
recommended 'that a Proclamation be issued forthwith
declaring the Transport Workers' Act inoperative and that
a bill be brought down to repeal the Act at the first 
119opportunity'. He concluded by saying that the Cabinet
was seriously divided on the issue and after a number of
motions and amendments the debate was adjourned. When it
was resumed on 19 June a motion to recommit the defeated
motion (15 votes to 25) of 29 May was rejected by 15 votes 
120to 24. The Cabinet recommendation was then adopted.
A Proclamation was issued at the end of June suspending the 
operation of the Act in all ports from 1 July.
The Union was bitterly disappointed. In July the
Federal Secretary sent an abusive letter - by registered post -
121to every member of Caucus. It contained a blistering
118
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attack on the Party. Scullin told Caucus that he resented 
the attack and Caucus took the unusual course of formally 
repudiating the contents of the letter (it did so 
unanimously, but divided 20 votes to 17 on a motion to send 
the resolution to the union). The Union's resentment 
was undiminished, but it began a campaign to have the 
Caucus decision reversed.
The Union's requests had seemed reasonable,
especially after they had been amended (and approved)by
Cabinet. The Caucus decision, however, was based on the
Party's opposition to the Transport Workers' Act. This had
been stated frequently in 1928 and 1929. Repeal of the Act
had been promised by many members of the Party during the
election campaign and was expected by many sections of the
Labor movement. Because of the position in the Senate repeal
of the Act was unlikely. The next best thing was to render
it inoperative. In justifying the Government's policy the
Secretary of the F.P.L.P. said that 'the Party found itself
bound to give effect... to its pre-election pledges, and the
123action taken... was inevitable'. Gabb admitted that the
122
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A.L.P.-S.A., Council Minutes, 10 July 1930.
123
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policy would be detrimental to the interests of the W.W.F.
but that he Was nevertheless in favour of it; he, like
other members, had promised his electors to vote for repeal,
124’or anything that leads in that direction'. It was
unfortunate for the W.W.F. that it was a victim of one of the
few displays of determination made by Caucus. But the union
was also a victim of division in its own ranks. The
governing body of the Federation appealed to its forty-six
125Branches to leave all negotiations in its hands. This
appeal was ignored and as a result individual members of 
Caucus received requests which often conflicted. It seems 
that there was a wide range of opinion within the Union, and 
even within the worst effected Branch (Melbourne). Conflict 
within and between union branches was not unusual: in all 
cases the Government appears to have accepted the advice of 
the highest union authority, usually a Federal executive.
124
W.W.F., Correspondence, J.M. Gabb to A. Turley, 20 July 
1930; Gabb goes on - 'In regard to what I will do in Caucus, 
or how I vote, I am not allowed to divulge, I would answer 
more plainly, but as I am not altogether a white haired boy 
here, I do not want to put my neck in a loop, to enable 
somebody to pull the knot'.
125
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29 November 1929.
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But the W.W.F. had a special difficulty. The N.S.W. potts 
had not been subject to the regulations under the Act in 
1928 and 1929. Anstey was referring to the influence of 
the N.S.W. Branches of the Union when he asked the 
Federal Secretary, 'Further - are you satisfied that your 
local organisations - in those ports unaffected by the 
licence... - did their best to enthuse their Federal Labor
126MsP. your way?... I would like to see some evidence of it'.
Crouch stated bluntly that the Union’s requests were defeated
through the influences of watersiders from the unaffected 
127ports. There was not a bloc vote in Caucus of members
from New South Wales and Tasmania on the issue, but they were 
decisive in the votes rejecting the Union's proposals. A 
group of members from Victoria and South Australia had been 
unswerving in their advocacy of the Union's requests (Holloway, 
Keane, Lewis, Crouch, Makin, Lacy, O'Halloran). After mid- 
1930 these members continued to press for a reversal of the 
Caucus decision of 19 June.
126
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On 26 June the A.L.P. Council in South Australia
condemned the Government for acting against the wishes of
128 129the W.W.F. In August the Melbourne Trades Hall Council,"1"
130and in October the New South Wales Trades and Labor Council,
131asked the Government to do something to assist the W.W.F.
A Special A.C.T.U. Congress in September castigated the 
Government and called upon it to 'immediately exercise all its
powers to restore preference...'. 132 The W.W.F. sent a
deputation to a meeting of the A.L.P. Federal Executive in 
133October. The Executive decided that the F.P.L.P. should
again consult with the W.W.F. and find the best method of
134assisting the Union. By this time Daly had already told
128
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129
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130
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The motion was moved by Garden, and appears to have originated 
from the Newcastle Trades Hall Council.
131
The W.W.F. also lobbied the three State. Labor Premiers:
Hogan (Vic.) promised to consider the matter; Hill (S.A.) 
supported the W.W.F. and wrote to the Acting Prime Minister;
Lang apparently did nothing. (W.W.F., Correspondence, Gen.Sec. 
to Hill, Hogan and Lang, 28 October,- Hogan to Gen.Sec., 31 
OctoberHill to Gen.Sec. , 4 November 1930).
132
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The Federal Executive sent the following resolution to the 
Secretary of the F.P.L.P,: 'Pending a favourable opportunity to 
repeal the Transport Workers' Act, this Executive recommends
167
officers of the A.C.T.U. that the matter would be 
reconsidered by Caucus. Cabinet, said Daly, was still 
sympathetic to the Union's request but could do nothing
135until the Caucus decision of 19 June had been rescinded.
Unfortunately for the W.W.F., Caucus did not meet between
6 August and 27 October 1930. At a Caucus meeting on
13 November a sub-committee was appointed to consult with
the union and., on a motion from Curtin and Nelson, the matter
i 37was adjourned until the last Caucus meeting for 1930.
It was apparent that Caucus was now inclined to 
rescind its earlier decision. There were several reasons
the Federal Party to utilise such power as exists to reinstate 
members of the Waterside Workers' Federation in their former 
employment and that for this purpose we suggest the Party 
should confer with the representatives of the Waterside 
Workers' Federation. (W.W.F., Correspondence, D.L. McNamara, 
to A. Turley, 20 October 1930).
135
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136
Earlier, Nelson had written to Turley, 'You know my 
attitude on the matter and anything I can do in Caucus for 
your organisation I will do as a duty to my class' (W.W.F., 
Correspondence, 28 July 1930).
137
Caucus, Minutes, 13 November 1930. Of the meeting,
Holloway said, 'We had a real good debate upon your question 
yesterday. All members sympathetically and seriously examined 
the whole situation from every angle and after hours of debate 
referred- the whole matter to the Attorney-General and Cabinet 
to decide how and when...1 (W.W.F., Correspondence, E.J.
Holloway to A. Turley, 14 November 1930).
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for this change. In part it was a result of the campaign 
conducted by the W.W.F. through the unions, the A.C.T.U., 
the A.L.P. State Branches and the A.L.P. Federal Executive. 
Conflict between unionists and volunteers had intensified 
after June. And the Caucus majority had become more radical 
as the depression worsened, especially after the Melbourne 
Agreement (August) and the visit of Sir Otto Niemeyer 
(July-September). This was reinforced by the Labor victory 
at the N.S.W. elections on 25 October. Frustrated in many 
larger issues, Caucus at the end of 1930 was inclined to be 
defiant and aggressive in smaller ones, and one such small 
issue was the requests of the W.W.F.
The last Caucus meeting for 1930 was held on
11 December, by which time the Caucus sub-committee's report
had been considered by Cabinet. Daly, as Acting Attorney-
General, presented the Cabinet's recommendation: that the
operation of the Transport Workers' Act be restored by
proclamation, licences be issued and first preference be
given to returned soldiers and second preference to members of
138the W.W.F. Caucus adopted this recommendation. A
Caucus, Minutes, 11 December 1930.
138
Regulation giving effect to the new policy was issued on
19 December the day after Parliament adjourned.
The Acts Interpretation Act required that the
Regulation should be tabled in Parliament within fourteen
days. When Parliament reassembled in March 1931 the
Government waited the full fourteen days before tabling the
Regulation. The Senate then disallowed it. The Government
replied, on the same day, by re-enacting the Regulation.
The process of disallowment and re-enactment was repeated
some twenty times during 1931. The provisions of the
Regulations were progressively more favourable to the W.W.F.
The W.W.F. continued to confer with members of the Cabinet
and Caucus, representatives of the A.C.T.U. and delegates to
the A.L.P. Federal Executive (in June 1931). Though it was
unable to persuade the Government to meet its further demands,
the Union by mid-1931 was satisfied that the Government was
139doing its best to protect the interests of W.W.F. members.
The continued hostility of the Senate served to enhance the
140Government's reputation in the eyes of the Union.
139
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140
The Regulations were also the subject of four separate 
challenges in the High Court in 1931.
A Regulation was disallowed by the Senate on the 
day after Parliament was dissolved (26 November 1931).
The Government immediately gazetted a new Regulation. The 
non-labor Ministry which replaced the Scullin Government 
cancelled the regulation on 8 January 1932, two days after 
it was sworn in, and subsequently amended the Acts 
Interpretation Act. The W.W.F. again fell back, losing the 
strength it had gathered while under the partial protection 
of the Scullin Government throughout 1931.
During negotiations with the W.W.F. Brennan
continually stressed, as he had in negotiations with the
coal-miners, that the Government would not do anything which
the Ministry and its advisers in the Attorney-General's
Department considered illegal. A second point emphasised in
discussions with the W.W.F. by Scullin and Brennan - and
endorsed by a majority of Caucus - was that the Government
would not interfere with preference to returned soldiers.
Scullin said that 'he would not be a party to displacing one
141of these soldier volunteers'; a sentiment which was
141
W.W.F., 'Minutes...', 25 June 1931.
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most unpalatable to the W.W.F., which insisted that 
preference to unionists was a fundamental principle of 
the A.L.P.
The first Federal Labor Ministry (April-
August 1904) resigned over a conflict involving preference 
142to unionists. The Minister for Home Affairs in the
Fisher Labor Ministry of 1910-1913 introduced preference to
143unionists in government employment. The anti-Labor
Ministry which followed (1913-1914) chose this preference
clause as the measure on which to provoke a double 
144dissolution. The second Fisher Ministry (1914-1915)
issued a regulation which reinstated preference to unionists 
In July 1915 this was amended to give first preference to
145
146returned servicemen (there were, of course, relatively few of 
these in 1915, 1916 and 1917). From that time onward 
ex-servicemen were given preference over trade unionists in 
government employment.
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The depression sharpened union demands for
preference to unionists. For some unions it became a 
matter vital to their continued existence. In November 
1929 a deputation from the United Labourers' Union told
147Beasley that 55% of members of the union were unemployed.
By January 1930 the Victorian Branch of the Federated Moulders^
148Union was financially 'down and out'. In mid-1930 the
Secretary (J.J. Graves) of the N.S.W. Branch of the Stove-
makers' Union reported that union funds were 'almost depleted',
the Union's unemployment allowances had been suspended and
the Union staff had gone on short time, working two weeks in 
149every three. Other unions faced similar difficulties:
one in South Australia decided that besides reducing staff
wages it would also cancel its affiliation with the State
150Branch of the A.L.P. There was no doubt that compulsory
union preferences would have meant much for the unions. This
147
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was illustrated at the end of 1931 in N.S.W. when the
Lang Government announced its intention to legislate
for union preference: for the A.R.U. in N.S.W. this
'altered the position of this organisation entirely'
from a situation where the amount of arrears of dues was
'colossal' and the union faced 'a terrific struggle' to
one where'inundated by applications the Union increased its
151office staff and had them' work overtime. A similar
situation prevailed in many other unions.
Generally, preference was a matter for State 
and Commonwealth Arbitration authorities. The Arbitration 
Bill introduced by the Scullin Government in mid-1930 
provided for chang es to the preference clause in the Act. 
There was, however, one area where the Government had the 
power to grant preference on its own initiative. This was 
in the regulations governing employment under contracts let 
by the Department of Works and Railways. There was agitation 
in the Labor movement to induce the Government to demand
151
A.R.U., N.S.W. Branch, State Secretary's Quarterly Report, 
4 April 1932.
that preference to unionists must be observed by
contractors.
The A.W.U. Convention of January 1930 
153discussed the matter. A resolution was passed, 'That
the Prime Minister be requested to make a public 
pronouncement that the policy of the Government is strict 
preference to Unionists'. This was agreed to by 12 votes 
to 11. The split vote did not indicate opposition within 
the A.W.U. to union preference but doubts about the wisdom 
of making the request public. Both the President (Senator 
Barnes) and the General-Secretary spoke against the motion 
on the grounds that it would lead to'the stirring up of 
sleeping dogs'. The A.C.T.U. Conference of February 1930 
resolved that the promised amendment to the Arbitration Act 
should provide for absolute preference, that all Federal
bounties should 'be conditional on the grant of union
152
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Meeting, 17 February 1930.
153
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preference by employers in the favoured industry, and
that all employers holding government contracts must
154give preference to unionists.
Individual unions had already approached the 
Government directly. The Painters' Union in South 
Australia had arranged through Daly and Barnes to have
certain Commonwealth buildings repainted. 155 Preference
to unionists was granted and the union acted as the hiring
156centre for the necessary labor. (In Barnes' wards, he
had 'arranged that in the engagement of Labor the Works
Director will select from list supplied by the Unions and
157in consultation with them'.) This was general policy,
for on 28 March notices had been sent to all Departments of 
Works with instructions that a policy of absolute preference
to unionists must be observed in all contracts. 158 Later
154
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there was some dispute about who was responsible for 
this direction: it seems indisputable that the initiative 
was taken by Barnes (Assistant Minister for Works and 
Railways), and highly probable that he did so without 
advising his fellow Ministers.
The 'sleeping dogs' did not lie undisturbed for long.
In the Senate on 30 April Pearce asked if it was true that
159a change had been made. Barnes temporised, asking
that he be given notice of the question. A meeting of the
Cabinet was hastily convened for the next morning. It was
decided to compromise by deleting straight-out preference,
as ordered by Barnes, and substituting an instruction that
preference should be given, other things being equal, first
to returned servicemen who were also trade-unionists, and
secondly to members of trade u n i o n s . O n  the next day
the Opposition moved formal adjournment motions on the 
161matter. In the Senate tne motion was moved by Major-
General Sir Thomas Glasgow, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.;
159
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160
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161
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and in the Representatives by Lt. Colonel Sir Charles 
Cameron, D.S.O., V.D. The Government replied from its 
meagre stock of ex-soldiers. As in the discussions on the 
suspension of compulsory military training in 1929, the 
debates were particularly vehement. The Government stuck 
to its guns. But its determination was short-lived.
Five days after the debate in Parliament,
Caucus sanctioned a further and final retreat. On 7 May
a special Caucus meeting was announced to consider what
Scuilin called 'the political storm' over preference. Scullin
told the forty-two members present that 'the question was not
big enough to fight the Senate and go to the country, and he
now suggested that v/e make a graceful retreat, and endeavour
still to affirm the principle of preference to unionists'.
He then submitted for approval a statement he intended to read
in Parliament that day. The statement was endorsed by
Caucus, after the defeat of an amendment from Crouch and Rae
16 3calling for the Party to stand firm for union preference.
162
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163
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The Opposition expressed great satisfaction at this
climb-down, 164 The unions regarded it as a betrayal.
The Ballarat Trades and Labor Council congratulated Barnes
165and expressed disgust for the Governments somersault.
The N.S.W.Trades and Labor Council condemned the Government
for 'its scabby action in granting preference to returned
soldiers, and dividing the working classes' an attempt
to recommend that all unions connected with the Council cancel
their affiliation with the A.L.P. unless the Government
reconsidered the matter was defeated by a narrow margin,
1G 736 votes to 40. Five months after the change on
preference the Melbourne Trades and Labor Council resolved 
'that this Council condemns the Federal Parliamentary Party 
[for] their recent somersault in connection with preference
to unionists'. 168 The five months lag points to one of
164 • •
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the weaknesses of the unions when they attempted to exert
pressure on the Government. On this issue there was a
union policy, but, as with other union demands, it went
by default partly because of lack of representation at
the crucial time. The A.C.T.U. had no full-time officials
and its meetings were held infrequently. Individual unions
were at a severe disadvantage. By contrast, officials
of the returned soldiers^ organisations mounted a campaign
in April and May which has been described as ‘something of
169a classic' in the field of pressure-group activities .
The Caucus decision of 7 May is surprising.
There were several reasons for the decision. One was the 
lack of countervailing pressure from the trade unions, which 
apart from their disadvantages as lobbyists, were looking 
for other favours from the Government. Another reason was 
that Caucus was presented with a Cabinet recommendation 
and such recommendations always carried good weight in Caucus. 
169
G.L. Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism: The 
Pressure Group Activities of the Returned Servicemen's 
League , Canberra ,1966, p.51.
In addition, there were many members of Caucus who were 
most unwilling in mid-1930 to provoke a conflict with the 
Senate: as in the debate on the watcrsider problem it seems 
likely-that, on this issue, Caucus members from rural 
electorates were the more loathe to be defiant. Finally, 
there is the diffidence shown by some members of the 
F.P.L.P., in Parliament and Caucus, to the mystique 
associated with the 'Digger legend'. This diffidence is 
surprising in a Party regarded in the 1920s and 1930s 
(at least) as isolationist, anti-conscriptionist and 
generally anti-military. It is even more surprising if 
Serie is correct in saying that 'in the period between the 
wars the digger legend was largely taken over by the 
conservative classes'.
During the dispute over preference the 
Government was preparing to introduce its Bill to amend 
the Arbitration Act. The last amendments had been made by 
the Bruce-Page Government in 1928. The Labor movement had
_
G. Serie, ’The Digger Tradition and Australian 
Nationalism', Meanjin Quarterly, No.2 , 1965.
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shown great hostility to the changes.
In his election policy speech, Scullin had
171promised to make extensive revisions to the Act. When
in office the Government found that 'the time and
circumstances, and the limitations imposed by the 
172Constitution' precluded any sweeping changes to the
Arbitration Act. On this issue, as on so many others, the 
trade unions were divided, and the Government did not meet 
their demands.
In October 1929 the trade unions had no joint
proposal to present to the Government. Their demands were
formulated by the A.C.T.U. Congress of February 1930. In
the intervening months the A.C.T.U. Executive arranged for
individual unions to submit their proposals to local Trades and
Labor Councils which, after adding their own schemes, sent the
173proposals on to the Congress. A committee of seven was
appointed from the Congress delegates to draft proposals for
discussion and after consulting with M. Blackburn, M.L.A- /
171
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172
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a lengthy report was brought in. Some minor amendments
were made before the comprehensive and radical plan was
accepted and a committee established to negotiate with the 
174Government. This committee presented the A.C.T.U.
175programme to Brennan on 14 April and continued its
representations at frequent meetings during the following
months with members of the Ministry and the Caucus
Industrial Committee. It seemed that negotiations would be
simple and straightforward, concerned, for example, with
what provisions would be accepted by the Senate. The matter
was not so easy. When the A.C.T.U. presented its programme
in April the Government had already drafted its own Bill 
176to amend the Act , and it was unwilling to make revisions 
to this Bill. Further, the A.C.T.U. was not alone in trying 
to influence the Government. . Representatives of employers'
organisations were consulted. 177 Individual unions
174
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176
177
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also approached the Government. First in importance
among these was the A.W.U., which was not affiliated
with the A.C.T.U. The A.W.U. established its own
arbitration committee (which included Senator Barnes) in 
178November 1929. This committee presented its set of
179proposals to Brennan on 15 April and also continued
to make representations to the Government, side by side 
with those of the A.C.T.U.
The Arbitration Bill was introduced into
the Representatives on 29 May and passed by the Senate on
8 August 1930. The Bill as introduced was primarily that
drafted by the Government (and approved by Cabinet and
Caucus). Such outside influences as can be detected seem
to owe more to A.W.U. than A.C.T.U. suggestions. The
unions were not pleased with the Bill. The A.C.T.U.
180organised a campaign to get the Bill revised. Union
178
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secretaries in N.S.W. held meetings on the matter and
181sent deputations to Canberra. ° As a result of this 
dissatisfaction the Government withdrew the bill on 
3 July"'-0^ , while it was in Committee.
At a Caucus meeting on the morning of 3 July
Scullin explained what had happened:
... after all the Industrial Committee and the 
Government had done it v/as disconcerting to find 
that many of the Trade Unions were not in favour 
of the Bill, and some had gone so far as to 
request that consideration should be given to the 
matter of dropping the Bill, and bringing in a 
fresh one. 184
In the circumstances there was only one course open, which 
Caucus agreed to follow on a motion from Curtin and Makin:
That we concur in the principle of a new draft for 
the Arbitration Bill, outlined by the Leader, and 
that a sub-committee comprising representatives from 
the original Industrial Committee, and one Senate 
Minister be deputed to act in conjunction with the 
Attorney-General in the formation of the amendments 
to be made to the'Bill. 185
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The move was very abrupt: Scullin told a special Caucus 
meeting on the previous day that 'he proposed to ask the 
House to complete the Bill by tomorrow night' (i.e. 3 July), 
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184
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When re-introduced on 8 July, some further A.C.T.u.
suggestions had been incorporated in the Bill. Brennan
had resisted drastic changes, and warned that the Bill
136would be 'severely mauled' in the Senate. One Union
Secretary was so disillusioned with the negotiations and
the Government's intentions that he reported to his
Executive that 'it would be a blessing' if the Bill were
187rejected by the Senate.
The Bill was before the Senate from 16 July until
1888 August. When it passed the Third Reading, on 5 August,
the Bill contained thirty amendments inserted by the Senate 
189Opposition. Among the changes made were several matters
of importance to the unions: the sections dealing with
suspension or cancellation of awards, secret ballots, legal
representation before the Court, and preference to unionists,
were drastically altered. The Caucus meeting of 6 August
190resolved to reject all of the Senate amendments. Some
186
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Minutes, 30 July 1930.
190
Caucus, Minutes, 6 August 1930.
members, including Chifley and Beasley/ were in favour of
191using the issue to provoke a double dissolution. On
the afternoon of 6 August the Government majority in the 
Representatives rejected all the amendments and returned the 
Bill to the Senate - which insisted on its amendments and 
sent the Bill back to the Representatives on 7 August.
A deadlock had been reached. Canberra at this time was 
swarming with Union officials. After representatives of the
A.C.T.U., the A.W.U. and other unions had conferred they
192advised the Government to accept the amendments. The
Government then arranged a conference of Managers of eight
members, five members of the Government and three Opposition
Senators. The result was that of the thirty amendments made
by the Senate, four were dropped, seven were amended and
nineteen accepted. The Bill then passed through both Houses
193in the early morning hours of 8 August, with five Labor
194members voting against.
191
A.F.U.L.E.- N.S.W. Branch, Annual Delegate Meeting 29 
September-2 October 1931,pp.81,83; S.M.H., 12 August 1930.
192
A .F .U.L.E ., Report of the Tenth Annual Conference 1931,
pp.2, 22.
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C.P.D., Vol. 126, pp.5665-78 (H.of R.), pp.5560-2,
5583-5 (Senate).
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James, Lazzarini, Yates, E.C. Riley, E. Riley; Ibid, p.5678.
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The new Act was an improvement. Many of the
penal provisions inserted in 1928 were repealed or amended.
It also placed a much greater emphasis on conciliation.
It was this feature which induced the unions to accept the
195Bill in its mutilated form. It was obvious in mid-1930
that the Arbitration Court was favourable to wage reductions:
after hearing an application frcm the Graziers' Association
the Court had, on 14 July, granted reductions under the Award
of approximately 20%; in early August the Railway Commissioners
in N.S.W. and Victoria lodged applications to have
variations made in the relevant awards. The new Act had
established a system of Conciliation Commissioners and
Conciliation Committees which in effect largely took over the
Court's powers to make and vary awards. The Act was
proclaimed and the first Commissioner appointed on 21 August
(it was understood that the Commissioner was a'suitable 
196appointment') . There was a flood of union applications
197for the appointment of Conciliation Committees. It seemed
195
Labor Daily, 13 August 1930.
196
A.F.U.L.E.,"Federal Secretary's Personal Correspondence", 
Galvin to Chifley, 27 August 1930.
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Labor Daily, 20 August 1930; S.M.H., 20, 22, 28 August 193Q.
that the Union tactic of accepting the compromise on the
Arbitration Bill would be effective in at least delaying
wage reductions. The unions, however, miscalculated.
The constitutional validity of Section 34 (dealing with the
powers of Conciliation Committees) of the Arbitration Act
was challenged in the High Court. The main provisions of
Section 34 were held to be invalid, and it was made clear
that power to vary awards remained with the Arbitration
Court. There was little that could be done by the unions
to save the situation. A campaign was launched to get the
Government to remove certain Judges from the Arbitration 
198Court. The A.C.T.U. and other unions urged the Government
to introduce another Bill - which was drafted for them by
Blackburn - to re-establish the Conciliation Committee in
conformity with the High Court's decision. Beasley was
granted leave in the Representatives on 10 December 1930 to
bring in a second Arbitration Bill, but nothing more was heard
of this for many months. Eventually another Bill was
introduced, in July 1931. This was of course too late to do 
198
In April 1930 the Government transferred Judge Lukin - a 
hated figure in the Labor Movement, particularly in N.S.W. - 
from the Arbitration Court to the Federal Bankruptcy Court; 
Brennan denied that the move had any political significance 
(Australian Worker, 7 May 1930); the Argus, however, thought 
otherwise and devoted an editorial to-the matter, under the 
heading 'Labour pays its debts' (Argus, 1 May 1930).
much to protect the unions; the Bill still did not meet 
the demands made by the A.C.T.U. The Bill was rejected 
by the Senate. A third Arbitration Bill was considered 
but the Government was defeated before anything could be 
done.
The Government was blamed for being dilatory;
nearly ten months had gone before the first Bill passed
through Parliament. (Senator Barnes reminded the critics
that the unions bore some of the responsibility for the 
199delay •) The main attack expressed union disappointment
at the Government's failure to enact the full A.C.T.U. 
programme. Yet this had not been possible while the 
Government lacked control of the Senate, and the unions had 
agreed with - and helped make - the decision not to seek a 
double dissolution. By doing so they helped prevent the 
Government from carrying out union policy on the coal fields 
on the waterfront, in the matter of preference for unionists 
and in Arbitration legislation.
199
A.W.U., Annual Convention, Official Report, 1931, pp.3,26
The unions were not inclined to acknowledge 
that they were also partly responsible for the Government's 
lack-lustre performance. They saw that in industrial affairs 
the Government was, at best, only partially effective. 
Consequently, August 1930 marks a decisive stage in the 
disenchantment of the unions with 'their' Labor Government. 
This was made even sharper by a series of events in July 
and August 1930. In those two months Theodore resigned from 
the Ministry, Sir Otto Niemeyer, a representative of the Bank 
of England, arrived in Australia to assess Australia's 
economic position, Sir Robert Gibson was re-appointed to the 
Commonwealth Bank Board, and Scullin left Australia to go to 
London. Each of these was to have profound effects on the
Government and in the Labor movement.
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Chapter IV
By early 1930 Scullin's hair had turned white; 
this, he said, was the result of continual worry about the 
unemployment problem. The strain of office had eroded 
Scullin's health and strength. His physical and 
emotional reserves had not been great and his unrelenting 
activity had taken a heavy toll. Apart from the usual 
duties of Parliament, Cabinet, Caucus, Party Conferences,
Deputations, Press interviews and innumerable public meetings, 
Scullin had been affected by the tension within the Labor 
movement. There was also the unremitting hostility of the 
press - to which, it seems, Scullin was more than 
ordinarily sensitive - and the Parliamentary Opposition; his 
deep sense of the extraordinary difficulties facing Australia 
and the Labor Party made Scullin more susceptible to such 
hostility and the attacks which implied that he was inadequate
for the task. By early 1930 there were rumours that Scullin
. _  , 2would step down in favour of Theodore.
1
Australian Worker, 8 January 1930.
2 /Worn.»**
South Australian Worker, 3 January 1930; W e s t a c W o r k e r ,
31 January, 1930.
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In his difficulties Scullin lacked the 
support of one member of his Cabinet. J. Fenton left 
Australia in January 1930 to attend a Naval Disarmament 
Conference in London and arrived back in late June. While in 
London he attended the Conference, and, more importantly, was 
at hand to give emphatic denials to suggestions that the 
Scullin Government might depart from the straight and narrow 
road of 'sane finance'r or in any way fail to honour its 
international obligations. It is possible that he was also 
engaged in the financial negotiations with the Bank of England 
which led eventually to Sir Otto Niemeyer's visit to Australia.
The Labor movement was not enthusiastic about 
Australian politicians going overseas. When the politicians 
were of the Labor Party the reaction was hostile. There was 
a suspicion that the high life of London made politicians of 
humble origins even more susceptible to the 'duchessing' than 
had their elevation to the Parliament in remote Canberra. There 
existed a sharp memory of the treachery of W.M. Hughes when as 
Labor Prime Minister in 1916 he had returned from London a 
fervent advocate of conscription. As a result it was suggested 
at the 1918 Federal Conference that no Labor Prime Minister
193
be permitted to leave Australia during his term of office;
3on a motion from Scullin the suggestion was quickly dismissed.
The movement's hostility to Labor politicians
4leaving Australia was evident in 1930 and 1931. Nevertheless, 
Scullin was not deterred. In late August 1930 he left for 
London to attend an Imperial Conference. He returned to 
Australia early in January 1931. At the time of his departure 
Scullin was- seriously ill: as he journeyed by train to Fremantle 
he had less and less to say to the waiting crowds. Doctors 
were brought to the stops to examine him and in Fremantle an 
ambulance waited to take him from the train to the ship.^
Scullin's decision to leave Australia for four 
months was not the result of physical exhaustion and the need 
for rest; within weeks of assuming office in 1929 Scullin announced 
that he would attend the Imperial Conference in mid-1930.^ Scullin 
said that 'he was going away with great reluctance... CbutH it
3 • • .
Report... Conference of the Australian Labor Party, 1918, p.15.
4
Labor Call, 8 May 1930; South Australian Worker, 15 August 1930.
5
West Australian, 26 August 1930.
Argus, 5 November 1930.
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was more than ever necessary to tell people on the other
7side of the world the true positron regarding Australia 
11 firmly believe that there never was a time when it was more 
important that Australia's financial and economic position
g
should be properly interpreted in Great Britain,' He
continued that he would be dealing with trade relations and
agreements, shipping freight charges and preferential 
9tariffs. It is apparent that Scullin believed that the
authority of the Prime Minister was needed in the task of 
restoring overseas confidence in Australia's financial position. 
It was an added advantage that the Prime Minister was also a 
strong and capable advocate of the Government's high tariff 
policy.
The reasons given for Scullin's absence are not 
entirely satisfying. The need for leadership in Australia 
and within the Labor party was great - and evident by mid-1930. 
It is doubtful whether the men of power and influence in 
London were much swayed by Scullin’s speeches and reassurances;
7
Advertiser, 23 August JL93CU
8
Ibid, f 24 August J.930.
Ibid.
9
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it is most probable that they were swayed by the reports 
which followed Scullin to London of the rancour and division 
within the Government, Labor party and trade unions.
Divisions within the Government were aggravated by 
the absence of two of Scullin's most loyal Cabinet Ministers. 
Parker Moloney, Minister for Markets and for Transport, left 
Australia with Scullin; he was to advise on matters such as 
trade, tariffs and freight charges. Frank Brennan, the 
Attorney-General, left a few weeks earlier, to attend a League 
of Nations Conference in Geneva and then join Scullin and his 
party in London. Like Scullin, Brennan was in a state of 
physical and mental exhaustion by the time he left Australia.^ 
Although not a Minister, P.C. Coleman, M.H.R. for Reid, N.S.W., 
was loyal to Scullin, politically moderate and deeply attached 
to the principles of the Party; Coleman, too, was in Europe in 
mid-1930, as a delegate to a League of Nations Conference.
It is possible that other members of Caucus might 
have left Australia in 1930 or 1931 if there had not been an 
outcry in the Labor movement against the exodus of mid-1930.
R. R. Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth, Sydney 1958,pp.159-60.
10
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In Caucus Scullin defended the intention to send three 
. , 12Ministers overseas. A motion from two South Australians
CGabb and Hoare) at another Caucus meeting to allow only
13Scullin to leave was defeated. A comment typical of
many came from one Union Secretary:
... We expected from the Federal Party that they 
would within six months of taking office have sent 
to the Senate measures in the interest of the general 
community, that they would be able to secure a 
double dissolution and have gone back to the electors, 
when I feel sure they would have been returned with 
the Senate majority in favour of Labor. But our 
Ministry decided on a joy ride trip to the 
Continent... 14
The benefits from the journeys of Scullin and the 
others were small. The only advantage for the Government came 
from securing King George V's reluctant consent to the 
appointment of an Australian ,Sir Isaac Isaacs, as Governor-
11
Apparently the Speaker of the H.of R,, N. Makin, thought it 
wise to cancel a planned trip to the U.S.A. (South Australian 
Worker, 12 September 19301• See also the critical remarks 
of Riordan and Lazzarini, C.P.D., Vol. 127 (9 December 1930),
p.1180.
12
Caucus, Minutes, 3 July 1930.
13
Ibid., 8 July 1930.
14 . ■
A.W,U, - Adelaide Branch, Annual Report, 1931.
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General. Such, an appointment had been mooted in
16Caucus since late .1929 and was greeted, in the Labor
movement, with 'hearty congratulations' as a 'step in the 
17right direction'. It was, however, principally a sop
18to Australian nationalism, which was strong in the 
Labor movement. However by December 1930, when the 
appointment was announced, the majority of Australians could 
find but small and passing comfort in the change; the economic 
depression seemed to deepen inexorably and the Government's 
gesture to national spirit had a ring Qf irony and 
irrelevance.
15
For which see L.F. Crisp, 'The Appointment of Sir 
Isaac Isaacs as Governor-General of Australia, 1930:
J.H. Scullin's Account of Buckingham Palace Interviews', 
Historical Studies Australian and New Zealand, Vol. 11, No.42, 
April 1964, pp.253-7.
16
Age, 14 November 1929; Eldridge was reported to be the 
most enthusiastic advocate and lobbyist in Caucus on the 
matter (Argus, 14 November 1929, 2 January 1930).
17
Geelong Trades and Labor Council, Minutes, 9 December 1929.
18
Other such gestures included the Speaker's decision to 
discard wig and gown and to keep the mace under the table; 
Scullin's decision not to live in the Lodge in Canberra; the 
first promotion of two Australians - Chauvel and Monash - 
to the full rank of General; and the usual Labor refusal 
to recommend Imperial Honours.
198
While away from Australia Scullin was
frequently in contact by telephone and cable with senior
members of his Cabinet. By these means he managed to exert
some influence over the F.P.L.P. during the 'Caucus revolt'
of October-December 1930. His four-month absence undoubtedly
exacerbated the divisions in the Party - those divisions provoked
by the experience of Government and those latent in the Labor
party. In the Party crisis of 1930-31 the job of 'holding
the Party together* was a task beyond the powers of any leader.
But in his choice of Acting Prime Minister Scullin selected the
man best qualified and most likely to minimise the damage.
Six weeks before his departure Scullin announced that
E.J. Theodore would be Acting Prime Minister as well as 
19Treasurer. Four days later Theodore was forced to offer his
resignation from the Ministry and concentrate his attention on 
defending his name against the smirchings of a mighty scandal.
Theodore entered politics in Queensland in 1909 
at the age of 28. By 1915 he was State Treasurer and from 1919 
until 1925 he was State Premier. His early life had been hard - 
he had been a miner and later a union organiser - and by the
19 •
S.M.H,, 2 July 1930.
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20late 1920s he was politically seasoned, mentally
outstanding, and personally tough. His rise had also been
21accompanied by a large increase in personal riches.
Although there was no doubt about his political talents there 
was some suspicion about the source of his wealth. This was 
reinforced, in a section of the Labor movement, by the feeling 
that a political representative of the working class lost 
sympathy for their cause as his wealth increased and, among the 
political Opposition, by the hope that in Theodore's financial 
dealings might be found the weakness which they could use to 
bring him down.
Theodore was vulnerable. He resigned as Premier
in 1925 but was defeated for the Federal seat of Herbert
(Queensland) in the same year. At a by-election in February
1927 he gained the safe New South Wales Labor seat of Dailey.
__
Smiths Weekly Cl4 May 19301 had this to say of Theodore's and 
McCormack's Cone of Theodore's Ministers, later State Premier) 
rule in Queensland; ’They ruled Labor after the manner of a bar­
tender in an old-time Bowery saloon, keeping under the counter 
a short, thick, serviceable club; if politics went to the head 
of anybody in the rank and file, that head was promptly 
battered1.
21
At his death in 1951 he left an estate of £ 528,018 Conformation 
supplied by Dr, J, Playford, Monash University, Melbourne).
Shortly afterwards he was elected Deputy Leader of the 
Party. Rumours began to circulate that Theodore's seat
in Dailey had been 'bought'; among those said to have been
22 23 24approached were Lambert,““ Coleman, Anstev and Mahoney.“
In May 1928 the Nationalist Government appointed a Royal
Commission to investigate. After examining witnesses, among
whom was John Wren, the Commissioner reported that Mahoney
had received a sum of money, probably £5,000, to resign in
favour of Theodore, and that Theodore had contributed £200 
25of the total.
There were other dubious incidents in Theodore' 
past. In 1924 Mt. Isa Mrnes was launched with an issue of 
80,000 five shilling shares. The bulk of these went to John 
Wren and his friends but 500 were given by the promoter of 
the company to Theodore, who was then Premier, and 250 to
22
M.H.R. for West Sydney, 1921-1928.
23
M.H.R. for Reid (N.S.W.), 1922-1931.
24
M.H.R. for Dailey, 1915 - resigned 18 January 1927.
25
'Report of the Royal Commission ...' Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Papers, Vol.4, Session 1926-27-28, pp.1235-45.
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William McCormack, one of Theodore's Ministers. Although
this transaction may have been innocent it was certainly
unwise, for at the time the company was seeking favours from
the State Government; it was not, however, sufficient to
27discredit Theodore in 1930.
For some years there had been rumours linking
Theodore with allegations of corruption in the Queensland
28Government in 1921. It was said that Theodore and others,
McCormack among them, had sold the Mungana Mine to the 
Government - Theodore's Government - at the grossly inflated 
price of £40,000. This was done through intermediaries, so 
the financial interests of members of the State Government 
remained secret. After the Labor defeat in the Queensland 
election of May 1929 the new Government appointed a Royal 
Commission to investigate the allegations, though only after a 
considerable delay.
26
G. Blainey, Mines in the Spinifex: The Story of Mount 
Isa Mines, pp.94-5. Blainey says (p.112) that Theodore 
also bought shares in Mt. Isa.
27
For allegations concerning Theodore's connection with the 
Queensland Liquor trade, see C,P.D. , Vol. 122, (3 December 
1929}, pp.547-8, Ibid. (13 December 1929}, pp.1263-5.
28
Smith's Weekly, 26 April 1930.
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The Mungana Royal Commission began in Brisbane 
on 30 April 1930. The Commissioner was Mr. J.L. Campbell, 
a retired Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 
Evidence was heard through May and June, and the Report was 
released on 4 July.
Early in the proceedings Theodore's name was
mentioned; then his bank books and other personal documents 
29were called for. In mid-May Theodore wrote to the
Queensland Crown Solicitor offering to give evidence on the
29 or 30 May. This was unacceptable because the Commission
was to go North at that time to hear evidence. Another date
was suggested but Theodore refused it on the grounds that he
was busy preparing the Budget, which was to be presented in the
first week in July. The Queensland authorities replied that
the Commission could not possibly sit after 24 June. In the
frequent exchange of letters and telegrams which followed,
the closing date was finally extended to 28 June. In the end
Theodore did not give evidence. Bearing in mind the time 
29
The following account of Theodore's negotiations with the 
Commission is taken from reports in S.M.H., 1-3, 8-10, 12-16, 
20, 22-24, 31 May, 2, 4, 10, 12, 18-21 June 1930.
203
the Queensland Government had taken to establish the
Commission, the speed with which it was closed down seems,
at best, unreasonable; such haste buttressed the widely held
opinion that the enquiry was a deliberate political attempt
to destroy Theodore. Given the currency of this opinion and
considering the evidence which was being reported daily in
the newspapers it was unwise of Theodore to have stayed 
30away. However, his reason for not doing so was a persuasive
one and would probably have had the support of a majority of 
Cabinet and Caucus had they been consulted. He had been 
Treasurer for nine months and was the Government's outstanding 
financial expert;31 he was preparing an extremely difficult, 
complex budget to be presented in a few weeks; to appear before 
the Commission would take not less than four or five days of 
his time.
30
Though perhaps not if he were guilty; it is the writer's 
impression that he was.
31
Of Theodore's abilities as Treasurer, Schedvin says,
1 . . . it is probable that he was the most able holder of 
the Treasury portfolio in Commonwealth history... . His 
imprint is everywhere evident in Treasury policy papers... 
Theodore examined every clause in detail and commented 
extensively...' CC.B. Schedvin, Australia and the Great 
Depression, Sydney, 1970, p.119. )
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On Friday 4 July the Commissioner's Report was made
public and the hopes of Theodore's many enemies were realised.
rdith the others involved ,Theodore was reported guilty of
misrepresentation, fraud and dishonesty. He was singled out
32with a charge of 'the grossest impropriety'. The severity
of the report created a sensation.
On Saturday 5 July Theodore telephoned Scuiiin from
Sydney and was granted his request to be relieved of his
33Ministerial position. A meeting of the Cabinet on 7 July
34accepted his resignation and Scullin took over Theodore's 
portfolio until he left for London, when Lyons became Acting 
Treasurer. Theodore retained his seat in Parliament and the 
Deputy-Leadership of the Party.
At a special Caucus meeting on the morning of 8 July 
Scullin discussed'the unfortunate circumstances which had 
arisen'; Theodore made a statement and expressed his
determination to seek a judicial investigation of the charges
32
S.M.H.,, 5 July 1930.
33 -
Ibid., 7 July 1930.
34
Ibid., 8 July 1930.
made against him; and it was 
parliamentary tactics on the 
Later in the Representatives 
in the Ministry and Theodore 
own defence.0^
resolved to leave
matter in Scullin's hands. 
Scullin announced the changes 
made a dramatic speech in his
35
In general, the Labor movement supported
Theodore; he was seen as the victim of a plot - and it was
often implicit in what was said that his guilt or innocence
37was a matter of no great consequence. After conferring
with Theodore the President of the New South Wales Branch
of the A.L.P., J.J. Graves,supported Theodore and promised
38the support of Labor m  New South Wales. Garden made
39similar statements. Lang remained silent.
35
Caucus, Minutes, 8 July 1930.
36
C.P.D., Vol. 125, pp.3749-53.
37
South Australian Worker, HI July, 8, 22, 29 August 1930.
38
Labor Daily, 8 July 1.930.
3 9  ....
Ibid. , 1.0 July 1930.
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When leaving his Sydney offices Theodore
farewelled his Private Secretary with the words, 'Good-bye'
40it will only be for two months'. His estimate was
conservative for it was six months before he returned to
Cabinet (and then amid strife which paralleled that
surrounding his departure). After its burst of attacking
speed in early 1930 the Queensland Government lapsed into
torpor. Theodore made several visits to Brisbane to hurry
things on. Eventually a Bill was passed to enable the
Government to take civil proceedings for £30,000 against
41Theodore and others. On 24 August 1931 a special jury
of four found the group not guilty on all charges. The 
Government did not appeal against the verdict.
So great were Theodore's talents, both as Treasurer 
and political leader, that it is tempting to see his eclipse 
as an 'accident' which did much to bring the Government to
40
Argus, 8 July 1930.
41
In August or early September 1930 Latham, Leader of the 
Nationalists, volunteered the opinion to the Queensland 
Premier that although there was no hope of a criminal 
prosecution, there was a chance of civil action (C.P.D.,
Vol. 128, p.29).
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its eventual sorry state. This was unlikely. it is 
necessary to remember the imposed by the
international economic depression, the Government's 
position in the Senate, the always delicate fabric of 
unity in the Labor movement, and the ever present distrust 
of the competence and intentions of Labor among those in 
positions of power and influence. There were also 
institutional inheritances from the past which restricted 
Labor, such as the Arbitration Court and the Commonwealth 
Bank.
The commonwealth Bank was under the direction of
the eight members of the Bank Board: in 1930 the majority
42were not bankers but men of business and commerce and
the Bank's policy was conservative, politically and 
43economically. The Board was dominated by the Chairman,
__
One member was the Secretary to the Commonwealth Treasury. 
43
The attitude of the Board was indicated by R.S. Drummond, 
Board member and Riverina wheat grower, in late 1930 when he 
told Cabinet that he was opposed to Labor policy and would 
always fight it. (Beasley, C.P.D., Vol. 130 (19 June 1931) , 
p.2842; confirmed by Fenton - 'I threatened to put him out 
of the room' - ) Ibid., p.2843.
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Sir Robert Gibson. * The great significance of Gibson
to the Scullin Government is most ably summed up by
Schedvin in his comment, 'more than any other individual,
Gibson determined the course of economic policy during
45the depression and early recovery period'.
Gibson arrived in Australia from Scotland 
46in 1891. He quickly established himself in Melbourne
commerce and industry. By the early 1920s he was a 
distinguished man of affairs, with wealth, position and 
Imperial honours. In 1924 he was appointed to the 
Commonwealth Bank Board and two years later he was 
elected Chairman of the Board. His appointment to the 
Board was to expire on 10 October 1930.
Like his fellow Board members Gibson 
was not versed in the theory of economics, nor did he
44
L.F. Giblin, The Growth of a Central Bank, Melbourne, 
1951, pp.35-6.
45
Schedvin, Op.cit. , p.85.
46
For a biographical sketch of Gibson see P. Serie, 
Dictionary of Australian Biography, Sydney, 1949, Vol. 1, 
pp.339-40.
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possess a very deep understanding of banking:he was
47essentially a businessman, and consequently he was
extremely orthodox in economics and extremely suspicious
of the Scullin Government. Furthermore, he regarded himself
and the Bank as being completely independent of Government
direction. This became obvious in late 1930, and starkly
so in 1931. But the Government had been in office less
than a week when a public exchange between Gibson and
Scullin - during which Gibson asserted the Bank's freedom
from 'political control*-established the tone of business
48relations between Gibson and the Government. Gibson,
however, was not impartial: at the time of the Government's 
attempts to legislate for the Theodore Plan of early 1931
Gibson remarked to Pearce, Leader of the Opposition in the
47
In 1930 Gibson was connected with the following 
establishments: Robert Harper & Co.; National Mutual Life 
Assn.; Chamber of Manufacturers' Insurance Ltd. (he was 
Chairman of the Board for the previous three companies);
Union Trustee Company; Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd. 
(A.Jobson & A. Pooley, The 'Digest' Year Book of Public 
Companies of Australia and New Zealand, Sydney, N.D./p.247). 
He also had a controlling interest in the Austral 
Manufacturing Co. and the Lux Foundry (Serie, Op.cit.f 
p.339). Between 1922 and 1925 he was President of the 
Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers (E.Knox, Who1s Who in 
Australia, Melbourne '1933, p.139), and President 'for a time' 
of the Associated Chambers of Manufacturers of Australia 
(Serie, Op.cit■, p.339).
48
Argus , 28, 29 October 1929.
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Senate, that 'They... will do this only over my dead 
49body'. In May 1931 Gibson was called before the Bar
of the Senate by the Opposition to give evidence
relevant to a crucial Government Bill (later rejected by
the Senate); on this event one writer has noted that
'there would appear to be prima facie grounds for
suspecting collusion between Opposition Senate Leaders and
Sir Robert G i b s o n . ^  Nor did Gibson give great
allegiance to constitutional forms: in 1931 he told the
Leader of the New Guard, an extremist organisation with
dubious aims, that it was'high time the New Guard did
51something ' as 'Lang has got to be stopped...'.
To many in the Labor movement Gibson was 
scarcely distinguishable from the representatives of the 
Money Power who controlled the private banks. They looked 
to the approaching day when Labor could depose him and put
a 'Labor .man' in his place. There was a double opportunity
49
Sir George Foster Pearce, Carpenter to Cabinet, London, 
1951, p.188.
50
L.F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, London,1954 (1st ed. 1949), 
p.296, FB.36.
51
E. Campbell, The Rallying Point: My Story of the New 
Guard, Melbourne, 1965, p.138.
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in 1930 for Sir Samuel Horden had retired from the 
Board in late 1929. The way was open in mid-1930 for 
Labor to make two appointments to the Board.
The Cabinet appointed M.B. Duffy to replace 
Sir Samuel Horden. Duffy had served on two Royal 
Commissions - one on taxation, the other on the Constitution - 
during the 1920s. He was a Victorian, with extensive 
trade union experience; at the time of his appointment he 
was Secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council. On 
economic matters Duffy was regarded as a radical, principally 
because he advocated credit expansion and reduced bank 
interest rates as measures to fight the depression. The 
favourable impression created in the Labor movement was, 
however, virtually obliterated when it became known that the 
Cabinet had also re-appointed Sir Robert Gibson.
Sometime in late July Scullin approached Theodore - 
who was no longer a Minister - and asked what should be done 
about Gibson's position. Scullin was in favour of renewing 
his tenure. Theodore was doubtful but agreed that the financial 
circumstances, international and domestic, made it difficult to 
do otherwise; he suggested that Gibson only be re-appointed for
212
one year, but this was not possible as the Act provided for 
a minimum appointment of seven years.
Gibson's tenure was to expire on 10 October.
Scullin was to leave for London on 21 August. On 4 August
a meeting of Cabinet in Canberra considered Scullin's
recommendation that Gibson be re-appointed for a further seven 
53year term. The nine Ministers present gave their unanimous
54approval. The decision was confirmed at the next Cabinet
meeting, on 8 August; at this meeting Beasley made an 
55informal protest. Gibson was advised on 11 August, although
the decision was not sanctioned by the Executive Council until 
563 September. At a further Cabinet meeting a few weeks later
after Scullin's departure - on 6 September, the matter was 
raised again. Beasley repeated his objection and Anstey handed 
a note of dissent - 'I protest against this appointment' - to
52
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53
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Theodore was no longer in the Ministry; Brennan left for 
London on 22 July; Beasley and Daly were absent in Sydney.
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the Secretary to the Cabinet. Nothing, however, could
be done; the majority of the Cabinet were firm for Scullin's 
advice, and the two appointments were made public on 
8 September 1930.
The matter was discussed at a meeting in Sydney of 
Federal Caucus members from New South Wales, on 8 September. 
Beasley declared that he was unable to help with information 
as he was 'in the dark' on the matter. It was reported that 
members:
complained that Sir Robert Gibson had only given 
passive assistance to the Federal Government in 
carrying out its financial policy. They declared 
that he had 'sabotaged' them over the Wheat Pool 
Bill... Members made it clear that they would 
bring the matter up at the first meeting of Federal 
Caucus, and would call for an explanation from 
Ministers. 58
Gibson's reappointment was regarded as a betrayal.
It particularly irked some members of Caucus that Scullin had
not honoured a promise to bring the issue to Caucus before any
59decision was made. Cabinet made its decision on 4 August,
57
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Ibid. Caucus Minutes do not show when this promise was given; 
it is possible that it was made during discussion on the Central 
Reserve Bank Bill, such as that which occurred cn 26 March 1930, 
(Caucus, Minutes, 26 March 1930).
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vet no mention of it was made at the Caucus meetings of 
5 and 6 August. The latter, it should be noted, was the 
last in the March-August series and had Scullin's plan for the 
adjournment of Parliament been adhered to there would have been 
no further Caucus meetings until his return in January 1931.
It is clear that with the approval of a majority of the Cabinet, 
Scullin deliberately broke his promise and kept the issue from 
Caucus.
. * 60 The matter was raised in Caucus on 30 October. Eldridge
gave notice of motion that at the first Caucus meeting at which
Scullin was present he would move a motion of disapproval of the
reappointment of Sir Robert Gibson. The motion was moved by
Eldridge and Rae nearly four months later, at the third Caucus
meeting after Scullin's return. After Scullin spoke in defence
of his actions, Frost and Riordan moved as an amendment, 'That
we accept the explanation of the Prime Minister'. The
amendment was carried unanimously.^ This may give a false
60
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impression of the attitude of Caucus. In mid-February 
the F.P.L.P. was being shaken by divisions which 
produced resignations from Cabinet and Caucus (and a 'spill' 
of all positions was imminent); the Party had been defeated 
in the Parkes by-election; the Lang plan had appeared; the 
Party was advancing a comprehensive policy of its own: in 
short, it was a time when many in the F.P.L.P. were inclined 
to sink past differences and disappointments for the sake of 
unity and future prospects. Earlier, in late 1930, there 
was considerable hostility to Scullin's action. The 
reappointment was an influence in the 'Caucus crisis' of 
October-December 1930; in particular it was significant in the 
action taken by Caucus - and against Scullin's wishes - to 
secure two appointments to the High Court.
Scullin's explanation of his action was simple enough. 
Gibson, he said, had been in the middle of very important 
negotiations for the Government and as he was held in 'very 
high esteem here and by people on the other side of the water'
C.P.D., Vol. 129, p.1612.
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it was thought best not to keep Gibson 'in the dark' until 
October. Scullin expected that the reappointment would 
help him with his own negotiations when he arrived in London.6' 
No doubt Scullin genuinely believed this might be so but it 
is doubtful whether it was more than a minor and passing 
asset in negotiation. There were other influences which 
Scullin does not mention. Sir Otto Niemeyer arrived in 
Melbourne on 19 July and spent many days in conferences with 
representatives of the private banks, and Gibson and Scullin; 
the long and delicate negotiations with the banks to establish 
an exchange mobilization pool were not completed until 5 
August; the Loan Council was to meet, with Niemeyer in 
attendance, on 5 and 6 August; and the Reserve Bank Bill was 
still before the Senate Select Committee: the immediate 
circumstances seemed to Scullin to make it unwise to change 
horses in mid-stream. At this time too, Scullin was acting 
as Treasurer, a position for which he was not suited. He was 
also seriously ill.
63
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Scullin ignored Caucus because he thought that the
circumstances left him no alternative. However, had the
circumstances offered greater freedom it is still probable
that Scullin would have recommended the same action. It was
suggested in December 1929 that it was unlikely that Gibson
would be replaced because he was 'held in high esteem by
64leaders of the Labor Party' . One of these leaders was 
Scullin.
Before leaving Australia Scullin told Fenton that 
'in regard to banking there was no man in Australia in whom
65he had greater confidence than he had in Sir Robert Gibson'.
A few years later, after Gibson's death, Scullin said that he
had 'held him in the highest respect, and had the greatest
66admiration for him'. It has been said that Gibson exercised
67a curious kind of domination over Scullin. Certainly the 
two were opposites in temperament and Gibson was by far the 
stronger in character. Though perhaps apocryphal, two stories
64
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65
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provide accurate pointers to the two men; Scullin is
reported to have telephoned Gibson, 'and in a voice
broken with emotion [said], "For God's sake, Sir Robert,
68give me money for the unemployed of this country’1'; ° when 
approached in August 1930 by Scullin with a request for 
credit expansion Gibson is said to have replied, 'Mister
Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet, I bloody well
, , 69won 11 .
The consequences of Gibson's reappointment were 
great and as they grew and became more obvious the reasons 
for the decision became harder to accept. W.M. Hughes felt 
that he could neither endorse nor complain of the decision; 
but he was perplexed:
Who reappointed Sir Robert Gibson...? The 
Government knew very well that finance is the 
root of the present trouble, and that along 
financial lines alone can a remedy be found. Yet, 
holding those views, the Government appointed a 
man who, Ministers must have known, would defeat 
their every endeavour to rectify the position by 
the aid of the Commonwealth Bank. 70
68
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Scullin said that Gibson was only one member of the Board,
'and no advantage could have been gained by getting rid of 
71only one'. But 1930 presented the opportunity of getting
rid of two. And it was known that 1931 could provide an
opportunity of getting rid of a third, for C.H. Reading's
72tenure on the Board was to expire on 9 October 1931.
One member was the Secretary to the Treasury and as a 
public servant he was surely amenable to Government 
instruction. And it was possible that further vacancies
might have arisen from deaths or retirements. Yet Scullin and 
his Ministers were attached to the short-term view and thus 
the opportunity to adopt an aggressive policy was neglected. 
The episode also showed the gap between the Cabinet and 
Caucus.
Part of the hostility to Gibson stemmed from the 
fact that he was a conservative - and an arrogant one - who 
was blocking Labor policy. It was doubly frustrating that
71
S.M .H., 14 December 1931.
72
The Government fell before the vacancy was filled;
George Crowley, the General Manager of City Mutual Life Co., 
was rumoured to be the likely nomination (Age, 29 October 
1931; C.P.D., Vol. 132 (3 October 1931), p.1372).
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he controlled the Commonwealth Bank, which Labor 
regarded as its own child and an instrument to be used in 
reforming society. But behind much of Labor's attitude 
to Gibson was an interpretation of society which saw banks 
and bankers as sinister manipulators: for many in the Labor 
movement Gibson was a representative of the Money Power.
For a long period after the 1890s an important
strand of Labor's analysis of Australian society was drawn
from the writings of the American populists and their
73Australian imitators and adapters. In Australia the
conspiracy theory remained vague. Among its effects was,
as Gollan has said, a general
Feeling that the existing banks operated
against the interests of the workers and
that their operations should be controlled
by state action. In its most extreme form
the private banks were seen as a conspiracy
of a minority against the welfare of the majority. 74
In 1930 and 1931 the 'most extreme form' of the conspiracy 
theory had a great many adherents in the Labor movement.
73
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Yates, Lazzarini, Eldridge and West were among
the principal exponents of the Money Power conspiracy
between 1929 and 1931, though it is possible to detect
considerable elements of the theory in the speeches of
almost every member of the F.P.L.P. The most ardent
expositor, however, was Frank Anstey. His best known
publication, Money Power (1921), had exerted considerable
75influence in the Labor movement. Anstey's views had been
s s V öadopted by his protege* John Curtin, and Curtin's writings 
and speeches on financial matters in 1930 and 1931 are very 
close to those of Anstey . Views similar to much material 
appearing in the Labor press were expressed by Curtin in 
early 1930:
To the advocates of various reforms - note issue 
inflators, opponents of the gold standard and 
others - I now say that whether under a different 
currency system the resources of credit would be 
greater or less is comparatively immaterial if
75
Another of Anstey's books, The Kingdom of Shyiock was still 
being sold in 1928; it was recommended as 'brilliant on the 
inside of finance' (Union Voice, 21 January 1928). Anstey's 
Red Europe was banned in New Zealand in the 1920s but was 
nevertheless most influential among socialists in that country 
( S.W. Scott, Rebel in a Wrong Cause, N.Z., N.D., p.35).
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they continued to be controlled by a
small groups. . . The great monopoly in
this country is the money monopoly.... A few
men, linked by their power to dominate the
banking policy of a country, are enabled to
exercise an influence on the nation greater
than that of its elected representatives in the
Legislature. . . . Money Power pulls the strings...
the tentacles of the Money Power are so widely
cast that they are all embracing. The financial
rulers of the world are superior to all interests,
national or international; they make wars and
gain much profit and when peace comes they keep the
people in subjection with their demands.... And
they seek, unceasingly, to control all Governments. 79
There was one strand of such thinking which did not 
directly involve a 'financial ruler' such as Sir Robert 
Gibson. This was the all-pervasive power of international 
finance; international meaning mainly Europe, Europe mainly 
England ,and England mainly the Bank of England. Labor might 
hope for a time when it would crush the domestic Money Power, 
but it had little hope of escaping the grip of Europe's 
bankers. Consequently, a special hostility was reserved for 
the international Money Power and its representatives.
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On 19 June 1930 Scullin announced in the House
of Representatives that Sir Otto Niemeyer of the Bank of
England was coming to Australia at the Government's
80invitation to advise on financial matters.
Later in 1930 Fenton, then Acting Prime Minister,
81explained how Niemeyer's visit had come about. "" Since
February the Government had been negotiating for finance
82with the Bank of England. At the end of May the Bank said 
that 'whilst anxious to assist' it must first have a wider
understanding of Australia's position, perhaos best 
gained by sending a representative to report on the 
situation. The Bank asked
...Whether such a visitor would be welcome, and 
whether the Government would be ready to give 
him its full confidence and allow him full 
opportunity for enquiry and freedom to confer 
with the Commonwealth Bank Board and such other 
sources as might seem wise. 83
80
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Within a week Scullin had accepted the proposal, which,
says Schedvin, 'must have surprised' both Gibson and the 
84Bank of England. By the time Scullin announced the
impending visit the Niemeyer mission was on its way.
Niemeyer's background was of a kind to send a chill 
of apprehension through those Australians opposed to
M e  M *  P  9 P C N T  f w ü i M T y - O H C  y C A » t 5
deflation. Twan ■y -<m g«op» h i o  a i n t y  ■ £ I r a  y ii>fi,ars. hn,d ä a o n  epo*»«
with the British Treasury. In 1927 he transferred from that 
pillar of fiscal orthodoxy to its twin in monetary policy, 
the Bank of England. He joined the Bank as an Executive 
Director at the invitation of Montague Norman, the aloof, 
inflexible Governor of the Bank. The two men had long been 
close associates and 'they liked and understood each other
85remarkably well'. Both were rigid believers in the canons
of economic orthodoxy: balanced budgets were part of the
natural order of things, international financial obligations
were inviolable, the gold standard was sacrosanct and, in a
depression, wages must be reduced.
84
Schedvin, Op.cit.f p.135. It is not clear from Schedvin's 
account (pp.132-6) whether an alternative suggestion from the 
Bank of England was sent to Gibson or Scullin, or if to the 
former - as seems likely - it was made known to Scullin; the 
alternative was '(b) We could confer with a special 
intermediary sent here privately by [the] Commonwealth 
Government with complete information on all aspects and a 
considered picture of the future'.
I t  seems p r o b a b l e  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  some members o f
t h e  C a b i n e t  r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  N iem eyer would recommend
d e f l a t i o n .  D uring  h i s  t im e  i n  London in  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f
1930 , F e n to n  had  t a l k e d  w i th  N iem eyer and F e n to n  b e l i e v e d
t h e  N iem eyer  m is s io n  would  do good f o r  t h e  G overnm ent and 
86A u s t r a l i a .  The C h ie f  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Labor Governm ent
in  S o u th  A u s t r a l i a  s a i d  t h a t  N ie m e y e r 's  recom m enda tions
37were e x p e c t e d  by t h e  S t a t e  Governm ent and were welcome.
B a v in ,  P r e m ie r  o f  New S o u th  W ales ( u n t i l  O c t o b e r ) , s a i d  t h e  
88same t h i n g . ^  In  S ep tem ber  Lyons s a i d  t h a t  N iem eyer had
t o l d  t h e  Governm ent n o th in g  i t  d id  n o t  a l r e a d y  know and
89recommended no t i l in g  i t  had  n o t  a l r e a d y  c o n te m p la t e d .
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Niemeyer and his party arrived in Fremantle on
9114 July and in Sydney on 20 July. On their journey
across Australia they were accompanied by senior Commonwealth
public servants. In Adelaide Nierneyer consulted with the
.92Premier - who was most impressed' and lunched at the
Adelaide Club with financiers and an economist, Professor
Melville;93 in Melbourne he was met by the economists
94Giblin and Copland; the train journey from SvdlTuy to
Vy Oru&y was made with representatives of the Melbourne 
Associated Banks; in Sydney Nierneyer immediately began
9Cdiscussions with Gibson, after a brief meeting with Scullin. 
From their arrival in Sydney on 20 July until the release of 
Nierneyer's statement to the Melbourne Conference on 22 August 
very little was heard of the visitors.
89
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not known before, but... reference to the opinions of such 
highly respected and capable people was of considerable help..
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England.
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The non-Labor press was delighted with the
Niemeyer mission, anticipating correctly that the voice 
of 'sane finance' and responsible 'national housekeeping' 
was about to be heard. One paper was so optimistic that 
it burst out:
We've got an Otto 
Always merry and bright 
Look around, and you will find 
All of our loans a year behind 
The sun will shire,
Though Bailiffs murmur, 'What-ohl'
But we always say to ourselves, we do,
Cheer up Australia, you'll soon pull through,
For we 1ve 
got
Otto ! 96
The Labor press was suspicious. The South Australian
Worker said that although there were many rumours, nobody
yet seemed to know the real reason for Niemeyer's visit;
its own interpretation was wildly astray for it concluded
that he was in Australia;
to discuss under what conditions Australia 
will permit the Bank of England to conduct 
its business in future [and] those who have 
feared that Sir Otto was an emissary of Nemesis
96
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arc therefore mistaken. He is, in fact,
the advance agent of Midas, and carries
with him a map of the way to the Golden
sands of Pactolus. 98
The same paper deplored the secrecy surrounding the
99purpose of the Niemeyer mission, and it was not many 
weeks before it joined the Labor chorus of vilification 
of Niemeyer.
The three principal decisions of the Melbourne
Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers made for a
policy for deflation: budgets were to be balanced in 1930-31
and in future years; the Loan Council was to raise no more
loans until the short term debt was dealt with; any future
loan expenditure from money raised internally must be
100confined to reproductive works. Niemeyer's address to
the conference urged Australian Governments 'to face the 
realities of the situation':
98
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...In short, Australia is off budget 
equilibrium, off exchange equilibrium,and 
faced by considerable unfunded and maturing 
debts both internally and externally; in addition 
to which she has on her hands a very large 
programme of loan works for which no financial 
provision has been made... There is also 
evidence to show that the standard of living 
in Australia has reached a point which is 
economically beyond the capacity of the 
country to bear without a considerable reduction 
of costs... Australia cannot wish to remain 
forever under a regime of emergency tariffs....
Costs must come down. There may be room for 
increased efficiency, but there seems to me 
little escape from the conclusion that in recent 
years Australian standards have been pushed too 
high relatively to Australian productivity and to 
general world conditions and tendencies. 101
On 4 September Niemeyer accepted an invitation from 
the New Zealand Government to investigate the country's 
banking and currency system. He advised the Government 
to establish a Central Reserve Bank; and 'he rather
102deprecated the tendency toward a pessimistic outlook'.
101
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Australian economists.'
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He returned to Australia, at the invitation of Sir 
103Robert Gibson,^ and left at the end of October. He 
later went to South America and later still to India to 
advise Governments on rehabilitation of national finance.
Despite his presence in Australia after August 
1930, Niemeyer was little regarded. His recommendations 
of August, however, were a centre of attention for several 
months.
At the most superficial level the Niemeyer mission
produced temporary additions to the national vocabulary of
abuse: a 1Niemeyerite' advocated 'Niemeyerism' and hoped
Australia would be 'Niemeyered'. Memories of Niemeyer lived
104long in the Labor movement, partly because the immediate 
effect of the Niemeyer mission in 1930 was to create a furore 
in the Labor party and trade unions. Obviously, this was
103
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because Niemeyer advocated reducing 'costs', which was 
a euphemism for wages: those in the Labor movement who 
were confused by talk of the gold standard, exchange 
devaluation and credit expansion knew exactly what was 
meant by wage cutting, and what were the likely consequences; 
wage cuts would threaten the very raison d'etre of 
Australian unions - at a time when they were otherwise under 
stress - and shake faith in the value of Labor as a protector 
of the working class. Niemeyer became synonymous with wage 
cutting and because this was so the Scullin Government's 
association with him brought it further discredit.
The decision to invite Niemeyer had not been known in 
the Party until Scullin's statement of 19 June, though 
rumours had circulated that 'somebody was coming out from
105England to take charge of Australia on behalf of the banks'. 
Denning states that some Ministers were not aware of the 
impending v i s i t . C e r t a i n l y  the Caucus had not been told.^^
105
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The secrecy surrounding the visit gradually excited
apprehension which turned to suspicion as the weeks passed; 
eventually Fenton felt compelled to explain to the Parliament 
the circumstances surrounding the visit.
10;
Labor's theory of the Money Power was especially 
antagonistic to the foreign banker. Gollan has noted 
further elements in the theory, in its American setting:
The high emotional charge carried by the populist 
ideology was due to the fact that the conspiracy 
in which the populists believed brought together 
a number of elements each of which separately was 
the object of suspicion, fear and hostility. The 
conspiracy was English, Jewish and foreign... the 
populists could see themselves... also as defenders 
of their country against an external aggressor...
The Money Power was made more dangerous by its 
Jewish overtones... its image of the financier was 
a caricature of the Jew. Ill
108
Reflected for example, in the following Labor Council 
resolution; 'That a letter be forwarded to the Secretary,
Federal Labor Party, requesting that information be forwarded 
regarding statements made by Sir Otto Niemeyer' f (Ballarat 
Trades and Labor Council, Minutes, 7 August 1930).
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These elements were apparent in Australia during the
campaign against 'Niemeyerism'. Much was made of 'the
112good old Briddish name of Otto Niemeyer', 'Sir Otto de
113 114Moses1 and the 'receiver for Shylock'.^ The mission
was also the target for anti-German and anti-British
feeling. Thus, Niemeyer's opponents in the Labor movement
had a rich store of prejudice and a strong tradition - the
Money Power theory - to draw upon. (Lang drew constantly
on this store during the New South Wales election campaign
of October 1930.)
Circumstances made the Niemeyer mission a turning
point in the history of the Scullin Government. Scullin and
the others were now out of Australia, Theodore was gone from
the Treasury and Sir Robert Gibson's control of the
Commonwealth Bank was d. The Government's major
legislation during March - August 1930 had come to nothing and
had ended with the disappointing compromise Arbitration Act, 
112
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the benefits of which were shortly to be nullified or 
eclipsed. The policy vacuum was filled by the Melbourne 
Agreement, but its proposals were not likely to be easily 
accepted by the Labor movement. The Niemeyer mission had 
forced the issue on policy, crystallized opinion and thereby 
helped produce the struggle in the Labor movement which was 
to preoccupy the F.P.L.P. through the last months of
1930.
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Chapter V
Scullin left Australia at the end of August
1930 and, with Brennan and Parker Moloney, returned over
four months later. Theodore resigned from the Cabinet
on 17 July and was not re-instated until 29 January
1931. Thus for four months the Party was without the
control and guidance of four senior Ministers, including the
Prime-Minister, Treasurer and Attorney-General, and
without its elected Leader and Deputy-Leader. It is
reported that Scullin was asked by Party members to stay in
Australia,1 2and that when he refused to do so Beasley
commented 'Scullin is leaving his Government behind him; he
2may not find it here when he returns'. In a sense, this 
prediction came true. There were, however, reasons other than 
Scullin's absence which brought about the 'Caucus Crisis' of 
October-December 1930, and the subsequent splintering of the 
Party in early 1931, and it is to the development of this crisis 
we now turn.
1
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The Commonwealth Government and the six
State Governments v/ere faced with the task of carrying
out the Melbourne Agreement of August 1930, which required .
that all seven budgets be balanced for the financial year
1930-31 and in future years. It was recognised that
balanced budgets were an ambitious objective and the
Agreement ended with an exhortation and a warning: the
conference'confidently expected the full co-operation of
all classes' in making the 'substantial sacrifices' expected
3of 'all sections of the community'; for if the Agreement
failed and Australia's overseas obligations were not met,
there would follow 'infinitely greater and more prolonged
sacrifices... immediate financial disaster ... tandj
4unemployment on an unprecendented scale'.
Each Government was to decide how its budget would 
be balanced but it was agreed that there should be no further 
loans raised overseas and no further Government expenditure
on 'unreproductive' works.^ The Conference appointed a
3
Shann and Copland, The Crisis in Australian Finance 1929 to 
1931, Sydney, p.31.
4
Ibid.
5
Reproductive works were those which would produce at least 
enough revenue to cover the interest charges on the cost of 
their construction.
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committee to advise the seven governments and co-ordinate
their efforts. The committee, comprising Lyons, Stevens
(Treasurer in N.S.W.), Hogan and Kill, met frequently
in September and October with Niemeyer, Gibson and other
experts. The State Governments introduced various economy
programmes into their Parliaments.0 In Victoria and
South Australia these measures met with opposition and
hostility within Labor caucuses and Labor's extra-
parliamentary organisations, but Hogan and Hill defied
majorities of their respective A..L.P. State Conferences and
went on with policies of reduced expenditure, increased
taxation and wage reduction. Both Premiers made threats
7hinting at resignation, and the State Conference delegates, 
aware of the ruthlessness with which non-Labor Governments
3were pursuing economy , were unwilling'to force a Labor
Government to resign with the certain consequence of opening
the way for a Government whose financial measures would be far
9less palatable to Labor supporters'. This unwillingness
6
For a summary of the six programmes, see the West Australian,
21 October 1930.
7
Labor Call, 25 September 1930; Australian Worker, 24 September, 
1 October 1930.
8
The outstanding example was the Moore Government in Queensland: 
see C. Lack, Three Decades of Queensland Political History, 
Brisbane, N.D., pp.63-125.
9
Round Table, March 1931, p.433.
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regained a potent force through 1930 and much of 
1931.
As the Federal Parliament and the F.P.L.P. 
were not meeting the establishment of economy plans in 
the Federal sphere rested with the nine remaining members 
of the Scullin Ministry. The Ministry met on 2, 5 and 6 
September and Fenton, now Acting-Prime-Minister, announced 
that its members were unanimous in their determination to 
balance the Federal budget for 1930-31 and honour all 
Australia's obligations. A Cabinet sub-committee (of Fenton, 
Lyons, Forde and Daly) was appointed to consult with 
industrial, commercial and banking leaders. The sub­
committee also sought the advice of the economists Copland, 
Giblin and Dyason, an ominous move in view of their known 
advocacy of measures which were on balance deflationary.
Their advice to the Ministry, in 'A Plan for Economic Re- 
. 10adjustment' (18 September) included reductions in all 
public service salaries and 'such action as is possible for
government and parliament to bring about a rapid reduction in
. 11 real wages...
TÖ
D. Copland, Australia in the World Crisis 1929-1933, 
Cambridge, 1934, pp.68-72.
11
C.P.D., Vol. 128, p.311.
The report brought to Cabinet at the beginning
of October by the sub-committee followed the general line
of deflation. The Ministry was deeply divided on this
policy. Lyons, Fenton and Forde were in favour, Anstey and
Beasley opposed; while Blakeley, Greene, Barnes and Daly
supported some proposals and opposed others. Cabinet
decided to submit the sub-committee's scheme to Caucus as a
12Cabinet recommendation - reportedly by a majority of 1.
The scheme called for reductions in public service salaries,
including those of parliamentarians, general reduction in
expenditure of £4,000,000 for the remainder of 1930-31 and
the promotion of such public works as would prove 
13productive. No provision was made for the taxation of
interest. There was much support in the Labor movement for
14some kind of imposition on interest. It was attractive as
a potential source of revenue, it seemed undeniably necessary 
on the grounds of 'equality of sacrifice', and it appealed to 
Labor's hostility to receivers of unearned income. Even 
Ministers who feared the effects on business confidence of
12
Argus, 3 October 1930.
13
S.M.H., 2, 3, 4 October 1930.
14
See, for example, Union Voice, 15 March 1930; Labor Call,
27 March 1930; West Australian Worker, 2, 5 May 1930.
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an interest tax recognised that salary and pension cuts
without penalties for interest-takers would shake the
Party: on these grounds Daly, 'one of the most level-headed
15men in the Ministry', advocated an interest tax and was
responsible for adoption of the proposal by the A.L.P.
16Conference in South Australia in September 1930 . The
proposal excited much fear among investors and it caused
an abrupt fall in the market prices of Government securities
in August and September."1"'7 After the announcement that
interest would remain untaxed and the loan contract sacrosanct,
the market revived. The sub-committee's report also included
provisions for reduction of pensions. This was anathema
to all but the most conservative members of the F.P.L.P. and
attempts to reduce pensions would have severely strained
party unity. Anstey, for example, said in September, that
'pensions are as sacred to me as are our debts to bondholders
abroad' and added a very strong hint that he would resign
18from the Ministry if they were interfered with. The
15
Advertiser, 6 September 1930.
16
Australian Worker, 24 September 1930.
17
Australasian Insurance and Banking Record, 22 September 1930, 
p.p.747, 749; 22 October 1930, pp.838,871.
18
S.M.H., 29 September 1930.
proposed interference was not endorsed by the Ministry,
after Sculiin gave his approval to all the measures in
ISthe sub-committee's report except pension cuts.
Fenton, Lyor^ fs, Forde and Green wished to
summon Parliament to immediately enact the economy
programme but a majority of the Ministry succeeded in
deferring the special session to the end of October. Their
reason for the postponement was the N.S.W. State election,
which was to be held on 25 October. Several Ministers and
a large number of members of the F.P.L.P. were taking part
20in the A.L.P. campaign. Federal members would have been
an embarrassment to the N.S.W. Branch if they attempted to 
support Lang while legislating for deflationary measures in 
the Federal Parliament. Indeed, the contrast between the 
policy of the Federal Labor Government and Lang's 
extravagant promises would have provided much ammunition for 
non-Labor at the election. In this regard it is relevant 
that Anstey and Beasley were supported on the postponement
19
Dame Enid Lyons, So We Take Comfort, London, 1965, p.162.
20
Beasley claimed 35 members of the F.P.L.P., including 
six Ministers, Australian Worker, 22 October 1930.
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vote by Daly, Blakeley and Barnes; these were the
Ministers with very strong A.W.U. connections - and the
A.W.U. had recently re-affiliated with the A.L.P. in 
21New South Wales and was now campaigning vigorously for 
22a Lang victory. These tactics, however, were not only
designed to benefit the N.S.W. Branch. Ministers opposed
to deflation had taken their opposition beyond the
Cabinet room and campaigned to have pressure exerted on
wavering members of the F.P.L.P. They hoped that a Lang
victory would influence those members who had been swayed
by the arguments of the deflationists; that Lang's success
23would, in Daly's words, 'stiffen their backs'. No doubt
Lang's resounding win on 25 October contributed significantly 
to the strength of the Opposition during the series of 
dramatic Caucus meetings which began on 27 October. But 
other influences were also at work.
21
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The visit of Sir Otto Niemeyer (July-September), 
the Melbourne Agreement (August) and the steadily decreasing 
economic situation combined to awaken the Labor movement 
to the dangers threatening it. The period August-December 
1930 saw attempts to develop policies within the movement 
as alternatives to the orthodox deflationary policy. Two 
important alternatives were developed. One was based on 
proposals made by the N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council in 
August. This can scarcely be called a policy proposal; it 
was rather an emotional protest, drawing on traditional 
Labor hostility to the Money Power and using that tradition 
in a crude way. Nevertheless it contained several specific 
proposals for Government action and these were influential 
in 1930. The second alternative - credit expansion - was 
that developed by E.G. Theodore. Thus at the end of October 
Labor had three sets of proposals to consider: the orthodox, 
conservative and deflationary policy supported by the majority 
of the Federal Ministry; the inchoate and incoherent 
suggestions which originated from the N.S.W. Trades and Labor 
Council; and Theodore's moderate and logical proposals for 
credit expansion. We shall trace the history of the last 
two proposals, observe their fate in the Caucus struggle of
October-December 1930 and, in the next Chapter, observe 
the course of their near relatives, the Lang Plan of 
February 1931 and Theodore's Fiduciary Notes Issue Bill 
of March 1931. A later Chapter will relate the triumph of 
an amended form of the deflationist policy in the Premiers' 
Plan of June 1931.
On 14 August 1930 the N.S.W. Labor Council
resolved to hold a special conference to deal with 'the
24relief work issue'. Before the conference met the
Melbourne Agreement had been formulated and the Ministry
had agreed to balance the Federal Budget, principally
25through reduction in expenditure. At about this time
Anstey had a long conversation with Garden during which he
urged that some action must be taken against Niemeyer's
proposals, as the majority of the Ministry wasprepared to
2 6accept his advice. These events were responsible for a
change in the .purpose of the Sydney Conference which, meeting 
on 21 August, discussed 'Unemployment and the Economic Crisis'
Garden read a long statement drafted by the Labor Council
24
N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council, Minutes, 14 August 1930.
25
L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley, London, 1961, p.50.
26
S.M.H., 4 September 1930.
Executive, which was then adopted by the Conference. The 
statement dealt with the crisis of over-production, the 
fundamental contradictions of the capitalist system,
'Imperial Financial Magnates', the 'Shylocks of London' and 
'correct working class tactics'. Among the latter were 
exertion of pressure on the Federal Labor Government and 
threats of penalties on Labor members who refused to fail 
in with conference recommendations. The recommendations 
were.
(1) Declare a five year moratorium on the interest 
payable on overseas Government loans.
(2) Repudiate EsicH all war debts.
(3) Mobilize the credit of the community for the 
purpose of providing work or sustenance for the 
unemployed and for the revival of industry. 27
A committee of twelve was appointed from the
Labor Council and N.S.W. Labor Party Executives 'to mobilize
the forces of the whole of the movement for the purpose of
28forcing action...'. The committee decided to send the
conference resolution to the A.C.T.U., Trades Halls, all
27
N.S.W. Trades and Labor Council, Minutes, 21 August 1930;
S.M.H., 22 August 1930.
28
Ibid.
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affiliated unions and A.L.P. local leagues in N.S.W. and
29also to the State Executive of the A.L.P. The demand
for repudiation provoked outcries of horror in Australia
and overseas. The N.S.W. Executive, with an election
approaching,refused to endorse repudiation of war debts.
It contented itself with a resolution asking Scullin to
negotiate an adjustment to war debt payments, demanding
the abolition of the Loan Council (as an instrument of
'the loan-mongers and capitalists generally'), and the
30rejection of the Melbourne Agreement. The resolution
was sent to every member of the F.P.L.P. and all N.S.W.
members were instructed to vote for it at the next meeting of 
31Caucus.
The N.S.W. Executive's proposals were milder 
than those of the Labor Council but neither included all the 
major proposals - such as reduction of interest rates - then 
being discussed in the Labor movement. The fusion of the two
29
Labor Daily, 27 August 1930.
30
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31
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N.S.W. recommendations and the inclusion of other Labor 
ideas on depression policy was achieved at an A.C.T.U. 
conference.
A special A.C.T.U. 'Key Industries' conference
32was held in Melbourne from 9 to 15 September. The
conference.comprised about forty delegates from fifteen 
major unions, among which for the first time was the A.W.U. 
(with Senator Barnes and J. Bailey as delegates). Unions 
in Western Australia not being affiliated with the A.C.T.U. 
were not represented, while Queensland, South Australia 
and Tasmania were represented by one delegate each from the 
capital city Labor Councils; otherwise the representation 
was exclusively from New South Wales and Victoria.
The Conference was convened by the A.C.T.U.
Executive at the request of the Federal Council of the Miners'
Federation, who wished the Conference to discuss the 'serious
position' and the plight of the unions and find some way 'to 
33stem the rot'. The agenda was confined to five matters;
32
That is, concurrently with the A.L.P.-Vic. Special 
Conference of 13-14 September 1930.
33
A.C.T.U., Minutes of Conference of key Unions...Melbourne... 
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the position of the W.W.F.; unemployment; wage reduction; 
the Niemeyer report and the Melbourne Agreement; and 
overseas debts and interest. The discussion on all these 
was critical of the Government, and when Fenton appeared 
before Conference he was subjected to some searching 
questions. His answers were not considered satisfactory by 
the President (Duggan), who complained that no answer had 
been given to 'the central question', namely:
Why the Government had not given effect to the 
decisions of the Movement, said if these decisions 
had been considered impracticable, who had been 
responsible for brushing them aside. 34
This pointed to one of the problems confronting the 
conference - what could the unions do to ensure that their 
recommendations would at the least be given serious 
consideration by the Government ? Behind them was the 
Government's neglect of the recommendations of the February 
1930 A.C.T.U. Conference. The proposals of that conference 
had, in large part, been accepted by the May A.L.P. Federal 
Conference, while those of the September Conference would have 
to rest solely on the authority of the A.C.T.U. and the union 
34
Ibid, p.13.
movement.. Doubtless they would influence some members 
of the F.P.L.P., though Fenton had made a disheartening 
comment regarding resolutions passed by the Victorian 
A.L.P. Special Conference, which were very similar to 
those being debated by the A.C.T.U. He said:
Resolutions may be . pious aspirations but are 
not within the realm of practical politics. 
There have been numerous resolutions passed at 
Labor Conferences which have never been given 
effect to. 35
Delegates discussed a resolution from the Brisbane Trades 
and Labor Council, which, inter alia, stated that if any 
Labor parliamentarian failed to resist deflationary measures 
'the Trades Union Movement will require the Australian
. 36Labor Party Executive to summarily expel such Parliamentarians 
One delegate pointed out that there was little likelihood 
of such drastic action being taken when it was considered that
35
Australian Worker, 17 September, 1930. This and similar 
remarks provoked the following union resolution, 'This State 
Council of the A.R.U. views with disgust..., and contrasts 
his extraordinary attitude with the facility with which he 
agreed to the demands of the Representative of Foreign 
Bondholders [i.e., Sir Otto Niemeyer ] ..., and calls upon the 
bodies concerned to take immediate and decisive action to 
bring this alleged Labor man and his ilk into line...'.
(A.R.U.-N.S.W. Branch, State Council Minutes, 18 September 1930.
36
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Scullin's repeated promise to honour overseas obligations
37would lead to his exploitation.'" Eventually it was 
decided to leave the matter of enforcement of A.C.T.U. 
recommendations with State A.L.P. Executives, who were 
requested to 'deal with' parliamentarians who approved of 
wage reductions.
It was apparent that delegates were not hopeful
that their resolutions would have much affect on the
Federal Government. The comments of the delegates were
generally pessimistic: the President, for example, felt
that, 'the movement did not appear to be fighting but had
apparently become despondent and seemed to be accepting the 
38position'; others lamented the lack of unity among the 
trade unions; and others deplored the apathy of unionists and 
their indifference to the working class cause. It was 
obvious from such remarks that there was little immediate 
sense in suggestions that ‘the Conference should and could
39create a psychology in the interest of the working class'. 
Likewise, talk of a general strike obviously showed little
appreciation of the realities of 1930. The delegates were
_
Ibid., p.19
38
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left with political action, the method they had espoused 
so ardently in better times - but their belief in its 
efficacy had evaporated with economic prosperity.
Nevertheless, the delegates had to establish a union policy - 
yet again - in'the hope that their resolutions would however 
indirectly have some influence on the Federal Government,
Union policy on unemployment in 1929 and 1930 was 
incoherent. Unemployment insurance had been the central 
measure but this was dropped after it became apparent that 
the Government could not proceed because of constitutional 
and financial problems. Tariff protection was regarded 
as vital but while it remained extremely important to 
individual unions it was obvious by mid-1930 that the 
Government was doing its best in this field and that protection 
was not the answer to halting the down-turn. Similarly, 
though gratifying to the unions (particularly the A.W.U.), 
cessation of immigration had not noticeably affected the 
economic situation. As with some other measures urged by 
the unions proposals for increased wages and reduced hours 
were (as we now understand) expansionary - but wages and hours 
were not within the control of the Federal Government, Another 
principal union demand was a programme of public works and
this too, like the union call for reduced interest rates, 
was a crude anticipation of Keynes' analysis in the 
^General Theory...^of 1936. Union demands for 
expansionary government action were rooted in self-interest, 
not economic theory or understanding: but what the unions 
saw intuitively was in the best interests of their members, 
and a capitalist Australia.
As a policy for governments there were three 
major difficulties with union suggestions. The first was 
only vaguely understood at the time, though it was perhaps 
the most insurmountable of all Labor's problems. Labor 
found itself in a contest of ideas in 1930 and 1931. It lost 
the contest because it had so few ideas with which it could 
fight; and those it did pick up at the last moment were no 
match for the long-established, carefully nurtured and 
strongly held beliefs of its opponents. So pervasive had 
been the influence of orthodox opinion and so neglectful and 
work-orientated the Labor movement, that a substantial 
proportion - probably a majority - of unionists and their 
parliamentary representatives subscribed to the basic ideas 
behind orthodox economic opinion; so Labor had to struggle 
against prevailing orthodox opinions both without and within
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its own ranks. The second difficulty with union 
recommendations was that they sometimes involved matters 
over which the Federal Government had no direct control, 
such as wages and hours of work. The third difficulty 
was finance. Government revenue from all sources continued 
to decline rapidly and the gap between income and 
expenditure gradually widened. The Government pleaded 
financial stringency to all suggestions for, for example, 
a large-scale public works programme.
Thus to the union movement the many problems 
facing the Government narrowed down to those of finance.
This concentration was the logical outcome of the situation.
The political arm of the unions was hamstrung by Australia's 
position as a dependent economy, by the institutions and 
ideas of Australian society and the way in which the Labor 
Party had moulded itself into that society. These things could 
not be changed but it seemed that the problem of finance 
could be solved. This led the unions to concentrate on 
monetary solutions - changes in interest rates and manipulation 
of credit - and the struggle with the Money Power.
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The A.C.T.U. 'Key Industries' conference
40endorsed a lengthy, six-point programme. The first
point endorsed the recommendations of the A.L.P. Federal 
Conference of May 1930, which called for 'the freeing 
of the credit resources of the country' to which 'as a 
first contribution... the Federal Government should find 
£20,000,000'. The second recommended the establishment 
of an Economic Council to determine the allocation.of 
credit. The third called for all Labor governments to 
repudiate that section of the Melbourne Agreement which 
demanded wage reductions and to support moves to abolish 
the Loan Council. Another recommendation requested State 
A.L.P. Executives to 'deal with' Labor politicians who did 
not oppose wage reductions. The fifth recommendation called 
for re-negotiation of Australia's war debts, and the last 
asked Governments to legislate to control company dividends 
and share issues.
40
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The A.L.P. Federal Executive, which began a •
three day meeting on 13 October, agreed with some of the
A.C.T.U. proposals, though its statement was couched in
even more imprecise terms. After hearing the opinions
41or Fenton and Lyons, the Executive released a statement
which said it was 'emphatically opposed' to the Melbourne
Agreement, which was 'an attempt to ensure those drawing
interest on increase in purchasing power... at the expense
and sacrifice of the workers'. The Executive made no
mention of the Loan Council or penalties for recalcitrant
Labor politicians but suggested a five point programme
to revive the economy. One of these was the renegotiation
of war debt and another, not mentioned in the A.C.T.U.
programme, a deduction of interest rates on bank advances.
Two important suggestions were concerned with credit
manipulation: one asked that maturing internal loans should be
met by bank credit, the other than 'industry should be stimulated
by making credits immediately available'. The first part of
the Executive's statement was the fatuous suggestion 'that
there should be immediately instituted a 'back to work*
42campaign.' One copy of the Executive's resolutions was sent
41
A .l -P•“W.A., State Executive Minutes, 20 October 1930.
42
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by cable to Scullin and another to Fenton, who said that
he would read it while making the train journey to
0 . 43Canberra.
The Federal Executive did not specify the
amount of credit required. There was discussion of this
at the Executive meeting and the figure of £20,000,000 was
44mentioned by several delegates. This was the figure
mentioned by one delegate (N. Roberts, of the A.E.U.)
during the debate on credit expansion at the A.C.T.U. Congress 
45in February 1930, and adopted in the resolution on
unemployment policy carried by the A.L.P. Federal Conference
46 47in May. It continued to appear in Labor proposals but
it was not until September that £20,000,000 became the
magic number in discussions on credit expansion: in mid-
September it was adopted by the A.C.T.U. conference and
48A.L.P. conferences in Victoria and South Australia.
The earliest advocate of the £20,000,000 proposal 
was Anstey, in November 1929, during the course of one of
43
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44
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45
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his frequent attacks on the banking system. He urged 
the banks to adopt a more liberal x^°licy in making 
advances and suggested that an expansion of the note issue 
could be used to finance public works and ease conditions 
for industry. He concluded that 'there is a wide margin 
to be covered before you could claim inflation of a note 
issue tha.t is already so thoroughly deflated. The practical 
.fact remains that a further note issue of, say, £20,000,000
would not in the circumstances operate to destroy our
, 49reserves....
At first there was only slight support for the
proposal within the Labor movement. The credit expansion
clause in the A.C.T.U. employment policy statement of
February 1930 was added as an amendment (moved by Crofts) to
the Unemployment Committee's Report, and carried against
50spirited opposition. A month earlier the Annual Convention
of the A.W.U. had considered similar proposals. Delegates 
voted 14 to 9 in favour of financing a section of railway
* ‘ A**Westawaa— n Worker, 20 June, 11 July; 26 September 1930.
48
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construction in South Australia 'by an expansion of the
51Federal Note issue; and 17 to 14 in favour o~ the
proposal 'that the Australian Note Issue be extended to meet
Australia's financial requirements, and to provide work
for the unemployed of a developmental and productive 
52character'. The relative closeness - for an A.W.U.
Convention - of the voting is indicative of the doubts held
about the wisdom of inflation; and it must be stressed that
the proposal, with its emphasis on public works, was in one
respect more likely to win support from the A.W.U. than
most other unions, whose members would receive no direct
benefit. This point is borne out in the records of two
unions. Yates, M.H.R., was the most persistent and
outspoken advocate of expansion in late 1929 and early 1930.
His propaganda efforts included canvassing the unions for
support: the Victorian Branch of the Amalgamated Postal
Workers' Union received his circular on expansion of the
note issue with indifference, allowing it to lie on the 
54table; the South Australian Branch of the Australian
51
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Government Workers' Association, whose members were
employed on public works, devoted several hours to his
55proposals in 'a general and interesting discussion'.
Nevertheless, the A.G.W.A. made no effort to support or 
commend Yates. In early 1930,in pre-Niemeyer times, the 
depression and the Scullin Government were still in their 
infancies and the unions still expected something of 
.orthodox political and economic approaches. This wait-and- 
see attitude was also evident in the F.P.L.P. when credit 
expansion was debated.
Though the issue was doubtless raised earlier, 
the first formal move in Caucus was made on 13 March 1930 
when Yates proposed as an addendum to the Ministerial 
Financial Statement, that the Government should arrange with the
Commonwealth Bank to issue credit for 'stimulating Government
56activities and to improve the economic position' . Kis 
suggestion was ruled out of order by the Caucus chairman 
(Scullin) and the ruling^ was not challenged. Several weeks 
later Yates, supported by another economic radical, E. Riley,
moved in Caucus 'that the Government arrange to make £20,000,000
55
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56
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available through the Commonwealth Bank... for public 
57works'. At a subsequent meeting the motion was
58defeated by 14 votes to 28. This vote was taken a
few days before the £20,000,000 proposal was endorsed by 
the May A.L.P. Federal Conference but this endorsement 
was not sufficient to get a Caucus majority for the proposal 
when it was raised again in June and July. At the meeting 
at which Yates' proposal was defeated a compromise motion
ror the appointment of a special (and temporary) Caucus 
Committee on finance was approved. The Committee of seven
(Scullin, Theodore, Anstey and Holloway, Tulley, Keane and 
59Yates) was to investigate the financial position and
possible measures to restore prosperity and report back to
Caucus after two weeks. Scullin reported to Caucus that
the committee had been unable to reach agreement (which was
not surprising, in view of its composition). On hearing this
Lazzarini, another of the economic radicals, and E. Riley
gave notice of a motion calling for legislation to enact the
A.L.P. Federal Conference's recommendation for credit
60expansion of £20,000,000. When the motion was considered 
57
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seven Caucus meetings later, on 16 July, it was defeated 
by 18 votes to 24.^ With this vote the £20,000,000 
credit proposal seemed to have been finally rejected. Yet 
it reappeared during Scullin's absence and, in a refined 
and elaborated form, was accepted by Caucus. And its sponsor 
at this later time was E.G. Theodore, who had earlier been 
one of its principal opponents.
Theodore was regarded as the financial brains of
the Party. There is no doubt that he had an acute
intelligence, was well read in the literature of economics
and had an excellent understanding of the problems of
government finance. Nevertheless, as McFarlane has pointed
out he was before September 1930 no less orthodox in his
economic opinions than Scullin and the majority of the 
G 2F.P.L.P. And on the matter of credit expansion his
opposition to the earlier proposals of Anstey, Yates, Curtin,
Lazzarini, West, E. Riley and others did much, because of the
high regard for his understanding of finance, to discredit
and defeat them.
60
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The most obvious reason for Theodore's 
change of front was his position in the faction politics 
of the Labor movement. As will be related, he was 
seeking support for his bid to regain his post as 
Treasurer in the Ministry, and he was still involved 
in manoeuvres to establish a personal power base within 
the New South Wales Branch of the Party. To gain new 
supporters and to hold old ones Theodore had to discern 
the mood of the Labor movement, appreciate the direction 
in which the Party was heading and then place himself at the 
head of the vanguard and help it to victory.
After mid-1930 the mood of the Labor movement 
became angry and radical. Earlier there had been hopes 
that the depression might prove to be a down-turn of the order 
of that experienced in 1921. Such hopes had disappeared 
by late 1930. Niemeyer and the Melbourne Agreement had 
produced a sharpened awareness which had crystallised in the 
policy recommendations in September and October of the A.C.T.U., 
A.L.P. Branches in New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia, and the A.L.P. Federal Executive . Behind these 
formal resolutions was a ferment of ideas and dogmatic 
assertions which began sweeping through the Labor movement 
after mid-1930. But although the debate was intense the
263
level of understanding was low and the confusion very 
high. In March 1930 a letter to the Labor Call summed 
up the situation:
After reading the 'Call' for a number of years,
I am getting a bit mixed over the darned 
economic question. First we had the Henry George 
scheme, then the Socialists' doctrine, then Labor 
came along with its comprehensive platform, and 
from that grew such nostrums as Comrades Harry 
Langridge's 'Free Bread', J. McKellan's prolific 
note issue, Paulus Brandt's 'mentality stunt', 
and now J.E. Thomas' co-operation scheme is the 
topic, to say nothing of Comrades Duffy's and 
Mendell's taxation,stunts, also not forgetting 
Communist Bodswoth's cure-all economic proposals, 
and others too numerous to mention... 63.
Although the confusion persisted theie were by 
September 1930 several themes which might prove acceptable 
to the Federal Labor Party: exchange rates should be freed; 
internal interest rates should be reduced; something should be 
done about overseas interest committments,particularly on the 
war debt; and, most important, there should be an expansion 
of credit. The difficulty was that there were so many voices 
calling for expansion, each of them emphasising different 
remedies. There was one theme on which there was a fair
Labor Call, 20 March 1930.
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degree of unity, the need for credit expansion, but 
unlike some other measures (such as freeing exchange rates 
and reducing interest rates) opposition to this was
64uniformly vehement among upholders of economic orthodoxy. 
Not only was credit expansion anathema to the orthodox 
(and these included many in the Labor movement and the 
F.P.L.P.), it also suffered from the reputations and styles 
of its leading parliamentary exponents. Anstey, Yates 
and the rest knew what was required but were unable to make 
their pleas effective, and this was in part due to their 
reputations as radicals and in part to the emotional nature 
of their advocacy. What was needed was a group or person 
who could understand the arguments involved, expound them 
with authority - and without more than a dash of radical 
emotion - and generally give the proposals the stamp of 
respectability within the Labor movement. This would not 
sway those who were die-hard conservatives, ;but it would 
unite the hesitant, bewildered but well-meaning centre with 
the economic radicals. The latter, however, much as they
64
See for example D.B. Copland's two very simple studies 
The Australian Economy: Simple Economic Studies (Sydney, 
1931), and What Have the Banks Done: An Essay in Banking 
Policy, (Sydney 1931).
265
may dislike the expositor, would be compelled to join 
forces with him, and his supporters. In these circumstances 
there was a role ready made for a politician of the stature, 
ability and astuteness of Theodore. He was in every way 
except inclination suited to adopt the part of leader of an 
A.L.P. 'forward policy'; and inclination was provided in late 
1930 from his political struggles within the Party.
Early in September 1930 R.F. Irvine, a former
Professor of Economics at Sydney University, contacted
Theodore and discussed with him the theory and application
of economic policies needed to combat those of Niemeyer and
65the orthodox economists. At this time Irvine was
expounding the need for credit expansion (to a limit of
£20,000,000) , public works financed by borrowing and
adjustment of exchange rates: he opposed all deflationary
measures and called for a policy of expansion through mild,
66controlled inflation.
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McFarlane notes that Theodore's subsequent espousal
of expans.' onary measures showed an 'obvious academic
inspiration' and suggests that Irvine was responsible
67for Theodore's conversion. It is undoubtedly correct
that Theodore's understanding of the theory behind 
expansionary policy was due to Irvine. The extent of 
Theodore's own contribution cannot be determined but it 
must be noted that in March 1931 he quoted with
understanding the expansionary views of Cassel, Kobson and Keynes,
and said of Keynes that he was 'one of the best guides upon
economic doctrine, economic necessities and the consequences
63of economic policies'. He also quoted the views or
C.H. Wickens, the Commonwealth Statistician, who made several 
reports to the Ministry between October 1930 and January 
1931 on the need for a thoroughly expansionary policy.
At Fenton's request Wickens prepared a confidential report fbr 
the Cabinet on price stabilisation through a measure of 
inflation, to be achieved by the issue of fiduciary notes.
67
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The report was submitted on 24 October and quoted publicly
69by Anstey on 19 November and so close were the views of
Nickens and Theodore that it was believed that Wickens was
the source of the Theodore plans of October 1930 and 
70February 1931. Wickens also gave evidence before the
Basic Wage Enquiry of October 1930 - January 1931, during 
which he quoted Keynes and Cassel in support of his 
arguments.
Many of the 'experts' called by unions as
witnesses (principally engineers and accountants) advocated
inflation of the currency, credit expansion, free exchange
rates and so on. All were opposed to deflation, and wage
reductions in particular. Among these witnesses in the
Arbitration Court were G.v. Portes, A.ssistant-Director of the
71W.E.A. in New South Wales; and C.A. Alison and J.A.L. Gunn,
respectively an engineer and an accountant, authors of
72'Is this Depression Necessary?'. Others were H.E.Langridge,
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73
an accountant and author of 'Free Bread1 (mid-1930?) and
H.W. Parkinson, an engineer and author of the pamphlet
74'Unemployment - its cause and cure', (and in 1924, of the
book 'From Capitalism to Freedom: Containing a Study in
75Marxian Economics'). Ail these witnesses were active in
1930 in spreading propaganda for expansionist policies.
And at the same time some members of the F.P.L.P. were
spreading similar ideas in publications which were being
distributed throughout the Labor movement. At the end of '
September Anstey produced his pamphlet Facts and Theories
of Finance' and at the beginning of October Curtin his
booklet Australia's Economic Crisis and the £55,000,000 
77Interest Bill. Thus, toward the end of 1930 expansionary 
economic policy had many advocates in the unions and the A.L.P. 
Branches, among a group of informed persons sympathetic to 
Labor, and in a small but outspoken group in the F.P.L.P. But 
■this advocacy lacked theoretical backing, was most often
73
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piecemeal, sometimes contradictory and permeated with
crude emotional appeals (for example, Anstey's pamphlet
is prefaced with the slogan 1 'Financiers are the Dictators
of Policies - the Unseen Power in Democracies'; Curtin's
has the sub-title, 'How the Years of Money Power Extortion
Have Brought Misery to the Nation' and is prefaced with a
quotation which begins, 'The Money lords have spoken,
And forth goes their decree,...'.) In the circumstances of
1930 these efforts at propaganda, powerful as they were,
helped stimulate the great interest in economic problems which
78the depression had produced. But while helping to create
an essential background of information and a mood within the 
Labor movement, they were not sufficient to sway the F.P.L.P. 
Theodore, with the assistance of Irvine, employing his great 
talents, looking to his own interests, and using the now 
receptive - but still cautious and apprehensive - mood of the 
Party, was able to bring cohesion and force to the disparate 
ideas of the economic radicals and give the F.P.L.P. a semblance 
of an economic policy.
78
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At the New South Wales State elections on
25 October the A.L.P. increased its percentage of votes
from 43% to 55% and its seats in the Legislative Assembly 
79from 40 to 55. Lang formed his third Ministry a few
days later amid the elation provided by a great Labor 
victory. This carried into the F.P.L.P., where the first 
motion carried at the meeting of 27 October was a 
congratulatory message to Lang. It was soon apparent that 
the New South Wales election result had, as Daly and others 
had hoped, wrought some changes in the F.P.L.P. When 
Parliament met on 30 October the Ministry found itself in the 
embarrassing position of being unable to present any business 
for debate. The Parliament was adjourned after a few hours 
and the Ministry returned to redrafting its policy, as 
directed by Caucus in the series of meetings 27-30 October.
After sending its message to Lang Caucus passed 
a resolution (moved by Beasley) which denounced Niemeyer's 
August address, on the grounds that 'the tariff and industrial 
policy of Australia are domestic matters to be determined by 
79
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the people of Australia'. After these preliminaries
Caucus began to debate the Ministries financial proposals.
These had already been amended; pension cuts had been
discarded and the provision for direct salary cuts in the
Commonwealth public service had been replaced with a special
graduated salary tax. Scullin cabled his support for the 
81Ministry's policy. The policy presented to Caucus had
82six main points: “ economies in Government departments; 
adjusted payments to the National Debt Sinking Fund (giving 
a saving of £1.95 million for 1930-31); a further increase 
in revenue duties (£2 million); a super-tax of 7^% on all 
property income and a reduction in the level of exemption 
from £300 to £100 (saving £1.5 million); a further increase 
on income tax from the 10% level of July 1930 to 15% on all 
income over £500 (an estimated saving of £160,000); and, lastly, 
a special tax on all Commonwealth salaries, including those 
of Federal Parliamentarians.
The Ministry's policy was subject to strong
criticism in Caucus from Theodore, Beasley, Anstey, Yates,
83Lazzarini and others, in a fiery debate which continued 
80
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over three days. Three measures provoked particularly
bitter opposition. One of the increases in duties was
the imposition of la per gallon on kerosene: eventually
this was approved by Caucus but was shortly afterwards
discarded, apparently as a result of opposition from the 
84 . .Party Branches. A second and srmilar measure was a
proposed customs tax of 3d per lb. on tea, expected to
yield the substantial amount, in the total policy,of
£625,000 This was a regressive tax whose incidence would
fall most heavily on middle and low income families. It
was approved by a Caucus majority of 24 to 17 after angry 
85debate. The greatest vehemence was displayed on Lyons',
proposal for a special tax on public service salaries. The 
motion for the adoption of the tax was defeated, 17 votes 
to 18,°° (i.e., 35 votes: there is no indication of the 
attitude of the other 20 members of Caucus: the division
84
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before that on the salaries tax mustered 41 voters, that
which followed, 45). The debate on the issue continued
over two days). Four compromise proposals varying the
gradation and allowing various exemptions, were all
defeated.^ The deadlock was broken by conciliatory
speeches pleading for unity from a Minister,, Daly, and one
88of the economic radicals, Curtin. A diversion of those
opposed to the tax was achieved when the debate was
interrupted to take a vote on the Theodore plan, which was
adopted, and this 'victory' assisted in reaching the final
compromise. A motion from Crouch and Chifley that
Ministerial salaries be taxed 15% and Members salaries 10%
89from 1 November was carried by 27 votes to 14. This was
then extended, in a successful motion from Chifley snd 
Holloway, to all public servants in receipt of £750 a year.
Unity had been preserved, but the Ministry's 
policy had been severely mauled for the special tax would
91
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Nevertheless, the Ministry had the basis of its 
deflationary policy intact and was able to present to 
Parliament a programme which moved - toward the balancing of 
the Federal Budget for 1930-31. This was only made possible 
because the Caucus majority had accepted the emergency 
measures while also accepting a larger policy which when 
implemented would reverse the special economy measures of 
October -December 1930.
The debate on the Ministry's deflationary policies
was held at the same time as the debate on expansionary plans
for late 1930 and early 1931. On the second day of the
Caucus meetings (28 October) three long-term financial
proposals were put to Caucus. The first came from Lazzarini
and Maloney and asked that the Government demand of the
Commonwealth Bank that it underwrite either by expansion of
credit or the issue of notes the £28 million internal loan
92falling due in mid-December. Surprisingly, the second
91
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proposal for re-inflation came from two Ministers, Lyons
and Barnes: they proposed that the Government's policy
should be free exchange rates, stabilisation of prices by
monetary control, reduction of interest rates, 'provision
of credits for industry', and pressure on the Commonwealth
93Bank to carry out this policy. The third proposal did
not differ in its essentials from that moved by Lyons.
It was, however, more detailed, comprehensive and
authoritative and had the advantage of being sponsored by
Theodore. Gibbons and Theodore moved as an amendment
94to the Lyons proposal a four point plan:
1. That the Commonwealth Bank be required to create 
sufficient credit, as and when required, for the 
following purposes
(a) Finance the requirements of the Commonwealth 
Government in connection with all services 
covered by Parliamentary appropriation.
(b) Meet that portion of the internal loans 
maturing during the financial year 1930-31 which 
has not been otherwise provided for.
(c) Provide for financing State and Commonwealth 
loan works up to a limit of £20,000,000.
(d) Provide financial accomodation through the 
Commonwealth Bank, trading banks, State financial 
institutions and, if necessary, through insurance 
companies to be used for productive purposes in 
primary and secondary industries. The ultimate amount 
of credit to be issued under this head to be determined 
by the effect upon the commodity price levels.
93
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2. Credit under the various heads to be made 
available at an interest rate not exceeding 
5% per annum.
3. An effective exchange pool to be continued to 
provide Australian Governments with first claim 
on Australian funds in London, The external 
'exchange rates to be fixed at such rates as will 
give primary producers the full benefit of the 
exchange premium on their exports to compensate 
for the diminished market prices.
4. Wages and salaries to be stablised for a definite 
period at the 1929 level.
After discussion the last clause was withdrawn by Gibbons.
Then Lazzarini was granted leave to withdraw his motion,
which was covered by Section 1 (b) of the Theodore-Gibbons 
95plan. A vote was taken on the two plans on the following
day, 30 October,in the midst of the debate on the 
Ministry's deflationary policy. The Lyons-Barnes plan was
96defeated and the Theodore plan accepted by 26 votes to 14.
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A motion was then carried that the plan be submitted to 
the Ministry for consideration. The future of the plan 
rested on the Ministry's negotiations with the Commonwealth 
Bank. The expectation of a successful outcome was low, 
and the acceptance of the Theodore plan is the first indication 
that the F.P.L.P. was now inclined to contrive a double­
dissolution. This inclination was greatly reinforced by 
Lang's great victory of 25 October,but as the inclination 
gathered strength the likelihood of the Government being able 
to complete the manoeuvre, let alone win the ensuing election, 
diminished.
The first series of Caucus meetings (27-30 October)
concluded with a unanimous resolution expressing the Party's
appreciation of the services of Lyons, Fenton and the rest 
97of the Ministry.
Caucus met again on 6 November. Fenton opened the
98meeting by reading a cable from Scullin in which he supported 
the Caucus minority in its opposition to the Theodore plan
of 28 October. In view of what happened later in the meeting
97
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98
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the themes of the cable are important: Scullin
concentrated on two things; first, that 'all this talk
about creating credit and inflation is most damaging' to
Australia's standing in the London money market and, second,
that the Government had no power over the banks - the
'Government cannot deliberately coerce the administration 
99of the banks'. The cable, and others which followed it,
illustrates Scullin's conservatism in economic matters and how 
greatly this had been reinforced by his absence from 
Australia and his daily contacts with London financiers. To 
Scullin it seemed that Australia's national honour must be 
upheld at any price. But, like Hughes in 1916, Scullin had 
lost contact with the mood of his own Party, which was now less 
nervous of the international effects of its actions sind more 
concerned to find its own solutions within Australia. And this 
was exemplified by the Caucus meeting of 6 November. After 
Scullin's cable was read Lyons opened discussion on the £28 
million internal conversion loan and proposed that it be 
converted by public subscription in the normal way. Caucus 
had already declared its attitude to the loan in the Theodore
S.M.H., 16 March 1931.
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plan, which stated that the Commonwealth Bank should 
'meet that portion of internal loans maturing during the 
financial year 1930-31 which has not otherwise been 
provided for'. The Bank, hpwever, had not yet given its
100decision on the plan (and dxd not do so until 16 December).
The loan was due on 15 December and Lyons suggested that the 
whole Ministry interview the Bank Board on the plan and in 
the meantime the loan should be converted in the normal way. 
This was put formally in a motion from Crouch and Maloney. 
Curtin and Yates countered with an amendment insisting that 
the Bank meet the loan, on the 'collateral' of Government 
securities. Anstey moved a further amendment calling on the 
Government to prepare a Bill which would compulsorily renew 
the loan for another twelve months. After a short dinner 
adjournment Curtin was given leave to incorporate his 
amendment with Anstey's. The joint amendment then said that 
the full Cabinet should meet the Bank Board, before the next 
Loan Council meeting (11 November), and require the Bank to 
meet the loan, failing which the Government should legislate 
to extend the term of the loan for a further twelve months. 
This was a plain threat to the Bank that it must co-operate 
or else. It was in fact an empty threat for the probability
Too
L.F. Giblin, The Growth of a Central Bank, Melbourne, 1951, 
p. 87.
280
of such legislation passing the Senate was nil, and there 
was little likelihood that Sir Robert Gibson, knowing this, 
would bend to the Party's challenge to his power. His 
attitude in this game of bluff would have been strengthened 
by the knowledge that a majority of the Ministry was against 
the proposal.
The Anstey-Curtin amendment was carried by 22
votes to 1 6 , with two Ministers (Anstey and Beasley) voting
for it and five Ministers against (Fenton, Lyons , Forde,
102Green and Blakeley). With one exception (McGrath), the
vote showed a predictable division between the known economic 
radicals and economic conservatives. The large number of 
absences (16) renders any analysis on State lines of 
doubtful value except perhaps for Victoria and New South 
Wales. The eight Victorian voters divided four on each side, 
while the sixteen members from New South Wales voted twelve 
in favour and four against (the four were Blakeley, McTiernan, 
Chifley and Theodore). In the voting there is an observable 
tendency for Senators, members from city or industrial
101
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electorates and members with strong union connections
(other than with the A.W.U. and the small craft unions) to 
support the motion. Interlaced with these influences was 
that of personality, for there were many in the F.P.L.P. who 
were genuinely appalled at the prospect of besmirching 
Australia's national honour. The Anstey-Curtin resolution 
could be construed as 'Repudiation' and this was unthinkable 
to those who equated.national with personal honour and held 
both above considerations of Party or class. Fenton and 
Lyons were among these.
In her memoirs Dame Enid Lyons describes the 
emotional scene at the end of the Caucus meeting of 6 
November:
When the vote was taken in the Party room, the bells 
were already ringing for the evening session..., and 
members, in a state of high excitement, began to leave 
the room. But as they did so, Joe [Lyons] sprang to 
the table, and raising his voice above the clamour of 
the bells and the babel of confused shouting, he 
instantly stilled the hubbub. 'I will not do it... 
you have done this thing, but I tell you I will not be 
a party to it. I will go out of public life first. I 
will cable the Prime Minister and if he wants it done 
then he must get someone else to do it'. And he 
hurried from the room, white-faced and trembling with 
anger. 103.
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Caucus records state that Fenton protested at the
insignificance of the vote when so many members were absent
and that Lyons and Fenton said ’that in view of the vote they
104would have to consider their position'. It had been
widely known for several months that Lyons and, to a lesser 
extent, Fenton were at odds with Anstey and Beasley in the 
Ministry and with many members in the F.P.L.P. This discord 
had been aggravated by the Caucus squabbles between 27 October 
and 6 November - all widely and, on this level, accurately 
reported in the press. After the emotional scene of 
6 November (repeated later on the Canberra railway station as 
Lyons left for Melbourne) there was good cause for the public 
speculation about Lyons' intentions.
Lyons cabled Scullin that he would not carry out
the Caucus decision, which he called 'absolute repudiation';
if Scullin approved of the decision he must appoint a
replacement for Lyons; in the meantime, while he waited for
Scullin's reply, Lyons said he would carry on with normal
105procedure to convert the loan. This brought Lyons
104
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and those who supported him into open defiance of the 
principle of majority rule in Caucus, one of the Party's 
most cherished principles. When Lyons proceeded to 
convert the loan in the usual way it was starkly obvious 
that a crisis of unity, with the possibility of a 'split', 
threatened the Party.
The resolution was passed on 6 November and
the next Caucus meeting was scheduled for 12 November. In
the interim Scullin advised Lyons to proceed with the
conversion as he, Scullin, was opposed utterly to the
resolution: 'I do not approve and will not support resolution
of the party, which I agree is repudiation, which is
dishonest and disastrous. Brennan and Moloney concur. . .
Representatives of the N.S.W. Labor Party Executive, the
A.W.U. in N.S.W. and the A.C.T.U. flocked to Canberra to
107
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another meeting of the A.L.P. Federal Executive.
Efforts were made to convene
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Lyons and Fenton went to the Loan Council and 
on 11 November the Council agreed to launch a conversion 
loan in the usual way, thus presenting the Party with a 
fait accompli. Equally as powerful was the influence of 
the Australian and overseas press, which accused the 
Government of the great sin of repudiation which was with 
'inflation' one of the great bogey words of the day, and 
with the Theodore plan and the Anstey-Curtin resolution 
there was plenty of ammunition to hand. Both accusations - 
of 'inflation' and'repudiation' - were unreasonable and 
inaccurate but together their influence was substantial , 
the moreso because the majority of Labor politicians and 
unionists, lacking any other conditioning, were extremely 
susceptible to such propaganda.
The first motion passed at the Caucus meeting of 
12 November was a statement for release to the press 
emphatically denying that the Party was repudiationist and 
insisting that all lawful committments would be honoured."1’09 
Fenton then reported on the Loan Council meeting , advised 
that the full Cabinet would shortly meet the Commonwealth
S.M.H., 13 November 1930.
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Bank Board to place the Theodore plan before it, and said
110that Scullin would be back on 14 January. All three
things had a bearing on the Anstey-Curtin resolution. He 
concluded, 'the Cabinet had met and were unanimous in their 
opinions that the Party should not participate in a crisis
l i ;while the Prime Minister and his two Ministers were absent'.
Yates and Lazzarini at least were not inclined to heed this
pathetic appeal, for they moved that Caucus reaffirm the
resolutions of 6 November. In the debate which followed
Lyons was much criticised, presumably for seeking Loan Council
sanction for the loan conversion after Caucus had decided
against such action. Theodore, Chifley, Keane and Maloney
restated their opposition to the 6 November decision but
affirmed their determination to abide by the majority ruling
of Caucus. Fenton read a long cable from Scullin in which
he appealed to the Party to reconsider the 'appalling' and
'disastrous' resolution, which, he said, was repudiation and
therefore against personal and Party honour; the resolution
had crippled his efforts to restore confidence in Australia;
to 'default on this loan would weaken the value of their 
_
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[i.e.f small investors ] investments, would destroy public
confidence, and would delay for years the restoration of
112economic prosperity.' After further discussion, in
which Anstey spoke in favour of shelving the issue until
Scullin's return, Curtin suggested that Yates withdraw his
113motion, and Yates agreed to do so. After two hours
the meeting closed with a resolution, agreed to on the •
voices, 'That the matter stand adjourned until Mr. J.H.
114Scullin's return'.
Scullin was expected on 14 January 1931, and 
as the loan was to open on 15 December 1930 it was clear that, 
without saying so directly, Caucus had decided to ignore its 
decision of 6 November. The reasons for this reversal are 
clear: the Loan Council endorsement; Lyons' determination; 
the scare campaign against repudiation; the authority of the 
arguments advanced by Scullin (and the appeal of his plea - 
'I know and share members' feelings regarding the suffering 
of the unemployed but the extinction of our credit will spread 
that suffering greatly' ); the knowledge that the Theodore
112
113
S,M.H., 16 March 1931.
1
Caucus, Minutes, 12 November 1930.
114
Ibid.
plan remained as Party policy. But the over-riding 
consideration was the fear of provoking a split in the 
F.P.L.P. A split had been avoided temporarily. A small 
price, however, was demanded by the Caucus majority as 
payment for its capitulation.
Lyons and Fenton were anxious to adjourn
Parliament as soon as the economy measures were enacted.
It was reported that Scullin asked that no further legislation
115be introduced before his return. Caucus decided
against these wishes on 20 November when a motion (from
116Keane and Holloway) was passed saying that the
Parliamentary session must continue until effective assistance
117or relief had been offered to the unemployed. Three
weeks of Caucus rule followed. During this time the Caucus 
majority succeeded in bringing forward some measures which 
had been rejected by the Ministry while Scullin, Brennan and 
Moloney were in Australia (the Port Augusta railway, a bonus 
on gold production, and filling vacancies in the High Court),
115
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116
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or in forcing the Ministry to amend its recommendations 
(the wheat assistance Eill and the export duty on 
sheepskins).
Several unions wanted the Government to impose
an export duty, or a complete export embargo, on sheepskins.
The unions — the wool and basil-workers and the tanners - were
small but their campaign was a strong one. They managed
to get their claims incorporated as one of the eight
clauses of the report of the Unemployment Committee of the
A.C.T.U. Congress in February 1930, so that amid the requests
for unemployment insurance, bank nationalisation and public
works appeared: '3. Export provision against goods going out
of Australia that can be treated here such as sheepskins 
118etc.' Garden argued that 4,000 men would be brought into
119employment by the measure. Garden's advocacy was
surprising, and the fact that he and J. Graves went to
120Canberra to press the matter to Forde suggests that it was
possible, as the Parliamentary Opposition alleged, that
interests other than the trade unions were involved. The 
118
Report... Trade Union Congress, Op.Cit, p.121.
119
Ibid., p.121(a).
120
Argus, 2 April 1930.
289
matter was raised several times in Caucus by E. Riley
(N.S.W.) and Lewis (Vic.): Lewis acted on behalf of the
Geelong Trades and Labor Council, which had a strong
121interest-in the matter, while Riley was acting under
122■pressure from his local Electorate Council, The Tariff
Board reported on the industry in June 1930 and advised
against an export duty but for a bounty. Against the
v/ishes of Riley and Lewis, Caucus by 22 votes to 15,
referred the matter back to the Tariff Board for another 
123 'report. The matter seemed to have been shelved, but
the prospects brightened in November when Caucus insisted
on measures to assist the unemployed. Fenton announced that
the Ministry was prepared to grant assistance to the 
124industry and recommended that this be in the form of a
bounty. Caucus refused to accept the Ministry's recommendation
125(moved by Blakeley and O'Halloran) and instead accepted
a motion from Riley and Lang that an export duty of hd lb.
126be imposed. It was most unlikely that the Senate would
pass legislation giving effect to this resolution, as Caucus
121
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122
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recognised when it rejected,by 18 votes to 23, Riley's
127request for immediate legislation on the duty. But
128after discussion in Caucus Fenton proclaimed the duty
in the Representatives on 18 December, the last day of
sitting. His announcement was greeted by an outburst
from the Opposition, with interjections which spoke of
'bare-faced bribery', 'absolute robbery' and 'a bare-faced 
129swindle'.
himself entirely from the Government's action.
One Labor member (Crouch) rose to dissociate
130
The duty was a complete failure: the export
market collapsed and the collection of the duty was
131challenged in the High Court. On 3 March 1931 Caucus
132voted 24 to 12 to remove the duty and when Parliament
met on 18 March Forde announced that the duty had lapsed
133and all collections would be refunded.
126
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Caucus again over-ruled the Ministry when the
most vital clause in the Wheat Bill of December 1930 was
decided. The wheat industry was in great need of
assistance and throughout November members of the Ministry
conferred with growers, merchants and the Commonwealth
Bank Board. Eventually the Board agreed to assist with
the 1930-31 crop to the extent of guaranteeing 2/- per
bushel F.0.3. Under pressure from the Ministry the Board
later raised this offer to 2/6. Given the intransigence
of the Board, the Ministry had cause to congratulate itself;
but a majority of Caucus was still dissatisfied with the
dictatorial and unsympathetic attitude of the Board, and
Sir Robert Gibson in particular, and it decided to confront
the Board with a fait accompli or, as Daly put it, make an
134''attempt to use moral suasion' on the Board. On 11
December Caucus debated the wheat Bill recommended by the 
135Ministry. Two Ministers (Forde and Blakeley) moved the
vital clause that would allow a guarantee of 2/6 per bushel.
134
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135
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This was defeated in favour of an amendment from two N.S.W.
members (Gibbons and Dunn) which called for a guarantee of
3/-. Caucus minutes do not record voting figures on this
issue but it is likely that the amendment was supported by
those members representing rural electorates and that
large section of Caucus which saw the Bank Board as an
instrument which was deliberately frustrating the Government
for political reasons. The fate of the Wheat Bill served
to fortify such opinion. The Bill passed through both
Houses in a few days and received Royal Assent on 23
December. The Act did nothing to assist the wheatgrowers,
for the Commonwealth Bank's legal advisers told the Board that
the Government had no constitutional power to guarantee the
13 GBank against losses. Thus the Act was rendered inoperative.
The Red Hill - Port Augusta railway was another
of the measures recommended by the Ministry after the Party's
decision not to adjourn Parliament until something had been
137done to relieve unemployment. A motion to adopt the
136
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Ministry's recommendation on the railway was moved by
two Ministers (Forde and Daley) at the Caucus meeting of
1389 December and approved without much debate. A Bril
to authorise calling tenders for the work passed through
both Houses in the following week; during the debate it
was said that construction of the eighty-four miles of line
would provide employment for 1,000 men in South Australia;^
but as it was estimated that only £20,000 would be spent
140in the remainder of the financial year 1930-31 there 
was little prospect of the work giving much immediate 
relief to the unemployed. In the end it gave no relief 
at all.
Scullin had not been in favour of the project and
one of his last acts before leaving in August was to inform
the Secretary of the A.W.U. in South Australia that the
141Government had decided against the project. The A.W.U.
138
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had lobbyed hard for the line, for it anticipated that
1,000 men, all of them A.W.U. members, would find
142employment on the work. Though disappointed with
Scullin's decision the A.W.U. resolved to continue its 
campaign in Scullin's absence, through pressure on the 
eight South Australian members of the F.P.L.P. These 
members, the general rebelliousness of Caucus at the 
time and the influence of the mighty A.W.U. combined to 
make the campaign successful. The success, however, was 
short-lived for the project was dropped from the Government's 
programme after Scullin's return to Australia.
Before his departure Scullin had rejected
overtures to introduce a bonus on gold production. As with
the Red Hill - Port Augusta line, the A.W.U. was the
principal union involved, though in this case the Western
Australian and Victoria-Riverina Branches were the lobbyists.
The A.W.U. was an influential part of a much larger movement
campaigning for a gold bonus, through conferences, deputations 
143and publications.' Scullin, Theodore and a majority of
142
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the Ministry remained unimpressed and in August Scullin
informed the Premier of Western Australia that his
Government was not; prepared to provide for a bonus, on 
144any basis. The blow as softened by Parker Moloney when
he said that the matter had not been finally rejected and
that it would be considered again when Scullin returned 
145from London. Campaigners for the bonus did not accept
either statement as final. The A.L.P. Federal Conference
of May 1930 had already approved of a bonus when it
endorsed (by 20 votes to 8) a proposal from the Western
Australian State Executive of the A.L.P. for a bonus of £1 
146per ounce. The Federal Executive meeting of October 1930
also recommended a bonus and asked 'that immediate effect
147be given to the proposal'. Fenton and Lyons told the
Executive that the Ministry would consider its recommendation. 
Fenton told Caucus on 27 November that the Ministry had
decided for the bonus and the proposal was adopted by Caucus. 148
144
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A Bill to provide for a bonus of £1 per ounce was 
rushed through Parliament.
At the last Caucus meeting in 1930 Fenton
said that although he had not consulted the Ministry on
the matter he recommended that Caucus approve a Christmas
149grant to the unemployed of £250,000. At a time when
Ministers were paring Governmental expenses in every
conceivable way this probably seemed to Fenton to be a
generous gesture. But Caucus was not satisfied. Keane
and Riordan moved that the grant be increased to £1,000,000.
This, however, was too daring for a majority of Caucus, which
accepted instead an amendment from McGrath and Frost to
150double Fenton's suggested grant, to £500,000. This was
Caucus' final gesture of defiance against the majority of 
the Ministry, and the sacred doctrine of balanced budgets.
Scullin's attitude to the Caucus crisis remains 
largely unknown. Fenton and Lyons were in daily contact with 
him during the crucial days when Caucus was meeting in
149
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150
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October, November and December. An indication of 
Scuilin's attitude to Caucus rule was provided in his 
cables dealing with credit expansion and 'repudiation'.
A further illustration of Scuilin's attitude is provided 
by the events surrounding the party's decision in December 
1930 to fill the two vacant positions on the High Court 
Bench. The decision was a part of the Caucus rebellion 
of the period but the issue is more important as the 
exemplar of Scuilin's caution, his conservative leadership 
and his fear of the Caucus.
The High Court bench ordinarily numbered seven.
Justice Powers retired in July 1929 and Chief Justice Knox
in April 1930. Members of the Ministry announced in
January, April and August that the Ministry had decided not
to fill the vacancies: it was said that five Judges were
adequate for the volume of work before the Court and that
the absence of two Judges would mean a saving of £12,000
per year; the position would be regularised by an amendment
to the Judiciary Act to reduce the required number of
151Judges from seven to five. In the rush of legislation
151
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in the March-August sitting this amendment was neglected, 
but the Ministry's position on the matter was clear.
There was considerable dissatisfaction with the 
Government's decision within the Labor movement, particularly 
in New South Wales. The Government had unwittingly 
contributed to this dissatisfaction during the early part of 
1930 with its campaign for a referendum on constitutional 
amendments, when members stressed the restrictions imposed 
by the Constitution and, by implication, the conservative 
nature of the High Court interpretations. The importance 
of the Court was also highlighted by its decision in the 
coal miners' and A.R.U. cases in 1930. These decisions, 
both adverse to union interests, pointed to the need for some 
'good Labor men' on the Bench. More force was added to the 
agitation by the circumstances of Chief Justice Knox's 
retirement, for he stepped down after becoming the principal 
beneficiary of the estate of 'Baron' John Brown, the coal 
millionaire and great villain of the 1929-30 coal lock-out. 
In the Labor movement this offered further confirmation that 
Judges were conservative, anti-Labor and appointed with their
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political bias in mind. There seemed no good reason
why Labor should not redress the balance by 'packing' the
Court while it had the opportunity. As Attorney-General
in the Fisher Labor Government, Hughes had not hesitated
152to fill three vacancies on the High Court Bench. The
Bruce-Page Government had appointed one of its own
15 3Senators, Senator Drake-Brockman, to the Arbitration Court.
By contrast, the only appointment of political importance yet 
made by the Scullin Government was to extend the tenure of 
Sir Robert Gibson.
On 4 December Fenton announced that Scullin had 
secured the appointment of Sir Isaac Isaacs as Governor-Goner .al. 
This caused much rejoicing in the Labor movement, and e<jual 
dissatisfaction outside it. There were, however, some 
drawbacks for Labor. Isaacs had been Labor's favourite on 
the High Court Bench: he had offered the only dissenting 
opinion in the coal case and the A.R.U. case; it was felt,
152
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with reason, that he was considerably more radical 
and generally more sympathetic to Labor ideals than his 
fellow Judges. With his departure in early 1931 the Court 
would be reduced to four. It seemed that this was an 
excellent opportunity to appoint new Judges who were at 
least as sympathetic to Labor as Isaacs had been. Moreover, 
the Court was shortly to deal with an important case involving 
the W.W.F., and it was likely that there would be an appeal 
before the Court over Lang's attempt to abolish the N.S.W. 
Legislative Council: to some it appeared that Labor's
appointees would enhance the chances of getting favourable
a . . 155decisions.
When questioned about the possibility of new 
appointments both Daly"1"55 and Fenton""57 had little to say, 
but neither referred to the earlier statements of Ministerial 
policy on the matter. Rumours continued that the vacancies
154
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would be felled, though it was thought unlikely that
159this would be done before Scullin's return. At the
Caucus meeting of 30 October, Keane and Watkins moved a
motion asking for two appointments but after discussion
160the motion was withdrawn. Agitation within Caucus
for the appointments c o n t i n u e d , a n d  was reinforced by
a request (originating from the Bendigo Trades and Labor
Council) from the A.L.P. Central Executive in Victoria
to all members of the F.P.L.P. to proceed with the 
162appointments. On 11 December Caucus resolved that the
vacancies would be filled, though - according to Scullin -
Caucus did not discuss or recommend particular persons.
From a cable which Scullin sent to Lyons it appears that
Caucus rejected a unanimous recommendation from the Ministry
163that the matter be deferred until Scullin's return, but 
after the Caucus resolution the Ministry reconsidered the
158
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matter and the eight Ministers (Lyons was in Tasmania)
decided unanimously to accept the Caucus resolution and
go ahead. Telegrams were sent to Scullin asking him
to nominate his choices but due to delays in transmission
164his reply (utterly hostile to making any appointments)
was received after the Ministry had approved two persons
(presumably recommended by Daly, the Acting Attorney-General).
As the Argus had predicted in January 1930, the two new
165Judges were H.V. Evatt and E. McTiernan. The appointments
were made public on 19 December, the day after Parliament 
adjourned.
Scullin had made strong protests against making 
the appointments. One cable to Lyons contained the 
extraordinary statement: 'I would go out of office if under
the circumstances appointments were rushed through during our
absence1 .^° Considering the impositions and the frustrations
164
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he had accepted in the previous twelve months there is
nothing more indicative of Scullin's attitudes than these
words. There is no record, and there was little likelihood,
of his ever threatening to resign on any other issue.
Scullin's argument was that the Ministry had already decided
against making new appointments (but as we have seen this
also applied to other measures which were accepted during
October - December 1930) and it was a violation of a 'grave
principle' for Caucus to be involved in the appointments,
amounting to 'political direction' in a matter which should
167be 'solely for Cabinet decision'. In this Scullin was
correct, but the breach of principle was a minor one - 
Caucus said only that the vacancies must be filled -, and it 
was a breach sanctioned by the Labor Party's myth of rule 
from below. Moreover, Scullin's appeal to strict principle 
had a hollow ring: there is no doubt that many Caucus members 
were smarting under and influenced by Scullin's broken promise 
to consult Caucus when Sir Robert Gibson's tenure expired; 
at the time of the High Court appointments Sir Robert's 
reappointment and his seemingly absolute power over the 
167
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Government crept into many Caucus debates and helped 
goad Caucus into compensating acts of defiance. In this 
sense Scullin made his own positive contribution to the 
appointment of Evatt and McTiernan.
In 'January 1931 Scullin returned to a Party which
was taut with expectancy and tension. The interndcine
struggle in Caucus in late 1930 had produced fractures which
would not easily be healed. The Caucus resolution to, in
effect, call a truce until Scullin and the others came back
did not mean that internal Party manoeuvres ceased. Theodore
continued his intrigues: Lyons intensified his flirtation
with powerful anti-Labor interests in Melbourne; in his usual
blunt manner Anstey added further fuel to an already
considerable pile by predicting a split in the Party, and urging
168the party to'default and be damned1. As 1931 began the
future of the Federal Government seemed shaky indeed. But even
the most pessimistic could not have predicted the series of
momentous events of January to March 1931. At the end of
those three turbulent months the Federal A.L.P. had split and
two 'wings' of the F.P.L.P. had deserted, one to join the
Opposition, the other to sit as an 'independent' group in
Parliament.
Australian Worker, 7 January 1931.
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Chapter VI
The Labor split of January-March 1931 has a 
history which begins well before the immediate causes and 
events of early 1931. To understand the forces operating 
in 1931 it is therefore necessary to reach back and sketch 
events and influences which often preceded the formation 
of the Scullin Government.
Before the mid-1920s the A.W.U. had for many 
years been the dominant influence in the A.L.P. in New South 
Wales. By 1927 this influence had been broken. The story 
of the A.W.U.1s eclipse in N.S.W. is a long and complicated 
one, the details of which need not concern us here.'1’ Some of 
the consequences, however, are important to an explanation of 
1931.
The Federal Labor Conference and Executive became 
involved in the N.S.W. conflict and their decisions had at 
various times managed to alienate both the winning and losing
I
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factions. On the other hand the theoretical powers of the 
Federal Executive had been strengthened and given clearer 
definition, though the Executive's efforts to heal the breach 
in N.S.W. were singularly unsuccessful.
The lines of future conflict - and a fundamental 
basis of the 1931 split - were clearly set out by the N.S.W. 
Executive in 1928, in a letter to the Federal Executive:
The Executive elected by the rank and file of the 
Australian Labor Party, State of New South Wales, 
desires to make clear the constitutional position in 
regard to any ruling or dictum concerning the 
domestic affairs of the Party issued by the Federal 
Conference, the Federal Executive, or any other 
grouping of Federal officials -
(1) The [N.S.W.]Executive ... is the creation of the 
rank and file in conference, and in all domestic 
matters recognises only the authority of the rank 
and file of the A.L.P., State of New South Wales 
as expressed in conference or by plebiscite.
(2) It is contrary to the democratic principles of 
the Australian Trade Union and Labor Movement, 
and to the Working Class Movement in all civilised 
countries, that a small group of officials such as
is comprised by the Federal Executive and Conference, 
should have the extraordinary power to over-ride the 
expressed will of the rank and file to whom they 
owe their existence and sustenance.
(3) Therefore, the [N.S.W.] Executive... will maintain 
the right of autonomy in all domestic matters, which 
the rank and file of the Party in New South Wales/ 
in conjunction with the Parties in all other States, 
have enjoyed since the inception of the Australian 
Labor Parties, and this Executive, consequently, will
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repudiate any ruling or dictum of Federal 
officials on any domestic matter which has 
not firsu received approval of the rank and 
file of the Party in New South Wales. 2
The upheaval in N.S.W. was partly the cause and partly 
the consequence of the extraordinary rise of J.T. Lang.
Lang had been Treasurer in the State Labor Government 
in 1920 and 1921. He was elected to the leadership of the Party 
in N.S.W. in 1923 and was State Premier between 1925 and 1927. 
During his time as Premier the Government introduced a number of 
controversial, progressive social and industrial reforms which 
won him great admiration and support in the Labor movement. So 
great was loyalty to Lang that in 1926 a Labor conference agreed 
to a motion which read:
This conference has confidence in John T. Lang,... 
and hereby confirms him in the leadership of the 
Parliamentary Labor Party for the period of the present 
parliament; and recognising that unity is essential to 
the carrying out of the platform and policy of the Labor 
Party, the Premier is authorised, in the event of 
circumstances arising which in his opinion imperil that 
unity, to do all things and exercise such powers as he 
deems necessary in the interests of the movement. 3
2
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Such a vote of confidence is remarkable in the A.L.P. But 
the way in which Lang dominated his Caucus and Cabinet was 
entirely without precedent; in April 1932 the Chief Secretary 
explained that:
When he announces [Government policy] we follow, 
and as soon as he announces it we know where we 
stand. We do not seek to know what he is doing, 
and are prepared to surrender our judgement, if 
necessary, in advance.' 4
By 1930 Lang and his close personal supporters and 
advisers - the Inner Group - ruled the Labor Party in N.S.W. 
And Lang's power over the Party machine had been achieved and 
was sustained by corrupt methods. As L.F. Crisp notes:
What distinguished the State Executive dominated by 
Lang over the decade from 1926, was the consistent 
ruthlessness with which it organised or contrived the 
defeat in selection ballots of opponents and critics, 
withheld ballots in favour of Executive selection, or 
simply refused endorsement to those whose 'reliability' 
was as much as suspect. 5
Nevertheless, the majority of the Labor rank and file in N.S.W. 
were loyal to Lang, believing him to be a militant 'champion of 
the people'. And through 1930 this loyalty increased to levels 
which reached the hysterical in 1931 and 1932.
4
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The situation in N.S.W. was unsatisfactory to the 
Federal Party. Obviously the Lang autocracy was repugnant to 
all who believed in Labor's hallowed principles of democratic 
control. It was true that these were frequently ignored by 
all sections of the Party, not least by the A.W.U. during its 
pre-Lang domination in N.S.W. But the history of the Labor 
Party had seen nothing to compare with the perversion of Labor 
principles which occurred under the Lang regime.
Another reason for concern about the N.S.W. Branch was 
simply the absence of A.W.U. influence in the Labor politics 
of the State. The A.W.U. interest was dominant in A.L.P. 
affairs in Queensland and Western Australia, strong in the other 
three States and very important in the Federal Labor Party, 
Executive and Conference. But in 1928 and 1929 and for most of 
1930 the A.W.U. was not affiliated with the A.L.P. in New South 
Wales. Nor was it affiliated with the New South Wales Trades and 
Labor Council. The Council was important in political and 
industrial affairs in N.S.W.; 'Jock' Garden and other members of 
the Inner Group were prominent in the Council, which was also one
of the five State branches of the A.C.T.U.
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The N.S.W. Branch was out of step with the other 
State branches and the Federal Party. Had it been the case 
that the dissident was not N.S.W. but, for example, Tasmania 
or Western Australia, Federal Labor would not have been so 
greatly disturbed. But as the most populous and industrial 
State it was natural that N.S.W. provided the key State Branch 
of the A.L.P.: when the Scullin Government was formed in 
October 1929 fully twenty of the forty-seven Labor members of 
the House of Representatives were drav/n from N.S.W. Given the 
N.S.W. attitude to Branch autonomy the implications of this 
strength for Federal Labor were, in one respect, ominous. While 
N.S.W. remained under Lang's domination the precious unity of the 
Australian Labor Party - and the F.P.L.P. - was in jeopardy.
While maintaining its own position and integrity, Federal 
Labor made formal attempts in the late 1920s to restore harmony 
between itself and the N.S.W. Branch. These efforts were 
ineffective. But by 1929-30 another less public attempt was 
making some progress.
E.G. Theodore entered Federal politics through the safe 
N.S.W. Labor seat of Dailey. Remembering Crisp's remarks on the 
N.S.W. Executive and political 'reliability' it is easy to 
understand why Theodore should be concerned to establish a personal
power base within the N.S.W. Branch. That he should do so
and possibly go on to supplant Lang as the dominant figure in
the Branch was also in the interests of the Federal Labor
Party. It was also in the interests of the A.W.U. There was
a difficulty, stemming from the hostility felt by Jack Bailey
6of the A.W.U. m  N.S.W. tov/ard Theodore, but this was softened 
by the greater hostility existing between Bailey and Lang, and 
the superimposed interests of the mighty A.W.U. organisation.
Theodore was a formidable challenger. His parliamentary
record in Queensland was a distinguished one. In intellect he
was Lang1s superior - and he was at least Lang's equal in his
mastery of the craft of political intrigue and manoeuvre. This
latter talent Theodore had brought to bear, by at least early
1930, against Lang. We have Lang's word that Theodore was
7trying to depose him. But by its very nature, acceptable 
evidence of the behind the scenes intrigue is scarce. However, 
a few scraps are available.
6
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Ä.J. McPherson was an A.P.W.U. official. He was also 
in 1929 and 1930 the Organising Secretary for the N.S.W. Branch 
of the Party - and he doubled as Theodore's unofficial chief 
lieutenant in N.S.W. between 1929 and 1932. McPherson and 
J.B. ('Plugger') Martin of the Inner Group and N.S.W. Branch 
Executive had, in 1930, produced rival 'tickets' at the 
election of delegates from the land transport union group to the
3Easter A.L.P. Conference; it is probable that these rival 
faction organisers were active in the interests of their respective 
patrons in other group meetings. On 17 April 1930 the N.S.W. 
Executive recommended that McPherson be dismissed as Organising 
S ecretary:
On the grounds that he had made disloyal remarks 
regarding State Labor leader Lang, and had, plotted 
to bring about his downfall from the position of 
leader of the Party. 9
The Easter Conference in N.S.W. was a faction battleground, complete
10with 'basher gangs' and organising and procedural irregularities. 
Garden claimed that 'there was no split between Mr. Lang and 
Mr. Theodore' and that 'talk in that direction had been
3
A.R.U.-N.S.W., State Council Minutes, 13 March 1930.
9
Australian Worker, 23 April 1930.
10
Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union, N.S.W. Branch, 
Executive Minutes, 26 May 1930.
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manufactured by Mr. McPherson'. Yet when the Executive's
recommendation on McPherson was put to the conference, he
12was dismissed from his position, by 74 votes to 47. ‘
McPherson's removal v/as a set-back for Theodore, but 
it did not halt the efforts of those struggling against Lang. 
According to the Australian Worker, at the N.S.W. conference:
...considerable hostility towards the A.W.U. was 
shown by delegates supporting the Graves-Garden 
faction... the impression was gained that they 
desired the money of the A.W.U. more than they did 
the reaffiliation of the union. 13
Negotiations between the A.W.U. and the A.L.P. in N.S.W.
had been underway since the formation of the Scullin Government.
In early 1930 the N.S.W. Labor Party Country and Metropolitan
conferences carried resolutions in favour of readmitting the
A.W.U. It is apparent that the union hoped to have its
reaffiliation accepted before the N.S.W. annual (Easter)
.conference in April 1930. But the N.S.W. Executive 'for some
14unaccountable reason' - to use Barley's ironic words - failed
to act in time. The annual conference elected a committee to
discuss the matter with the A.W.U. The negotiations were
stormy. At one time Scullin agreed to act as arbitrator between _
Australian Worker, 23 April 1930.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
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the two organisations but he withdrew his orfer after it
was alleged (by the N.S.W. Executive) that he was treating
15privately with the A.W.U. Soon after, the negotiations
cane to a standstill. Eventually the A.W.U. made direct
representation to the N.S.W. Executive and the deadlock was
broken. In mid-August it was announced that, after payment
of £650 in 'arrears' to the A.L.P., the A.W.U. reaffiliation
16 •had been accepted. And on 29 August the three A.W.U.
17delegates took their seats in the N.S.W. Executive. This
was potentially at least an opening in the armour of the Lang
machine. At the time it seemed of even greater significance
for negotiations were proceeding for an amalgamation between
the A.W.U. and the miners' union in N.S.W.; in the end nothing
came of the proposal but in 1930 the negotiations seemed 
13promising enough and doubtless the implications of such an 
amalgamation were not lost on Lang and the Inner Group.
14
A.W.U.-Central Branch, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 
1930, p .20.
15
Ibid.
16
17
Labor Daily, 16 August 1930.
r
Ibid, 30 August 1930.
Ibid., 16, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22 August, 26, 27 November 1930.
3X5
Elections for the N.S.W. Executive were held during
November-December 1930. According to the Sydney Morning i-Ierald
the McPherson faction ran practically a full 'ticket' for the
19various groups electing the Executive. However, little
20progress was made in dislodging the 'Garden-Graves' faction.
This was probably the result of Lang's great electoral victory 
in October. Perhaps also it was influenced by Theodore's 
disappointing performance over the coal dispute, and his 
temporary eclipse in the Federal political sphere.
The Mungana affair had forced Theodore's resignation from
the Ministry in July 1930. He was not idle in the months which
followed. At first he spent much time in Brisbane, but he soon
turned his attention elsewhere. Later it was said that during
21the latter part of 1930 the strings were being pulled and that
the period August 1930 to early January 1931 was, on Theodore's
22part, a time of 'persistent and unrelenting intrigue'. “ The 
intrigue was designed to secure Theodore's reinstatement as
19
S.M.H., 4 December 1930.
20
Ibid., 4, 6, 11 December 1930.
21
Labor Daily, 28 January 1931.
22
S.M .H ., 29 January 1931.
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Treasurer and it was conducted principally in N.S.W. And 
Theodore's battle for support in N.S.W. threatened the 
position and standing of Lang.
In August 1930 the President of the N.S.W. Branch issued 
a statement asking the Party in N.S.W. to:
immediately call upon Mr. E.G. Theodore to take 
up his previous position... the Movement here 
states that drastic times require drastic action; 
therefore in the interests of the whole Movement 
Mr. Theodore should be immediately recalled into 
action. 24
Several weeks later, on 18 October, the President (Graves) wrote 
privately to Theodore and ended his letter;
If I can judge the feelings of the Executive I feel 
sure you will succeed in your action in again taking 
your place in the Federal House. With best wishes 
for your ultimate success. 25
According to Rowe (N.S.W.) and Chifley (N.S.W.) J. Beasley was
2'the ringleader' in canvassing for support for Theodore in N.S.W.;
23
Writing in January 1931, N7arren Denning said, 'Much of the 
unwritten history of the last six months centres around efforts 
to have the former Treasurer reinstated in his old position, 
and his domination of the situation in this State [N.S.W.] makes 
further moves in this direction beyond doubt'. (Argus, 19 January 
1931) .
24
Australian Worker, 27 August 1930.
25
Ibid., 8 April 1931.
and Beasley later admitted that while Theodore was out of
the Ministry 'he had some very good friends within it/ who
27were pleading his cause'. Senator Dunn (N.S.W.), an
28acquaintance of Theodore's for twenty years and an ardent
29 30Lang man, was also said to be active on Theodore's behalf.
By the end of October there were many rumours that Theodore had
31secured the support necessary to his return.
Theodore's prospects brightened as a result of the
Niemeyer mission, the Melbourne Agreement and the ensuing
dissatisfaction with the leadership of Fenton and Lyons. As we
have seen, he placed himself at the head of those in the F.P.L.P
who rebelled at the deflationary policies of Fenton and Lyons
but were apprehensive of 'repudiation' and the other policies
expounded by Anstey, Curtin, Yates and the other Caucus radicals 
26
Printer, 19 February 1932; Australian Worker, 6 May 1931; see 
also McPherson's remarks in the Australian Worker, 8 April 1931.
27
C.P.D., Vol. 130, (9 July 1931), p.3654.
28
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29
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30
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Theodore gathered support around his policy as set out in 
the 'Gibbons' plan. And however much Lang may have disliked 
and feared its originator and chief expositor, such a policy 
of economic expansion in the Federal sphere was necessary to 
Lang if his State Government was to survive. In this sense, 
Lang's reputation and future depended on Theodore's success.
His position was thus an extremely delicate one (and we may 
assume that it was also extremely irritating). It was made 
more so by the events of January 1931.
In early December 1930 plans were made for Scullin's
return. The Queensland Central Executive initiated a proposal
to call together the Federal Executive, the Leaders and Deputy
Leaders from each State Branch and the senior members of the
F.P.L.P. 'to consider co-ordinating action and policy in the
32State and Federal spheres'. The organising of thrs conference
was painfully slow and it did not meet until 11 February.
In the meantime the N.S.W. Branch had planned, launched and 
carried through its own confrontation with Scullin.
In mid-December 1930 the N.S.W. Executive voiced its
determination to secure a 'definite understanding' from Scullin
on 'the interpretation and application of the wishes of the 
33Labor movement'; as a first step it resolved to summon a
32
A.L.P.-Qld., Central Executive Minutes, 27 February 1931.
33
Australian Worker, 24 December 1930.
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meeting of all N.S.W. Federal members and the N.S.W.
Executive. The meeting was held in Sydney on 12 January 
(two days after Scullin arrived in Melbourne) with sixteen 
Federal members, the two N.S.W. members of the Federal 
Executive and twenty members of the State Executive. Graves 
made a long speech in which he recited the Scullin Government's 
sorry record, emphasised the urgent need for a positive policy 
(especially as a Parkes by-election was near: it would, Graves 
said, provide a test for the prospects of a double-dissolution) , 
and stressed that although;
We are anxious to avoid a split in the Party... we 
are determined on a changed policy, and when Caucus 
meets we expect every man to stand behind those who 
may be leading the fight on this matter. 34
Theodore was, of course, expected to be 'leading the fight1.
He outlined his financial proposals - the 'Gibbons' scheme - 
in a fighting speech. Beasley and other Federal members'also 
spoke,- Chifley was among those who were dubious about credit 
expansion but, he said, 'notwithstanding his personal views,
34
Ibid., 14 January 1931.
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he would be guided by the majority decision'. The meeting 
then formally adopted the 'Gibbons' scheme; if Chifley’s 
words are a guide, it appears that the twenty Federal members 
present had pledged themselves to support the 'Gibbons'scheme 
in Caucus. But the 'Gibbons' scheme was, at the time, regarded 
as 'inflationary' and Scullin had emphatically rejected any 
measure of that kind. The Sydney meeting elected a committee 
of five to interview Scullin when he came to Sydney on 14 
January to open the Parkes by-election campaign. At the end of 
the meeting Graves concluded:
The committee would make no demands on Mr.Scullin...
[he] knew the will of the movement, and had always 
been loyal in carrying it out. If he could not do 
so, he would get out of it. 36
Scullin arrived in Fremantle on 6 January. During an 
interview he said that:
He was prepared to play his part either as Prime- 
Minister or, if it be so willed, as the humblest 
citizen of Australia... he had never been filled 
with an overwhelming personal ambition. He would 
make way at any time for a better man... . 37
In Adelaide he added that he 'was not v/orried about his personal
position... and if the people [sic] did not see eye to eye with
35
Chifley continued that 'he would prefer to have a settled 
policy and go to the country, even though it might mean defeat'; 
(Australian Worker, 14 January 1931).
36
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37
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him, he would be prepared to stand behind somebody else'.
And after his arrival in Melbourne he claimed that he was
'at any moment ready to retire onto the back benches, or go
39out of Parliament altogether1. It seems that Scullin was
well aware that 'the great wire pullers in the Caucus' had
40spoken of deposing nim rrom the Party leadership. No doubt
this was one influence upon him during January 1931. But bound
41up with this vague threat were otner matters of great 
importance: Scullin now had to align himself with either Lyons 
and Fenton and the policies of the Melbourne Agreement or 
Theodore and a policy of credit expansion; in 1930 he had 
supported Lyons and Fenton, but it was doubtful that he could 
continue to do so.
Fenton and Lyons boarded Scullin's train at Ballarat and
42conferred with him during the journey to Melbourne. Fenton's
attitude - which was to be short-lived - was summed up by his
38
Ibid., 10 January 1931.
39
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Around this time there were several 'vague' comments made,such 
as the following by Yates: 'I know of no specific move in the way
of replacing Mr. Scullin as Prime Minister. Of course, if he 
were to remain adamant against the wishes of the majority of Caucus, 
it is obvious he would have to be deposed... the responsibility for 
it would be on his own shoulders, as he quite realises'; (Register 
News Pictorial, 31 December 193D) .
42
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remark, 'Thank God, Scullin has come back'. Lyons
stepped down as Acting Treasurer, asked Scullin to take the
portfolio and offered his assistance if Scullin would do so.
Scullin refused on the grounds that the task would be too 
44onerous.
In Melbourne Scullin conferred with a few Ministers and 
with Sir Robert Gibson, attended meetings of the Loan Council 
and addressed several gatherings. From 14 to 16 January he 
was in Sydney.
Before leaving for Sydney Scullin telephoned Graves and
received an assurance that the N.S.W. committee had no
45intention of 'dictating' policy to him. After meeting the
committee Scullin issued a statement in which he stressed that no
46attempt had been made to dictate terms to him. The meeting
discussed the outlines of the policy speech with which Scullin 
was to open the Parkes campaign on 15 January. Presumably 
the 'Gibbons' scheme was part of the discussion. But if Scullin' 
speech at Ashfield on 15 January is taken as a measure of his
acceptance of credit expansion, it appears that the committee's
43
Age, 14 January 1931.
44
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45
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representations had very little immediate effect on him.
No policy was enunciated. Instead, Scullin reviewed the
difficulties of the past year and the problems of the present
and the future. There were ample references to exchange rates,
customs revenue, loans and gold but little of what might be
expected in a Labor policy - except that the answer to
Australia's economic problems was 'neither inflation nor deflation,
47but restoration and stability.' There was nothing to indicate
where Scullin stood on the policy conflict within the Labor 
Party.
Scullin's indecisiveness on this point may have been the 
result of his awareness of the need to have the matter settled 
first in Caucus. Arrangements had been made before Ashfield to 
gather the F .P .L .P . together.
On Friday 16 January, J. Price, Secretary of the F.P.L.P.,
received instructions from Scullin to call Caucus together on 
4827 January. It seems probable that Scullin's decision to ask
Caucus to reinstate Theodore was made between his arrival in 
Melbourne on 10 January and his decision to convene Caucus on
47
Argus, 16 January 1931.
48
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16 January, and most likely that the final decision was
made while in Sydney, 14-16 January. In any case, a delegation
from the N.S.W. Branch (Graves, Bird and Martin) went to
49Canberra on 19 January to urge Theodore's reinstatement.
Possibly, too, they complained of calling Caucus together before
the Parkes by-election on 30 January. Graves was angry that
the Cabinet meeting on 23 January and the Caucus meeting on
27 January would draw off Federal campaigners from N.S.W.
Telegrams were sent to several Ministers (but not Lyons and
Fenton) and letters to all N.S.W. Federal members reminding
them of their campaign obligations and that the N.S.W. members
50were not free until after the by-election. Because, Scullin
said, a number of members wanted more than one day for the Caucus
meeting, the date was set back one day, to 26 J a n u a r y . B u t
Scullin remained adamant that the meeting was to be held before
52Parkes and that all members of the F.P.L.P. must attend.
Eight members were absent when Caucus met in Canberra at 
11.00 a.m. on Monday 26 January. The meeting continued, with 
two short (but busy) adjournments until late in the evening.
49
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53
Toward the end there was some discussion of the basic wage
case, the W.W.F. case and the position of the wheat industry.
Earlier, Caucus accepted Scullin's recommendation that the
Party meet again in three weeks time, after the Ministry had
reviewed the financial position and drafted proposals to put 
54to Caucus. However, the real business of the meeting was
Theodore's future. And given that Theodore was regarded by 
many in the Party as the financial wizard of Caucus, Scullin 
had prepared the ground for his reinstatement with a two hour 
address on the Government's problems in finance and economics.
Shortly after the meeting began, Lyons moved, 'That all
Cabinet positions be declared vacant, and the Party proceed
56to elect a new Ministry. The motion was debated at length.
It was probably a move intended to fracture the alliance between
Theodore and Beasley and his friends. But with the Parkes by-
election only a few days away the Party could not afford a full-
scale display of its divisions. Eventually Lyons was granted
57permission to withdraw the motion.
53
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Shortly afterward, Scullin introduced the vital issue 
for which most had been waiting. A few weeks later he 
explained to a Richmond audience how he approached the matter:
He did not go into the party room to judge which side 
the big battalions were on, nor did he put his ear to 
the ground to listen to the rumblings among the Party. 
He went into the Party room and declared which side he 
was on and left it to the members there to decide... 
he told them that he felt Mr. Theodore was not getting 
a fair deal from the National Government of Queensland 
... that from the outset he had believed he was not 
guilty of the charges... he returned from abroad and 
said, 'This has gone far enough. Let him come back 
into Cabinet. Australia needs the best brains that 
Australia has got'. 53
Scullin, of course, made no reference to his own dilemma or 
to any pressures which may have been put upon him.
The debate centred around a short motion put by
Senators O'Halloran (S.A.) and Dunn (N.S.W.) , 'That the
recommendation of the Prime Minister "That Mr. Theodore be
59reinstated as Treasurer", be adopted'.
Although he had no reason to be pleased with the outcome, 
Fenton believed it was the most 'orderly' and 'dignified' Caucus 
debate he had ever heard; everybody, he claimed, was 'very
58
Age, 12 February 1931.
59
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earnest and candid... and a very high tone prevailed throughout 
60the meeting'. But although the meeting did not approach the
rowdyness of those of October-December 1930, while Scullin 
was away, the atmosphere was tense, harsh things were said and 
the anticipated closeness of the vote produced some last 
minute lobbying.
Some members later explained their vote. Green said:
I voted for Mr. Theodore because I believe in him as 
a man of wonderful ability who has been kept in a 
cleft stick. He stands alone in Australia today, 
and there never was his equal in ability. 61
After the meeting Curtin issued a statement explaining his 
attitude:
I have felt that the proceedings in connection with the 
report of the Royal Commission in regard to Mungana 
have been unduly protracted, and, in the present 
desperate circumstances of the country, it appears to 
me to be wrong that the Labor Party and the people should 
be deprived of the services of a man who is regarded by 
the leader of the party as being incomparably capable 
of dealing with a portfolio which is most perplexing and 
most important at the present time .... 62
60
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This was of course a statement for public consumption. Sometime 
later, after he had become disillusioned with Theodore, Curtin 
touched on the subject again - and was more explicit:
I voted for his reinstatement... because he fought- 
the process of deflation and the ... drastic economies 
which some were endeavouring to force upon the Labor 
Party... the programme then enunciated by [Theodore] 
won my vote for his reinstatement ... I said to myself, 
'At last, this Government will do something'. 63
There can be no doubt that Theodore's sponsorship of credit 
expansion, as epitomised by the 'Gibbons' plan, swayed some to 
speak and vote in his favour on 26 January. Indeed, it was 
alleged that he had earlier pledged himself, if reinstated, to 
implement the 'Gibbons' plan and that his pledge had won the 
support of a group of nine members.0"1
Theodore's opponents in Caucus put their point of view 
with great force and moral fervour. Makin (S.A.) was of the 
opinion that:
No suspicion should surround the public life of any 
person entrusted with the high responsibilities of a 
Minister of the Crown. On ethical grounds alone 
Mr. Theodore should not return to office until he had’ 
been freed from suspicion. 65
63
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Senator Hoare was an A.W.U. man who, he claimed, was a part
66of 'the moderate section of the Labour movement1. Apparently
he was not among those who were privy to the 'unrelenting 
67
intrigue' which x^receeded Scullin's recommendation to Caucus for,
68to Hoare, Scullin's words 'fell like a bombshell'. Koare felt
tliat Theodore must first clear his name, otherwise his
reappointment was 'rash', 'unwarranted' and 'hasty'; he concluded
that, 'Mr. Scullin will soon discover til at Mr. Theodore has only 
. , 69one goal .
Price, McNeill, Jones, McGrath, Frost and Lacey adopted 
attitudes similar to those of Makin and Hoare. Moses Gabb was 
so incensed during the meeting that he threatened to leave the 
Party. And on the next day he wrote a long letter to Scullin:
Sir,
Having slept upon my statement in Caucus yesterday 
that in the event of a want of confidence motion being 
moved in the House against your Government because of 
the inclusion of Mr. Theodore therein as Treasurer,
I would support same, I feel the only logical course to 
take is to v/ithdraw my support from the Scullin Government, 
as a Government. This I do. I think the Minister of the 
Crown should be if possible, above suspicion. Certainly 
he should not have the findings of a Royal Commission
66
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hanging over him as in the case under notice. May 
I also state that I have lost faith in your judgement 
as a leader, and in your possession of gratitude, when 
I noticed how the advice and appeal of Mr. Fenton and 
Mr. Lyons were received by you.
In the light of my experience in the Caucus during 
the dark days of the last few months, I am sure you 
have chosen wrongly, and 'A friend in need is a friend 
indeed'.
I intend handing a copy of this letter to the press 
as an explanation of my attitude.
Yours, & etc.
J. Moses Gabb. 70
Fenton and Lyons were still smarting from the rough 
handling they had received from Caucus, and some Ministers, 
during Scullin's absence. Theodore had been among their more 
savage Caucus critics, and doubtless his great ability had made 
his attacks much more wounding. Both Ministers professed to be 
appalled at the lack of ethics involved in Theodore's reinstatement. 
And both, with their supporters, deeply resented Scullin's 
'betrayal' in recommending the return of the 'inflationist'
Theodore.
Anstey, Lazzarini and Yates were also critical; the latter
told Caucus that he would not have Theodore 'at any price' (and
he said later that as a result of the whole business he found 
—
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Scullin 'a most mystifying enigma').
The Caucus debate lasted for several hours and
nearly forty members spoke. According to the Age, which was
usually extremely well informed on Caucus matters, the issue
was in the balance until half an hour or so before the vote was 
72taken. The report suggests that Theodore's supporters
filibustered after the dinner adjournment while others canvassed 
for more affirmative votes. Several members were said to have 
approached Theodore and asked him, as the vote was going to be 
so close, to consider withdrawing; the report says that
73'Mr. Theodore sat silent and took no part in the debate'. But 
the numbers gradually increased. Rowe is reported to have changed 
sides at the last moment, and finally Senator Barnes was 
persuaded by Scullin to support Theodore.
When the vote was taken at 9.45p.m. there was a majority 
of five for Theodore. With two members (Theodore and E. Riley)
74abstaining, the division was 24 votes in favour and 19 against:
71
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The following list was compiled from reports in the S.M.H., Age, 
Argus, Labor Daily and Australian Worker; there is a discrepancy 
in the 'yes' list which as given here numbers 25 although Caucus 
Minutes and other sources clearly record 24. There were eight 
absentees (P. Moloney, Dr. Maloney, Mathews, West, James, Daly,
Rae, Crouch). McTiernan had resigned.
332
For Against
(Ministers' names underlined)
Scullin X X Anstey
Brennan X X Lazzarini
Barnes X X Long
X X Beasley X Nelson
X Blakeley X X Yates
X Forde X Lyons
X Green X Fenton
X Cnifley X McGrath
Coleman Guy
Cunningham X Price
X X Culley X Gabb
X Cusack X Frost
X X Curtin X X Lacey
X Dooley Hoare
Dunn X Jones
X X Eldridge X Lewis
X Gibbons X X Makin
X X Holloway X McNeill
X Keane X Watkins
X X Martens
0'Halloran
X Riordan
X X Riley, E.C.
X X Rowe
X Tulley
Note: x
x
x
Indicates a Caucus vote for the 
Anstey-Curtin motion on 6 November 1930.
Indicates a Caucus vote against the 
Anstey-Curtin motion.
Indicates a vote in the H. of R. in 
June 1931 against the Premiers' Plan
In each case absence and abstention has not been marked.
333
There are several things of interest in the division.
75Members of the Senate voted 4 to 1 and of the Representatives 
20 to 19 for Theodore. Ministers divided 7 for and 3 against.
The State division is most revealing. Western Australia and 
Queensland voted their full strength of 5 in favour of 
reinstatement. Tasmania was split 1 for and 7 against. Victoria 
had only a minority for Theodore, 5 in favour and 6 opposed. Thus, 
with the one N.T. representative, five States were divided 12 br 
Theodore and 19 against. The fifteen representatives from New 
South Wales split 13 in favour and only 2 against. It is 
obvious that support from N.S.W. was the crucial factor in 
Theodore's return to the Ministry. Theodore's activities in the 
weeks and months before 26 January show he had been aware of this. 
And the fact that he had gained great support from that quarter 
could not have escaped the notice of Mr. J.T. Lang.
The list of No voters is revealing for it contains some 
names not usually found together.
The group Anstey, Lazzarini, Yates, Long and Nelson was 
sometimes called the 'extreme radicals' or 'militants'. They were 
certainly to the left of Theodore on economic matters, as is
75
A few days later Senator Daly said that he would have voted 
for Theodore, had he been able to attend; (Advertiser, 28 January 
1931).
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indicated by their solid record in voting for the Anstey-
7 6Curtin motion - and, later, against the Premiers’ Plan 
and other radical proposals. It is true there were others - 
notably, Eldridge and Curtin - who were usually associated with 
them but were on the Theodore issue on the other side. The 
distinctive mark of the Anstey group on the Theodore vote was 
their inability to accept Theodore, as Yates put it, 'at any 
price' ,- they disliked and distrusted him as the arch fixer and 
opportunist; there was also a certain feeling of pique for the 
group had labored in early 1930 - and labored against Theodore's 
opposition - for a policy similar to that which Theodore now 
propounded with such mastery. In passing, it should be noted that 
the 'militant' section was by no means made -up of those in Caucus 
with the longest or closest associations with the trade unions 
and that they did not comprise the section of Caucus sometimes 
labelled 'the industrialists'.
Lyons, Fenton, Guy, Frost, McNeill, Jones, Price and Gabb 
and possibly a few others made up a section of Caucus which, at 
this time, was conservative on economic and political matters. 
Within two months five of the above were to desert the Labor Party 
and join the Opposition.
76
Nelson did not have a vote in the H. of L  on the Premiers'
Plan but was opposed to it in Caucus.
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Among those rejecting Theodore on 26 January were five 
who had voted for the Anstey-Curtin motion of 6 November 1930.
(And two of these, Lacey and Makin, were later to vote against 
the Premiers' Plan). Given their 6 November vote and other 
similar indications of their attitude it is surprising to find 
these five voting against Theodore. It seems that these men 
were opposed for personal rather than political reasons: that they 
found it genuinely shocking to contemplate Theodore's reinstatement 
while he was still about to be prosecuted; this may have been the 
case with Makin, a non-smoking, non-drinking, Methodist lay-preacher 
of righteous mien and behaviour.
Some voted for Theodore because he promised a radical 
policy. Others voted against him because he was too radical and 
others because he was not radical enough. Some, such as Chifley, 
voted for him while not supporting his policy while some, such as 
Makin, supported his policy yet voted against him. Staunch union 
men were to be found in reasonable numbers on both sides. There 
was no significant relationship between voting and the type (e.g., 
rural or urban) of seat held. Ministers were divided. Some States 
voted heavily for Theodore, some heavily against and one was 
fairly evenly divided. Of the many influences contributing to the 
decision of 26 January there are three, however, which because
of their consequences, are worth restating: first, the hope
or fear that Theodore was the strong man who would fight the 
banks and sponsor a Government policy based on credit expansion; 
secondly, faction intrigue,- and thirdly, the accretion of Theodore' 
strength in N.S.W.
The consequences of Theodore's return were immediate and 
dramatic. Gabb resigned from the Party on 27 January and Fenton 
and Lyons resigned from the Ministry on 29 January. Rumours were 
rife that preparations were being made to form a splinter party 
around Lyons and loyal emissaries pursued those thought to be 
shaky and attempted to sooth them with assurances and inducements. 
But despite the tensions and the uncertainties of the future the 
Ministry proceeded with its negotiations with the banks and the 
preparation of a policy to be put to the Caucus meeting of 18 
February. Before then, however, the Party had been dealt yet 
another staggering blow.
The Parkes by-election on 31 January resulted in a defeat 
for Labor. The ructions attending Theodore's return brought the 
Government further discredit. And the 10% cut in the basic wage 
announced on 22 January revealed Federal Labor's inability to make 
good its promise to protect the wage-earner. Then on 3 February
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J. West, the Labor M.H.R. for East Sydney, died and a further 
by-election was set for 7 March; the policy and politicians 
which had failed in Parkes might, it seemed, also fail again. 
This prospect may have affected Lang and the Inner Group. It 
is likely that they were also much affected by the recent 
demonstration of the support which Theodore and his policy had 
gained in N.S.W. Possibly Lang felt threatened or jealous. 
Possibly too, Lang and some of the Inner Group believed that, 
Theodore or not, the Federal Party was at the point of breaking 
up and that consequently it was time to dissociate the N.S.W. 
Branch from the impending failure. Or it may have been that, 
in the worst Party traditions of State autonomy, Lang and his 
circle really believed that Lang was right, and greater than 
Scullin. But for whatever reasons, Lang proceeded to deliver a 
crippling blow to the Scullin Government.
A Premiers' Conference began in Canberra on Friday 6 
February. On the second day Theodore put forward a proposal for 
a three year plan. The details were to be worked out later but 
its principles were the same as those which Theodore had been 
advancing since Caucus had adopted them as the 'Gibbons' plan.
The Conference adjourned late on Saturday and resumed on 
Monday morning. To the dismay and consternation of the others,
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Lang immediately presented his own plan, 'The Lang Plan':
(1) That the Governments of Australia decide to pay no 
further interest to Brinish bond-holders until 
Britain has dealt with the Australian overseas debt 
as Britain settled her own foreign debt with America.
(2) That, in Australia, interest on all Government borrowing 
be reduced to 3 per cent.
(3) That immediate steps be taken by the Commonwealth 
Government to abandon the gold standard of currency/ 
and set up in its place a currency based upon the
wealth of Australia, to be termed 'the Goods Standard'. 77
As Schedvin remarks, the origins of the Lang plan may never be
satisfactorily explained. Schedvin is correct in pointing out
that the usual reference to Lang's comment at the Conference on
Saturday 7 February - 'Mr. Theodore's suggestion appeals to me' -
is a far from adequate sample of Lang's initial reactions to
Theodore's three year plan; Lang made many comments which can be
construed, as Schedvin says, as indicating 'that the bare bones of
78the scheme [i.e., the Lang plan] had already occured to him'.
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There is a theory that Lang had the plan thrust upon 
hira on Sunday 8 February by members of the Inner Group. Several 
members of Lang's entourage have been suggested as the 'true' 
authors of the Lang plan. According to Cooksey, Harold McCauley, 
Lang's secretary and 'the political tactician for Lang, the Inner
Group and the N.S.W. Labor Party', was the man responsible for
79 . 80the Lang plan. Young nominates A.C. Paddison. Theodore
also had a candidate from among Lang's men; he said that ' the
plan was prepared by Mr. John Sleeman... the best evidence that
Mr. Lang was not the author of the plan was that [on Monday 9
81February] he could not pronounce many of the words'.
Schedvin departs from the Inner Group and, basing
his speculation on remarks in the Sydney Morning Herald of 27
February 1931, concludes that Frank Anstey may have collaborated
82with Lang in drafting the plan on Sunday 8 February. It seems
highly likely that Anstey was at least one of those involved in the 
creation of the Lang plan; indeed, only a few days after it was 
made public the plan was referred to as 'the Lang-Anstey panacea'/
79
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As his autobiography reveals, Lang had great admiration for 
84Anstev. And Anstey had since at least mid-1930 been in
close contact with Labor developments in N.S.W.; in August 1930,
as we have seen, he had engaged in behind the scenes counselling
of Garden on the Labor Council's policy towards deflation.
Certainly the Lang plan has terms, a style and themes which are
very similar to those found in Anstey's own writings and speeches.
And between Friday 6 and Monday 9 February, during the Premiers'
Conference, Anstey was in Canberra and 'at frequent intervals' he
85was in 'close collaboration with Mr. Lang'. Moreover, there is
evidence that although Lang may not have had the details worked
out, he did have a plan before Sunday 8 February: as the Premiers
left the Conference on Saturday they were each questioned on their
attitude to the Theodore plan; Lang's reply was 'The plan does not
86impress. I have a better one .
The Lang plan was quickly taken up by the N.S.W. Branch
of the Party and accepted by the N.S.W. Cabinet, Caucus and
Executive. Then, on 13 February, the N.S.W. Executive selected
E.J. Ward as the candidate for East Sydney and enjoined him to
87advocate the Lang plan during his campaign.
34
J.T. Lang, The Great Bust, Sydney, 1962, pp.110-4.
85
Age, 10 February 1931. On the following Saturday Lang attended a 
Sydney meeting of the Federal Executive at which the Lang and 
Theodore plans were to be discussed; before going to the meeting 
Lang again conferred with Anstey, (Argus, 16 February 1931).
86
Age, Monday, 9 February 1931. (Report headed, 'Canberra,Sunday'.) 
87
Age, 14 February 1931.
341
Before the appearance of the Lang plan the Federal
Executive had arranged to meet in Melbourne on 11 and 12 
88February. With the Executive over the two days were Scullin
and Brennan (Theodore was negotiating with the bankers in 
Sydney) and the Labor Leaders and (or) Deputy-Leaders from each 
State, except N.S.W. The discussion was a general one on 
divisions in the Party and the merits of the rival plans. The 
debate, however, was hampered by Lang's absence and therefore the 
conference adjourned to Sydney, to meet again on Sunday 15 February.
The Sydney conference heard Theodore and Scullin on the
Federal Government's plan. At this point Theodore's scheme
was still afloat, although the Commonwealth Bank had just rejected
89requests to finance the proposal. Lang also explained his
plan. After discussion of the rival plans a sub-committee of five 
(Theodore, Lang, Kenneally, McNamara and Forgan-Smith) was. 
appointed to draft a report for the conference. According to the 
W.A. delegates on the Federal Executive, the sub-committee, -
88
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meaning, in effect, Theodore and Lang - reached agreement, but
when the report was discussed at the conference 'Mr. Lang backed
90down and said he was going right on with is own proposal'. The 
conference closed late on Sunday evening after the following 
resolution had been agreed to (presumably with Lang as a dissenter, 
or after he had withdrawn):
That’ it be a recommendation to the Federal Executive 
that the Conference approves of the Commonwealth 
Government continuing negotiations with the banks on 
the lines laid down [by Scullin and Theodore]. In the 
event of these negotiations failing, the Government 
immediately proceed to secure legislative power to give 
effect to the party's platform on banking and currency. 91
The Sydney conference of 15 February may be taken as the 
point at which the lines of division became fixed beyond alteration 
and the subsequent split became inevitable.
The concluding resolution of the Sydney conference was
accepted by the Federal Executive on 16 February, put to Federal
Caucus by Theodore and Brennan on 18 February and accepted by
92Caucus next day by 29 votes to 17.
90
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The Federal Executive meeting' of IS February bestowed
its approval on Theodore's reinstatement and deplored and
called for a halt to the publication of criticism by Labor members
93of Caucus decisions (meaning the decision of 26 January). The
President then ruled, and the ruling was endorsed unanimously
by the Executive, that any member of Caucus 'voting against a
Labor Government or deliberately abstaining from voting for a
Labor Government on a censure motion' would automatically cease to
94be a member of the A.L.P. Finally, the Executive made a formal
statement of its position on East Sydney:
That the East Sydney by -election being a Federal 
fight, the campaign shall be opened by the Leader 
[of the F.P.L.P.], and the policy announced by all 
speakers must be that laid down by the Federal 
Conference and interpreted by the Federal Executive.
This decision was sent to the N.S.W. Executive, which after
discussing the matter at an Executive meeting sent representatives
to meet the Federal Executive on the evening of 17 February. Neither
side would shift from their previously prepared positions, and the
96meeting closed after two hours without result.
'Federal Executive Decisions', Op.cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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The Federal Executive ended its marathon series of 
meetings on 18 February. Obviously, all hope of a settlement 
by negotiation had vanished and the final resolution from the 
Federal Executive recognised this:
In the event of Alderman Ward, in his campaign for 
the East Sydney by-election, advocating a policy 
contrary to that of the Australian Labor Party, as 
announced by the Federal Executive, this Executive 
declares that he is not a candidate of the Australian 
Labor Party, and does not represent its aims or 
policy. 97
The N.S.W. Executive replied with a resolution demanding that all
the N.S.W. Federal members campaign for East Sydney as advocates 
98of the Lang plan.
The crises was discussed at length by Cabinet on 17 
99February. Next day Scullin told Caucus that 'he was not going
to take dictation from any one section of the movement''1'0  ^and he 
threatened expulsion for any member who campaigned on the Lang 
plan in East Sydney, to which Eldridge's reported reply was,
'Here's one who is going to do it... put me out n o w ' T h e  N.S.W. 
members met separately several times during the day-long Caucus 
meeting of 19 February. They decided by 15 votes to nil (with
97
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three abstentions: Rae, Eldridge and Lazzarini) to advocate 
only Federal Labor policy in East Sydney, but they rejected a 
motion requesting the Federal Executive to endorse a candidate 
for the by-election.^0  ^ Further conferences in the following 
days between the N.S.W. Federal members and the N.S.W. Executive 
were utterly fruitless.
All the strength, pressure and authority of the Federal 
Labor Party and Executive had been insufficient to shift the 
N.S.W. Branch. Meeting after meeting had served only to deepen 
already entrenched positions. Now, even if Ward was defeated in 
East Sydney it seemed certain that expulsions from the F.P.L.P. 
would have to be considered, for Beasley (who opened the East 
Sydney campaign), Lazzarini, Eldridge, Dunn and Raw were all 
actively supporting Ward and the Lang plan. Whatever happened it 
was plain that at the very least Beasley's career as a Minister 
would have to end. And the two portfolios vacated by Fenton and 
Lyons had yet to be filled by Caucus election. With Lyons and his
supporters drifting inexorably^ toward the Opposition and Beasley
ofand his associates catapulting themselves out^the Party it 
appeared that the time had arrived for a Caucus 'spill' . On 20 
101
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102
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February a short Caucus meeting decided that the next meeting
should consider the re-election of all Ministerial and Caucus 
103positions.
A special Caucus meeting was held on 2 March. Scullin 
reported on the Premiers' Conference and recent negotiations 
with the Commonwealth Bank. Theodore elaborated on these 
reports and moved:
That as a first step to give effect to the Government's 
financial proposals, a bill be introduced for the 
purpose of creating a Fiduciary Note Issue of £18,000,000 
and this Bill be brought before the Party at an early 
date. 104
After Crouch and Rowe had withdrawn an amendment that, instead,
'The Gold Reserve to Australian Notes be abolished', a motion was
accepted from Nelson and Moloney that Theodore's motion be decided
by secret ballot. The Fiduciary Note scheme was approved by 32 
105votes to 12.
It was reported that members showed little interest in 
Theodore's explanation or the vote, as the majority of members 
'frankly admitted that they were unable to understand just what 
Mr. Theodore's proposal meant'.'^° Doubtless, too, the majority
103
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104
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was distracted by its anticipation of the real purpose of the
meeting. There was not long to wait. Martens and Dooley moved
for a 'spill': 'That all positions in this Party be submitted
107to election by secret ballot'. The motion was carried, 32
108votes to 10.  ^ This meant that all positions - not just
Ministerial portfolios - were declared vacant and then filled 
by exhaustive ballot.
Scullin and Brennan were elected first; Beasley nominated
109against Scullin but received only five votes. Then Barnes,
Dooley - in place of Daly in the Senate - Blakeley, Brennan,
Forde and Moloney were elected. Nobody was returned on the second 
ballot. At this point there were still nine candidates for the 
remaining five Ministerial positions: Anstey, Beasley, Green,
Culley, Curtin, Chifley, McNeill, Holloway and Yates.110 The 
third ballot secured positions for Holloway and McNeill and the 
fourth brought elevation for Culley and Chifley.1x1 Three 
candidates (Green, Yates and Curtin) remained for the last position.
107
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However, because Anstey had been eliminated Curtin felt that 
he no longer wished to serve in the Ministry and although he 
did not formally withdraw, he advised those friends seated near
him not to vote for him 112 Nevertheless, Curtin secured 9
votes in the fifth ballot, which was tied when Green and Yates
secured 23 votes each 
24 to 2 2 . 1±4
113 A final ballot returned Green, by
During the evening session of Caucus further balloting
re-elected Makin as Speaker, E.C. Riley as Whip in the
Representatives and Price as Secretary to the F.P.L.P. But in a
move which was to have some startling consequences, McGrath was
replaced as Chairman of Committees by L. Cunningham. Then Lacey,
Tulley, Long and Lazzarini were elected to the Public Works
Committee and Coleman, Rowe, Riordan and Yates to the Public
115Accounts Committee. The Senate members decided to leave
112
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election of Senate positions until after Daly had returned.
When they met later, however, Daly and Dooley declined to
stand; the result was that Dunn remained as Senate Whip and
Raw was still Senate representative on the Public Works 
116Committee. 3oth of course were Lang men and had by that ■
time left the F.P.L.P. so a further meeting was necessary to
117replace them with Senators Hoare and Daly.
Caucus had voted on twenty-five positions. Three Ministers 
had been defeated. Beasley's elimination was entirely predictable,- 
he had opposed and embarrassed Scullin while the latter was in 
England and had since virtually resigned his Ministerial position 
by taking a leading part in the East Sydney campaign on the 
Lang platform. That Anstey should go also was not unexpected, 
and for much the same reasons; Anstey had been the prickle in the 
Ministerial bed ever since October 1929 and although his association 
with Lang had not been as public as Beasley's it was known and 
resented; besides, he had voted against Theodore on 26 January.
At first glance Daly's exclusion is surprising. It is
generally believed that his eclipse was Scullin's revenge for the
part he had played in securing the appoint of Evatt and McTiernan 
118in December 1930. It is probably true that revenge played a
115
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part. It v/as said that Daly received no support frora Scullin
119and Theodore and their close friends. But Daly's chances
had been diminished by his almost continuous absence from the
Federal scene since the beginning of January; he had been ill
for much of January and for several weeks before the Caucus
'spill' he had been absent in W.A. on departmental business.
Also, of course, he was not present during the vital Caucus
meeting. And besides, he had not voted for Theodore on 26 
120January.
It is certain that McGrath's loss of the position of
Chairman of Committees was largely an act of revenge. McGrath
had once been an ardent Theodore man. In May 1928 for example
he had been extremely angry when Theodore was narrowly defeated
121for the deputy leadership of the F.P.L.P. Yet he had voted
against Theodore on 26 January 1931. His vote had produced what 
the Age called 'a story of political intrigue almost without
precedent in the history of Federal Parliament' . In short, 
Theodore had marshalled his supporters and on 2 March sponsored
118
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Cunningham against McGrath. Even so, the margin of victory
was a narrow one and it was questionable whether McGrath could
in fact be deposed: his position was decided by a vote in the
House of Representatives; should the Government attempt to
remove him it was certain that the Opposition would support him
and very likely that some in the F.P.L.P. would also - McGrath
123claimed that ten Labor men would cross the floor for him.
It seems that the Ministry also thought it likely. The matter
was raised in Caucus on 25 March and Anstey and Jones stated that
they would support McGrath in the House if a vote were taken on 
124the issue. It was decided that the matter would best be left
125to the discretion of the Prime Minister. Caucus later jogged
Scullin's memory, but nothing was done. In June Cunningham was 
elected an Assistant Minister, and McGrath remained Chairman of 
Committees. Yet the damage had been done, for on 16 March McGrath 
announced that he had left the Labor Party and was joining the 
other Labor defectors.
122
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The croup of Labor defectors was growing. Gabb had
been the first to go. Lyons, Fenton and Guy had formally
severed connections with the Party on 13 March when they voted
against the Government on a no-confidence motion. They were
joined in the House by J.L. Price. Price had been re-elected
Secretary of the F.P.L.P. on 2 March. Martens claimed that
Price's subsequent sudden disillusionment with the Labor Party
was the result of disappointment - he had canvassed for a
position in the Ministry, and asked Forde to advance his claims -
12 Gand outside pressures. For whatever reason, Price resigned
his Caucus position nine days after his re-election. "L“7 Thus by 
mid-March there was a group of six ex-Labor men voting with the 
Opposition. And by that time another group from the F.P.L.P. 
had also deserted the Labor Party.
E.J. Ward won the East Sydney by-election on 7 March.
As we have seen, the Federal Executive had declared that Ward, as
an advocate of the Lang plan, was not an A.L.P. candidate. A
meeting of the Ministry on 11 March agreed that Ward could not
128be accepted as a member of the F.P.L.P.
126
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Ward's position was debated at length at a Caucus 
meeting on 12 March, a few hours before the no-confidence 
motion was to be debated in the House. In Caucus Scullin ruled:
That any member elected on any other policy than the 
Federal A.L.P.,cannot be a member of the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party. Further, that in view of 
the Federal Executive's ruling and pending the holding 
of the [special] Federal A.L.P. Conference, Mr. Ward 
cannot take part in the business of the Federal Parliamentary 
Labor Party. 129
Beasley objected to this ruling. His reasons for doing so were,
of course, not based on an appeal against the correctness, within
the Party rules, of the ruling for such grounds did not exist.
The appeal - or threat - was to the consequences, for Beasley
'maintained that if Mr. Ward was to be excluded... other N.S.W.
members who supported Mr. Ward's candidature must be similarly 
130dealt with'. Rae and Lazzarini moved dissent from Scullin's
ruling and Theodore occupied the chair. He refused to accept a 
motion from Dr. Maloney that the dissent motion be adjourned until 
after the forthcoming (27 March) Federal Conference had reached a 
decision on the matter. A motion that the entire debate be 
adjourned was put, and lost.
129
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Even though he was questioned directly by Scullin,
131Ward remained silent throughout the Caucus meeting. Beasley,
Dunn, Rae, Lazzarini and Eldridge all spoke for his admittance.
Holloway, Martens and Dr. Maloney also spoke in Ward's favour.
Curtin defended the Federal Executive's interpretation and stressed
the need for unity around a single policy, but he nevertheless
appealed to Scullin to withdraw his ruling and allow the matter
132to be settled by Federal Conference. ° Nelson made a strong
plea for Ward and attacked Scullin, pointing out that the Prime-
Minister had himself chosen to ignore the decisions of Conference-
and Executive in 1930, when both had accepted the proposal for a
133£20,000,000 credit expansion.
There was never any doubt about how the matter would end.
In a sense, the decision to be made in Caucus had been formed for 
it in the days when the Lang plan had been announced and then 
adopted by the N.S.W. Branch. And in another sense, the decision 
was only the culmination of several years of struggle between the
131
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Federal A.L.P. and the N.S.W. Branch. It was a decision which 
the Federal organisation had long striven to avoid; now, however, 
it was inescapable.
The motion of dissent was defeated by 3 votes to 34.
Beasley, Eldridge, Lazzarini, Ward, Dunn and Rae immediately 
walked out of the Caucus room. The 'Beasley group' had come 
into existence.135
¥  '
Bv mid-March 1931 the Scullin Government had lost twelve
13 Gof the fifty-four Caucus members of October 1929. The Lyons
group voted against the Government on most issues from March 1931.
In May Lyons became Leader of the Opposition (and at the same time
the Nationalist Party changed its name to the United Australian 
137Party). The Beasley group - five M.H.R.s and two Senators -
supported the Government on all major issues. And with the 
Government and Opposition each able to muster thirty-five effective
134
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votes in th'e House of Representatives, the Beasley group now 
held the balance of power.
Lyons and the five who crossed the floor with him could
never hope to rejoin the Labor Party. But with the N.S.W.
Branch behind them, members of the Beasley group were in a
different position. Eventually, after several years, the split
138between the N.S.W. Branch and the Federal Labor was healed.
The first of many conferences dealing with the 1931 split was 
held in Sydney, 27-29 March, 1931. This Special Federal Labor 
Conference, however, was concerned to make the split 'official' 
and establish a rival Branch in N.S.W.
Scullin was the only Minister among the six members of the
139Federal Caucus who were delegates to the Conference. Nine
other delegates were State Labor members of Parliament. Thus,
thirteeen of the thirty delegates were Labor politicians. This was
Nationalist -U.A.P. Opposition see, J.R. Williams, John Latham 
and the Conservative Recovery from Defeat 1929-1931, A.P.S.A. 
Monograph, No.10, Sydney, 1969.
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a lower proportion than that of the May 1930 Conference, where 
there were eighteen politicians among the thirty-six delegates 
(and lower still than the twenty of the thirty-six at the 
August 1931 Conference). At the March 1931 Conference (as at 
the May 1930 and August 1931 conferences) the A.W.U. seems to 
have been the dominant union influence.
New South Wales did not send delegates to the Conference.
Graves explained that Labor in N.S.W. saw the Federal Conference
as 'inconsistent and insincere'; and in any case the Conference
140was certain to be stacked against N.S.W. Nevertheless, some
delegates wanted Lang and representatives of the N.S.W.
Executive to attend. A motion to give effect to their wishes 
opened the debate on one of the principal*- issues of the Conference.
Those in favour of yet another attempt at conciliation had 
a double argument; first, exclusion would set the seal on a split 
which would have momentous and long-felt consequences and it was 
therefore imperative to first exhaust every possible way to patch 
up the trouble; secondly, it was argued that Federal Labor's record 
of adherence to Conference and Executive decisions since October
Labor Daily, 25 March 1931.
140
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1929 was not so pure that it could adopt a highly principled 
stand about the breaches of proper practice on the part of 
Lang and the N.S.W. Branch. Behind these arguments was the 
feeling expressed by one delegate where he said that while he 
'believed in discipline', he believed also that at least 'New 
South Wales had done wrong in the course of humanity' and that 
therefore the N.S.W. Branch 'should be given■another opportunity'. 141
A majority of the delegates were firmly against further
consultation with N.S.W. It is clear that most saw the breach
as the inevitable culmination of the long internecine struggle
between the Branch and the Federal organisation; delegates
emphasised repeatedly that, in Curtin's words, 'the story of
previous efforts at conciliation in the past was the story of
continued humiliation for those endeavouring to maintain the
solidarity of the Movement'; Curtin concluded that 'he was not
142prepared to waste any further time about it'. The
prevailing mood of the Conference was expressed by a Tasmanian
delegate (T. Jude) when he said that 'New South Wales had been
trying for the past 12 years to wreck the Labor Movement throughout
143Australia', and now 'the time had arrived for a show-down'.
141
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The motion for further consultation with N.S.W. was
defeated by 9 votes to IS. 144 Then Curtin moved:
That the Executive [sic] of the A.L.P., New South
Wales Branch, having refused to acknowledge and
accept the Federal Platform, Constitution and Rules
of the Australian Labor Party, is hereby declared
to have automatically placed itself outside the Australian
Lahor Party. 145
After the rejection of amendments designed to secure tactical
or propaganda advantages in N.S.W. the motion was passed, 25 
„ 146votes to 4. The matter was never m  doubt. The Federal
President made a succinct statement of the vital principle 
involved when he said:
The issue to be determined is whether the Australian 
Labor Party shall continue on a Commonwealth basis, 
or become divided into different units, each limited 
in its operations by the various State boundaries. 147
As a strong Federal union, the A.W.U. understood the danger of 
giving in to the N.S.W. encroachment; in July 1933 C.G. Fallon, 
President of the Queensland Branch of the A.W.U. between 1929
144
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and 1933 148 spelled out the consequences of bowing to State
Branch autonomy:
It would have meant that each State would have been 
entitled to pledge its Federal Labor candidates to 
a purely State policy. The various States would have 
been in conflict with each other, and in the event of 
a majority of Labor men being elected to the Federal 
Parliament the position would have been that a number of 
Labor men pledged to different policies would have 
congregated at Canberra with each State group bidding 
for the support of other groups, which would have 
resulted in chaos and rendering impossible anything of 
a constructive character in the interests of the 
Commonwealth as a whole. 149
The decision to expel the ruling N.S.W. Executive was 
reached at the end of the first day of the Conference. The 
remaining two days were spent establishing a framework for a 
new 'Federally loyal' Branch in N.S.W. and in defining a policy 
for the Federal Government.
Judging from the frequency of his appearances at the 
Conference, Theodore was an unofficial delegate for the new N.S.W. 
Branch. He was co-opted to the committee which was to establish, 
yet again, Federal Labor's policy on financial and economic matters. 
As we shall see, all of the Bills embodying Labor's financial
148
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149
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policy had been introduced into the House of Representatives
well before the Federal Conference met. On policy the
Conference was marking no more than a gesture. And according
to one member (Yates) when the policy committee met it was
150merely asked to rubber stamp an already prepared scheme. After
the propaganda appeals and the denunciations have been removed 
the report of the committee, as accepted by the Conference, was 
Theodore's Fiduciary Note Issue scheme and concomitant proposals.
The Conference had about it an air of irrelevance and 
failure. It was necessary to expel formally the N.S.W. Executive. 
But the N.S.W. Branch had long before seized the initiative and 
throughout March it retained its advantage. It was necessary to 
establish a new Branch in N.S.W., but its future looked grim 
indeed. And the report of the Conferences' Finance and Economic 
Committee was little more than a belated endorsement of a policy 
created by Theodore and already endorsed by Caucus.
A few trade union officials attended the Conference at 
various times as observers. Representations of the Railway 
Officers, Clerks, Miners and Postal Workers unions listened to 
the Conference debates. But these observers did not represent 
150
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the interest of the trade unions generally, which was in early 
1931 concentrated elsewhere.
The 10% basic wage cut produced a spate of union 
resolutions which angrily condemned the Federal Government for 
'allowing' the Arbitration Court to inflict such a penalty; one 
such resolution said:
... we hold the Scullin Government responsible for 
the Court's conduct, and demand -
(1) That the decision shall not be proclaimed or 
gazetted.
(2) That these Judges who in such a brazen-faced manner 
robbed our wives and children and presented the 
result of the theft to the employers shall be 
removed from the Arbitration Court forthwith.
We are also firmly convinced that it is about time that 
the Federal Government commenced to govern and ceased to 
hide behind the excuse that the Courts and Banks have 
usurped the powers which the Federal Labor Party prior to 
the last Federal Election claimed to possess. 151
The Government, through Brennan, made an unsuccessful attempt to 
have the Court's decision set aside. The unions were left to 
combat the reduction by non-parliamentary means.
The New South Wales Trades and Labor Council voted 64 to 13 
152for a general strike. After considering this resolution the
151
A.C.A.T.U.- N.S.W. Branch, Minutes of General Meetings, 2 
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A.C.T.U. Executive, meeting in Sydney, 29-31 January, decided
to, summon an A.C.T.U. Congress for 16 February to decide the
matter. In the interim the A.C.T.U. sent a deputation to the
1931 A.W.U. Federal Convention with a request that the A.W.U.
153affiliate with A.C.T.U. and attend the February Congress. As the
Th £Congress voting was to be one vote forA wwgy 1,000 union members
and an extra vote for every additional 2,500 members the A.W.U.
decision could have had a substantial effect at the Congress. It
seems that an important section of the A.C.T.U. was anxious to
ensure that the general strike proposal was defeated. Crofts
urged one union to affiliate in order to ensure the defeat of the
154Sydney 'red element' at the Congress - and so enthusiastic were 
some of his listeners that 'failing eyesight' and a 'dark corner' 
led to some tampering with a ballot box when the Congress delegates 
were being elected. Such manoeuverings were unnecessary. Union 
after union resolved that support for the Sydney proposal would, 
in the circumstances of early 1931, be madness.
The A.C.T.U. Conference met for seven days in Sydney, from 
16-22 February. Some eleven major proposals were debated, and the 
motion for a general strike was easily defeated, by 41 votes to 104.
153
A.W.U. Annual Convention, Official Report 1931, pp.ll, 39-40, 
101-3; The A.W.U. did not affiliate but agreed to send three 
delegates to the Conference.
154
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The A.C.T.U. Executive wanted the Congress to urge the
Government to declare a State of National Emergency, suspend the
Constitution and govern by decree. This proposal had often been
put to the Government while it had been seeking a solution to
the N.S.W. coal lock-out. It was revived again after the Niemeyer
mission and the Melbourne Agreement, and adopted by the A.C.T.U.
155Key Industries Conference of September 1930. The A.C.T.U.
Executive met the A.L.P. Federal Executive on 17 February 1931 
and urged it to 'use its influence' with the Federal Government 
to persuade it to accept the State of Emergency proposal. There is 
no record of such influence being exerted. The proposal, however, 
was considered by Caucus on 18 February when Rae and Eldridge 
moved:
That the Government by proclamation declare the existence 
of a State of National Emergency, and proceed to govern 
Australia by means of regulations on the lines of the War 
Precaution Act. 156
The motion was quickly dismissed by Caucus on the following day,
157by 5 votes to 41. Later that day a delegation from the A.C.T.U.
Congress arrived in Canberra to urge the policy on the Government.
155
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156
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157
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The delegation interviewed Scullin, Theodore and Brennan.
The delegation's request met with very little sympathy and
was rejected as vague and without legal or constitutional
significance; it was pointed out that regulations to give effect
to the policy would first have to be approved by Parliament.
Brennan stressed the Government's firm intention to 'preserve
158order and uphold the law' at all costs." ° And the Ministers
reminded the delegation of the dangers of establishing a precedent
which might be used in the future by a non-Labor Government.
Their arguments were reminiscent of those used in the Government's
early days, during its attempts to settle the coal dispute. A
departure on this occasion - reflecting the changed circumstances
of twelve months - was their argument that it was possible that
should the Scullin Government suspend the Constitution, 'any
twelve men with sufficient force behind could set themselves up as
159a power in control of the Commonwealth'. The delegates reported
to the Congress (and said that Brennan 'had admitted that the 
Government was such in name only');X^  but their report seems to 
have passed almost without notice.
158
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Eventually the Congress decided to organise mass meetings
of unionists 'on the question of taking action to combat the
161onslaughts of the employing class'. Nothing much came of
this proposal. A few meetings were held but the programme
petered out quietly and quickly; it seemed that most unionists
162 The Congress was a disappointment in its 
163
were not interested.
lack of industrial or political effects. And the conclusion
cannot be avoided that such a result was not unexpected on the 
part of the A.C.T.U. Executive and a majority of the union officials 
present at the Congress.
The A.C.T.U. did not hold another Congress until September
1932. It continued to make representations to the Scullin
Government throughout 1931, principally on industrial matters. But
some concern with political Labor remained. Attempts were made to
heal the breach in the Labor Party. The following letter, over
the signatures of the President and Secretary of the A.C.T.U., was
sent to all members of the F.P.L.P., (and to members of the 
164Beasley group);
161
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163
164
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At a special meeting of the emergency committee 
of the Ä.C.T.U., held at the Trades Hall, Melbourne,
[17 March] very grave concern was felt in connection 
with the recent developments in the Parliamentary 
parties, both State and Federal, and the probable 
effect of these developments upon our industrial 
movement.
Differences of opinion on vital issues will always 
arise when an economic crisis confronts our party.
Upon those who remain loyal to the movement falls 
the responsibility of preserving the solidarity of Labor.
This aspect seems for the moment to be overshadowed 
by the earnestness with which individual members of the 
party are pursuing their own troubles. As responsible 
officers of the industrial movement we consider the 
present crisis warrants internal and personal differences 
being laid aside, and the interests of Labor placed in the 
forefront.
It is felt that the interests of the industrial movement 
have been submerged, or have not been protected as they 
might have been, in view of the efforts at all times put 
forward by the trade union movement, and particularly 
immediately prior to and during the election campaign, which 
resulted in the return of the party in October, 1929, to the 
House of Representatives with an overwhelming majority.
The industrial movement, being vitally interested, is 
fearful of the ultimate outcome of the present disintegration 
in the Parliamentary party, and it must of necessity express 
itself in condemnation of individuals who in any way obstruct 
or fail to render assistance in furthering the interests of 
our movement, which has taken years of sacrifice and struggle 
to build.
We therefore urge upon every member of the party, in the 
interests of all sections of the movement, to strive with 
wholehearted earnestness to consolidate the Party within 
Parliament and in the constituencies on the platform laid 
down for the realisation of Labor's ideals. 165
165
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A more concrete effort was made in April. The
A.C.T.U. Executive tried to convene a conference of the
diverse groups involved in the split. It suggested that two
representatives from the F.P.L.P., the Federal Executive, A.C.T.U.,
N.S.W. Executive, N.S.W. Caucus, the A.W.U., and one representative
166of the Beasley group meet to attempt to restore unity. The
F.P.L.P. considered the 'invitation. 31akeley and Coleman were in
favour of participation, providing the Beasley group was excluded.
On Scullin's suggestion, Caucus resolved that the invitation be
acknowledged - and that the whole business be referred to the
1G 7Federal Executive;“- the Government, of course, could not afford 
to dismiss the invitation out of hand as the risk of offending the
unions involved we* too great, but referal to the Federal 
Executive was a polite wa y r of letting the matter drop. In the 
end nothing came of the A.C.T.U. approach.
The political influence’of the A.C.T.U. was severely 
limited. And in 1931 its position in the trade union movement 
was weaker than it had ever been in its short history. It could
166
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count few successes since October 1929; perhaps one of its
greatest was staving off for so long the basic wage reduction
(by, among other things, 'talking out' the issue at maximum
length: a rough count indicates that thirty-five of the forty-three
sitting days of the enquiry were devoted to hearing union evidence).
Even so, its involvement in the enquiry had pushed it by January
1931 to a position where its finances were 'strained to the point
of e x h a u s t i o n B y  June 1931 the A.C.T.U. was reduced to
169circularising 'An Appeal for Moral and Financial Support'.
New South Wales had the largest number of unions and
unionists. Of those N.S.W. unions affiliated with the A.L.P., the
Lang Branch took all but a few. The A.W.U. and the A.P.W.U. were
the only two N.S.W. unions of any size to adhere to the new
(Federal) Branch in N.S.W.; the support of the A.W.U. was vital to
the new Branch, but the union - or, more properly, its members -
170suffered because it denied Lang and his men.
The A.L.P. Federal Secretary circularised all affiliated 
unions in N.S.W. and asked them to declare themselves. One by one
168
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they plumped for Lang and the schismatics. The terms of the 
declarations were often eulogistic, and stiff with noble intention; 
a typical example said:
... we again express our complete confidence in the 
Leadership of the Honourable J.T. Lang, his policy 
and this plan and we unreservedly promise him our 
undivided support in his attempt to remove the shackles 
which have been placed upon us by the money lenders 
and userers both at home and abroad. 171
Such allegiance, and subservience, may have in some cases stemmed
from genuine admiration for Lang and his works. In others it may
have been influenced by the knowledge that the Lang Government was
shortly to introduce an amendment to the State Arbitration Act,
which was to include preference to unionists. Doubtless other
boons were expected; one union secretary said that while he had no
great opinion of either of the contending N.S.W. branches of the
A.L.P., 'he did not think they could afford to break with the
172[Lang] State Executive.' Thus, whatever the cost, the upshot
of the split in N.S.W. was virtually to place the Scullin Government, 
from March 1931, outside the interests, influence and effective 
criticism of all but a few of the trade unions in N.S.W.
171
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Unions in South Australia in early 1931 concentrated
their attention almost exclusively on the Hill Government, which
they were making determined efforts to 'discipline'. A Special
A.L.P. Conference in S.A. in mid-March 1931 had been preceded
by an unofficial meeting of affiliated unions to 'decide upon a 
173common policy'; the State Council of the A.L.P., which had
been 'captured' by the unions,17 .^ demanded that it be supplied 
regularly with copies of the S.A. Caucus Minutes;'*’7“’ the Special 
Conference defeated a motion for the expulsion of Hill and two 
of his Ministers by only 86 to 107 (and the No vote included
-j 70
twenty-two members of the State Caucus). A few months later
Hill and his two Ministers, and others, were purged. But in the 
first part of 1931 none of the turmoil in S.A. flowed into 
Federal sphere: consequently, the Scullin Government remained 
untouched by an apparently strong potential source of criticism.
A similar situation prevailed in Victoria. There, too, 
important unions were attempting to bring State Labor politicians 
under 'control'. One of many early indications of the direction 
in which the extra-parliamentary organisations of the A.L.P. were
173
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moving came at a March meeting of the Trades Hall. A motion
was carried, by 72 votes to 33:
That Rule 10, Clause (a), be amended... strike
out the word 'except' and insert the word 'including'
... making the Rule to read: 'Council may at any 
ordinary or special meeting thereof consider and make 
order upon any matter (political, industrial or 
otherwise) remitted to it by an affiliated organisation 
including all matters pertaining to political 
organisation, drafting of platform, and selection or 
endorsement of candidates for Parliament. 177
At the same time one Victorian union was organising, on lines
similar to those followed in S.A., to ensure that 'all affiliated
unions be invited to send delegates to a meeting to be held [before
the A.L.P. annual Conference in Victoria] to formulate a plan of 
173campaign.' The campaign was intended to 1 re-instate' control
over State Labor politicians. And as in South Australia the 
campaign eventually led to the expulsion of the Labor Premier, and 
others, from the Party. Again, however, the Scullin Government 
appears to have been immune from all this concern for 'discipline'.
As has been explained, the Federal Government's immunity 
was in part a result of geography, federalism and the structure
177
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of the Labor movement. At this time, too, it was obvious 
that tlie Government’s position was precarious and that hence 
the situation was unsuitable for provocative criticism or 
attempts at direction. The Government's position may also have 
been strengthened by the impression of new purpose created 
around mid-March, (admittedly, the impression may have been 
brief, and it was certainly faint). It is true that the 
Federal Party had suffered a 'double-split'. But the split, so 
long threatened, was now a fact. And now the Party had a 
policy, at last it seemed that the Government was firm in 
intention and aware of the need to fight for its beliefs.
Theodore's proposal for a Fiduciary issue had been
accepted by Caucus on 2 March. The Bill for the note issue was
discussed in Caucus on 12 March and read for the first time in
the House of Representatives on 17 March. The Bill was one of
several introduced at this time: together they constituted a new -
in one sense, the first - Labor policy offensive. The Bank
179Interest Bill (24 March), a Wheat Bill (18 March) , and the 
179
The Second Reading of the Wheat Bill passed the Representatives 
by 47 votes to 16, with Lyons, McGrath and Gabb voting for and 
Fenton voting against; (C.P.D., Voi, 128, 16 April 1931, p.947).
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Commonwealth Bank Bill No.2 (24 March) were all introduced
into the Representatives. The pivotal measure was Theodore's
130Fiduciary Notes Issue Bili.~w It allowed notes to be 
printed up to £13,000,000; two-thirds of the issue were to be 
used for public works for the relief of the unemployed (at the 
rate of £1,000,000 every month) and one-third for assistance to 
the wheat industry. The Second Reading of the Bill in the 
Representatives, on 25 March, was passed by 34 votes to 29.
In the Senate the Second Reading ended with the defeat of the 
Bill, on 17 April, by 6 votes to 21; whereupon the Wheat Bill 
was withdrawn and the Bank Interest Bill was allowed to lapse. The 
Bank Bill No.2 went on, only to be annihilated by the Senate 
on 13 May. And so by the middle of April the Government's 
major policy thrust had been thwarted.
The Opposition in the House of Representatives had
not concealed its belief that the Fiduciary Notes Bill would be
181defeated in the Senate. Despite hopeful comments from
Theodore and Scullin (and Chifley) that the Bill would pass, it
Iso
A fiduciary issue is the issue of notes over and above the 
gold cover held, i.e., an unsecured note issue; orthodox banking 
theory regarded such an issue as highly dangerous; see the 
comments in H.E. Teare, Australian Banking Currency and Exchange, 
Melbourne, 1926, pp.169-70.
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seems certain that the Government realised that the chances
of the Senate approving the Bill were very slender. Indeed,
in March several Labor members in the Representatives stated
or implied that the Bill was designed to act as a catalyst
182ror a double-dissolution. And on the day on which the
Senate rejected the Bill (17 April), Scullin said that the
Government's policy for the future was to resubmit the Bill
and if it was again rejected, seek a dissolution of both
Houses; 'we shall', he said, 'test this matter to the bitter 
183end'. These were brave words. Yet it seems likely that
Scullin and Theodore were bluffing and that the bluff was in 
part directed at members of their own Party.
It would take four or five months to bring the
double-dissolution process to the point of an election for both
Houses. As we shall see, Latham was correct in pointing out
that the financial situation was such that Australia simply
could not wait for a double-dissolution; as Latham said, the
intervening months would bring 'a national crisis of a most
extreme character in which the Government would be forced into 
184default'. it is impossible to believe that Scullin and
182
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Theodore were unaware of the approaching crisis. Theodore
had already acknowledged, on 24 March, the looming possibility 
135of default, as had Scullin - who added that 'our attitude
is that while we have a sovereign in the bank we will not 
default1 .
In Parliament and in Caucus Federal Labor was 
outwardly calm. In the records of both, and in the public 
pronouncements of members of the F.P.L.P., there was no 
indication that the Party was aware that Labor had now been 
driven to the wall and would shortly be forced to surrender 
Labor principles, and accept the policy of its opponents,
185
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Chapter VII
By April 1931 the original fifty-four members of the 
Sculiin Government had been reduced to forty-two. The 
Opposition controlled the Senate with twenty-nine members to 
Labor's sis and the Beasley group's two. In the Representatives 
Labor had. thirty-five and the Opposition thirty-five, leaving 
the balance of power with the five members of the Beasley group. 
The Government's position was precarious for it could not rely 
on the continued support of the Beasley group, despite Beasley's 
protestations to the contrarywhile it could be certain of 
frustration in the Senate.
In March 1931 the Government had begun a much belated 
attempt to extricate itself from this impossible situation. 
Without any hope of receiving the Senate's approval the 
Government introduced several banking and finance Bills, 
intending to use their rejection as a means of beginning the 
process of double dissolution. It is not clear how strongly 
the Government was determined to pursue this policy. Sculiin and 
others announced that a double dissolution would follow if the 
Senate rejected the Fiduciary Notes Issue Bill, and the party
Advertiser,'17 April 1931.
1
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branches in the States began to select candidates for the expected
election. But the dissolution process was expected to be a long
one: Brennan told an A.C.T.U. deputation at the end of April that
2the election would be in September or October. The Government
was also fully aware that the Opposition, through its control of
the Senate, would manoeuvre the timing of the dissolution to
suit itself - as Senator Barnes said, 'We will never be able to
3do it until it suits them'. It is likely that late 1931 would have 
suited the Opposition, but the matter was never put to the test.
The restricted freedom of action which had been the Government's 
in 1929, 1930 and early 1931 came to an end in April 1931: the 
Government was told that it could have no more money.
On 2 April Sir Robert Gibson wrote to Theodore that a
point was being reached beyond which it would be impossible for
the ( Commonwealth ) bank to provide further assistance for the
4Government in future; the bank was prepared to extend credit to 
the Government within Australia up to £ 25 million - sufficient 
for a few weeks only - and to £25,125 million in London - a limit 
already reached. This was the second of the Government's urgent
2
United Trades and Labor Council of South Australia, Minutes,
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financial problems, for it was obliged to meet a debt payment 
of £5 million in London on 30 June. The Commonwealth Bank 
had told the Government that it could not raise this amount in 
London and that it would not endorse the Government's proposal 
to ship £5 million in gold from the Australian note issue reserve. 
Nevertheless the Government attempted to legislate for an 
alteration to the note issue reserve ratio. When the Bill was 
before the Senate the Opposition called Sir Robert Gibson and 
sought his opinions. He said, in effect, that to accept the Bill 
and ship the gold would be wrong, but that not to meet the payment - 
to default - would also be wrong; there was another course but he 
refused to say what it was, making the ironic claim that it was 
for the Government to formulate economic policy. It was obvious, 
however, that he meant a policy of Government economy and balanced 
budgets, such as than urged by Sir Otto Niemeyer in August 1930, 
and accepted by the great volume of orthodox opinion since then.
Thus by the end of April 1931 the Government was stranded, 
without even the possibility of continuing its search for a 
double dissolution, for before that could be accomplished the 
Government would have defaulted on its external and internal 
payments and the resulting chaos would, at best, have meant the 
annihilation of the Party at the polls. The Government, therefore,
prepared to surrender.
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A meeting of the Commonwealth Loan Council at the end of
April appointed a committee to report on ways of achieving budget
equilibrium by June 1934. This committee appointed sub-committee -
the Experts (five State Under-Treasurers and four economists) -
which, after conferring with prominent representatives of banks,
insurance, and commercial institutions, presented a report to the
Loan Council, where its recommendations were endorsed by Scullin
before being passed on to a conference of State Premiers held in
5Melbourne, 25 May - 10 June 1931. The conference formulated the 
Premiers' Plan, a slightly amended and elaborated version of the 
recommendations of'the Committee of Experts. The principles of the 
plan were quickly agreed to and further consultations took place on 
matters of detail v/ith representatives of banks, insurance companies 
and stock exchanges. Two disputed matters delayed the signing of 
the agreement. Originally the conference proposed to make a 
•voluntary conversion of internal Government debt, with a strong tax 
penalty for those bondholders who refused to accept the lower rate 
of interest. Lyons, Latham and Pearce, leaders of the Parliamentary 
Opposition, objected to this slight element of compulsion and, as 
the approval of the Opposition in the Senate was necessary, they 
were invited to the conference, where they succeeded in making the 
conversion entirely voluntary. The second matter of dispute arose 
5
Conference of.Commonwealth and State Ministers Proceedings
and Decisions, Government Printer, 1931.
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out of this, for Lang was strong for compulsion. Ke agreed to 
accept the voluntary scheme only on the condition that his 
Government would not act on the Plan's economy measures until the 
voluntary conversion was successfully completed. Further latitude 
was allowed Lang by an agreement that Governments would decide 
for themselves where reductions in their expenditure were to be made.
The Premiers' Plan was signed by Scullin and all six State
_ 6 Premiers on 10 June 1931, It had five main provisions:
1. A reduction of 20 per cent in all adjustable Government 
expenditure.
2. Conversion of the internal debts of the Governments on the 
basis of a 22^/2% reduction of interest.
3. Increased taxation, both Commonwealth and State.
4. A reduction of bank interest,
5. Relief for holders of private mortgages.
The final resolution of the conference declared: 'The representatives
of each Government present at this Conference bind themselves to
,7give effect promptly to the whole of the resolutions agreed to...
Scullin had committed the Labor Party to the plan. He was 
aware that the constitution and traditions of the Labor Party placed
Ibid. , pp. 171-173. 
7
Ibid., p. 173.
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at least token restrictions upon his ability to bind the Party on 
policy matters. As a participant in the conscription split of 
1816, when he had moved the motion expelling conscriptionists 
from the party,^ Scullin knew the possible consequences of the 
course he proposed. However, as his own career showed, responsibility 
changes politicians. And as the weeks after 10 June were to show, 
circumstances often alter principles.
The Federal Cabinet had already reversed its opposition of
]_9 March and 27 May to cuts in public service salaries and social 
9services. On 6 June a majority of the Cabinet, with Culley absent •
10and Holloway dissenting, agreed to accept the plan. This was to
be expected. The next step, the most important from Scullin's 
viewpoint, was the approval of the Federal Caucus. Caucus had 
already discussed the Premiers' Conference and, after being
cautioned not to pass 'any resolution which could be misconstrued 
as one of suspicion or distrust' of Scullin and Theodore, it asked 
Scullin not to agree to any reductions without first consulting 
Caucus."“  ^ This request was ignored.
8 ’
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The Federal Caucus met debate the plan on 11 June, 
with all but three of the forty-two members present, The three 
absentees, Cullev, Mathews and Curtin were all opposed to the 
plan, but only Curtin notified the meeting of his objections, 
in a telegram which Scullin read to Caucus.
The meeting began with speeches lasting more than two
hours from Scullin and Theodore. Scullin explained the
Government's financial difficulties, gave a lengthy summary of
the proceedings of the Premiers' Conference and stressed, as he
did repeatedly in the weeks which followed, the urgency of the
matter, claiming that unless the plan was approved the Government
would be forced into default by mid-July. To those critical
of the reductions in social service payments he replied that,
either way, plan or no plan, pensioners and public servants would
have to accept cuts, but under the plan pensions would be
reduced by 2/6 in the £1, while if the Government defaulted the
12best it might do would be to pay 12/- in the £l. Scullin ended
his plea for the plan by hinting that the future of the Ministry
13depends upon its acceptance, Theodore then explained the
details of the plan and the budget which was to accompany it. He
12
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claimed that the plan would put 100,000. men back to work and 
bring the start of economic recovery within a few months, a 
claim which only two months earlier he had made for the fiduciary 
issue. This was a persuasive (though dubious) argument for it 
suggested that if members of the Party rode out the odium of 
approving the plan they would enjoy the benefits in 1932, when the 
Federal election was held.
Several hours of questions followed. The critical issue 
was the cuts in social services. To proposals that exemptions be 
given to all classes of pensioners who were solely dependent on 
pensions Scuilin replied that althoughthis would not be written 
into the legislation all cases of hardship would receive 
sympathetic treatment. A further suggestion that the plan be 
sent back to another Premiers' Conference and the wage and pension 
economies be replaced with other economies was dismissed by Scuilin 
as impracticable. Then, as Chairman, Scuilin ruled out of order 
an attempt to eliminate the pension cuts altogether, saying that
14the Caucus must either accept or reject the plan in its entirety. 
After eight hours of discussion the meeting adjourned.
The debate continued next day. All but one of the twelve 
Ministers present urged acceptance of the plan, and although the 
discussion was reported to be quiet - Scuilin announced 'there was
Caucus, Minutes, 12 June 1931.
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no heat, and a very fine spirit has been shown' - strong
objections to the entire plan were made in speeches by Makin,
Kneebone, Yates, Riordan and Holloway. But Scullin and Theodore
countered every objection by asking the critic to suggest an
alternative course, one which would also save the Government
from approaching default. Eventually an amendment was put to the
meeting calling on the Government to seek a double dissolution
and fight the ensuing election on the fiduciary notes and other
government financial proposals. This amendment was possibly
inspired by the Ministry, for it was moved by Coleman, one of the
Government's most uncritical supporters and an advocate of
acceptance of the plan. The amendment, however, divided members
into those who were intransigent in their opposition - believing
that the threat of default was a political trick, a bluff which
could be called - and those who, however reluctant, were prepared
to compromise. In a secret ballot Coleman's amendment was defeated
16by 14 votes to 15. Scullin's and Theodore's original motion for
the adoption of the plan was then carried in another secret ballot 
17by 26 to 13, including among those in favour eleven of the twelve 
Ministers present. The voting indicated that several members, might
15
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have been glad of the secrecy ror it v/as reported that fifteen
members spoke against the plan, and the three who did not speak
18(Anstey, Koare and Rowe) were known to be opposed, so that 
five members had undergone a rapid change of conviction.
On leaving the meeting Scullin was reported to have shown
obvious signs of satisfaction, though he must have been disturbed
at the size of the opposition in Caucus, and his subsequent
19statement reflected his feelings, Theodore confined himself to
commenting on the economic virtues of the plan, claiming (with 
some justification) that he was quite confident that 'this plan 
will do more than anything else properly to restore confidence' 
and (with little justification) that 'employment will be 
forthcoming in a few months for 100,000 men at present not in 
employment'.
The Caucus opposition did not share its leader's 
satisfaction. Within a few hours of the close of the meeting 
Holloway submitted his resignation from the Ministry to Scullin.
He argued that the plan would not improve the economic position, 
that only Labor's policy of credit expansion could alleviate 
conditions, and that the plan was immoral and fundamentally
18
S.M.H., 13 June 1931,
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opposed to every principle of the Labor Party - to which Scullin
replied that 'We cannot pay ouu what we do not receive. It is
20really a question of arithmetic rather than argument'.
Some press reports implied that Holloway's resignation was 
prompted less by opposition to the plan than by his hope of gaining 
support in the ballot for Labor selection for the seat of Melbourne 
Ports, which was held the following day.^ Holloway indeed won the 
ballot, but this does not prove that opposition to the plan was a 
prerequisite for success of this kind, for on the same day 3rennan, 
a supporter of the plan, also won a selection ballot by a comfortable 
majority. In fact, with the exception of two South Australian 
Senators who were temporarily expelled from the party, no member of 
Federal Caucus who sought endorsement in 1931 failed to secure it, 
irrespective of his stand on the Premiers' Plan, Culley, another 
Assistant-Minister, resigned from the Ministry on 24 June, giving 
as his reasons his opposition to the plan and its violation of 
Labor principles. Other members of the Federal Labor Party also 
made public protests, among them Curtin, Makin, Riordan and Yates,
the last of whom said that 'members of the Labor movement must have 
20
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some assurance as to where they stand whether • they are to be
bound by their pledge, platform and conference decisions' or
22whether they were to be 'the playthings of the Ministry'.
A Special Federal Conference had met in Sydney in March
1931. It dealt mainly with the break-away of the N.S.W. Branch and
the establishment of a new Federally-loyal Branch in N.S.W. However
23it had adopted a 'Statement of Financial Proposals' which was
•■9Texpansionary in tone, calling for credit expansion, public works, 
and control of interest rates. There was nothing in this programme 
which was in direct conflict with the proposals of the Premiers'
Plan, though the two were certainly opposite in spirit. Similarly, 
there was little in the Federal Platform and Objective which 
explicitly prohibited Party members from supporting the plan's 
economy measures, except that the plan ran contrary to the provisions 
in the Platform which called for 'increased Old Age and Invalid 
Pensions' and 'liberal treatment' of disabled ex-soldiers. There 
was no doubt, however, that the Premiers' Plan was a negation of 
that vaguely worded section of the Platform which demanded 'The 
cultivation of Labor ideals and principles, and the development of 
the spirit of social service'.
22
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In the crisis of June 1S31 there was not sufficient
time to summon another Special Conference to establish
unequivocally the Labor Party's stand on the plan. The rules of
the Party, however , provided for such a situation. The Federal
Executive was empowered to administer the decisions of Federal
Conference and interpret the Platform of the Party. Under the
Rules, meetings of the Federal Executive could be requested by
any State Branch Executive, The Victorian Executive had
24requested such a meeting on 29 May, the S.A. Executive on 
252 June, and other State Executives in the following days. The 
Federal Executive meeting was set for Thursday, 18 June, at 
Canberra. This, it should be noted, was eight days after the 
plan had been signed, and six days after the Federal Caucus had 
accepted the plan. By the time the Federal Executive met, the 
Bills to implement the plan had already been drafted and were 
ready for submission to Federal Parliament,
Immediately after the Federal Caucus had accepted the 
plan Scullin sent a lengthy telegram to each of the six A.L.P. 
State branch executives setting out the Government's case for 
the plan, with the familiar stress on the certainty of default,
24
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asking them to defer judgment on the plan until after the
26Federal Executive had met. No doubt Scullin felt that his
Government was more likely to receive sympathetic treatment from 
the twelve delegates to the Federal Executive than from the 
hundred and twenty or more members comprising the State 
executives.
Scullin's appeal did not deter the extra-parliamentary
organizations in some States. The State Executive in W.A.
carried a resolution which expressed 'emphatic protest and
opposition' to the plan itself and disapproval of all Labor
members who supported it in Caucus; endorsed Curtin's opposition;
and summoned the Federal Executive to enforce the decisions of the
Special Federal Conference of March 1931 - 'failing which all
members who fail to carry out [Conference] decisions automatically
27place themselves outside the Labor Movement'. Meeting on the
same day, 15 June, the Party Executive in S.A. unanimously 
instructed its delegates to the Federal Executive to vote against 
the plan.“  ^ The State Council of the A.L.P. had begun to debate
26
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a motion threatening expulsion for any supporter of the plan.
Although the Victorian Executive was the first to lodge protest
against the plan - on 29 May - it did not meet again until 19 June.
In Queensland the party also moved slowly, and with caution.
Shortly after the plan was signed the small Executive Committee
recommended that the triennial Labor-in-Poiitics Convention, due
to open in early July, be postponed until 1932: the reason given
was not that the Convention - the 'Supreme Parliament1 of Labor in
Queensland - might cause disruption over the plan and thus reduce
the chances of success at the 1932 election, but that Labor members
of Parliament would be needed to fight the plan in the Queensland 
30Parliament. This recommendation was endorsed on 19 June by the
Queensland Central Executive, which passed a motion opposing the
plan as contrary to Labor Party principles - but refused to sanction
31disciplinary action against those supporting it. The
re-constructed N.S.W. Branch was less than three months old. It was 
weak in numbers, finance and influence. As it had been established 
in opposition to the Lang party and was composed of people with 
strong loyalty to the Federal Government, it could be expected
29
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to give its consent, however reluctantly, to the plan. And 
this it did, at a meeting of its provisional executive on 15 
June, which resolved to meet Scullin's request and defer
judgment until after the Federal Executive had considered the
. 32plan,
The twelve members of the Federal Executive were all men
with long experience of the Labor movement, including participation
in the conscription split of 1916. Half of its members were
members of parliament (three Federal and three State), and all had
strong links with trade unions. The influence of the A.W.U. was
strong, for perhaps half of the delegates were members of that
Union and two were secretaries of A.W.U. State Branches. The
delegates were well known to senior members of the Government. On
the day before the Executive met, several delegates attended informal
meetings with members of the Ministry - though at least one delegate,
Kneebone, declined an invitation to attend such a meeting in the
33Prime Minister's room. At one such meeting, called 'an informal
chat' by Scullin, he and Theodore put the Government's case to the
34delegates and distributed various documents,
32
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The formal Executive meeting began on 13 June with
lengthy addresses from Scullin and Theodore. Scullin again
outlined the events leading up to the Premiers' Conference,
stressing that other than default there was no alternative for
the Government but to accept the plan, and emphasising the
provision in the plan for reduction of internal interest rates.
He also emphasised the impracticability of any talk of a
double dissolution, which, apart from being an admission of
failure, would result in the party being destroyed at the polls,
since default must occur before the election. During the
questions which followed, Scullin assured the Executive that
adoption of the plan would not mean the shelving of the party's
programme for a fiduciary notes issue and other expansionary 
35economic measures - though he had told Lyons at the Premiers' 
Conference that the plan would replace that party policy. Scullin 
then left the meeting and returned to the House of Representatives 
to move the second reading of the first of the Bills related to the 
Premiers' Plan."' This action was more persuasive than any
argument Scullin might have presented to the Executive, for it
35
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showed that the Government was determined to put the plan into
operation, regardless of what the Executive might decide. It is,
however, quite likely that Scullin was also confident that the
Executive v;ould do its best to avoid embarrassing his Government.
During the discussion which followed Scullin's departure the
delegates groped their way toward a formula which would smooth
over all troubles. In reply to a question from Senator Kneebone
the President (J.J. Kenneally, M.L.A.) ruled that the pj_an was
'not in conflict with' the expansionary policy adopted in March 
371931, because that policy could conceivably have included cuts
in wages and pensions. As he said later, when giving this ruling
he was mindful that 'it was fraught with possible serious
consequences to many members, because if members act in direct
opposition to Conference decisions they cease to be members of the 
33Party'.^0 This ruling was not challenged, (though Kneebone later
39said he thought it 'rotten') . 'Not in conflict with' did not
mean that the plan was necessarily to be regarded as Labor policy, 
so that it might be possible for Labor members to vote against it 
in Parliament. But, by approving the plan by a majority Caucus
37
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had, in a sense, made it the policy of the Labor Government 
and members were therefore bound by their pledge to vote for 
it. Curtin took up this point, asking if he would be bound to 
vote for the plan. The President ruled that members would have 
a 'free vote' on the matter. In doing so he overlooked the 
Caucus decision and returned to his 'not in conflict with' 
interpretation. The ruling was not challenged, though it excited 
some comment within the party. The desired compromise had been 
achieved.
The way was now open for the second compromise. The 
Executive wished to conclude with a public statement embodying 
two inconsistent points of view: opposition to that part of the 
plan requiring cuts in wages and social services, and opposition 
to the Government relinquishing office. A committee of six - one 
from each State - was established to draft such a resolution. In 
consultation with Sculiin and Theodore the committee deliberated 
until midnight, and presented its report on the second day of the 
Executive meeting (19 June). The draft of two hundred and ninety 
words did contain the two principles asked for, but it was 
strongly biased toward defence of the Government, with only a short 
section of twenty-two words expressing opposition to the cuts in 
expenditure. When this was presented for adoption Curtin, seconded 
by Makin, moved an amendment which sought the rejection of the entire
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plan on the grounds that it was 'repugnant to the principles
and ideals of the Labor movement, subversive of the policy and
intention of the Federal Labor Platform and the supplementary
practicable proposals adopted at the special confernces of
March 1931 ; and incapable of meeting the real problems of the
nation which have their roots in the collapse of the capitalistic 
40monetary system'. Curtin's amendment was defeated, 7 votes to
5 (the five being Curtin, Cameron, Kneebone, Makin and Oglivie).
A further amendment from Cameron favouring an early double
dissolution and expressing opposition to the cuts was again
defeated, 7 votes to 5. A separate resolution from the drafting
committee applauding that section of the plan which sought a
reduction in interest rates was then discussed. An amendment from
Curtin, seeking to divorce the lowering of interest from the rest
of the plan was also defeated 7 to 5, after which the whole
41resolution on interest rates was defeated by 9 votes to 3.
After several changes in its wording the committee's 
recommendation was adopted unanimously, though no doubt only in the 
cause of unity and with some reluctance by the five who had fought 
to reject the plan. The decision of the Federal Executive read:
40
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'The executive of the A.L.P. is definitely opposed 
to that part of the Premiers' Conference plan which 
involves reductions in wages, pensions and social 
services. The executive recognizes that the 
Commonwealth Labor Government's monetary policy has 
been thwarted by the banks and the reactionary Senate, 
thereby creating widespread industrial stagnation and 
unemployment and leading to a collapse of national 
finance. The executive is convinced that a Nationalist 
Government as an alternative to the present Labor 
Government would be abhorent to the workers and 
disastrous to the country. It is of the greatest 
importance that the Labor Government should remain in 
office during this time of crisis in order to prevent 
the enemies of Labor enforcing a ruthless policy of 
aggression against the hard-won rights of the workers; 
and the restoration of their conditions will depend upon 
the return of Labor at the polls with a majority in both 
Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament, 42
Legislation to enact the plan was hurried through the
Federal Parliament. Speeches in support from Government members
were few: twenty-three members spoke on the Financial Emergency
Bill in the House of Representatives; three of these were members of
the Beasley group, six were opponents from within the Government,
and only four, two of whom were Ministers, spoke as supporters of
43the Government and the plan. The second reading of the Bill was
carried by 44 votes to 16, with three pairs. Labor members divided 
15 for and (counting pairs) 15 against. (Makin, the Speaker, voted 
against the Bill in Committee . 1 In the Senate four Labor members
42
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voted for and two against the Bill. The debate was quiet,
with the exception of emotional speeches delivered by Curtin 
44and Anstey, who released the frustrations accumulated during 
the eighteen months when they had tried to steer the Government 
onto another course. But by this time nothing could be offered 
except recriminations.
There was some support within the Labor movement for
those Federal parliamentarians who opposed the plan. There was
much criticism of the Scullin Government, some excusing, a little
self-examination - but the reaction was surprisingly pacific,
reflecting the prevailing disillusionment with the Labor party
('there appears to be a marked tendency on the part of a large
number of members to decry the value of political action on the 
( 45part cm the union') and with the facade of parliamentary
democracy. The comments of the Westsafe«a~. Worker were typical
46of the Labor press. The paper used the Premiers' Conference to
restate its analysis of the depression and to demonstrate that
the country was in the hands of the Senate, the Money Power -
47and Sir Robert Gibson, 'the financial ruler of Australia'.
44-
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It offered particular objections to the presence of Lyons,
Latham and Pearce at the Conference and to the lack of
compulsion in the conversion loan. It ended by conceding,
however, that the plan had to be accepted. Although the paper's
report of the Federal Caucus meetings which endorsed the plan
was headed 'Expediency Carries the Day', the text which followed
was a plea for the government, in terms similar to those used by
Scullin: the plan was repugnant but inevitable, otherwise 'a
general smash was certain'; there was no practicable alternative;
the government was sincere and honest and would at least
administer the plan sympathetically; and 'it should not be
forgotten that while Mr. Scullin has a duty to the Party he has
an important duty to the country and to the obligations of the 
48office he holds'. The paper continued to support the government,
though it became more critical, possibly influenced by Curtin,
when the plan was introduced into the Western Australian
parliament. It reiterated its criticisms of the social system
which made such measures inevitable, but added warnings that the
Labor movement was also at fault for its timidity and orthodoxy,
concluding that 'the maddening and saddening part of it all is
49that it could have been avoided'.
48
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Some trade unions were vehement in their denunciation
of the government, particularly those public service unions
whose members were directly affected by the wage cuts. The
Victorian Branch of the Australian Postal V/orkers' Union - one
of the few public service unions affiliated with the A.L.P. -
helped to organise a number of mass protest meetings of public
servants'. A meeting of the branch executive of the union on
16 June demanded that the Government stick to the decisions of
the last A.L.P. Federal Conference, suggested that as an
alternative to salary and pension cuts the government suspend all
overseas interest payments for two years and reduce all interest
rates, and resolved that the union withhold all financial support 
_ 50from any Labor member who supported the plan (which it did at
the federal election of December 1 9 3 1 ) . Later in 1931 the 
Branch instructed its delegates to various union and A.L.P. 
conferences to continue opposition to the plan and support 
disciplinary action against Labor parliamentarians who had voted 
for it. But although such resolutions were important in the 
internal politics of the Labor Party in Victoria, they were not 
an accurate reflection of the attitude of the rank and file members,
50
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for most public servants were, as Caiden says, 'completely
52apathetic and indifferent'.
The non-public service unions, though not directly 
affected, were hostile to the plan and its Labor supporters.
Even the A.W.U. was critical: in its first and only official 
criticism of the Scullin Government the A.W.U. voiced its 
'invincible repugnance' for the plan, but it dealt lightly with 
the Government and did not suggest that the union might waver in
its support. Other unions were less sympathetic. Several
issued statements condemning the government for what one union
54called Scullin's 'craven surrender... to the capitalists'. The 
Geelong Trades and Labor Council took a more moderate (and 
representative) line when it expressed its 'very grave alarm' at 
the plan and requested all labor parliamentarians to vote against
it.' This resolution was endorsed by the Ballarat Trades and
Labor Council, with an addendum seeking a special conference of
56Victorian trade unions to deal with any recalcitrants. Similar 
proposals were debated in Adelaide, where the Labor Council 
registered 'its uncompromising hostility to the plan' though this
54
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resolution was itself a compromise, for there was some confusion
about whether Mr. Lang had been among those 'alleged representatives
of the Workers1 who had signed the plan. The group of 'Lang
planners' in the Council succeeded in deleting Lang's name, at the
57cost of watering down criticism of the Premiers' Plan.
The only serious debate on the plan by representatives of 
the trade unions took place in Melbourne. Delegates to the 
Trades Hall Council discussed the plan at a series of well-attended' 
meetings on 4, 11, 18 and 25 June. The motion carried on 25 June, 
by 77 votes to 44, repudiated 'the so-called Premiers' Plan' and 
declared an intention to organise the unions to force the party 
to discipline its 'planite' members. It also called upon the 
Federal Executive to cancel the endorsement of those federal Labor 
members in favour of the plan, though the endorsement of candidates 
was a matter for the State, not the Federal, party authorities 
(and in any case the Federal Executive had the previous week already 
whitewashed the supporters of the plan). The Council also issued 
a general call to all A.L.P. organisations and the A.C.T.U. to 
take Immediate action for a counter-offensive for the socialisation 
of industry and adherence to Labor principles. This declaration 
came too late, and was too remote, to influence the Scullin
57
United Trades and Labor Council of S.A., Minutes, 6 July 1931.
58
Melbourne Trades Hall Council, Minutes, 25 June 1931.
government. it was, however, probably directed at the
Victorian Labor government, and it was there that its effect 
was felt.
The A.C.T.U., which was by now largely discredited and
ineffective, joined the chorus of opposition. In June the
Emergency Committee and in October - three months after the plan
became effective - the Interstate Executive of the A.C.T.U. issued
statements deploring the salary and pension cuts: the Executive
demanded that all supporters of the plan be declared outside the
Labor movement and therefore ineligible for any kind of support
59from the trade unions. In financial terms, the unions were
merely being asked to make a virtue of necessity for by mid-1931
all but a few unions were in financial trouble and were therefore
unlikely, irrespective of the government's attitudes, to be
60generous to the Labor Party. Indeed, by mid-1931 the trade
unions generally were in difficulty: membership had declined
59
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This was reflected in the accounts of Labor's richest union 
supporter: The affiliation fees paid by the A..W.U. in S.A. to 
the A.L.P. from 1928 to 1933 were:
1928 • £ 547
1929 £ 528
1930 £424
1931 £ 376
1932 £ 219
1933 £ 25
(A.W.U.-Adelaide Branch, Annual Report, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 
1932, 1933).
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between 1929 and 1931 by approximately 16%, unemployment among
62trade unionists at the end of June 1931 was 27.6% and still
rising, the unions had been unable to prevent wage cuts or
preserve conditions and officials complained that hardship had
produced apathy rather than defiance among their members - 'in
periods of depression members are under the impression that one of
63the first avenues to economies is in union dues'. Thus, at
the time of the Premiers' Plan, many trade unions drew back from 
political activity to turn inward and concentrate on survival.
Some unions which might have attempted to influence the Government 
in 1931, or earlier, were now virtually extinct - the timber 
workers and several building trades unions - while others, such as 
the waterside workers and coalminers, were lobbying the government 
on matters remote from the plan, yet vital to the interests of the 
unions. And several of the smaller unions were reluctant to 
criticise the government for fear that they might contribute to its 
defeat, and hence to the elimination of the protection they 
enjoyed under the Scullin tariff.
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There was still some militancy (apart from that of the
Communists, who in 1931 were still an insignificant force in
union affairs). The Labor Council in Queensland urged its members
to start a special campaign against all employers and others who
64supported the plan, presumably by some form of boycott. One of
the very few specific proposals for action came from the Tramways
Union in W.A., which suggested a programme of stop-work meetings,
boycotts of the capitalist press, a 'pay-no-rent' campaign, and
that all trade unionists pay liabilities such as water, sewerage,
65electricity and gas at their value, less 20%. A more realistic
attitude was shown by a group of nine unions which refused to
consider a mild proposal to hold stop-work meetings, most of them
saying that 'no matter what action was taken the Government would
66carry out the proposals'. At the Federal level there was indeed
very little that the unions could do except pass pious resolutions 
of dissent - and many did not even bother to make that gesture, 
troubled as they were with internal difficulties, disillusioned 
with a Federal government which seemed insulated and distant from 
their influence, and more concerned with State affairs (with the
64
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principal and striking exception of the A.W.A.)* Direct action 
was unthinkable in the circumstances, and it had already been 
rejected at the A.C.T.U. conference of February 1931 which had 
considered the 10% cut in the basic wage - an issue which had 
affected most unionists much more directly than cuts in public 
service salaries and pensions. As the statement issued by 
the A.L.P. Federal Executive on 19 June had recognised, there was 
a widespread feeling among unionists, or, at least, union 
officials, that 'their' government was by definition likely to 
remain more sympathetic than any possible alternative - that
'the worst Labor Government is better than the best anti-Labor
^ , 67Government .
67
A.W.U.-W.A., Annual Report... , 1931.
407
Chapter VIII
At the Federal level the Premiers' Plan created little 
difficulty for the Government in its relations with the Party 
and the Labor movement. In part this was due to circumstances.
By stressing the urgency of the matter the Government presented the 
movement with a fait accompli: the plan was signed on 10 June, 
approved by Caucus on 11 June, accepted by the Federal Executive 
on 19 June and pushed quickly through Parliament. The Labor 
movement had little time to organise resistance. The unions were 
in no condition to threaten or fight the Federal Government in 
1931. Their delayed, insipid reaction to the plan reflected their 
weakened state, the immaturity of the A.C.T.U. and the poorly 
federalised structure of Australian unionism.
At the State level the party was subject to more 
direct pressures. In the three States where the A.L.P. was in 
Opposition - Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania - the 
Premiers' Plan presented no great difficulties. There the various 
sections of the movement ^unions, branches, conferences, councils, 
executives and caucuses - suffered relatively few conflicts of 
loyalties for they could repudiate the plan and vote against it,
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knowing that their attitudes were in accord with sound 
Lahor principles and practical political tactics. This was 
made easier still by the Federal structure of the Commonwealth 
and the A.L.P., and the strong traditions of State autonomy in 
the State branches of the Party.
Tensions were obviously likely to be far more 
serious in the remaining States, where Labor governments were in 
office. In New South Wales, where the Lang Government's 
adherence to the plan was only nominal, these took the form of 
a clash between rival Labor parties, since all but a fragment 
of what had been the A.L.P. had left or been expelled from the 
party before the crisis over the plan occurred. In Victoria 
ana South Australia, however, Labor State governments 
endorsed and carried out the plan and they proved much more 
vulnerable than the Scullin Government to extra-parliamentary 
pressure.
It is not possible here to describe the course of 
events during 1931 and 1932 which culminated in the defeat of 
the Hogan and Hill governments and the departure of their 
leaders from the party; it must suffice to say that the 
State conferences and executives showed themselves quite willing
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to apply pressures and penalties to the State politicians 
which had no counterpart at the Federal level. One 
reason, though not the decisive one, for this difference was 
that the State party authorities had more time to make up 
their minds.
A Special Federal A.L.P. Conference was called in
an attempt to avert trouble in the States. The initiative
2came from the Queensland Central Executive, which suggested
that the Conference should consider 'the effect on A.L.P.
organisation of adoption by the Parliamentary Party of [the]
Premiers' Plan and [the] attitude of and possible
disintegration in [the] States as a result of the plan'.0
The South Australian Executive agreed and asked that the terms
of reference be 'to consider all problems arising out of the
adoption... of the Premiers' Plan, and its effects upon all
4Labor Party organisations generally'. But despite 'the 
1
The Victorian situation is dealt with at length in L.J. Louis, 
Trade Unions and the Depression A Study of Victoria,1930-1932, 
Canberra, 1968, passim. There is no adequate account of the 
struggle in South Australia; there is a brief outline in Don 
Hopgood, 'Lang Labor in South Australia', Labour History 
(No.17), pp.161-173.
2
A.L.P.-Q., Central Executive Minutes, 26 June 1931.
3
A.L.P.-S.A., Council Minutes, 9 July 1931.
4
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urgency and importance of holding the Conference at an early 
5date', the Conference did not meet until two months had 
passed. In the interim the extra-parliamentary organisations 
in Victoria and South Australia had already launched 
disciplinary action against the considerable number of state 
Labor politicians who supported the plan.
The Special Conference met in Melbourne on 27
6 7August. The debate was vigorous and sometimes heated.
Scullin and Theodore were both delegates and they defended the
Government with the arguments they had used so frequently during
the previous three months: much of the debate was in fact a
repetition of the now familiar arguments for and against the
plan. The major purpose of the Conference, however, was to
clarify the position of state Labor politicians and several
proposals designed to achieve this were discussed and voted upon
All attempts to adopt a rigid, 'disciplining' line were rejected
A motion from the S.A. delegation calling for expulsion of all
members who had supported the plan was defeated by 7 votes to 28
5
Ibid.
6
Australian Labor Party, Special Federal Conference, Melbourne, 
August 1931.
7
Age, 28, 29 August 1931.
Those in favour of this motion for what amounted to a 
party purge were a Victorian delegate, M.P. Considine - who 
had earlier resigned from the Victorian Central Executive in
Qprotest against the acceptance of the plan - and the six
$ u f p o n T C iSouth Australian delegates; among the latter were three 
of the Scullin Government, Yates, Makin and Kneebone. Another 
motion demanding the expulsion of all those who supported the 
plan in the future was defeated by 10 votes to 25. Two 
further attempts to institute penalties were also defeated, the 
first by 13 to 21 and the second by 14 to 21. Finally a lengthy 
motion sponsored by Forgary^Smith and Curtin was accepted by the 
Conference by 22 votes to 13. The motion read:
. In view of the position created in the ranks of 
Labor by the adoption by the Federal Labor Party of that 
part of the Premiers1 Plan to which the Labor Movement 
throughout Australia has declared its definite hostility, 
this Conference declares that the reduction of wages, 
pensions, and social services runs counter to Labor's 
platform, cannot be accepted as any part of Labor's policy, 
in that it  ^-
(a) Seeks to pivot National and Industrial recovery on 
the balancing of Government budgets, whereas budgets can 
only be balanced by the restoration of employment to the 
workless and the stimulation of industry;
(b) Exposes the workers to further reductions in wages, 
and pensioners, etc., to further reductions in pensions.
8
A.L.P.-Vic., Central Executive Minutes, 3 July 1931.
9
The five sections (a) to (e) may safely be attributed to 
Curtin.
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(c) Evades the essential nature of the crisis, 
which is monetary in character, and can only be 
met by a policy of monetary and banking reform;
(d) Emphasises the dominance of the financial 
control bv compelling Governments to adapt political 
and economic policy to the decrees and desires of 
the banking and credit monopolisers; and,
(e) Violates the substance of the ideals and 
principles for which the Labor Movement stands, and 
for the realisation of which it exists.
Conference therefore instructs the Federal and 
State Labor Parties that there shall be no further 
reductions in wages, and social services, and that 
any proposals in this respect must be resisted.
Conference reaffirms the policy agreed upon at the 
March Special Interstate Conference at Sydney, together 
with Labor's platform in general, as providing the 
only means whereby economic and social justice can be 
secured for the people of the Commonwealth, and the 
period of special crisis brought to a termination.
Conference recognizes that Labor's policy can only 
be given effect to by returning a majority of pledged 
Labor members to both Houses of the Commonwealth 
Parliament, as well as those of the States, and therefore 
emphasises the necessity of all Labor organisations 
working with a united front to secure such a majority 
and conference further instructs members of the A.L.P. 
to wholeheartedly concentrate on Labor's policy, with 
a view to securing the necessary mandate from the 
electors.
These decisions to be binding on all members of the 
Australian Labor Party.
.The Conference decision made no mention of penalties: 
indeed, the decision was so vague and so loosely worded that it is 
difficult to see what might have constituted a breach of its 
proposals. The conciliatory toneof the decision suggests that
A.L.P., Special Federal Conference, August 1931, p.7.
10
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the political wing of the Labor movement dominated the 
Conference. But it cannot be said that the decision 
represented a simple 'politicians" victory, for the twenty 
delegates who were also members of State parliaments 
(thirteen) and the Federal Parliament (seven) divided fairly 
evenly. It is significant, however, that of the twenty-two 
supporters of the final motion at least fourteen were staunch 
A.W.U. men. This influence was particularly strong in the 
Queensland, Western Australian and New South Wales delegations, 
while the only two Tasmanians to vote with the majority - 
j. McDonald and T. Jude - were also A.W.U. members. On the 
other hand, the opposition to the final motion contained no 
delegates with A.W.U. connections but several, such as Duggan 
of the A.C.T.U. and Cameron of the Melbourne Trades Hall,^ 
who had long been outspoken critics of the A.W.U. and the 
Scullin Government.
The moderate line adopted by the Conference majority 
was an attempt to eliminate disunity in the movement by, in 
effect, drawing a line after the Premiers' Plan and beginning 
again. At the Federal level this was successful, though it
IT
Among others prominent in the Opposition were E.R. Dawes, 
M.H.A., an official of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
and, in 1930 and 1931, President of the Trades and Labor 
Council in S.A., and A.S. Drakeford, M.L.A.(Vic.), Federal 
President of the A.F.U.L.E.
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was as much a peace from exhaustion as a result of appeals 
for unity. But as an attempt to avert or smooth over 
divisions in Victoria and South Australia the Conference was 
a failure, for the A.L.P. in both States refused to sheath the 
sword of retribution.
Before long the struggles in South Australia were 
again before the Federal A.L.P. authorities.
The Federal Executive met in Melbourne on 18, 19
and 20 November. The principal business was an appeal against
expulsion brought by twenty-two Labor members of the S.A.
Parliament and the S.A. Senators Daly and O'Halloran. The
State Council of the A.L.P. in S.A. protested strongly against
the appeals being heard, first because the members had been
expelled for defying an instruction of the Council (on the
Premiers' Plan) and, secondly, because they had not first
appealed to the State Conference; the S.A. representatives on
the Federal Executive (Yates,M.H.R. and E.R. Dawes, M.H.A.) were
instructed to dispute the right of the Federal Executive to hear 
12the appeals. The State members were instructed by the
Federal Executive to appeal first to the State Executive and if
A.L.P.-S.A., Council Minutes, 12 November 1931.
12
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necessary - and it was certain that it would be - any further
appeal would be heard by the next meeting of the Federal
Executive, to be held in early 1932. (Only two members did
appeal: their appeals were upheld by the Federal Executive, on 
1327 June 1932 .) Daly and O'Halloran had already made
unsuccessful appeals to the State Conference and, therefore, it
was constitutionally in order for the Federal Executive to
consider their case. The Executive annulled their expulsion,
14by 7 votes to 4.
As instructed by the August Special Federal Conference,
the Federal Executive consulted with representatives of the
Ministry (Scullin, Brennan, Green and Chifley) on 'matters
connected with the policy of the party and the methods to be
15adopted in conducting the elections'. The elections were
then expected to be in May 1932. Scullin was reported to have made 
an optimistic speech about the restoration of economic stability 
- which 'might be expected shortly' - and the party's election 
p r o s p e c t s . I t  was not reported whether the Executive or the
13
Op-cit-,14 July 1932.
14
Age, 20 November 1931.
15
Ibid.
16
Argus, 20 November 1931.
Ministers discussed the possible implications of the 
threatening attitude being adopted, in mid-November, by the
Beasley group in their preparations for what was described
17 ISas a 'sham fight' over a 'relatively venial offence'.
Like the Federal Conference and Federal Executive, 
the meetings of Caucus were quiet, concerned mainly with 
tidying-up and consolidation. Caucus in the last quarter 
of 1931 presented a vivid contrast with the vitality it 
had displayed just twelve months before, when caucus debates 
on Labor policy had been a centre of national interest. There 
was during this later period one faint echo of the great 
policy fights of 1930 - and this served only to further 
demonstrate the exhaustion and demoralization of the F.P.L.P.
The March 1931 Special Federal Conference had made
the Fiduciary Notes measure a part of Labor policy. This
had been reaffirmed by the August 1931 Special Federal
Conference. It was a proposal which enjoyed widespread
19support throughout the Labor movement. On 23 September 
Holloway and Makin reintroduced the matter in Caucus, asking
17
Advertiser, 24 November 1931.
18
Argus, 23 November 1931.
19
See, for example ;Melbourne Trades Hall Council,
Minutes, 27 August, 5 November 1931; Australian Worker,
9 September, 7 October 1931.
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for another Fiduciary Notes Issue Bill which, when rejected
by the Senate, should be used as an issue on which to resign
and go to the country, on the dual platform of banking
20reform and credit expansion. This proposal was rejected
by Scullin - who had assured the Federal Executive in June
that the Fiduciary scheme was still a part of Labor's policy -
and by Theodore - the originator of the scheme - on the
grounds that it would be unwise to make changes in financial
21policy while the position in Britain was uncertain, and
because 'precipitate action ... might endanger the financial
stability of the Commonwealth' . As Curtain had predicted in
early August there was little likelihood of the Fiduciary
23scheme finding favour with Caucus, for the majority 'believed
24in waiting to see what would happen': Theodore was reputed
20
Caucus, Minutes, 23 September 1931.
21
The British Labou r Government had been relegated to the 
Opposition benches at the end of August 1931, when the Prime 
Minister (Ramsay MacDonald) formed a National Government.
Britain went off the Gold Standard on 21 September. The 
Labour Party suffered a heavy defeat at the General Election 
on 27 October 1931.
22
Australian Worker, 30 September 1931.
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24
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to have urged Caucus on 23 September that the party policy
25be one of 'wait and see'. The Holloway-Makin proposal
was debated again at the next Caucus meeting (24 September),
when a motion to adjourn the debate for two weeks was
2 6carried by 21 votes to 10." When the matter was revived
on 8 October Caucus decided to defer further consideration
27until some future time.
Although the Fiduciary Notes proposal was later 
to become one of the legends of the Labor movement, its 
feeble eclipse in late 1931 excited very little comment. The 
trade unions cared little, if at all, about the large policy 
issues of the Labor Government. There was, however, in late 
1931 the beginnings of interest in fundamental principles, 
displayed through interest in articles, books, lectures and 
classes (and the establishment of small libraries) on the 
O.B.U., socialism, communism, monetary and fiscal theory and, 
especially, in the nostrun of Douglas Credit.
The Labor Party had very little to offer to those 
who sought to understand the turmoil of the previous two years.
25
Age, 24 September 1931.
26
Caucus, Minutes, 24 September 1931.
Ibid., 8 October 1931.
27
The A.L.P. has probably never been so devoid of 
practical policies, so bankrupt in idealism or so lacking 
a sense of its own faith and cause as it was in the few 
months between the launching of the Premiers' Plan and the 
defeat of the Government on 25 November. Nevertheless, the 
Government was still of immediate use to sections of the 
industrial wing of the movement.
The A.C.T.U. continued to press the Government
to establish a Royal Commission to investigate the methods
of determining the basic wage. The unions hoped to use the
evidence and Report of the investigation in their application
for the restoration of the 10% basic wage cut of January 1931
At first the Government was not inclined to undertake such 
29an enquiry, but it soon softened to the point where it was
30'engaged on an enquiry on this subject'; however, the 
Government was defeated before the matter was decided.
28
A.F.U-L.E., Federal Executive Minutes, 4 November 1931, p.4
29
Scullin in reply to a question from R.V. Keane, C.P,D. , 
Vol.132, 1 October, pp.373-4.
30
Daly, in reply to a question from Kneebone, C,P.D., Vol.132 
(28 October), p.1279.
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Some unions continued their demand for
further industrial legislation. Nothing more had been
heard of the second Conciliation and Arbitration Bill of 
31December 1930. In April 1931 the A.C.T.U. Arbitration
Committee interviewed Brennan and
.... it was put very forcibly to him...that the 
Government should put a Bill forward that would 
have the backing of the industrial movement, even 
if it was known that the Senate would throw it out... 
the movement was expecting them to do something... 
unless the Government done something [ sic] 
they could not expect the support of the industrial 
movement at an election.32
After further discussion with the Ministry and Caucus and
33more conferences with the A.C.T.U. and the A.W.U., Brennan
introduced the Government's third Conciliation and Arbitration
34Bill on 29 May 1931. After passing through the Representatives-
35where it passed the Second Reading by 31 votes to 17 - it was
36defeated in the Senate on 24 July. In August the
31
C .P ,D. , Vol.127 (10 December), p.1233.
32
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33
Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union, Federal Office, 
General Correspondence, Brennan to Carter (Fed.Sec. of the 
Union), 25 May 1931.
34
C.P-D./ Vol.129, p .2425.
35
C.P-D-/ Vol.131, p.4175. Among those voting for the Bill were 
Fenton, Gabb and McGrath, while James, Lazzarini and Ward 
voted against it.
Ministry accepted A.C.T.U. proposals for a fourth
Arbitration Bill. Nothing more was heard of this; it
was undoubtedly meant to be a measure based on the full 
A.C.T.U. proposals of February 1930 and intended for use 
during the lead up to the projected Federal Election in 
1932.
The Government was successful in two matters
affecting Commonwealth employees. First, it allowed the
downward basic wage adjustment for the quarter July-September
1931 to be absorbed in the salary reduction of the Premiers'
Plan; this, Chifley explained, was 'for certain reasons' a.
38decision which would not be made public. Secondly, the
Government stipulated that all organisations submitting
tenders for Government contracts must indicate whether they
39employed union labor; this was of course a veiled attempt
36
Ibid., p.4404.
37
A.F.U.T.-E., Report of the Tenth Federal Conference, pp.2, 23.
38
A.F.U.L.E., Federal Secretary's Personal Correspondence,
J.M. Galvin (Fed.Sec.) to H.C. Barnard (Tas.), 23 September 
1931; Galvin to A.S. Drakeford, M.L.A. (Vic.), 16 September 
1931.
39
C.P.D. Vol. 132 (24 September 1931), p.271.
to encourage preference for unionists. Both matters -the 
quarterly adjustment and union preference - were not issues 
of national importance, but they were of significance to 
the unions concerned. Both were implemented quietly, even 
with a degree of secrecy, and it is safe to assume that these 
were not the only small matters in which the Government 
tried to assist the unions.
The Government continued to do battle with the 
Senate over regulations concerning licences for waterside 
workers. The W.W.F. followed the battle with close attention; 
it recognized the instability of the Government, the
40probability of a Federal Election before the end of 1931,
and the likelihood of a Labor defeat and was therefore more
than ever anxious to have the Transport Workers' Act repealed.
The Government would not do this but instead continued
issuing regulations, which the Senate disallowed as quickly
as possible. The Senate disallowed on 12 November - and
41the Government regazetted on 14 November. On the day
following the Government's defeat in the Representatives, the
40 - "
W.W.F., Minutes of Half Yearly Federal Committee of 
Management, 5 November 1931; see kiso 10,"L2 November 1931.
41
C,P.D./ Vol. 132 (12 November), p.1607; Age, 15 November
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Senate again disallowed. The Government had the last
43sav when it again regazetted the regulations, thus 
ensuring protection for the W.W.F. for a further six weeks.
One of the first actions of the Lyons Government in 1932 
was to cancel the regulations.
There was very little trade union militancy in 
the latter part of 1931. The number of industrial disputes
in 1931 and the number of working days lost were the lowest
44since 1913, when the statistics were first collected. There 
was one dispute, however, in which the Government became 
involved. In October,a shipping dispute began in Sydney and 
quickly spread to Melbourne, Adelaide and Fremantle. The
conflict was settled within three weeks by a compulsory
45conference under the Concilation and Arbitration Act. The 
Conference was held as a result of representations made by 
Scullin, who also approached the ship-owners with a request, 
to which they acceded, that volunteer labor not be employed
42
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until the conference had met.* As in the coal lock-out
of 1929-30 the Government dismissed any suggestions that
it should use the Army in an industrial dispute, and
Scullin said that he was thankful that the Constitution
provided - in its 'greatest safeguard' - that the Commonwealth
could only intervene at the request of and in co-operation 
47with the States; he held that'Constitutional methods are the
only sound and effective means of dealing with industrial 
48questions'. Another indication of Scullin's attitude
to industrial disputes was given in the House of 
Representatives when he attacked the unions involved in the 
dispute, labelling their grievances as trivial and their 
actions as irresponsible - while at the same time admitting 
that his only sources of information on the matter were 
reports in the daily newspapers, a source of information which
4he had many times previously dismissed as biased and unreliable. 
On this occasion his willingness to chastise the unions on 
such doubtful evidence was no doubt conditioned by allegations
46
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47
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that the dispute was communist inspired and directed, and
the Labor Party was, as it had been in the past and was to
remain in the future, anxious to dissociate itself from any
cause supported by the Communists. This was particularly
so in late 1931, when the Opposition in Parliament was
50making much of the threat of Communism.
Parliament resumed on 16 September, after an 
adjournment of six weeks. It continued to sit until 24 
October, when the House of Representatives' (but not the 
Senate) adjourned until 25 November. There was little to 
arouse interest in the dozen or so Bills introduced by the 
Government, most of which were of a miner nature. The three 
measures brought in to amend the Premiers' Plan legislation - 
principally to force conversion on the 3% of bondholders who 
had refused to convert voluntarily - failed to rekindle the 
interest which had attended the original legislation. There
50
See, for example, the debate on the Opposition's formal 
adjournment motion in the Senate on the question of 'The 
activities of the Communist Party in Australia', (C.P.D., 
Vol.132, 19 November 1931, pp.1756-1789). Davidson provides 
the following figures for Communist Party membership in 
this period: December 1928 - 249; April 1931 - 1,116;
December 1934 - 2,824, (Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party 
of Australia: A Short History, California, 1969, p.81, p.61.)
was some spirit in the debates on the tariff, though not
in the Representatives where the Opposition refused to
debate the items, after announcing that it would rely on
its strength in the Senate to check the Government's tariff
excesses. There was little heat or interest in the
proceedings of Parliament; the Government had exhausted its
own policy initiatives; it spoke of its intention of
51establishing a national broadcasting commission, and
frequent mention was made of the coming re-introduction of the
52three Constitutional Brils of 1930. But both were projects
for 1932 and a part of the Government's election strategy,
for although Scullin made it quite clear that the Government
53would resign if it were defeated in the House, it was plain 
that the Government expected to retain office until May 1932. 
This, however, depended on the attitude of the Beasley group.
While Parliament was in session the Beasley group 
made occasional threatening noises: Beasley, for example, on 
2l October, replied to an interjector who asked why the 
group did not eject the Scullin government with the retort
51
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52
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that members would need all their courage 'before many
54months had passed'. Yet many months had passed since
March, when the group had adopted its balance of power
position, and the group had only once voted solidly against
the Government, but then, on the Premiers' Plan, the
legislation had been supported by the Opposition, thus
nullifying the group's power. Since then there had been no
issue which was of sufficient importance to justify the
group voting the Government out, given that the group
wished to maximise its own advantage for the subsequent
election. Ideally, the group required not a routine piece
of legislation, but an issue of its own devising, preferably
concentrated in N.S.W., where it had its greatest support,
at a time when its own fortunes were, if not in the ascendent,
at least not at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the fortunes of the
Scullin Government. on these criteria the last quarter
of 1931 appeared to show two trends which the Beasley group
had to look at when considering its future. One was the
economic situation, which in September-October 1931 began to 
55improve slightly. This proved to be a false dawn,
54
Ibid. (21 October), p.999.
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1970, Chapter XI, passim.
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but it was sufficient at the time to encourage the Government
56to hope that the long-awaited up-turn had begun. Although
the Labor party's election prospects were dismal, an economic 
revival which had been underway for six months must have 
enhanced its chances at an election held in May 1932, while 
possibly decreasing those of the Beasley group. A second 
consideration was the future of 'Langism' over the same six 
month period. Any economic revival would erode support for
'Langism', which depended in part on its resistance to and 
denunciation of the economic collapse and the agents of 
capital and compromise. Should the depression start to lift 
Lang's appeal would diminish correspondingly. Moreover, in 
N.S.W. the Lang Government was itself exhausting its options: 
the Lang plan was dead, and the Lang administration was rapidly 
approaching the day of reckoning when it would have to acknowledge 
that it was bankrupt financially; as bankrupt as it was of ideas 
to combat a phenomenon which was not exclusive to N.S.W. or 
Australia but international. By October-November 1931 it was 
doubtful whether the N.S.W. Government could sustain for 
another six months the notion of Lang as the great champion of 
the people. In these circumstances a bid for increased influence
56
For an extremely optimistic speech by Scullin see, S.M.H.,
9 November 1931.
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at the Federal level in late 1931 was opportune. There
were many reports that Lang himself intended to contest the
Federal seat of Reid at the next election or, failing that,
that the selected Lang candidate - Gander, would resign in
57favour of Lang within four months. In retrospect the
chances of the Beasley group making significant gains in a 
Federal Election in late 1931 seem, remote - though it must 
be remembered that at the Federal Elections of September 
1934 the group increased its strength in the House of 
Representatives to nine.58 There was also in 1931 the 
possibility that if the A.L.P. lost seats, as seemed certain, 
a rump Federal Labor Party might split again and such members 
for industrial seats, opponents of the Premiers' Plan and 
known Lang sympathisers as Holloway, Yates and Makin be 
induced to support an augmented Beasley group. That such a
57
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(Sydney, 1970, p.143), Lang says that despite Gander's 
protests that he was only a 'seat warmer' for Lang, he (Lang) 
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possibility was considered by the Beasley group was
indicated by the attempts of Garden and others to dissuade
the Lang party in S.A. from nominating candidates for the
59seats held by Makin and Yates. At the back of such
planning was the extensive campaign conducted in N.S.W.,
Qld. , Vic. and S.A. by members of the Beasley group and
the Lang government, a campaign encouraged by the success
of a Lang candidate in a State by-election in S'A. in July,
and the result of another S.A. by-election in October when
the Lang candidate secured more votes than the A.L.P.
60candidate. Thus in October-November 1931 there were many
possible reasons why the Beasley group should consider 
ousting the Scullin Government. And threaded through such 
reasons was the faction struggle in N.S.W. between the rival 
Labor parties. Despite the establishment of the VJorld 
newspaper on 26 October - a journal in the control of the 
A.W.U. and therefore a supporter of the Federally loyal N.S.W. 
branch61 - the 'official' A.L.P. in N.S.W. was very weak.62
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A chance to deliver the coup de grace would appeal to the
Lang organisation, as would the opportunity to crush Theodore:
indeed, some saw events solely in this light; at an important
union conference on 26 November - the day after the
Government's defeat - 'the general view was ... that it
was due to no higher motive than the desire to further certain
63factional interests in the political Labor movement', or, 
as it was put elsewhere, it was just'a question of rival 
aspirants for power and influence'.^
The Beasley group needed a suitable pretext on which 
it could with a show of justice join the Opposition and bring the 
Government down. At the end of October a suitable issue was 
discovered.
At the end of 1929 and 1930 the Government provided
money for Christmas relief work for the unemployed. On 23
October 1931 Scullin announced that £250,000 would be
65allocated for such relief. On 29 and 30 October a Bill
62
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to appropriate the money passed through both Houses.
The money was to be allocated between the States on a 
population basis, with N.S.W. having the largest share at 
£88,000, the money to be spent on renovation and maintenance 
of Commonwealth property. It was estimated that work would 
be provided for between 12,000 and 14,000 men, at award rates, 
for not more than four or less than two weeks. With over 
300,000 men unemployed these jobs were bound to provoke a 
scramble for selection, and there was some discussion in debate 
on eligibility and methods of engagement. In reply to a 
question from Ward, Theodore stated that evidence of
66unemployment would be the only qualification necessary. Both 
Ward and Dunn pressed for the jobs to be allocated through the 
State Labor Exchanges, no doubt with an eye to the exercise of 
patronage. The Government decided to leave the distribution 
of the work in the hands of the relevant Commonwealth Departments.
On 11 November the Sydney Morning Herald reported 
that Howe, M.H.R. for the N.S.W. electorate of Parramatta - 
in an address to a meeting of unemployed in his electorate - 
had collected a list of names of those seeking work, and 
promised that they would get preference when the jobs created 
66
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by the relief grant were being allocated. Little more was 
heard of this allegation. On the following day in the 
Senate however, Dunn asked 'as a matter of extreme urgency' a 
series of questions: was it true that £5,000 of relief money 
was to be spent at the Cockatoo Island Dockyard and that 
'paid political organisers' of the Federal A.L.P. were 
collecting lists of names of those seeking employment at
0  —j
the dockyard? Further questions implied very strongly
that the canvassing was being done on Theodore's behalf, in
the Adjournment Motion on the same day (12 November) Dunn
returned to the attack, now explicitly accusing Theodore of
using his influence to have the £ 5,000 spread among his own
supporters, in what Dunn described as 'one of the greatest
63political scandals in the history of Federation'. Senator
69Rae spoke of the need to hold an enquiry into the allegations, 
and on returning to the matter next day (13 November) Dunn 
four times challenged the Government to appoint either a
70Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry or a Royal Commission. The
67
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attack and the challenge were renewed again in the Senate
on 17 and 19 November but by the 19 November Beasley had
sent written notice to the Speaker of his intention to raise
the issue when the House of Representatives reconvened on
25 November, and the Senate critics held back on detailed
accusations; but they promised the people of Australia that
something would be done, that the Government would be
challenged to a showdown, and that Mr. Theodore would be
71forced to face the music.
Cockatoo Island Dockyard drew most of its
employees from the electorates of Martin, Dailey, West Sydney,
72East Sydney, North Sydney and Parkes. Throughout the
Government's term of office the dockyard was a subject of
debate and questions: within a few days of the meeting of
Parliament in November 1929 the first of these questions revealed
73that William Mahoney, the ex-M.H.R. for Dailey, had been
74given casual employment in the dockyard. In 1931 members of the
71
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Beasley group continued to display a special interest in
the dockyard's affairs, and its members were annoyed that
the Government took exclusive credit for the activity at the
yard 7^ Senator Dunn, an ex-employee of the dockyard, was
a particularly persistent questioner. According to one source
it was Dunn who informed the Opposition, about a week before
25 November, that the group intended to vote against the
Government, which would therefore be defeated if the Opposition
7 5mustered its full strength on 25 November.
The Opposition, according to Lyons, was doubtful
that the Beasley group would press the matter to a division,
77but it nevertheless summoned all its members to Canberra:
, 7 3
Lyons sent telegrams to all U.A.P. members; after receiving
the message that 'it was imperative for him to attend', Fenton
commented on 21 November that 'he was rushing back to
Canberra in the hope that he would be able to cast a vote that
79would bring about the defeat of the Scullin Ministry'.
75
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The Beasley group decided on Wednesday 18
80November to move their adjournment motion. Beasley
departed from the usual practice by sending the notice of
motion to the Sneaker (Makin) by registered post. He later
enquired of the Assistant Clerk of the House whether the notice
had been received, and later again sought further assurances
81by telephone from Makin. On 23 November the Beasley group
82Caucus met in Sydney, and that evening Beasley attended a 
meeting of Lang's Inner Group. Lang tells the following 
story of the meeting:
When the Inner Group met on Monday, Beasley made 
no mention of his adjournment motion, or the 
possibility that Lyons and the Opposition might 
decide to support him, thereby creating a crisis and 
the defeat of the Government. As Beasley was leaving 
..., Harold McCauley called him back and said:
'Jack, do you know what you intend doing with that 
motion? Have you considered the fact that Scullin 
and Theodore are in serious financial trouble and may 
be looking for a way out and you may be faced with an 
election?'
Beasley laughed and replied:'Don't worry; they wouldn't 
be game to take such a risk'. So Beasley returned 
to Canberra still not realising that the gun he was 
carrying was loaded with live ammunition. 83
80
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J.T. Lang, The Turbulent Years, Sydney, 1970, p.141. Whatever 
else may be said of this account - and in all important respects
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Lang denies that, at this or any other time, he attempted
to give the Beasley group 'any instructions about the policy
84they should pursue in relation to the Scullrn Government'.
85This seems highly improbable. It is likely that at least
on this matter, which might involve the fate of the
Government, Lang and the Inner Group made their wishes known,
as they had before in a similar situation: Ward's biographer
records that on an Opposition no-confidence motion in March
1931 the Beasley group supported the Government after
'receiving instructions from A.L.P. headquarters [the Inner
Group?] to vote with the Scullin Government and save it from 
86defeat'.
The matter had first been raised in the Senate on 
12 November. Subsequent discussion in the Senate had made 
it clear that the Beasley group intended to press the issue and 
challenge the Government. It must be emphasised that this 
attack was in its persistence, intensity and promised threat
it seems most suspect - it is certainly incorrect that 
Scullin was, or 'may' have been, ’looking for a way out’; the 
evidence is incontrovertible that the Government had definitely 
decided for an election in May 1932.
84
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quite unlike any posture previously adopted by the Beasley
group in 1931. Yet Ministers were reported to be unconcerned
and Scullin and Theodore told Caucus on 25 November - the first
Caucus meeting for over a month - that there was nothing to 
87worry about; consequently Caucus decided to leave the
handling of Beasley's motion in Scullin's hands. Scullin,
however, had told reporters when leaving Melbourne on 24
November that he thought that the Beasley group was serious in
its challenge and would, if it received Opposition support,
88press the issue to the full. And if he read the newspapers
Scullin knew that the Opposition intended to support Beasley.
Thus there is a contradiction between Scullin's assessment 
of the Beasley challenge outside Caucus on the 24 November 
and inside Caucus on 25 November. One possible explanation lies 
in Theodore's standing in Caucus. This is best seen by considering 
what might have happened if Scullin had placed the matter before 
Caucus for decision on 25 November in this form; given that it 
is most likely that the Beasley group will have Opposition 
support and that there is a strong possibility that the group 
will insist on an enquiry into Theodore's activities, should
87
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the Government accede to this request, or should it allow 
itself to be defeated and thereby forced from office ? There 
were thirty-six M.H.R.s and six Senators in the
F.P.L.P. Two M.H.R.'s (McNeill and Mathews) were absent 
leaving a Caucus of forty members. It is likely that had 
a vote been taken on what was virtually a question of 
Theodore or resignation there would have been a majority for 
allowing the enquiry to be held. There was a considerable 
body of opposition to Theodore in Caucus, which had grown 
since January 1931 when he had been reinstated as Treasurer 
by 24 votes to 19. Opposition to refusing the enquiry could 
be expected from the group of ten to fifteen economic 
radicals, most of whom had supported Theodore but now labelled 
him an opportunist. These opponents were mostly members for 
urban seats. Had they been joined by ten or twelve
members for rural seats, Caucus would have decided for the 
enquiry. And such support was likely from men who held rural 
seats, which Labor had been lucky to win in 1929, was most 
unlikely to win in 1931 but which, might, given the 'economic upturn' 
and the accompanying rise in wheat and wool prices, be held 
for Labor in May 1932. This is speculation, for Caucus on 
25 November accepted the Ministry's assurances and Labor members 
left the Caucus room and entered the House in a mood described
44n
89as 'almost lighthearted'.
Debate on Beasley's motion lasted less than two 
90hours. Eleven members spoke: three members of the Beasley
group (Beasley, Ward and James) , four Government members
(Theodore, Gibbons, Scullin sind Chifley) and four members of
the Opposition (Thompson, Lyons, Page and Latham). The
Beasley group elaborated the charges made previously in the
Senate, supporting them with Statutory Declarations from men
who had been approached by Theodore's supporters in Dailey and
East Sydney, and, in the words of one such declaration,
'promised on his account relief work at Cockatoo in lieu of my
91support at the forthcoming elections'. It was not said that
Theodore personally had been involved in such canvassing, neither 
was it said that officers in the Commonwealth Public Service 
had actually given preference in employment to 'Theodore's men': 
although it was implied that this had only been prevented by 
Senator Dunn's revelations earlier in the month; and it was 
stated, by Beasley, that Theodore had instructed the manager 
of the dockyard to reserve employment for over one hundred 
men on a list v/hich Theodore had given him. In reply Theodore
89
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denied everything, giving particular stress to his statement
that if anybody had been compiling lists in his name they
had done so without his authority. He admitted that he
had personally received two or three hundred applications
for relief work, some of them in lists, but said that he had
sent the names to the appropriate authorities just as other
members had done - including Beasley, Ward and Lazzarini.
This opened a related issue, for the Beasley group and members
of the Opposition claimed that Government members had been
given early notice of the size, distribution and methods of
allocation of the relief work grant which had enabled them
to compile lists of applicants before non-Government members:
Ward said 'It is perfectly true.... that we [the Beasley
group] supplied lists of men; but what we complain of is that
the supporters of the Government had previous knowledge, and
92were able to supply their lists a week before we did', while
Eldridge, in an interjection, cried that 'our chief complaint
is that it is very unfair that supporters of the Government
93should have been able to furnish advance lists secretly'.
Thus there were three charges made by the Beasley group:
92
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first, the Government had favoured its own members; 
second, that at least one member of the Government 
(Theodore), and possibly another (Rowe), had used this prior 
notice to advance themselves politically in their electorates; 
third, that Theodore had improperly instructed a public 
servant to give preference to certain men. The charges were 
denied by the four Government spokesmen, though their denials 
were no more than bald assertions, for they produced little 
evidence. Scullin read the letter which had conveyed the 
Government's instructions to the dockyard management. Then 
the following exchange took place:
Mr. Scullin. ...I will not agree to the setting up of 
any royal commission or special committee 
of enquiry.
Mr. James. - Then we will have an election.
Mr. Scullin. Let us have it, if honourable members want 
to go on with, the motion -
94
Of this the President of the Printing Industry 
Employees' Union of Australia said, '... we do not think 
there was anything unusual in the procedure, as we believe 
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of every Government in the history of Australian politics.'
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Mr. James. - We are going on with it.
Mr.Scullin. If honourable members wish to take the
business of the House out of the hands 
of the Government, they can have an 
election. But I suggest that they have 
chosen a poor issue ...... 95
From that point onward it was apparent that the Government
was doomed. Sculiin went on to deny the allegations.
He concluded, 'I am not prepared to allow the Government to
be subjected to this humiliation that would be associated
with the appointment of a royal commission or a special
commission to inquire into any unsubstantiated accusation made
96against a Minister'.
A few minutes before the debate was to end 
Eldridge moved that the question be put. That being decided
95
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provides a slightly different report of the exchange:
James: Then we will have an election.
Sculiin: If the Opposition wants to go on and take control
out of the Government it can do so, but the 
present will be an empty issue.
White: You are sorry you said that.
Sculiin: I am repeating what I have already said that when
we lose control of this Parliament we will not 
attempt to carry on.
White: We will keep you up to that.
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in the affirmative, the House divided on Beasley's motion.
The Scullin Government was defeated in both divisions by 
9737 votes to 32.
Eleven of the Labor members of October 1929 voted 
to bring down the Government of which they had so recently 
been aLmmik members. Their action, however, had been 
predictable. What was less immediately understandable was 
Scullin's decision - and it appears that it was his alone - 
to refuse a committee of enquiry. It is unlikely that 
Scullin believed that a vote would be resolved in favour 
of the Government, either through a loss of nerve on the part 
of the Beasley group or by a split vote in the Opposition.
And Scullin's comment about the possible 'humiliation' of the 
Government reads strangely when the record of the Government 
over the previous twenty-five months is considered. It is 
possible that the charges against Theodore were true, but 
it is unlikely that Scullin believed this, or that even if
97
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Makin (Speaker) had no vote on this matter.
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believing them to be true he refused an enquiry 
because of Theodore's possible guilt. A more reasonable 
explanation is that Scullin believed the charges to be 
baseless but took them as indicative of a change of attitude 
by the Beasley group - that the group intended to depose 
the Government, if not on this then on some other issue: 
the group had been 'independent' for more than eight months, 
but this was its first initiative against the Government.
The Federal Election was set for 19 December, 
leaving only three weeks for the election campaign; but what 
was lost in time was made up in intensity. The nine 
defectors from Labor's ranks felt the terrible venom reserved 
by the Labor movement for 'turncoats', 'twisters', 'hirelings', 
'deserters' and 'rats'. Lyons, in particular, was vilified.
In N.S.W. Theodore enjoyed the special - and virulent - 
attentions of Lang and his men. The campaign was in fact 
distinguished more for rowdiness and slanging matches
98
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than for statement, development and defence of policy.
Lyons' appeals may be summed up as follows: reject 
the Labor gang of irresponsibles ('Scullin at the tiller, 
Theodore at the till'), return to the tried and trusted 
('Tune in with Britain'), then look to restored prosperity 
and security under a stable Government which would restore the 
methods of 'good national housekeeping' and 'sound finance'.
Much of the Opposition's time was spent in vehement denunciation 
of the record of the Scullin Government. Labor devoted less 
time to its opponents, and concentrated instead on the need for 
financial reform, the strictures of the depression and the 
obstruction of the Senate; there was a distinctively defensive - 
at times even apologetic - note in much of Labor's campaign. 
Scullin made much of the Government's tariff policy; there was 
a need for banking reform, changes in Arbitration legislation 
and alterations to the Constitution; the country had been
saved because the national welfare had been put before political
. 100 interest.
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Judging from the extent of newspaper advertising,
Lahor had difficulty in raising campaign finance: in 1929
Labor advertising had been on a lavish scale; in 1931 it was
small in size and infrequent of appearance. Doubtless some
manufacturers and the like who wished to continue the
protection they enjoyed under the Scuilin tariff contributed
to A.L.P. funds. Unions contributed little: for examplej
the Boot Trades Union in Victoria, which in 1929 gave the
substantial sum of £450, decided not to contribute at all in 
1011931; and the Queensland Branch of the A.W.U., which had
given £2,415 in 1929 reduced its contribution to £355 in 
1021931. Assistance from trade union offices - organising,
canvassing and clerical work - which had been so plentiful, 
and volunteered so readily, in 1929, was on a greatly reduced 
scale in 1931. Yet this coldness on the part of the A.L.P.'s 
traditional supporters - arising mostly from necessity, but 
also partly from disenchantment - probably did not matter much, 
if at all, to the fortunes of the Labor Government in December 
1931.
1Ö1
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iuoThe election was a disaster for Labor. Only
fourteen of the sixty-one Labor candidates for the House of
Representatives were elected; where it had secured 48.84%
of the valid vote in 1929, it now won only 27.09%. Six of
the thirteen members of the Ministry were defeated (Theodore,
Brennan, Moloney, Chifley, McNeill and Cunningham). Two
future Labor Prime Ministers - Curtin and Chifley - lost their
seats. Theodore suffered what he acknowledged as an
'overwhelming' defeat in Dailey and was replaced by a Lang 
104candidate.
The debacle was at its greatest in N.S.W. The
A.L.P. won just three of the twenty-three seats it contested
(gaining 16.37% of the vote), while Lang Labor took four seats
105of the twenty-three it contested (with 24.87% of the vote).
Neither of the Labor parties in N.S.W. won a Senate seat; 
voting for the Senate in N.S.W. however, provides a stark 
indication of the depth of the Labor schism in N.S.W. - and 
the prospects for unity in the near future; of a valid vote 
of 1,233,897, Lang Labor won 379,870 (30.79%) and the A.L.P. 
only 186,674 (15.13%).
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The result was almost uniformly grim for the 
A.L.P. The only exception was Queensland, where Labor won 
five of the six House of Representatives seats it contested 
and made a clean sweep of the three Senate positions.
1931 was nevertheless the greatest defeat Labor had ever 
experienced: Labor representation in the House of Representatives 
was now the same as it had been in the first Commonwealth 
Parliament. And the New Year opened on a party at the lowest 
ebb in its history.
In October 1929 Scullin left for Canberra amid 
scenes of wild enthusiasm. More than five thousand 
supporters gathered at the Melbourne Railway Station and heard 
Scullin speak of the hard struggles ahead; he asked that 'before 
you judge us you will have a little patience...[for] we have 
been left a task that no other Ministry has faced in the
106
The Qld. result must be the subject of a separate 
study. The following suggestions may be relevant: the 
non-Labor Government in Qld. - in office since May 1929 - 
had been particularly enthusiastic in pursuing orthodox 
policies of economy, etc; the A.L.P. in Qld. was stronger, 
better organised and more pliable than elsewhere; the election 
of December 1931 was the first opportunity offered Qld. 
voters to vote 'agin a Government' since 1929 (the State 
Government was non-Labor; seven of Qld.'s H.of R.. members, 
1929-1931 and all the Qld. Senators were non-Labor).
history of Australia'. As his train pulled into the
platform in Canberra a band struck up 'See the Conquering 
108Hero Comes'. In November and December 1931 there was no
enthusiasm, and the only music was a desultory chorus of
109'Solidarity Forever' from a dispirited Caucus. Looking
back on his experience, as Prime Minister Scullin, on the eve 
of the Government's resignation, said:
I cannot say that it was a happy two years... 
but it was intensely interesting, and there 
was always present the feeling that one was 
rendering some public service to the nation 
during its most difficult times. Had it been 
the will of the people I would have been glad 
to carry on. 110
Asked for a message for the party faithful, Scullin 
responded: 'Be of good cheer. The Party will come again'.
107
Argus, 21 October 1929.
108
Argus, 22 October 1929.
109
Age, 26 November 1931.
110
Age, 6 January 1932.
451
Conclusion
Any conclusions drawn from this study have certain 
limitations. The most obvious and important come from the 
circumstances of the time: it is difficult - if indeed it 
is possible - to separate those things in the record of 
the Government which were the result of the oppressions and 
restrictions of the depression from those in which it had a 
much greater degree of freedom of action. It follows that 
we must be cautious of applying conclusions reached in 
studying the Scullin Government to Federal Labor governments 
in general, or of implying that what was true of the Labor 
movement in our period is also true for other, less troubled 
times.
Another reservation stems from the scope of the enquiry 
and the source material used. In effect, this study has been 
confined to the period October 1929 - December 1931. It seems 
likely that it would have benefitted from concentrated examination 
of Federal and State Labor politics from, say, 1927 and after 
1931 to, say, 1936. And even for 1929-1931, a thoroughly 
researched understanding of the politics of the State Labor
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Governments in New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia would probably have added another and enlightening 
dimension to this study. Finally, like other work on the 
Australian Labor movement, this study perhaps suffers from 
the paucity of private records, in the form of letters, diaries 
and memoirs (and the consequent dearth of reputable biographies) , 
available to the researcher. It is little consolation that the 
scarcity of such material is itself an indication of one aspect 
of the nature of the Australian Labor movement. Inevitably 
this thesis has lost the richness and vitality which such 
material can impart: it is not possible to say whether the lack of 
such material has also distorted the argument which has been 
presented.
This study has been concerned primarily with three things: 
the Federal Parliamentary Party - the Leader, Ministry and 
Caucus - the Federal extra-parliamentary organisations - Federal 
Conference and Executive - and the trade unions. However, before 
drawing some conclusions about these organisations and the 
relations between them, we shall first examine briefly certain 
other related matters.
In general, the Federal Government was strikingly isolated 
and insulated from the State Branches. New South Wales is the
obvious and important exception. Elsewhere, the Branches were in
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the main content to let the Scullin Government go ahead 
without serious interference. Whether in Government or 
Opposition, Labor in the States at most times had its 
attention^ fixed hard on State matters. And where attempts 
were made to filter demands through to the federal ^artv it was 
most often the case that the demands were economic and State 
orientated; the State Branches wanted an unemployment insurance 
scheme, or Federal funds for public works.
New South Wales was a special case. It was special in so 
far as the friction between the Federal Party and the N.S.W.
Branch erupted and produced a split between the two. The 
tensions, however, were latent in the organisation of the 
Australian Labor Party; and were to some small degree evident 
in each State Branch during our period. It is suggested that 
they produced the split in N.S.W. for two reasons; first, 
because there was a longer history of discord between the Federal 
Party and the N.S.W. Branch: this had its origins in the economic, 
social and population distinctiveness of New South Wales and the 
consequent implications for representation in the Federal Caucus. 
Possibly, also, it was rooted in the Party's origins - in the 
fact that N.S.W. was the birthplace of the Labor Party and that 
the N.S.W. 'Branch' preceded the Federal Labor Party by several 
years; the Federal Executive, for example, was established in 
1915 and was therefore some twenty odd years junior to the N.S.W.
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Branch. Thus the Federal Party could be pictured as an 
upstart late-comer. In addition, the F.P.L.P. seemed isolated 
in remote Canberra, where it was out of contact with the 
ordinary Party member and less subject to the effective scrutiny, 
advice and discipline of the extra-parliamentary organisations 
of the Party.
However, such factors do not provide a sufficient 
explanation for the break-away of the N.S.W. Branch in 1931. To 
them must be added the elements of personal rivalry, conflicting 
ambitions and faction intrigues. It has not been within the 
scope of this enquiry to unravel the complicated power structure 
of the N.S.W. Branch in the late 1920s and early 1930s. But 
it is clear that Lang and the Lang machine used and deliberately 
accentuated, for personal ends, the underlying sentiment for 
State autonomy in N.S.W.
It is tempting to conclude that Lyons and those who 
crossed the floor with him simply should not have been in the 
Labor Party in the first place. But this is much too easy an 
explanation (if indeed it is an explanation). Like the split 
in N.S.W., personal characteristicst ambitions and disappointments, 
beliefs and sensitivities - even the ability to be 'touch' and 
withstand stress - must be accounted important; we shall perhaps, 
for example, never understand the importance of the relationship 
between Lyons and his wife in Lyons1 decision to leave the
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A.L.P. Yet Lyons and his fellow defectors point to a 
characteristic of the Labor Party which is a product of the 
society from which its Federal Members were drawn; the 
Party had to appeal to as many sections as possible in 
States which themselves were diverse geographically, economically 
and socially: thus, Lyons might be regarded as a 'good Labor 
man' in Tasmania and Eldridge or Lazzarini his opposite numbers 
in N.S.W.; but when together in Federal Caucus it was inevitable 
that the association should prove to be an uncomfortable one.
This point must not be over-stressed. In normal times it might 
have made only for animosity; in the crisis circumstances of 
1929-32 it could not but seriously accentuate discord.
Scullin has generally been judged a rather timid, weak 
and ineffective Labor leader. Probably Cabinet records, which 
were unavailable while this thesis was being prepared, may help 
us get a clearer picture: undoubtedly a proper assessment cannot 
begin until J.R. Robertson has completed his biography of Scullin. 
Tentatively, however, three things may be concluded from the 
present examination. First, it may be suggested that Scullin's 
ill-health has been regarded much too seriously; so far as it was 
important its significance must be confined to approximately 
December 1929 to August 1930; and apparently it was only in 
January and August 1930 that Scullin was seriously handicapped by 
his physical weakness. In passing, it may be noted that Scullin's 
physical stature and appearance appear to have had an unconscious
influence on the assessment made by many later commentators and
historians (and it seems, again, that much of this can be traced 
to the critical comments made by Denning in his book, Caucus 
Crisis). Secondly, much of the adverse comment on Scullin is 
made without sufficient regard to the circumstances of 1929-1932. 
Those doyens of Labor leaders Curtin and Chifley were spared the 
unprecedented, crushing and apparently insoluble problems of the 
economic depression: it is reasonable to speculate that neither 
Curtin or Chifley, nor any other member of the F.P.L.P. at the 
time, would have performed significantly better than Scullin as 
Labor Leader or Prime Minister. Thirdly, we have seen that 
Scullin made mistakes, such as the recommendation to reappoint 
Sir Robert Gibson (and the way in which the reappointment was 
secured) and, equally seriously, his determination to absent 
himself for several months to attend the 1930 Imperial Conference. 
Yet it is clear that while he was in Australia - and also, 
remarkably, sometimes while he was away - Scullin usually dominated 
his Ministry and exerted a commanding influence in Caucus. It is 
necessary to emphasise that Scullin was Leader of the Australian 
Labor Party; therefore, more so than in other Australian political 
parties, 'Scullin was only the first among equals.
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Except for the 'Caucus rebellion' in late 1930,
Scullin and the Ministry exercised control over Caucus in 
all significant matters. With a Caucus numbering more 
than fifty members, this was a considerable achievement.
Yet the size of Caucus was a limit on its effectiveness, 
vis-a-vis Scullin and the Ministry. And Caucus solidarity 
was weakened by the infrequency of its meetings - by comparison 
with the Ministry - for it was sometimes in recess for stretches 
of several months and frequently for several weeks, during which 
time a majority of its members often had little or no contact 
with each other. Then, too, the Ministry had an advantage 
additional to those rooted in group solidarity and heightened 
responsibility: a great many of the matters presented to Caucus 
were technical in character and most often drafted and prepared, 
presumably, by technical and expert staff in the various 
Commonwealth Departments. Even those in Caucus with a special 
interest in banking and finance were liable to be deterred by the 
complexities of, for instance, the Commonwealth Bank bills or 
the Fiduciary Notes Issues Bill, Criticism in Caucus based on 
'first principles' was therefore likely to seem dogmatic, carping, 
impractical or, against a defender like Theodore, ignorant. And it 
is plain that most of the Caucus were sufficiently ignorant of 
applied and theoretical economics to allow themselves to be 
guided by the responsible, informed and well-briefed members of
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the Ministry. This was not the case with industrial matters.
In this field a group in Caucus did exercise some influence on 
the Government's actions. Even so, they shared their influence 
with organisations in the Labor movement outside the parliamentary 
sphere.
One of the most important functions of Caucus was the 
election of the Ministry and other parliamentary and Party 
officials. Although it may seem paradoxical in light of its 
record of turmoil and defection, Caucus election was undoubtedly 
a factor making for some stability in the Government: although by 
no means making a majority, there were a significant number of 
Caucus members who were sufficiently ambitious for a position to 
dampen a little the criticism of Scullin and the Ministry.
Given that any Prime Minister, Labor or non-Labor, must 
observe the need to compromise and balance when constructing a 
Ministry, we may conclude that Scullin fared reasonably well with 
the Ministry elected for him by Caucus in 1929 and that its 
composition became even more agreeable to him with the changes of 
1931.
The Federal Conference met .three times in 1930-1931. The 
remarkable thing about the conferences is their almost complete 
irrelevance to the 'external' history of the Scullin Government.
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That of May 1930 performed three main functions: it laid down 
Party policy on constitutional reform, industrial law and 
unemployment policy. The last was ignored by the Government, 
which considered the Conference proposal impractical; the 
first was irrelevant as the Government had announced a few days 
earlier that constitutional reform was to be postponed until 
some indefinite future time; and reform of industrial law had 
already been dealt with by the A.W.U. and the A.C.T.U. in 
conferences with the Ministers and the Caucus Industrial Committee. 
In the same way, the Conference of March 1931 'established' a 
financial policy which in fact the Government was already 
defending in the House of Representatives. The Conference of 
August 1931 - to deal with the Premiers1 Plan - provides some 
indications of why the Federal conferences were apparently so 
irrelevant. It met many weeks after the event. Its small number 
of delegates, the high proportion of politicians among them and 
the large number with close associations with the A.W.U. present 
a strong contrast with the Annual and Special conferences in 
1930 and 1931 of, for example, the Victorian Branch.
The Federal Executive met six times in 1930 and 1931. 
Unfortunately, the minutes of the meetings have not yet been 
located (if indeed they were kept). But the lack of such evidence
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is not important. Other records, with newspaper reports, 
provide accounts which are sufficiently revealing and 
instructive. Its membership during 1930-31 changed but the 
twelve members of the Executive were mostly party stalwarts,- 
their decisions effectively made the Executive a buffer between 
the Scullin Government and those who were critical or were 
concerned to extract promises from it (let alone those who 
wished to force the Government to take action against its own 
assessment and intentions). A majority of the Executive was 
always made up of Labor members of Parliament and A.W.U. officials. 
And like the Federal Conference, the Executive met at infrequent 
and irregular intervals; as the records show (in the to-and-fro 
of telegrams) Executive meetings took some time to organise.
The result was that it often happened that the Executive, 
sympathetic or not, was virtually presented with a fait accompli 
by the Federal Government. The upshot was that the Executive 
mostly justified and excused. There was no occasion on which 
the Executive was in any significant way critical of the 
Government. More importantly, the Executive appears not at any 
time to have offered guidance, advice or instruction on any 
matter of importance. Such requests as were made to the Government 
were couched in a semi-deferential tone, most often on matters of 
relatively minor significance and too often - in the W.W.F. case, 
for instance - belated or merely another contribution to Caucus
debate.
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The Australian Workers' Union had a strong influence 
on the Scullin Government. Its members who were also 
members of the Federal Conference and Executive helped make 
those bodies moderate and pacific. Those with A.W.U. 
associations in the Cabinet and Caucus performed a similar 
function. The A.W.U. men - delegates and politicians - were 
of course not puppets who danced to an A.W.U. tune, turning 
and twisting with every tug on the strings. Rather, they 
followed an A.W.U. line: moderate - even on occasion conservative - 
practical and for compromise. The A.W.U. enjoyed political 
influence - unique among the unions - in the Federal sphere 
because it was large and rich and because it had developed 
earlier than many other unions and thus enjoyed a longer, more 
intimate association with the A.L.P. Equally basic to the 
influence of A.W.U. was the fact that it was a strong Federal 
union, and that no other significant union was so Federally 
conscious. The A.W.U. and Federal Labor were, as it were,
friends and neighbours in an alien and hostile land of 
individual unions and States,- that the A.W.U. was rich, strong 
and confident and moderate ensured that the friendship 
would be a loving one.
In so far as the unions and Labor Councils were concerned 
with the A.L.P., their attentions were concentrated principally
on the State Branches; most of the unions were themselves State-
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orientated and therefore State Lahor politics were in a 
real sense within their reach. Contact with the Federal 
Government was of two kinds: that very tenuous variety which 
was established through the State A.L.P. Branch organisations 
and their delegates on the Federal Conference and Executive 
and that more immediate and more effective contact through 
direct representation to the Executive, Caucus members or 
Ministers through letters, petitions, deputations and general ■ 
nagging pressure. Such an approach was often effective in 
individual matters; the most striking example of this was the 
ultimately - but partially - successful campaign conducted by 
the W.W.F. Where the tariff was the subject of a campaign 
it seems that all but an unfortunate few were successful.
On the larger policy issues the trade unions were with the 
exception of the A.W.U., ineffective in the Federal sphere.
The A.C.T.U. was only a few years old and- its powers were small 
and difficult to bunch up; the five State Branches were State 
Labor Councils first - and A.C.T.U. Branches only as a secondary, 
more or less minor function. The A.C.T.U. suffered also and 
consequently from a lack of finance and the many organisational 
difficulties inherent in its position as a Federal body without 
a permanent office or officials or, more importantly, a 'rank 
and file' base which in any meaningful sense it could call its
own.
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There was, however, one matter on which the trade unions 
were influential. On the crucial issue of whether to seek an 
early double dissolution it is clear that the trade unions, 
directly and indirectly, had a great influence. Without 
exception the unions were against a double dissolution. Of 
course many of them hoped to be granted favours by the 
Government or have their problems solved by it; in this respect 
tariff protection was decisive for many. But the deciding and 
most powerful consideration was that no matter how handicapped 
it was, it seemed that a Federal Labor Government would be a 
shield against the worst - a shield which would in the hands of 
a non-Labor Government be turned into an attacking sword. It 
seems that for twenty seven months the unions which desired short 
term protection achieved their wish, although in many cases the 
shield was less effective than they had anticipated. But in the 
long run - and it was not so very long - the unions and the 
Australian Labor Party and those they attempted to represent 
suffered. It was ironic that while on most policy matters the 
unions were generally content to let the Scullin Government go 
ahead, on the one vital occasion on which they were important
their influence was misdirected.
Abbreviations
The usual abbreviations for the names of the Australian 
States have been used throughout.
A.C.A.T.U. Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union
A . C. T . U. Australasian Council of Trade Unions
A.E.U. Amalgamated Engineering Union
A.F.U.L.E. Australian Federated Union of Locomotive 
Enginemen
A.G.W.A. Australian Government Workers' Association
A.L.P. Australian Labor Party
A.P.W.U. Australian Postal Workers' Union
A.R.U. Australian Railways Union
A.W.U. Australian Workers' Union
C.P.D. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates
F.M.S.C.E.U.A. Federated Municipal and Shire Council
Employees1 Union of Australia
H. of R. House of Representatives
M.H.R. Member of the House of Representatives
M.L.A. Member of the Legislative Assembly
M . L. C. Member of the Legislative Council
P.I.E.U. of A. Printing Industry Employees1 Union of 
Australia
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S.M.H. 
U. A . P. 
W.E.A. 
W . W . F.
Sydney Morning Herald 
United Australia Party 
Workers' Educational Association 
Waterside Workers' Federation
APPENDIX I
THE PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTH OF THE SCULLIN
GOVERNMENT 1929 - 1932
H.of R. Senate F.P.L
1. October 1929^ 47 7 54
2. 2December 1929 4S 7 55
3.
O
January 1931''’ 47 7 54
4. (a) 4March 1931 41 7 48
(b) 5March 1931 36 5 41
5. April 19311 234*6 36 6 42
1
At the Federal Election, 12 October 1929. The figure for the 
H. of R. (47) includes the member for the Northern Territory 
(H.G.Nelson), who had only very limited voting rights in the.
H. of R. (but full voting rights in Caucus): the effective Labor 
vote in the H. of R. was therefore one less than indicated; it 
stood, for example, at 35 from April until November in 1931.
2
A by-election on 14 December 1929 for Franklin (Tasmania) was 
won by the A.L.P. candidate (C.W. Frost).
3
The A.L.P. lost a by-election on 31 January 1931 for Parkes 
(N.S.W.). The by-election was caused by the resignation of the 
member for Parkes (E.A. McTiernan) on his appointment to the 
High Court.
4
Six members left the Government and joined the Opposition:
Lyons, Fenton, Guy, Gabb, Price and McGrath (the last did not 
leave until some weeks after March).
5
Seven members from N.S.W. left the Government and formed 
an 'independent' section (the 'Beasley Group'). They were 
Beasley, Eldridge, Lazzarini, James, Ward - all M.H.R's - 
and Senators Dunn and Rae. (Ward was elected for East 
Sydney on 7 March 1931 at a by-election caused by the death 
of the Labor incumbent, J.E. West).
6
A Country Party Senator from South Australia died on 14 
March 1931. The S.A. Parliament replaced him with a Labor 
man, H.Kneebone, on 1 April.
APPENDIX II
MEMBERS OF THE SCULLIN GOVERNMENT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NAME DIVISION STATE
3easley, J.A. West Sydney N.S.W,
Blakeley, A. Darling N.S.W.
Chifley, J.B. Macquarie N.S.W.
Coleman, P.E. Reid N.S.W.
Cunningham, L.L. Gwydir N.S.W.
Cusack, J .J . Eden-Monaro N.S.W.
Eldridge, J.C. Martin N.S.W.
Gibbons, G.A. Calare N.S.W.
James, R. Hunter N.S.W.
Lazzarini, H.P. Werriwa N.S.W.
Long, W.J. Lang N.S.W.
McTiernan, E.A. Parkes N.S.W.
Moloney, P.J. Hume N.S.W.
Riley, E. South Sydney N.S.W.
Riley, E.C. Cook N.S.W,
Rowe, A .E . Parramatta N.S.W.
Theodore, E.G. Dailey N.S.W.
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NAME DIVISION STATE
Tulley, J.T. Barton N . S . W .
Ward, E.J. East Sydney N . S . W .
Watkins, D. Newcastle N.S.W,
West, J.E. East Sydney N.S.W.
Anstey, F. Bourke V i c .
B r e n n a n , F . Batman V i c .
Crouch, R . A . Corangamite V i c .
Fenton, J.E. Maribyrnong Vic.
Holloway, E.J. Flinders V i c .
Jones, P. Indi Vic.
Keane, R.V. Bendigo Vic.
Lewis, A. Corio Vic.
McGrath, D.C. Ballaarat Vic.
McNeill, J. Wannon V i c .
Maloney, W.R.N. Melbourne Vic.
M a t h e w s , J . Melbourne Ports Vic,
Scullin, J.H. Yarra V i c .
Gabb, J.M. Angas S . A .
Lacey, A.W. Grey S . A .
Makin, N.J.O. Hindmarsh S . A .
NAME DIVISION STATE
Price, J.L. Boothby S.A.
Yates, G.E. Adelaide S.A.
Gulley, C.E. Denison Tas.
Frost, C.W. Franklin Tas.
Guy, J.A. Bass Tas.
Lyons, J.A. Wilmot Tas.
Forde, F.M. Capricornia Qld.
Martens, G.W. Herbert Qld.
Riordan, D. Kennedy Qld.
Curtin, J. Fremantle W.A,
Green, A.E. Kalgoorlie W. A.
Nelson, H.G. Northern Territory 
SENATE
Daly, J.J. S.A.
Hoare, A.A. S.A.
Kneebone, H. S.A.
NAME DIVISION
O'Halloran, M.R. S . A.
Dooley, J.B. N.S.W.
Dunn, J.P .D. N.S.W.
Rae, A. N.S.W.
Barnes, J. Vic.
APPENDIX III
THE SCULLIN MINISTRY 1929 - 1932 
(a) The Ministers and their Portfolios
Anstey, F. Minister for Health, Minister for
Repatriation, 22 October 1929 - 3 
March 1931.
Barnes, J.(Senator) Assistant Minister, 22 October 1929 -
Beasley, J.A.
Blakeley, A. 
Brennan, F. 
Chifley, J.B. 
Culley, C.E.
4 February 1931. Vice-President of 
the Executive Council, 3 March 1931 - 
6 January 1932.
Assistant Minister, 22 October 1929 - 
3 March 1931.
Minister for Home Affairs, 22 October 
1929 - 6 January 1932. 
Attorney-General, 22 October 1929 - 
6 January 1932.
Minister for Defence, 3 March 1931 - 
6 January 1932.
Assistant Minister, 3 March 1931 -
24 June 1931.
Cunningham, L.L. Assistant Minister, 26 June 1931 - 
6 January 1932.
Daly, J.J. (Senator) Vice-President of the Executive 
Council, 22 October 1929 - 3 March 1931 
Minister for Defence, 4 February 1931 - 
3 March 1931.
Assistant Minister, 26 June 1931 - 
6 January 1932.
Dooley, J.B.(Senator) Assistant Minister, 3 March 1931 - 
6 January 1932.
Fenton, J.E. Minister for Trade and Customs, 22 
October 1929 - 4 February 1931.
Forde, F.M. Assistant Minister, 22 October 1929 - 
4 February 1931.
Minister for Trade and Customs, 4 
February 1931 - 6 January 1932.
Green, A.E. Minister for Defence, 22 October 
1929 - 4 February 1931. 
Postmaster-General, Minister for Works 
and Railways, 4 February 1931 - 6 
January 1932.
Holloway, E‘. J. Assistant Minister, 3 March 1931 - 12
June 1931.
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Lyons, J.A.
Moloney, P.J.
McNeill, J.
Postmaster-General, Minister for 
Works and Railways, 22 October 1929 - 
4 February 1931.
Minister for Markets and Transport,
22 October 1929 - 6 January 1932. 
(Created two separate departments,
21 April 1930; Moloney held both 
portfolios).
Minister for Health, Minister for 
Repatriation, 3 March 1931 - 6 January 
1932.
Scullin, J.H. Prime Minister, Minister for External
Affairs, Minister for Industry, 22 
October 1929 - 6 January 1932.
Treasurer, 9 July 1930 - 29 January 1931. 
Theodore, E.G. Treasurer, 22 October 1929 - 9 July 1930;
29 January 1931 - 6 January 1932.
(b) Composition of the Ministry
1. 22 October 1929 - 9 July 1930
Scullin
Theodore
Brennan
Lyons
Fenton*
Blakeley
Anstey
Green
Moloney
Forde
Beasley
Daly
Barnes
Absent overseas, January-June 1930.
9 July 1930 - 29 January 1931
Scullin*
Brennan*
Lyons
Fenton
Blakeley
Anstey
Green
Moloney*
Forde
Beasley
Daly
Barnes
Absent overseas, late August 1930 - early January 1931.
29 January 1931 - 4 February 1931.
Scullin
Theodore
Brennan
Lyons
Fenton
Blakeley
Anstey
Green
Moloney
Forde
Beasley
Daly
Barnes
4. 4 February 1931 - 3 March 1931
Scullin
Theodore
Brennan
Blakeley
Anstey
Green
Moloney
Forde
Beasley
Daly
Barnes
5. 3 March 1931 - 12 June 1931
Scullin
Theodore
Brennan
Blakeley
Green
Moloney
Forde
Barnes
McNeil
Chifley
Holloway
Culley
Dooley
6. 12 June 1931 - 26 June 1931
Scullin
Theodore
Brennan
Blakeley
Green
Moloney
Forde
Barnes 
McNeill 
Chifley 
Culley 
Dooley
(Resigned, 24 June 1931)
26 June 1931 - 6 January 1932.
Scullin
Theodore
Brennan
Blakeley
Green
Moloney
Forde
Barnes
McNeill
Chifley
Daly
Cunningham
Dooley
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I. Ä.L.P. records 
(A) Federal
Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, 'Minutes of meetings', 
1927-1935; held in the offices of the Leader of 
the Opposition, Parliament House, Canberra.
A.L.P., 'Official Report of Federal Conference', (title 
varies), 1916-1936; (1916, 1918, June and October 
1919, 1921, 1924, 1927, 1930, March and August 1931, 
1933, 1934, February and July 1936).
(B) State
Queensland Central Executive, 'Minutes of Meetings', 
1926-1935; held in the Brisbane office of the 
Queensland Branch of the A.L.P.
South Australian Branch, 'Minutes of Council and
Executive Meetings', 1925-1934; microfilm, S.R.G.
73, held in the Archives Department of the S.A.
State Library.
________, 'Minutes of Meetings of the South Australian
Parliamentary Labor Party', 16 April 1930 - 6 May 
1931; one volume, held in the Archives Department 
of the S.A. State Library.
Victorian Branch, 'Minutes of Central Executive Meetings', 
1928-1932; held in the offices of the Democratic 
Labor Party, Melbourne.
Western Australian Branch, 'Minutes of Meetings of the
Metropolitan Council', 1929-1931, and, bound in with 
the above, 'Minutes of Meetings of Metropolitan 
Council Executive Officers', 1929-1931; held in 
the W.A. State Library, Perth.
________, 'State Executive Minutes', 1929-1931, and, bound
in with the above, 'Minutes of Meetings of State 
Executive Officers', 1929-1931; held in the W.A. 
State Library, Perth.
AQO
___, uncatalogued files of correspondence and
miscellaneous material, approximately 1928-1S32; 
held in the W.A. State Library, Perth.
II. Trade union records
Unless otherwise indicated the union material listed here 
is located in the A.N.U. Archives, Canberra.
(A) Labor Councils, etc.
Australasian Council of Trade Unions, 'Report of
All-Australian Trade Union Congress held at Trades 
Hall, Melbourne, on 24 February 1930 and succeeding 
Dates'; roneoed foolscap, 184 pages, T41/4.
________, 'Minutes of Conference of Key Unions held in
the Trades Hall, Melbourne, on Tuesday 9th September, 
1930'; roneoed foolscap, 37 pages, in the possession 
of the writer.
, 'Minutes of Special Congress, held Trades Hall 
Sydney, New South Wales from Monday, February 16, 
till Sunday February 22, 1931'; roneoed foolscap,
43 pages, T41/5.
Ballarat Trades and Labor Council, 'Minutes of Meetings', 
1929-1932; E97/1/10.
Brisbane Trades and Labor Council, 'Minutes of Council 
and Executive Meetings', 1929-1932; held in the 
Trades Hall, Brisbane.
Geelong Trades and Labor Council, 'Minutes of Meetings', 
1928-1932; E84/1/3.
Melbourne Trades Hall Council, 'Minutes of Meetings', 
1928-1932; microfilm, M14/7.
New South Wales Labor Council, 'Minutes of Meetings', 
1925-1933; microfilm, M17/7.
United Trades and Labor Council of South Australia,
'Minutes of Meetings', 1927-1934; microfilm, M15/6.
Unions
Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union, Federal
Office, 'Miscellaneous Correspondence', 1928-1932; 
T138/18/41, 45, 47.
, Queensland Branch, 'Minutes of Executive,
General and Special Meetings', 1929-1932;
T138/18/44, 45, 47.
, New South Wales Branch, 'Minutes of Executive, 
General and Special Meetings', 1929-1932;
T138/18/41, 45, 47.
Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union of Australia, 'Minutes 
and Reports of Annual Conference', 1925-1932; 
T16/23/1-7.
, Victorian Branch, 'Minutes of Executive Meetings' 
1929-1932; T16/19/2.
Amalgamated Printing Trades Employees' Union of New South 
Wales, 'Minutes of Board of Management and General 
Meetings', 1929-1932; T43/5/2.
Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation, 'Minutes of 
Federal Council, November 1930; T6/1/2.
, 'Minutes of Federal Executive Meetings', 1929- 
1931; T6/4/1.
, N.S.W. Branch, 'Minutes of Branch Meetings', 
1929-1931; T4/10/9-12.
, Queensland Branch, 'Minutes of Meetings', 1929- 
1931; T49/3-5.
, Victorian Branch, 'Minutes of Meetings', 1929- 
1931; T5/1/16-18.
Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen,
'Federal Executive Minutes', 1928-1932; T60/1.
, 'Miscellaneous correspondence', 1928-1932; 
T6Ö/15/10.
, 'Report of the Annual Conference', 1928-1931; 
T6Ö/5.
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________, N.S.W. Division, 'Report of the Proceedings,
Annual Delegate Meeting', 1928-1932; E99/i/4,5.
Australian Government Workers Association, 'State Council 
Minutes', 1929-1931; E106/1/2.
Australian Letter Carriers' Association, Victorian Branch, 
'Minutes of Meetings', 1929-1931; T6/12/3.
Australian Railways Union, N.S.W. Branch, 'State Council 
Minutes', 1928-1932; E89/3/3.
, 'State Secretary's Quarterly Report', 1928-1932; 
E89/12/1-6.
Australian Textile Workers' Union, Tasmanian Branch, 
'Minutes of Meetings', 1929-1931; E119/1/1.
Australian Workers' Union, Annual Convention, 'Official 
Report', 1921-1941. These and the following A.W.U. 
reports are held in the A.N.U. Archives but were un­
catalogued at the time when I examined them.
, Adelaide Branch, 'Annual Report', 1925-1935.
, Central Branch, 'Annual Report and Balance Sheet',
J 1924-1932.
, Queensland Branch, 'Branch Secretary's Report 
and Balance Sheet', 1925-1935.
, Railway Workers' Industry Branch of New South 
Wales, 'Annual Report and Balance Sheet', 1929/30- 
1931/32.
________, Tasmanian Branch, 'Annual Report and Balance
Sheet', 1928-1932, 1933, 1936.
, Victoria-Riverina Branch, 'Annual Report and 
Balance Sheet', 1925-1931, 1933-1935.
, Western Australian Branch, 'Annual Report and 
Balance Sheet', 1926, 1927, 1931-1934.
Baking Trade Employees' Federation of Australasia (Sydney 
Branch), 'Minutes of Meetings', 1929-1931; T13/2/2.
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Federated Carters' and Drivers' Industrial Union of 
Australia, Melbourne sub-branch, 'Minutes of 
Meetings', 1928-1933; E103/55/1.
Federated Furnishing Trade Society of Australasia,
Victorian Branch, 'Minutes of General, Special and 
Committee Meetings', 1928-1932; T58/1/25.
Federated Iron Workers' Union, N.S.W. Branch, 'State 
Executive Minutes', 1929-1932; E102/7/1.
Federated Liquor and Allied Trades Employees' Union of 
Australia, South Australian Branch, 'Minutes of 
Meetings', 1930-1931; E95/2/4.
Federated Miscellaneous Workers' Union of Australia,
N.S.W. Branch, 'Minutes of Executive and General 
Meetings', 1928-1934; T28/1/2-3.
________, Victorian Branch, 'Minutes of Executive and
Section Meetings', 1929-1932; T27/1/6-7.
Federated Moulders' (metal) Union of Australia, Victorian 
Branch, 'Minutes of Executive Meetings', 1929-1931; 
T20/1/5.
Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees' Union 
of Australia, Victorian Division, 'Minutes of 
Executive and General Meetings', 1929-1933; T18/1/7.
Federated Shipwrights and Ship Constructors' Association
of Australia, Melbourne Branch, 'Minutes of Meetings', 
1929-1931; E88/1/5.
, Queensland Branch, 'Minutes of Meetings', 1929- 
1932; E8 2/1/3.
Fire Brigade Employees' Union of N.S.W., 'Minutes of
Executive and General Meetings', 1929-1931; T22/1/3-4.
Furnishings Trades Society of New South Wales, 'Minutes of 
Meetings of the Management Committee', 1929-1932; 
Tll/1/5.
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